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Abstract
The debate between rhetoricians and philosophers goes back to the origins of 
the understanding of what philosophy is, which we can trace to Plato and the 
immediate Platonic tradition. I suggest that this tradition was not a 
disinterested one. Its concern was to carve out and develop a particular kind of 
discourse (i.e., what it takes to be the philosophical enterprise) for its own 
purposes (i.e., to marginalise its competitors). It did this in a particularly 
successful way, to the extent that it is difficult for us even to consider what the 
alternatives might have been. However, there are residual problems in the way 
that it conceives of the philosophical project, and this question is related to the 
widespread tendency of contemporary thinkers to view rhetoric as pompous 
vacuousness or mere trickery. Despite the theoretical questions posed, this 
thesis focuses primarily on concrete works, especially those of Plato, Aristotle, 
Cicero, Renaissance thinkers, Hobbes, and Locke. I analyse the rhetorical 
discourse in some of rhetoric’s staunchest opponents, and some of its most 
well-known advocates for a very specific purpose. First, I am trying to show 
that all these philosophers, whether pro or against the art of rhetoric, 
recognise the danger of ‘sophistic tricks’, and acknowledge (more or less 
reluctantly) that rhetoric potentially represents a dangerous threat to the 
moral basis of political life, but follow different paths. Next, and this is a 
fundamental part of my argument, that in the works of philosophers who are 
widely regarded as some of rhetoric’s staunchest opponents, we can find clear 
evidence, not only of the use of rhetoric to fight rhetoric, but allusions to what 
they see as a ‘true’ or legitimate rhetoric. In other words, echoing Plato, two 
forms of persuasion are alluded to in their works: (i) a rhetoric that produces 
persuasion for belief in the absence of knowledge, and (ii) a genuine or ‘true’ 
art of rhetoric, the sort of that produces knowledge (episteme) in the 
privileged sense. So in the Phaedrus, Plato suggests that the philosopher is the 
true rhetorician; for Hobbes the only ‘true’ rhetorician is, of course, the 
sovereign; and for Locke, any truly free and rational individual can, at least in 
theory, be a good rhetorician. At a more general level, and this constitutes the 
underlying theme of the thesis, I hope to show that philosophy itself, like all 
discourses, does not exist in a linguistic vacuum. Philosophy, like rhetoric and 
history, is deeply implicated in the social and political order that produces it.
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1Introduction: The problem in question
‘H um an souls also possess reason, and  w ith it 
they circle in discourse around the truth o f  
things’.
Pseudo-Dionysius1
The most basic concern of this thesis is with the single question of the 
relationship between rhetoric and philosophy. The examination of other 
questions is conducted, so to speak, through the prism provided by the 
discussion of rhetoric and philosophy in ancient as well as modem thought. 
‘Talking well’ (eu legein) has always had two meanings. It is not merely a 
rhetorical ideal, the art of speaking, of saying whatsoever well. It also means 
saying the right thing, i.e., the truth. In the ancient world, the ideal was 
proclaimed just as much by teachers of philosophy as by those of rhetoric. 
Rhetoric was always in conflict with philosophy and, as against the idle 
speculation of the sophists, claimed to teach tm e wisdom.
Western subdivisions and criteria of formal language and thought, of 
educated thinking and discourse, have recurrently linked rhetorical discourse 
with deception and fiction. Associations that linger in today’s critical lexica 
(e.g., rhetoric is an art of lying, most readily found in the politician; rhetoric 
encourages deceptiveness; a flawless eloquence is not to be trusted), were 
already old when Cicero wrote. In fact, it is widely acknowledged that the 
quarrel between rhetoricians and philosophers goes back to the origins of the 
understanding of what philosophy is, which we can trace to Plato (c. 427-347) 
and the immediate Platonic tradition.2 Less appreciated is that this tradition
1 Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus; in Complete Works, tr. C. Luibheid (N.Y., 1987), 
VII, 2, p. 106.
2 The modem idea that the origins of philosophy can be traced to Thales (as opposed to, e.g., 
Pythagoras, or Adam, or the Egyptians), is a mid-eighteenth century notion; see, C. Blackwell, 
Thales Philosophus’, in History and the Disciplines, ed. D. R. Kelley (Rochester, 1997), pp. 61- 
82. Walter Burkert has shown that the etymology of philosophos given by Diogenes Laertius
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was not a disinterested one. Its concern was not to discover what had been 
meant by ‘p h ilo so p h y ’,3 but to carve out and develop a particular kind of 
discourse (i.e., what it takes to be the philosophical enterprise) for its own 
purposes (i.e., to marginalise its competitors). It did this in a particularly 
successful way, to the extent that it is difficult for us even to consider what the 
alternatives might have been. But as I attempt to show in this thesis, there are 
residual problems in the way that it conceives of the philosophical project, and 
this question is intimately related to the still widespread tendency of 
contemporary thinkers to link rhetorical discourse with pompous vacuousness 
or mere trickery.-*
For centuries, both philosophical language and the history of philosophy 
have placed abstract reason at the top of a ladder of learning. Logic is the 
formal demonstration of truths; rhetoric is the deceptive purveying of 
falsehoods. Academic philosophers and serious-minded theorists in any field, 
therefore, are concerned only with logic, the analysis of theoretical arguments 
in terms of abstract concepts and the insistence on explanations in terms of 
universal laws (with formal, general, timeless, context-free, and value-neutral 
arguments). The study of factual narratives about particular, situation- 
dependent, and ethically loaded argumentation, on the other hand, is at its 
best a matter of rhetoric and left to literary students of elocution or style. Put 
differently, philosophers more often than not assume that rhetoric and logic 
are inescapably at odds. At best rhetoric is seen as an aid to ‘alleviate’ the 
‘severity’ and ‘dryness’ of rational language, to make it ‘easier’ to absorb 
rational truth.
Having said that, until the mid-seventeenth century there was no 
widespread tendency to insist on the superiority of theoretical abstraction and 
logical deduction, at the expense of directly human modes of analysis. Before
(3rd c.) in Lives o f Eminent Philosophers (I.12-13), cannot go back further than Plato and is 
rooted in Platonic thought (‘Platon oder Pythagoras? Zum Ursprung des Wortes “Philosophic”,’ 
Hermes, 88 [i960], pp. 159-77). Also see, EA. Havelock, Preface to Plato, (Oxford, 1963), pp. 
281-84, 306-7 n 8; and P. Hadot, What is Ancient Philosophy? (Cambridge, Mass., 2002), ch. 
2.
3 In fact, the Presocratics had classified what they were doing as historia (inquiry); see Hadot, 
What is Ancient Philosophy?, p. 16.
-* See, e.g., Peter Munz’s review article, "The Rhetoric of Rhetoric’, JHI, 51:1 (1990), pp. 121-42, 
at p. 121.
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Galileo, Descartes, and Hobbes, as Stephen Toulmin has shown, human 
adaptability and mathematical rigour were regarded as twin aspects of the 
human reason. However, from the mid-seventeenth century on, this balance 
was upset, as the prestige of mathematical proofs led philosophers to disown 
non-formal kinds of human argumentation. His is a profound ‘story’, worth 
quoting at length:
“The speculative pursuit of knowledge has played a central part in human 
culture for 2,500 years and more. From early on, the word “philosophy” 
referred to the systematic and methodical treatment of any subject. In this 
sense, it covered the whole range of inquiries that lent themselves to 
systematic investigation and debate,... from geometry and astronomy at one 
pole to autobiography and historical narrative at the other.... And, for more 
than two thousand years, all such activities were given equal consideration.
No field of investigation or speculation was dismissed as intrinsically 
unphilosophical. ... From the mid-seventeenth century on, however, an 
imbalance began to develop. Certain methods of inquiry and subjects were 
seen as philosophically serious or ‘rational’ in a way that others were not. As a 
result, authority came to be attached particularly to scientific and technical 
inquiries that put those methods to use.... Beside the rationality of astronomy 
and geometry, the reasonableness of narrative came to seem a soft-centred 
notion, lacking a solid basis in philosophical theory, let alone substantive 
scientific support.... So, as time went on, academic philosophers came to see 
literary authors like Michel de Montaigne ... as not being philosophers at all, 
let alone scientists’.®
Prior to the seventeenth-century, therefore, no one questioned the right of 
rhetoric to stand alongside logic in the canon of philosophy; nor was rhetoric 
treated as a second-class (and necessarily inferior) field.6 During the 
Renaissance period, the realm of the theoretical and the practical were both 
regarded as legitimate.? Theoretical inquiries were balanced against 
discussions of concrete practical issues, such as the specific conditions on 
which it is morally acceptable for a sovereign to launch a war, or for a subject 
to kill a tyrant.8 The context in which these discussions were held legitimated 
the place of rhetoric in human affairs. Since the end of the Renaissance, 
however, most philosophers have been committed to abstract, universal theory 
to the exclusion of practical issues. As Toulmin has put it, ‘a shift occurred
® S. Toulmin, Return to Reason (Cambridge, Mass., 2001), pp. 14-5.
6 Id., Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda o f Modernity (N.Y., 1990), p. 30. As seen in chapter 2, 
Plato did not object to rhetoric tout court; rather, it was the rhetoric of probability as taught by 
the sophists that he thought was wrong and wanted to discredit.
? See chapter 4, pp. 99-139.
8 Toulmin, Cosmopolis, p. 24.
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from a style of philosophy that keeps equally in view issues of local, timebound 
practice, and universal, timeless theory’, to one that ‘accepts matters of 
universal, timeless theory as being entitled to an exclusive place in the agenda 
of “p h ilo so p h y ”.’9 The Cartesian Cogito and later the Kantian transcendental 
subject (the first-person, thinking subject without memory, gender, race, 
nationality, or class), captured the minds of many thinkers who sought a 
philosophy purged of contingency, human qualities, and so of history and 
rhetoric. The clear idea and the unambiguous statement are the ideal of the 
modem thinker and of modem education.10 The ancient conceptions of 
rhetoric as a part of logic and of metaphor as essential to thought, which 
Aristotle said was the greatest thing to master and a sign of genius,u have 
become largely lost to us as elements of what we count as basic to human 
knowledge. We are inspired not by the turn of phrase, the sudden perception 
of a similarity in dissimilars, or the strength of memory, but by clarity and 
certainty. The greatest thing to be is the master of method, not the master of 
metaphor. After all, method brings with it the possibility of certainty, or near 
certainty; metaphor, on the other hand, brings only ambiguity and possibilities 
of meaning that perhaps can never be fully known.
The change took place only gradually over three or four centuries, but, for 
Toulmin, the long-standing fascination of Western philosophers with the 
method and style of natural science has inflicted a wound on human reason, a 
wound responsible for the current imbalance between our ideas of ‘rationality’ 
and ‘reasonableness’, and from which we are only recently beginning to 
recover. In simple terms, the centuries-old dominance of rationality, a 
mathematical form of reasoning modelled on scientific method and the quest 
for absolute certainties, has diminished the value of reasonableness, a system 
of humane judgements based on personal experience and practice. One of the
9 Toulmin, Cosmopolis, p. 24.
10 ‘If only Italy had listened to Giambattista Vico, and if, as at the time of the Renaissance, it 
had served as a guide to Europe, would not our intellectual destiny have been different? Our 
eighteenth-century ancestors would not have believed that all that was clear was true; but on 
the contrary that “clarity is the vice of human reason rather than its virtue”, because a clear 
idea is a finished idea. They would not have believed that reason was our first faculty, but on 
the contrary that imagination was’ (Paul Hazard, La pensee europeenne au XVIIIe siecle 
[Paris, 1963], p. 43).
11 Aristotle, Poetics, tr. W. H. Fyfe (Cambridge, Mass., 1932), 1459a 5-9.
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major consequences of this schism has been the separation of logic from 
rhetoric. In fact, for much of the last three hundred years, and most of the 
twentieth century, scholars treated these investigations not merely as distinct, 
but as separate. Analytical philosophers and scientific theorists need not 
(indeed, must not) be distracted by rhetorical or stylistic issues. But if there is 
anything solid in this distinction between ‘genuine reasoning’ and ‘mere 
persuasion’, how universally can it be applied? For example, to what extent 
can all the ‘theories’ individuals appeal to in one situation or another, be 
framed in ways which are indifferent to who is presenting them to whom, 
where and when they are invoked, how they are presented, and so on? Again, 
how far can the manifold kinds of facts we observe and report in one situation 
or another, be described in terms of context-free and timeless concepts? In 
fact, all kinds of speech and language are more or less embedded in their 
occasion of use.
Consider the case of ‘proofs’ in mathematics. Mathematicians, of course, 
have always set out to minimise the historical or cultural relativity of their 
assertions. But as Imre Lakatos has shown, the ideas of mathematical 
‘validaty’ and ‘rigour’ have had their own histories: there are changes of 
paradigm in mathematics as much as in the natural sciences. We can only 
understand questions about the validity of a proof by Diophantus in antiquity 
or by Gauss in the early 1800s, by referring to its given date.12 A perfectly or 
self-evidently ‘valid’ theory of proof, therefore, remains no more than a dream. 
As Umberto Eco says in his novel Foucault’s Pendulum,
‘With numbers you can do anything you like. Suppose I have the sacred 
number 9 and I want to get a number 1314, date of the execution of Jacques 
de Molay -  a date dear to anyone who, like me, professes devotion to the 
Templar tradition of knighthood. What do I do? I multiply nine by one 
hundred and forty-six, the fateful day of destruction of Carthage. How did I 
arrive at this? I divided thirteen hundred and fourteen by two, three, et cetera, 
until I found a satisfying date. I could also have divided thirteen hundred and 
fourteen by 6.28, the double of 3.14, and I would have got two hundred and 
nine. That is the year Attalus I, king of Pergamon, ascended the throne. You 
see?’^
121 . Lakatos, Proofs and Refutations: the logic o f mathematical discovery (Cambridge, 1976);
cited in Toulmin, Return to Reason, pp. 26-7.
l3 U. Eco, Foucault’s Pendulum, tr. W. Weaver (London, 1989).
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Natural science is another notable example. Modem science, as John Gray 
points out, triumphed over its adversaries not through its superior rationality, 
but because its early-modern founders were more skilful than them in the use 
of rhetoric and the art of politics:
‘Galileo did not win in his campaign for Copemican astronomy because he 
conformed to any precept of “scientific method.” As Feyerabend argued, he 
prevailed because of his persuasive skill -  and because he wrote in Italian.
By writing in Italian rather than Latin, Galileo was able to identify resistance 
to Copemican astronomy with the bankrupt scholasticism of his time, and so 
gain support from people opposed to older traditions of learning’. *4
Gray goes on to say that applying Karl Popper’s account of scientific method 
(i.e., that a theory is scientific only in so far as it is falsifiable, and should be 
given up as soon as it has been falsified), would have killed the theories of 
Darwin and Einstein at birth. After all, when they were first advanced, each of 
them was at odds with some of the available evidence; only later did evidence 
become available that gave them crucial support's
This brings to mind Thomas S. Kuhn’s thesis of conceptual change. Kuhn 
memorably argued that when the current scientific paradigm is no longer able 
to provide a useful answer to questions that confront them, a scientific 
revolution occurs, and new paradigms compete to replace the old. The 
participants in the competing paradigms are so different that they are simply 
unable to communicate clearly with one another. But surely conceptual change 
is evolutionary, not revolutionary; scientists from competing paradigms are 
able to (and, in fact, do) argue about the merits of the competing ideas. The so- 
called ‘Copemican Revolution’, for example, took a century and a half to 
complete, and was argued out every step of the way. The world-view that 
emerged at the end of this debate had, of course, little in common with earlier 
pre-Copemican conceptions. But however radical the resulting change in 
physical and astronomical ideas and theories, it was the outcome of a 
continuing rational discussion.16
Should the reader need further persuasion in these matters, we can always 
seek reassurance in the words of Einstein on the origin of scientific knowledge:
* J. Gray, Straw Dogs (London, 2002), pp. 3, 21.
Ibid., p. 22.
16 S. Toulmin, Human Understanding (Princeton, 1972), p. 105.
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‘Man tries to make for himself in the fashion that suits him best a simplified 
and intelligible picture of the world. He then tries to some extent to substitute 
this cosmos of his for the world of experience, and thus to overcome i t . ... He 
makes this cosmos and its construction the pivot of his emotional life in order 
to find in this way the peace and serenity which we cannot find in the narrow 
whirlpool of personal experience. ... The supreme task ... is to arrive at those 
universal elementary laws from which the cosmos can be built up by pure 
deduction. There is no logical path to these laws; only intuition, resting on 
sympathetic understanding of experience, can reach them . . . ’ .>7
Intuition? Sympathy? Strange words in this context. But, according to 
Einstein, the process of science does indeed rely upon intuition and the 
creative imagination.*8 A recurrent theme of his was that the basic axioms of 
physics could not be derived from any experimental results but had to be 
‘freely invented’; he thus instructs the physicist ‘to give free reign to his fancy, 
for there is no other way to the goal’.*8 And as the physicist and biologist Leo 
Szilard has said; ‘The creative scientist has much in common with the artist 
and the poet. Logical thinking and an analytical ability are necessary attributes 
to a scientist, but they are far from sufficient for creative work. Those insights 
in science that have led to a breakthrough were not logically derived from 
preexisting knowledge’.20
But to root philosophy in the imagination would amount to abandoning 
the search for a simple, non-contradictory system of statements and concepts 
-  and this, it seems, most professional philosophers refuse to do. Indeed, 
many continue to adhere to the scientific ideal of Enlightenment philosophy; 
and thus the method and style of natural science, is more often than not, taken 
to embody the only kind of rationality worth emulating, even in the ethical 
sphere. However, it is a mistake (or at least a carelessness), to take a method 
and style that have proven fruitful for the investigation of certain truths and 
apply them to a very different sphere of human life, a sphere that may have a 
different geography and demand a different sort of precision, a different norm
‘7 Cited in Robert M. Pirsig, Zen and the A rt o f Motorcycle Maintenance (London, 1999).
18 A. Einstein, ‘Principles of Research’, in Ideas and Opinions (N.Y., 1954), p. 226; id., ‘On the 
Method of Theoretical Physics’, in ibid., p. 274. In the aftermath of Einstein’s discoveries, the 
New York Times editor could proclaim that the scientist and the poet now complemented one 
another (‘Science Needs the Poet’, 21st Dec., 1930, Sec. 3, p. 1).
18 Einstein, The Problem of Space, Ether, and the Field in Physics’, in Ideas and Opinions, p. 
282.
20 Cited in A. Damasio, Descartes' Error. Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain (N.Y., 
1994), P -1 8 9 -
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of rationality. We would do well to bear in mind Aristotle’s remarks on the 
subject of precision,
‘What is proper to an educated man is not to try to achieve in eveiy kind of 
problem an exactness other than the one allowed by the nature of the matter.
It would be equally unreasonable to accept from a mathematician merely 
probable conclusions, as to demand conclusive demonstrations from an 
orator’.21
The great error of the moderns consists, therefore, in believing that the terms 
‘rigour’ and ‘exactness’ are synonymous, and that reasoning must be exact in 
order to be rigorous. As I repeatedly suggest in this thesis, this is nothing more 
than a venerable prejudice. Yet, the rejection of all passionate language as the 
expression of common sense is based on this. Many professional philosophers 
are still inclined to speculate about knowledge as though it were abstractable 
from the ‘contamination’ of time, place, and human motives.
Less acknowledged is that in science and philosophy alike, an exclusive 
preoccupation with logical systematicity has been destructive of both historical 
understanding and rational criticism. The science of logic, for example, has 
throughout its history tended to develop in a direction leading it away from 
practical questions (about the manner in which we have occasion to handle 
and criticise arguments in different fields), and towards a condition of 
complete autonomy, in which logic is as free from all immediate practical 
concerns as is some branch of pure mathematics. This is not to say that the 
intricate mathematical systems which constitute ‘symbolic logic’ must now be 
thrown away. Instead, I suggest that people with intellectual capital invested 
in them should keep no illusions about the extent of their relevance to 
practical arguments. After all, for an argument to be considered valid in formal 
logic, it must surely be good once and for all.22 But most argument fields 
cannot accommodate ‘timeless’ claims to knowledge. What is more, it is 
important to remember that the heart of moral experience does not lie in a 
mastery of general rules and theoretical principles, (however sound and well 
reasoned those principles may appear), but, as Jonsen and Toulmin put it, ‘in 
the wisdom that comes from seeing how the ideas behind those rules work out
21 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, tr. J. A. K. Thomson (London, 1953), 1, 3 ,1094b23 ff.
22 S. Toulmin, The Uses o f Argument (Cambridge, 1958), pp. 185,184.
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in the course of people’s lives: in particular, seeing more exactly what is 
involved in insisting on (or waiving) this or that rule in one or another set of 
circumstances’.^
Put differently, we need to balance the hope for certainty and clarity in 
theory with the impossibility of avoiding uncertainty and ambiguity in 
practice. This process, already well underway in science and beginning in 
philosophy, does not involve discarding all of the progress that was made 
during the modem period. Instead, it involves reconciling these advances 
(which produce a mastery of the world), with a wisdom of their actions in the 
human world that was classically known as pmdence (phronesis). In other 
words, a methodological conception of human knowledge must be balanced 
with a humanist conception of moral philosophy. A balance must be struck in 
education and thought between the empirical and scientific specialist methods 
of knowledge in the sciences, and the arts of poetry, rhetoric, and 
jurisprudence. In short, from now on, we must set aside permanent validity as 
illusory, and our idea of rationality related to specific functions of the human 
reason. After all, the substance of everyday experience refers always to a 
‘where and when’ (a ‘here and now’ or a ‘there and then’); general theoretical 
abstractions, by contrast, claim to apply always and everywhere, and so, as 
Thomas Nagel points out, hold good nowhere-in-particular.2* In fact, as 
Quentin Skinner eloquently concludes, ‘it may be right to view with a certain 
irony those moral and political philosophers of our own day who present us 
with overarching visions of justice, freedom and other cherished values in the 
manner of dispassionate analysts standing above the battle. What the 
historical record strongly suggests is that no one is above the battle, because 
the battle is all there is’.2®
Such scepticism towards the claim that rationality has a permanent 
validity is commonplace among students of rhetoric and history, and must 
now be embraced by philosophers. In this new scenario, philosophers would 
no longer see rhetoric and logic as inescapably at odds, as rivals offering
“3 A. Jonsen and S. Toulmin, The Abuse o f Casuistry: A  History o f Moral Reasoning (Berkeley, 
Ca., 1988), p. 314.
24 Cited in Toulmin, Return to Reason, pp. 15-6.
25 Q. Skinner, Visions o f Politics, Vol. I: Regarding Method (Cambridge, 2002), p. 7.
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competing recipes for judging the merits or defects in our reasoning. Instead, 
they acknowledge that the considerations that logic and rhetoric focus upon 
are complementary. Rhetoric puts the logical analysis of arguments into the 
larger framework of argumentation. When presenting one’s train of reasoning 
forcibly and vividly, one tries to give them a fuller and easier grasp of 
substantive claims. By and large, the act of arguing still has the dual role of 
seizing the audience’s attention and using this to convince them of a well- 
founded claim. Those who would condemn the orator for arousing the 
emotions of his audience, should bear in mind that the essence of human 
beings is determined both by logical and emotional elements; it follows that 
speech can persuade the human being only if it appeals to both these aspects. 
In Ernesto Grassi’s words, ‘[a]s a passionate, and not exclusively rational, 
being, man is in need of the emotive word’.26
In short, knowledge alone, as a rational process, can neither move the 
human being nor carry him away to certain actions. But it is important to note 
that the non-rational character of the principles are by no means identical with 
irrationality. In fact, as Martha Nussbaum has shown, emotions are not merely 
animal impulses, with no connection with our thoughts, imaginings and 
appraisals, but are instead essential elements of human intelligence.2? They are 
‘geological upheavals of thought’ (the metaphor is Proust’s), that ‘shape the 
landscape of our mental and social lives’.28 A great deal is at stake in choosing 
to view emotions in this way:
‘Instead of viewing morality as a system of principles to be grasped by the 
detached intellect, and emotions as motivations that either support or subvert 
our choice to act according to principle, we will have to consider emotions as 
part and parcel of the system of ethical reasoning’.28
26 E. Grassi, Rhetoric as Philosophy (University Park, Penn., 1980), p. 26.
2? Note that the view that emotions are just blind impulses that neither contain a perception of 
their object nor rest upon beliefs has never been strongly supported by major philosophers. 
Adam Smith, in particular, devoted a major part of his career to developing a theory of 
emotional rationality, since he believed that the guidance of certain emotions was an essential 
ingredient in public rationality (see The Theory o f Moral Sentiments, ed. D. D. Raphael and A. 
L. Macfie [Indianapolis, 1984], esp. pp. 9-10, 82-85, 97-9, 269-70). Martha Nussbaum argues 
that Adam Smith’s conception of the judicious or impartial spectator provides a reliable 
filtering device to help us discriminate the trustworthy from the untrustworthy emotions 
(Poetic Justice [Boston, 1995], esp. pp. 72-78).
28 M. Nussbaum, Upheavals o f Thought (Cambridge, 2001), p. 1.
28 Nussbaum, Upheavals o f Thought, p. 3.
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Put differently, if emotions are charged with intelligence and discernment they 
cannot be sidelined in accounts of ethical judgement, as they so often have 
been in the history of philosophy. This view is relevant to the political theorist 
because without emotional development, a part of our reasoning capacity as 
political creatures will be missing. The outlook of emotions as animal 
impulses, as totally non-cognitive, which continues to have a hold on much 
informal thinking and talking about emotions is, of course, intimately related 
to the rejection of rhetoric as a scientific mode of expression. Throughout the 
history of ideas, philosophy, as rational knowledge (episteme), was to supply 
the true, factual content, whereas rhetoric generally was assigned a formal or 
external function. But this distinction ignores the fact that the essence of 
human beings is determined both by logical and emotional elements. As 
Aristotle says in Posterior Analytics,
“The principles -  all or some -  m ust necessarily be lent more belief than  what 
is deduced. He who arrives at a certain knowledge through proof m ust 
necessarily ... know  and believe the principles to a higher degree than w hat 
is deducedfrom  them ’.3°
Nevertheless, over the centuries, philosophers have regularly denounced 
rhetoric and drawn a line between their pursuit of truth and the arts of mere 
persuasion. In practice, as I hope to suggest in this thesis, what philosophy has 
offered is a controlled rhetoric that often begins with the old rhetorical turn of 
denying eloquence, before going on to establish its own forms of persuasion 
within its logical structures. In fact, as Grassi has shown, even logical language 
must resort to metaphors, involving a transposition from the empirical realm 
of senses, in which ‘seeing’ and the ‘pictorial’ move to the foreground: to 
‘clarify’, to ‘gain insight’, to ‘found’, to ‘conclude’, to ‘de-duce’.3i The 
corresponding speech is neither purely rational nor purely pathetic. In Grassi’s 
interpretation philosophy itself becomes possible only on the basis of 
metaphors, on the basis of the ingenuity which supplies the foundation of 
every rational, derivative process: ‘we cannot therefore speak of rhetoric and 
philosophy but every original philosophy is rhetoric and every true and not 
exterior rhetoric is philosophy’. Philosophy, therefore, is not a posterior
3° Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, tr. J. Barnes, 2nd edn. (Oxford, 1994), 72a 37; my emphasis.
3l Grassi, Rhetoric as Philosophy, p. 33.
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synthesis of pathos and logos, ‘but the original unity of the two under the 
power of the original archai’.s2 The ubiquity of rhetoric is, indeed, unlimited. 
In fact, all representations of science that would wish to be of practical 
usefulness at all are dependent on it. Even Descartes, that great and 
passionate advocate of method and certainty, uses in all his writings the means 
of rhetoric in a magnificent fashion.33 The fundamental function of rhetoric 
within social life, therefore, cannot be denied.
At this point, it may be worth emphasising that I argue for a substantially 
broad conception of rhetoric; I suggest that what we call ‘rhetoric’ has to be 
understood as including dialectic, topics, and all those elements of the 
discussion regarding argumentation that are not analytic. In my view rhetoric 
does not merely refer to the beauty of the words that a writer or speaker may 
use (although these are of considerable importance). It refers instead to the 
ability to speak about the whole of the subject: following Cicero, I hold that 
‘eloquence is wisdom put into language’^  If the object of wisdom is the whole 
of a subject, then the object of eloquence is to speak in a manner that will 
present the nature of this whole in words. Understood in this manner, 
therefore, rhetoric is an honest and productive exercise. Instead of imposing 
my will on another, I seek to get her agreement and active support, and thus I 
argue in order to persuade her accordingly. While doing so I am obliged to re­
examine my premises and arguments. Put differently, the discourse I am 
addressing to another person is also simultaneously being addressed to myself 
in order to clarify what I want. So it follows, in an extreme case, that a 
rhetorical discourse designed to convince others of something could bring me 
to reject what I had intended to say. Unlike what happens in degenerate forms 
of rhetoric, the speaker is governed by a substantive intention: she speaks in 
order to move her listeners to something that she would be in a position to 
argue for but which, in front of many people, she cannot simply exhibit as it is.
32 Grassi, Rhetoric as Philosophy, pp. 34,32.
33 For more information see the following excellent studies: Stephen Gaukroger, Descartes: An 
Intellectual Biography (Oxford, 1995); and Henri Gouhier, La resistance au vrai, ed. E. 
Castelli (Rome, 1955).
34 Cicero, De partitione oratorio, ed. and tr. H. Rackham, 2 vols. (London, 1942), 23.79.
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Why? Because the many cannot be forced into a process aimed at a shared 
substantive understanding.
This is the class of questions with which this thesis is concerned. 
Intellectually and institutionally alike, however, we can only understand the 
current transition in our theoretical and practical lives by taking a longer-term 
historical perspective. Focusing on particular works relevant to the discussion 
of rhetoric and philosophy, in ancient as well as modern thought, this thesis 
hopes to make a small contribution towards the revival of an idea of civil 
wisdom I find has been missing since Descartes. I arrive at a conception of 
philosophy as a form of knowledge that requires both rhetoric and poetry to 
accomplish wisdom. But this thesis is also historical in another important way. 
It operates on the assumption that the discourse of rhetoric is not detached 
from other human concerns, merely a set of rules for public oratory or an array 
of techniques for managing interpersonal communication. On the contrary, it 
assumes that rhetoric is deeply implicated in the social and political order that 
produces it.35 In fact, the discourse of rhetoric can be seen as both a product 
and a producer of the social order. To borrow Pocock’s terminology, rhetoric 
texts Qike all texts), are events^* i.e., they simultaneously participate in the 
discourse or language of rhetoric in their period, and contribute their own 
terms, concepts and strategies -  which in turn help construct and, indeed, 
transform the discourse to which they belong.
The discourse of rhetoric is also ‘impure’ in another sense: it is 
interpenetrated by other discourses. In the Renaissance, for example, 
discussion of elocutio or style, frequently employs omatus, a word which 
means, among other things, adornment or dress, thus summoning the realm 
of social behaviour and etiquette of the period. In fact, the perpetual emphasis 
on decorum (i.e., on saying and doing what is fitting or proper), has much the
as A number of commentators have put forward this assumption; see, e.g., Nancy Struever, The 
Language o f History in the Renaissance (Princeton, 1970); Marc Fumaroli, L'age de 
leloquence (Geneva, 1980); Patricia Parker, Literary Fat Ladies (London, 1987); Wayne 
Rebhom, The Emperor o f Men's Minds (Ithaca, N.Y., 1995).
36 J.GA. Pocock, Texts as Events: Reflections on the History of Political Thought’, in The 
Politics o f Discourse, ed. K. Sharpe and S. Zwicker, (Berkeley, 1987), pp. 21-34. Also see, id., 
Politics, Language and Time: Essays on Political Thought and History (Chicago, i960).
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same result.37 In short, as with all discourses, this one does not exist in a 
linguistic vacuums8
Despite the theoretical questions posed, this thesis focuses primarily on 
the ancient and modem philosophers who best exemplify the significance of 
the relations between reason and rhetoric, and also their inner tensions: Plato, 
Aristotle, Cicero, Renaissance thinkers, Hobbes, and Locke. Put differently, I 
analyse the rhetorical discourse in the works of some of rhetoric’s staunchest 
opponents, and some of its most well-known advocates. Again, it is important 
to note that when I question philosophy and the philosophical project as such, 
it is not in the name of sophistics of rhetoric as just a playful technique. 
Instead, I am interested in the rhetoric hidden in philosophy itself because 
within, for example, the typical Platonic discourse there is a rhetoric -  a 
rhetoric against rhetoric, against the S o p h is ts .39 What is more, I hope to 
suggest that these philosophers, whether pro or against rhetoric, are all aware 
of the danger of ‘sophistic tricks’; they all (more or less reluctantly) 
acknowledge that rhetoric potentially represents a dangerous threat to the 
moral basis of political life, but take different directions. I argue, in addition, 
that in the works of philosophers who are widely regarded as some of 
rhetoric’s staunchest opponents, we can find not only clear evidence of the use 
of rhetoric to fight rhetoric, but also, most importantly, allusions to what they 
see as a ‘true’ or legitimate rhetoric. I hope to suggest, therefore, that for Plato 
the philosopher is the true rhetorician; while for Hobbes the only ‘true’ 
rhetorician is the absolute sovereign; and for Locke, any truly free and rational 
individual can (at least in theory), be a good or true rhetorician.
Chapter 2 clarifies the relations between rhetoric and philosophy with 
reference to Plato and Aristotle. The first treatise on rhetoric was, of course, 
written by Aristotle, and we now possess only fragments of it. But it is clear
37 See, e.g., Baldesar Castiglione, The Book o f the Courtier [1528], tr. T. Hoby, ed. V. Cox 
(London, 1994).
3s To employ Mikhail Bakhtin’s notion, although through a process of abstraction and a careful 
monitoring of borders and boundaries one can produce a monologic model of rhetoric as a 
unified, self-contained discourse, its true nature is dialogic, for it is always and everywhere 
engaged in dialogue with other discourses that are present within it. See M. Bakhtin, The 
Dialogic Imagination, tr. C. Emerson and M. Holquist (Austin, TX, 1981).
39 It is important to note that I am not saying that all concepts are essentially metaphors and, 
therefore, that everything is rhetoric. I try to analyse, instead, what has happened since Plato 
and in a recurrent way until now in this opposition between philosophy and rhetoric.
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that his theory was developed to carry out a programme originally projected by 
Plato; who, trying to undermine what he saw as the shallow claims put 
forward by the sophists, established a genuine foundation for rhetoric, which 
only the philosopher, the dialectician, could accomplish. We shall see that the 
task is to master the faculty of speaking in such an effectively persuasive way 
that the arguments brought forward are always appropriate to the specific 
receptivity of the souls to which they are directed. Two Platonic assumptions 
are implicit in this statement of the task of rhetoric: (i) that only he who has a 
grasp of the truth (i.e., the ideas) can unerringly devise the probable pseudos 
of a rhetorical argument; (ii) that one must have a profound knowledge of the 
souls of those one wishes to persuade. Aristotelian rhetoric is pre-eminently 
an expansion of the latter theme.
In chapter 3, I analyse the ideal orator in Cicero’s works, and argue 
against the traditional interpretation of Cicero as someone who prizes success 
in verbal combat above responsibility to truth. This is not to say that in his 
rhetoric is not inscribed a particular political model, a republican one in which 
orators, all theoretically equals, engage in a free competition in the public 
arena, aiming for victory over their fellow orators. Less appreciated is that 
rhetoric, in the way Cicero most often conceives it, does not only refer to the 
elegant or ornate forms of statement that a writer or speaker may use (even 
though these are of considerable importance). In fact, for Cicero, the ideal 
orator can employ the voice of a tragedian, the gestures of the greatest actors, 
but he also requires the acumen of the dialectician and the ethical knowledge 
of philosophers. Moreover, the orator works for the good of the state and 
cannot rest in the flowery excursus of the pedant who performs before his 
students or a select group of admirers. In his practice, therefore, Cicero might 
use the arts and crafts of rhetoric to make the worse cause appear the better, 
and might boast of having thrown dust in the eyes of the jury, but in his theory 
oratory was purely a power for good.
In chapter 4 1  turn to the Renaissance, where I suggest that in this period 
rhetoric constitutes a recognisable, definable discourse, constituted 
collectively in the vast number of discussions of the subject. Throughout it 
rhetoric is most often identified as the art of persuasion: language
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(accompanied by supporting looks and gestures), as it is used to move people 
into action. What is more, they conceive rhetoric as a political instrument, but 
not one whose main purpose is to enable free political debate and discussion. 
Moreover, even though rhetoric in the Renaissance constitutes a recognisable 
discourse, it is simultaneously marked by profound ambiguities, 
contradictions, and divisions. In fact, the discourse of rhetoric in the period is 
anything but monolithic in its attitudes and values, rather it is very complex, 
replete with interpretative puzzles. One thing seems certain, in the 
‘Machiavellian’ world of the Renaissance, the art of rhetoric had become 
indispensable. After all, traditional allegiances had been effaced, propaganda 
was becoming an essential tool of the church, and monarchs recognised that 
their success as rulers depended in good measure on their ability to display 
power and magnificence in elaborate spectacles. Still, much of the disorder of 
the contemporary world was also due to rhetoric. Its defenders tried to re­
establish order by using more rhetoric -  this time good rhetoric, to replace or 
drive out the bad.
In Chapter 5 I analyse the ways in which two of the most important 
seventeenth-century philosophers, Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, 
represented rhetoric to themselves, how they wrote about it and how they 
imagined its powers and its limits. We shall see that both thinkers use the 
resources of late-medieval and early modern culture to unearth and transform 
civil science and rhetoric. I hope to suggest that it is against this background 
that Hobbes’s concern to establish a science of virtue and Locke’s desire to 
examine knowledge in the light of physical science need to be understood. 
However, they develop and transform these assumptions in a manner 
characteristic of the influence exerted by the Reformation and by the modern 
scientific view of the world.
As hinted at earlier, the question which gives special pertinence to the 
grouping of topics covered in this thesis is whether rhetoric and philosophy 
are related in ways that may be mutually convenient or add to the efficient 
operation of one or both of them, or whether they are in some manner 
conjoined so essentially that without a genuine mutuality of relationship both 
of them would be significantly, if not fundamentally, incomplete. The
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hypothesis of this thesis is that neither rhetoric nor philosophy can exist 
independently of the other; that each depends for the achievement of its own 
function upon the unique or special contributions of the other. In short, I do 
not understand philosophical thought as something independent of rhetoric. 
This view, of course, stands in opposition to abstract theories that deduce the 
meaning of language in rationalistic terms from an a priori doctrine of being.
In fact, another way of expressing my underlying commitment in the 
thesis would be to say that I wish to highlight the divisions between three rival 
views about the character of moral and political argument, (i) First there is the 
view that our aim should be to argue deductively in such a way that any 
rational person who accepts our premises will feel compelled to endorse the 
conclusions we derive from them (Kant, Habermas, Rawls); (ii) Next there is 
the view that, even if it is possible to argue deductively about moral and 
political principles, our arguments will never be persuasive unless we enforce 
them with the art of rhetoric (Bernard Williams, Martha Nussbaum); (iii) 
Finally, there is the view that the character of effective moral and political 
argument is such that it is simply impossible to separate form and content. 
Res and verbum, thing and word, are joined in a symbiotic relation in the act 
of philosophical speech (Ernesto Grassi, Stephen Toulmin). This rhetorical 
conception of human knowledge is tied to how we make sense together as 
language-using animals. It takes issue with our rationalistic scientific ideal of 
knowledge which excludes eveiy form of figurative, poetic, and rhetorical 
language from the theoretical sphere. Be that as it may, view a is where 
matters stand at the beginning of the twentieth-first century.
Whether or not the readers of this thesis may agree that the case is made 
by what follows, I hope at least that the question will prove inviting for 
continuing examination and consideration. In fact, this work is presented not 
as a finished narrative or a dogmatic statement, but in the spirit of dialogue.
24
2Rhetoric is more than it seems: 
Plato’s (true rhetoric’and its institutionalisation by Aristotle
I
Plato (c. 427-347) and Aristotle (c. 384-322) saw philosophy as being in 
desperate need of radical reform, and each of them saw this reform as being 
carried out by a wholly new kind of person: a philosopher entirely unlike the 
sophists who wrote and taught philosophy. These new kinds of philosopher 
were not simply people who carried out investigations in a different way from 
their predecessors: they had (and needed to have), a wholly different 
persona.*0 Plato and Aristotle used this (in different ways, but with the same 
broad aims) to transform our understanding of what qualities (including 
personal qualities), one needs to be a philosopher. In other words, they 
enhanced the authority of their enterprise by denigrating the teachings of their 
rivals. For all their eloquence, wit and popularity, they argued, the sophists do 
not produce true knowledge. Plato and the immediate Platonic tradition, 
therefore, were concerned to carve out and develop a particular kind of 
discourse (i.e., what it takes to be the philosophical enterprise) for its own 
purposes (i.e., to marginalise its competitors). It did this in a particularly 
successful way, to the extent that it is difficult for us even to consider what the 
alternatives might have been. I hope to suggest that it is here that the 
theoretical depreciation of the rhetoric begins, and basically continues until 
today, for the interest we are prepared to devote to rhetoric in philosophy is 
very limited. In fact, there is still a widespread tendency amongst 
contemporary political theorists to view rhetoric as pompous vacuousness or 
mere trickery.41 For centuries, both philosophical language and the history of 
philosophy have placed abstract reason at the top of a ladder of learning, and
40 For more on the question of the persona of the philosopher see the contributions in C. 
Condren (ed.), The Philosopher in Early Modem Europe (Cambridge, 2006).
41 See, e.g., Peter Munz’s review article, The Rhetoric of Rhetoric’, JHI, 51:1 (1990), pp. 121-42, 
at p. 121.
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even though Plato’s metaphysical teachings have not gone unchallenged, his 
enmity to rhetoric has persisted, as has his identification of it with sophistry.
In this chapter I wish to clarify the relations between rhetoric and 
philosophy with reference to Plato and Aristotle. Plato is reacting against what 
he perceived to be the moral dissolution in his society and to the concurrent 
sophistic rhetorical techniques that in his view confounded any real moral 
reasoning. He was embittered against contemporary rhetoric by his own 
frustrated attempts to participate in politics and by the trial and execution of 
his master, Socrates, at the hands of the Athenian democracy in 399 B.C.*2 In 
his Seventh Letter Plato himself relates what it meant to him that this man, 
whom he so deeply revered and sought to emulate, was condemned to death 
for corrupting the youth with the then fashionable arts of sophistry.« His 
writings are dedicated in their entirety to showing that the Socrates who had 
to drink the cup of hemlock was not a sophist. Plato nevertheless 
acknowledges that Socrates, because of his singular art of dialectic, would of 
necessity look like a sophist to the Attic court. It is for this reason that he turns 
to mathematics: he saw there a kind of reasoning that was invulnerable to 
sophistic ‘tricks’.**
Plato’s enmity to rhetoric is well-known and has clearly persisted, but 
often ignored is the fact that his animus is directed at the forensic temper 
which prizes success in verbal combat above responsibility to truth, not 
against persuasion as a concomitant of instruction. I argue that already in the 
Gorgias, the first dialogue to be analysed below, two forms of persuasion are 
alluded to: a rhetoric that produces persuasion for belief in the absence of 
knowledge, and a genuine art of rhetoric (the kind of persuasion that produces 
episteme).^ However, it is in the Phaedrus that Plato contrasts rhetoric in its 
contemporary expression, with what he calls ‘the truly rhetorical and
42 See the autobiographical account in Plato’s Seventh Epistle, 324-26; I cite throughout the 
translations in Plato: Complete Works, ed. J. M. Cooper (Cambridge, 1997). Also see, S. 
Monoson, Plato’s Democratic Entanglements (Princeton, N.J., 2000); and P. J. Steinberger, 
‘Was Socrates Guilty as charged? Apology 24c-28a\AP, 17 (1997), pp. 13-29.
*3 H.-G. Gadamer, Dialogue and Dialectic (New Haven, 1980), p. 3.
** See Andrew Gregory, Plato’s philosophy o f science (London, 2000).
45 See Gorg., 454e.
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persuasive art’.-*6 1 hope to suggest that in this dialogue Plato reveals a genuine 
foundation for rhetoric that only the philosopher or dialectician, can carry out: 
to master the faculty of speaking in such an effectively persuasive way that the 
arguments brought forward are always appropriate to the specific receptivity 
of the souls to which they are directed. The corresponding speech is neither 
purely rational nor purely pathetic.
Aristotle may have been every bit as anti-sophist as Plato, and recognises 
the danger of sophistic ‘tricks’, but he nevertheless had a lot of time for 
rhetoric and thus follows a path different from Plato’s. Despite his alien 
resident status Aristotle’s thinking is prompted, first and foremost, by 
wonderment, not political alienation. His ‘descriptive caution’ leads him to 
separate the world of nature from the human practical world -  to distinguish 
between the methods and objects of inquiry appropriate to each realm. 
Consequently, he faults Plato precisely for not having made these distinctions 
(e.g., for having imported the ontological idea of the good into practical 
considerations where it has no application). Like Plato, Aristotle is reacting 
against the plurality of rhetorical and philosophical vocabularies already in 
circulation and use. But unlike Plato he was only too aware that philosophy 
was neither in a position to destroy rhetoric nor to absorb it. So Aristotle tries, 
instead, to organise the existing descriptions and rules for the use of 
persuasive speech, to delimit its legitimate u se s ,47 and to establish the 
connection between the sphere of validity of rhetoric and that of philosophy. 
His response to Plato (though without naming him) on the subject of rhetoric 
is analogous to his responses on the subject of the value of poetry, the nature 
of politics, ethics, and other subjects -  less idealistic and more pragmatic, but 
based on philosophical method.
But any attempt to understand what Plato and Aristotle are saying, of 
course, must first confront the problem of the disparate nature of the extant 
texts, i.e., the fact that we have fictional dialogues from Plato and a mixture of 
treatises and lecture notes from Aristotle. What is more, there is the 
distinction between Plato’s mythical, metaphorical way of writing and
46 Phaedr., 269c!.
47 A separate discipline -  ethics -  will take care of abuses.
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Aristotle’s ‘cautious’ conceptualisations (a style that seems to most readers 
spare and unemotive in the extreme). Failure to observe this distinction could 
mislead the reader into taking what Plato says in the dialogues as statements 
and then comparing these to supposedly equivalent statements made by 
Aristotle. In fact, as Gadamer has argued, we should not assume that Plato and 
Aristotle were consistent, with themselves and with each other, in ‘getting at’ 
the same thing (albeit in quite different modes of discourse). Rather, the 
primary reason for the apparent differences in their thinking is the fact that 
they are answering questions posed somewhat differentlysa
II
Before Plato’s time there was no distinction between ‘philosophical’ and 
‘literary’ discussion of practical problems.** The idea of distinguishing between 
texts that pursue a search for truth and another group of texts that exist 
primarily for practical purposes, would be foreign in this culture.®® (Similarly, 
no field of investigation or speculation was dismissed as intrinsically 
unphilosophical.) Plato’s own portrayal of the tradition against which he is 
working acknowledges the influence (as sources of ethical teaching), of at least 
six different kinds of texts: epic, lyric, tragic, and comic poetry; the prose 
scientific or historical treatise; and oratory. In fact, in the fifth and early fourth 
centuries B.C., epic and tragic poets were widely assumed to be the most 
important ethical thinkers and teachers of Greece. No one thought of their 
work as less serious, less aimed at truth, than the speculative prose treatises of
48 See H.-G. Gadamer, The Idea o f the Good in Platonic-Aristotelian Philosophy, tr. and intr. P. 
Christopher Smith (New Haven, 1986). This sets off Gadamer’s approach from that of Werner 
Jaeger’s Aristotle (Oxford, 1948).
w In antiquity, in fact, the boundaries between rhetorical and artistic literature were also 
drawn in a different way, and they were not clear-cut. Mikhail Bakhtin, Speech Genres and 
Other Late Essays, tr. V. W. McGee (Austin, TX, 1986), p. 150, has argued that this was partly 
because ‘there was no deep individual personality in the modern sense. It (individual 
personality) originated in the eve of the Middle Ages (“to me myself’ of Marcus Aurelius, 
Epictetus, Augustine, soliloquia, and so forth). The boundaries between one’s own and the 
other’s word became sharper here.
®° One important distinction did exist: between prose writers and poets. There were other 
distinctions of genre within each of these large divisions; but as Martha Nussbaum has said, 
‘none of these distinctions by any means corresponds to a distinction between writers who 
regarded themselves and were regarded as serious ethical thinkers and those who did not and 
were not’ {The Fragility o f Goodness [Cambridge, 1986], p. 123).
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historians and those primarily known as philosophers were also poets: 
Xenophanes, Parmenides, and Empedocles are the most prominent examples. 
It is also important to remember that figures who today are usually classified 
as poets were unhesitatingly judged by their contemporaries to be 
philosophers (if by this one means seekers for wisdom concerning important 
human mattersj.s*
There are at least two sets of incongruities at work in Plato and the 
Platonist tradition. The first is that between philosophical discourse and 
earlier forms of thought (which make no claim to the title of ‘philosophy*); and 
the second is that between rival notions of what philosophy entails. With 
respect to the latter point, Plato’s concern is to mark out what he takes to be 
the philosophical enterprise (i.e., the kind of teaching practised by Socrates) 
from the activities of the sophists. ‘Sophist’ was Plato’s term for his conceptual 
rivals, whose teachings he deplored and before his time the word bore no 
strongly negative connotations.s2 In fact, in its earliest uses, sophistes was a 
general term for wise (sophos) figures such as poets and orators. ‘The men of 
former times applied the name “sophist,” not only to orators whose surpassing 
eloquence won them a brilliant reputation’, wrote Philostratus (c. 170-245), 
“but also to philosophers who expounded their theories with ease and 
fluency’.^ Under Plato’s influence, however, the word came to have its 
narrower scope and its special association with rhetoric and relativism. This is 
misleading, for among the subjects taught by sophists were oratory, ethics, 
political theory, law, history, mnemonics, literature, mathematics, and
51 Nussbaum, Fragility, p. 124.
52 It is important to note that Socrates himself was called a ‘sophist’. Indeed, what the sophists 
were accused of doing (i.e., ‘to make the weaker seem the better cause’ -  cf. esp. Aristophanes, 
The Clouds, tr. W. Arrowsmith [Ann Arbor, MI, 1962], 889-1104), was also a charge made 
against Socrates in his trial (cf. Plato, Apology, 18b). The popular reaction against the sophists 
is illustrated in Aristophanes’ satirical play, The Clouds, by a character enrolling in a sophistic 
school in order to learn the ‘unjust argument’ (this, he has heard, can win a jury’s favour for the 
worst of offenders). Popular animosity against the school leads to it being burnt down (with at 
least one student inside) -  a grim sign of the strong feelings that would later contribute to the 
death of the man whose name Aristophanes uses for the leader of his imaginary school -  
Socrates. Although false on most details, Aristophanes’ portrayal of Socrates must be true 
enough to have amused an audience who knew Socrates’ reputation. It is hardly surprising, 
then, that Plato felt the pressing need to distinguish Socrates from the sophists with whom he 
was associated in the popular imagination.
53 Flavius Philostratus, The Lives o f the Sophists, tr. W.C. Wright (Cambridge, Mass., 1921), p. 
13. Also see, Graham Anderson, Philostratus (London, 1986).
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astronom y.;*  Nevertheless, unlike many philosophers, the sophists pursued 
philosophy without the sceptical attitude of Socrates and with greater 
attention to the power and social uses of language. Protagoras was also, 
Philostratus noted, the first to charge a fee for his lectures. In Plato’s dialogues 
the sophist is memorably portrayed as someone who is willing to teach anyone 
who is prepared to pay how to devise arguments to win a case, including 
making weak arguments appear better than strong ones:
'And Tisias and Gorgias? How can we leave them  out w hen it is they who 
realized tha t what is likely [eikos] m ust be held in higher honor than  what is 
true; they who, by the power of their language, make small things appear 
great and great things small; they who express m odem  ideas in  ancient garb 
and  ancient ones in m odem  dress; they who have discovered how to argue 
bo th  concisely and at infinite length about any subject?’®®
Plato condemns the sophists because, in his view, they give the appearance 
(phainesthai) of knowledge without its substance, and use probabilities (eikos) 
and semblances (eidolai) to persuade an audience. Their alleged teaching on 
probability is parodied in the Phaedrus:
‘Sometimes, in fact, w hether you are prosecuting or defending a case, you 
m ust not even say w hat actually happened, if  it was not likely to  have 
happened -  you m ust say som ething th a t is likely instead. W hatever you say, 
you should pursue what is likely and leave the  tru th  aside: the  whole art 
consists in cleaving to tha t throughout your speech’.®6
If the sophists’ material is apparent and not true knowledge, and if he is 
trained to prefer probability to truth if it will be more persuasive, he becomes 
no more than an ‘insincere/dissembling imitator’ of truth.57 Their conception 
of rhetoric, therefore, is to justice (the political virtue par  excellence) what 
sophistry is to legislation,®8 i.e., the art of illusion and deception: ‘It takes no 
thought at all of whatever is best; with the lure of what’s most pleasant at the
®4 See Havelock, Preface to Plato, pp. 162-63 nn. 27, 28, 306 n.8; and C. J. Rowe, ‘Plato on the 
Sophists as Teachers of Virtue’, HPT, 4:3 (1983), pp. 409-27.
5® Phaedrus, 267a-!); cf. Gorg., 4493-4580. Also see Aristotle, Rhetoric 2.24.11, where these 
probabilistic proofs are attributed to Protagoras; and Diogenes Laertius, Lives o f Eminent 
Philosophers, tr. R. D. Hicks, 2 vols. (Cambridge, Mass., 1980), where he says that Protagoras 
‘was the first to maintain that there are two sides to every question ..., and he even argued in 
this fashion, being the first to do so’ (II, 463).
®6 Phaedr., 272d; cf. also Gorg., 46411-4653.
®7 Soph., 268a.
®8 See Gorg., 46sb-c: ‘Sophistic is to legislation what beautification is to gymnastics, and 
rhetoric to justice what cookery is to medicine’. Cf. ibid., 4493-4580.
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moment, it sniffs out folly and hoodwinks it, so that it gives the impression of 
being most deserving’.^ So the failing of the sophist is ultimately not an 
intellectual, but a moral failing. Plato’s stylistic choices must be assessed 
against the background of what he perceived to be the sophists’ dazzling and 
specious use of argument, their use of the resources of language to bewitch 
and work on the hearer in the service of ‘untruth’. For Plato the prevailing 
conception of rhetoric (i.e., the art of persuasion as practised and taught by the 
sophist) is dangerous because (a) it puts formidable power in the hands of 
anyone who masters it perfectly; (b) it lays aside all concern for ‘speaking the 
truth’; and (c) it leaves human life unexamined and unchanged (because it 
accommodates itself to the prevailing ethos).60
However, Plato does not condemn rhetoric tout court As hinted at earlier 
his animus is not directed against persuasion as a concomitant of instruction, 
but against the forensic temper which prizes success in verbal combat above 
responsibility to truth. Even in the Gorgias, the first dialogue I analyse, two 
forms of persuasion are implied: a ‘bad’ rhetoric that creates persuasion in the 
absence of knowledge; and a ‘true’ or genuine art of rhetoric that produces 
episteme, knowledge in the privileged sense.61 Plato does not enlarge upon the 
nature of the second kind of persuasion, which even Athens’ best orators and 
statesmen had failed to attain and the secret of which, presumably, Socrates 
alone held.62 We must turn to the Phaedrus for his supplementary treatment. 
There Plato memorably contrasts rhetoric, in its contemporary expression,
ss Gorg., 464d; cf. ibid., 463b; Rep., 493b-c; Soph., 223a.
60 The traditional assessment of the sophists as both philosophically inadequate and morally 
blameable teachers was first challenged in Chapter 67 of George Grote’s A History o f Greece, 
12 vols. (London, 1846-56), and subsequently in his Plato and the other Companions o f 
Sokrates, 3 vols. (London, 1865). However low their standing in the history of philosophy, the 
attitudes of the sophists have been of major significance for historians of ideas down to the 
time of Cousin (whose position indeed was denounced as ‘rhetorical’ in the most pejorative 
sense) -  see D.R. Kelley, The Descent o f Ideas, (Ashgate, 2002), p. 44. Most recent 
commentators have attempted to separate the ‘new learning’ from the negative image it used to 
carry; see, e.g., S. Jarratt, Rereading the Sophists (Carbondale, 111., 1991); J. Poulakos, 
Sophistical Rhetoric in Classical Greece (Columbia, 1995); E. Schiappa, Protagoras and Logos 
(Columbia, S.C., 1991); J. Margolis, The Truth about Relativism (Oxford, 1991); O. Balaban, 
Plato and Protagoras (Lanham, Md., 1999); and B. McComiskey, Gorgias and the New 
Sophistic Rhetoric (Carbondale 111., 2002). A notable exception is M. Nussbaum, Love’s 
Knowledge (Oxford, 1990), pp. 220-9.
61 See Gorg., 454e.
62 Ibid., 517a.
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with what he calls ‘the truly rhetorical and persuasive art’.** I argue that the 
Phaedrus questions and modifies Plato’s earlier conception of value (and, 
consequently, of rhetoric): it gives a prominent place in the good life to 
passionate relationships between individuals (both as instrumental means and 
as intrinsically valuable components). I assess both Plato’s self-critical 
arguments and this new account of human goodness. Finally, I suggest that for 
him the worth of rhetoric is in its practitioners, just as the worth of moral 
philosophy is reflected (or perhaps one should say embodied) in its 
practitioners.
But before we look at the Gorgias and the Phaedrus, it is important to 
note that at least two major problems confront anyone pursuing an inquiry 
into Plato’s dialogues. First, Plato is a courageously self-critical philosopher: 
he not only revises old positions, he even subjects them to criticism within his 
own dialogues. It can be dangerous, therefore, to make a synthesis of positions 
from different works. And yet often, clearly, it can also be fruitful, even 
necessary. A second problem is the dialogue form. Plato uses the dialogue to 
motivate a view, to make the reader feel the force of a problem, to explain the 
practical roots and implications of a solution. A typical strategy towards these 
ends is to show us alternative responses to the same problem and to let them 
‘examine’ one another as the dialogue progresses. The Platonic dialogues, in 
short, contain more than a single voice, and we do not always so clearly see 
what choice ‘Plato’ wants us to make. What is more, Plato used the dialogue 
form to represent the philosophical discourse process employed by Socrates.6* 
However, Socrates did not write, because he thought (if we are to believe 
Plato’s account) that the real value of philosophising lay in the responsive 
interaction of teacher and pupil, of interrogator and respondent -  as they 
jointly engage in sifting the evidence and following, step by step, the unfolding 
import of the argument. Put differently, real philosophy is each person’s
** Phaedr., 269c!.
For the biographical tradition concerning Plato see, Debra Nails, The people o f Plato 
(Indianapolis, IN, 2002); A. Riginos, Platonica (Leiden, 1976); P. Friedlander, Plato (N.Y., 
1964); A. E. Taylor, Plato, 7th edn. (N.Y., i960).
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committed search for wisdom, where what counts is not merely the acceptance 
of certain conclusions, but also entails following a certain path to them.**
In the Phaedrus there is a notorious passage in which Socrates disparages 
writing and written artefacts precisely because they cannot perform this 
activity:
*You know, Phaedrus, writing shares a strange feature with painting. The 
offsprings of painting stand there as if they are alive, but if anyone asks them 
anything, they remain solemnly silent. The same is true of written words. 
You’d think they were speaking as if they had some understanding, but if you 
question anything that has been said because you want to leam more, it 
continues to signify just that very same thing forever. When it has once been 
written down, every discourse rolls about everywhere, reaching 
indiscriminately those with understanding no less than those who have no 
business with it, and it doesn’t know to whom it should speak and to whom it 
should not. And when it is faulted and attacked unfairly, it always needs its 
father’s support; alone, it can neither defend itself nor come to its own 
support’.66
Written words do not impact on self-understanding because they are not 
‘alive’. At best, they can remind us of what philosophising is like. At worst, they 
can ‘introduce forgetfulness into the soul of those who learn it’,6? both of the 
content and of the manner of real philosophising, teaching them to be 
passively reliant on the written word. Worse still, in some readers written texts 
can induce the false conceit of wisdom. Since they may mistake information 
about many things for true understanding, ‘they will imagine that they have 
come to know much while for the most part they will know nothing’.68 Once 
written down, furthermore, every discourse lacks the responsiveness of true 
philosophical teaching. It ‘rolls about everywhere’, unable to select its 
audience or adapt what it ‘says’ to the nature of the audience addressed, and 
with no regard for the way that the philosophical discourse will vary in 
response to a particular interlocutor. It is particularly significant that a written 
text cannot explain itself or reply to objections made by the reader. ‘When it is
<* For descriptions of Socrates’ effect on the interlocutor see, Meno 84a-c and Soph. 229e-23oe. 
On elenchos see, H. Benson, Socratic wisdom (Oxford, 2000); N. Ranasinghe, The soul o f 
Socrates (Ithaca, N.Y., 2000); T. Brickhouse and N. Smith, Plato’s Socrates (N.Y., 1994); M. 
Nussbaum, ‘Aristophanes and Socrates on Learning Practical Wisdom’, YCS, 26 (1980), pp. 43- 
97; R. Robinson, Plato’s Earlier Dialectic, 2nd edn. (Oxford, 1953); H. Sinaiko, Love, 
Knowledge, and Discourse in Plato (Chicago, 1965), pp. 1-21; and Cushman, Therapeia.
66 Phaedr., 275d-e.
67 Ibid., 275a.
68 Ibid., 275a-b.
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faulted and attacked unfairly*, Socrates remarks, ‘it always needs its father’s 
support; alone, it can neither defend itself nor come to its own support’.6’ It is 
an orphan -  defenceless against attack because its ‘father’ or author is absent. 
We can now understand why Socrates concludes that ‘No discourse worth 
serious attention has ever been written in verse or prose’ .?0
Plato, however, did write philosophical texts. What is more, he placed 
these criticisms of writing inside a written work of his own.?* Why? Plato’s 
dialogues tell us repeatedly that he lived surrounded by people who, in his 
view, cheapened philosophical activity by turning it into sophistry or eristic.?2 
In such circumstances, it is hardly surprising that, especially after the death of 
Socrates, he felt the need to produce written paradigms of good philosophical 
teaching. After all, a reminder of real philosophical searching -  even if it is no 
more than that -  can still be valuable. So Plato’s own practice of writing clearly 
reveals an acute self-consciousness about the relationship between choice of a 
style and the content of a philosophical conception. Yet, by placing the 
Socratic criticisms of writing inside his own written dialogues, Plato invites us 
to ask to what extent his own literary innovations have managed to 
circumnavigate the criticisms. Here we cannot hope to raise all of the most 
interesting questions about Plato’s use of the dialogue form.73 Still, it will be
6’ Phaedr., 275e.
?° Ibid., 277e.
71 On die criticism of writing see, Nussbaum, Fragility, pp. 200-33; D. Hyland, ‘Why Plato 
wrote dialogues’, Phil. Rh., 1 (1968), pp. 38-50; J. Derrida, ‘La pharmacie de Platon’, in La 
Dissemination (Paris, 1972), pp. 69-197; and J. Fisher, ‘Plato on Writing and Doing 
Philosophy’, JHI, 27:2 (1966), pp. 163-72. In fact, fifth-century Athens attitudes towards 
writing, including those articulated by Plato, suggest some of the reasons why Greece provided 
so propitious a setting for the emergence of rhetoric. Greek epic and rhetoric embody the 
primacy Greeks had long given to the spoken word, verbal cunning and craft, the poet’s song, 
and the suasive powers of the rhetorician..
?2 As pointed out earlier, Plato is among the first to call inquirers such as himself philosophoi, a 
term he uses to distinguish his practices from those of the sophists. Plato’s penchant for 
coining technical jargon and for giving new uses to old terms is well-documented. He coined a 
wide assortment of words ending with -ike (‘the art of) and -ikos (which, depending on 
context, denotes a person with a particular skill). Pierre Chantraine, ‘Le suffixe grec-IKOX’, 
Etudes sur le vocabulaire grec [Paris, 1956], pp. 97-171, has shown that of the more than 350 - 
ikos words in Plato, more than 250 are not found earlier. Thomas Cole, The Origins o f Rhetoric 
in Ancient Greece (Baltimore, 1991), has argued that there is ‘no trace’ of rhetorike before 
Plato’s Gorgias, and the word itself‘bears every indication of being a Platonic invention’ (p. 2.). 
E. Schiappa, ‘Did Plato coin rhetorike?’, AJP, 11 (1990), pp. 460-73, has postulated that Plato 
may have coined the word ‘rhetoric’ to portray and define the teaching of his rival Isocrates.
?3 For more information see, H. Slaatte, Plato’s Dialogues and Ethics (Lanham, Md., 2000); R. 
Hart and V. Tejera (eds.), Plato’s dialogues (Lewiston, 1997); C. Kahn, Plato and the Socratic 
Dialogue (Cambridge, 1996); A. Nightingale, Genres in dialogue (Cambridge, 1995); M. Frede,
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useful to provide a sketch of some ways in which his writing defines itself 
against the enormous influence of the sophists and rhetoricians:^ in 
particular, what distinguishes the ‘true philosophy’ dramatised in Platonic 
dialogues, from the sophistic abuses which he memorably depicts as a threat 
to proper philosophising.
In using the dialogue form, Plato interposes a fictional character between 
himself (as absent author) and the audience. This character serves as a ‘father’ 
to the words within the dramatic context of the dialogue. The fictional 
interlocutor is made to raise some of the virtual audience’s objections, hence 
giving Socrates an opportunity to defend himself against them. Yet, the 
rhetorical advantage of the dialogue over the treatise in this regard is not 
immediately evident. After all, one of the traditional parts of rhetorical 
composition is the refutatio -  the anticipation of the audience’s objections to 
the thesis advanced by the orator -  which also may be included in a treatise. 
Unlike the dialogue, however, the treatise (the characteristic vehicle of the 
‘epic impulse’ in philosophical composition),75 implies a completed 
formulation of the truth. It assumes that truth can be communicated in 
propositions formulated without reference to any particular existential 
situation or to what needs to be said to a particular audience. The form of the 
treatise implies, moreover, that if the reader raises objections not answered in 
the written text, these objections will invalidate the argument.
‘Plato’s Arguments and the Dialogue Form’, OSAPS, ed. J. Klagge and N. Smith (Oxford, 1992); 
J.A. Arieti, Interpreting Plato (Savage, Md., 1991); H.-G. Gadamer, Plato’s Dialectical Ethics, 
tr. and intr. P. Christopher Smith (New Haven, 1991), esp. pp. 51-83, pp. 201-19; Seth 
Benardete, The being o f the beautiful (Chicago, 1984), pp. 86-87; A. A. Krentz, ‘Dramatic form 
and philosophical content in Plato’s dialogues’, Phil. Lit., 7 (1983), pp. 32-47; and Derrida, ‘La 
pharmacie de Platon’, pp. 69-197.
7<i It is important as well to assess Plato’s stylistic choices against the enormous influence of the 
tragic poets and their ethical teachings; he both acknowledges a debt to tragic poetry and 
distances itself from it. For more information see, Jill Gordon, Turning toward philosophy 
(University Park, Penn., 1999); Krentz, ‘Dramatic form and philosophical content’, pp. 32-47; 
Nussbaum, Fragility, Pt. II; C. Griswold, The Ideas and the criticism of poetry in Plato’s 
Republic, Book 10,’ JHP, 19 (1981), pp. 135-50; and H. Kuhn, The true tragedy*, HSCP, 52 
(1941), pp. 1-40 and 53 (1942), pp. 37-88.
75 Citing Wittgenstein’s statement in the Tractatus that ‘Philosophy is not a theory but an 
activity’, Albert W. Levi, ‘Philosophy as Literature’, Phil. Rh., 9 (1975), pp. 1-20, persuasively 
argues that whereas the ‘epic impulse’ in systematic philosophy seeks to ‘tell a story,’ the 
‘dramatic impulse’ seeks to ‘show the activity’. The characteristic vehicle of the former is thus 
the treatise, that of the latter is the dialogue’ (p. 15).
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The dialogue, on the other hand, is an open form. It does not claim to 
present a universal, apodictic proof that must coerce belief in all rational 
individuals. It claims only to represent a particular argument, and to answer 
only the particular objections made by a particular individual. (In other words, 
it implies that the objections raised are not all the objections that might be 
raised, but only those that occur to a specific individual, the fictional character 
who serves as Socrates’ interlocutor in the particular case.) In fact, the 
discussion it represents could, in principle, be continued provided that the 
participants fail to reach complete agreement. Several of Plato’s dialogues, 
therefore, end with an adjournment rather than a final conclusion (as in the 
Protagoras, the Cratylus, or the Euthyphro). At times the dialogue is broken 
off by an interruption of some sort (as when in the Lysis the boys’ tutors come 
to take their charges home), or it continues until everyone (except Socrates) 
has fallen asleep, as in the Symposium. Even when agreement is reached, the 
implication of the form is that the argument could be reopened at any point by 
raising a new objection.
What Plato offers in his dialogues, therefore, is not an exposition of his 
philosophical theories, but a dramatic representation of the philosophic 
endeavour as he understood it.?6 We see an active, ongoing discussion, rather 
than a list of conclusions or a proclamation of received truths. Furthermore, in 
its open-endedness, the dialogue form establishes a similarly dialectical 
relation with the reader, who is invited to enter critically into the give-and- 
take, to see who is really praiseworthy and why.?? In short, Plato uses argument 
to show genuine communication taking place and to establish such 
communication with the reader. Yes, there are conclusions here, and some of 
Plato’s opinions.?8 However, we are asked not merely to memorise them, but to
?6 As Sinaiko, Love, Knowledge, and Discowse in Plato, has put it, not Plato but ‘only his 
characters speak, and they speak to each other within the strict confines of a dramatic context’ 
(p. 4). This, of course, raises a challenge: strictu sensu, we cannot attribute to Plato himself any 
of the statements made by his characters. This problem is explored in G.A. Press, Who speaks 
fo r Plato? (Lanham, Md., 2000); and D. Clay, Platonic Questions (University Park, Pa., 2000). 
?? This marks a great difference from many important works of earlier Greek philosophy, 
where it is usual for the speaker/author to claim to be an initiate (Parmenides), a recipient of 
wisdom from the gods (Homer, Hesiod), or even, himself, a god on earth (Empedocles)’ 
(Nussbaum, Fragility, p. 126).
?8 It is clear, for example, that the character Socrates is the real model for our activity as 
readers and interpreters, even of the speech of Protagoras. For what Protagoras did was, like a
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find them inside ourselves. So unlike all the written texts criticised by Socrates 
the dialogue form might fairly claim that it awakens the soul, arousing it to 
rational activity rather than lulling it into drugged passivity. It seems to be 
both less ‘silent’ and more responsive to individual differences than the 
written discourses criticised by Socrates. Through its depiction of the 
dialectical process, furthermore, the dialogue can show the reader moral 
development and change taking place. Seeing examples of learning is surely an 
important part of our learning from a written text.
In all these ways Plato learned from tragic drama,79 substituting its 
complexity and its exploratory character for the didactic flatness of much of 
the earlier philosophising in his tradition. In fact, the dialogue also shares a 
central structural feature with works of tragic theatre -  the elenchos, or cross- 
examination. A number of Socratic dialogues begin with the confident 
assertion of a general position, made by a character over-optimistic about his 
grasp of practical problems. This general assertion, like so many candidate 
definitions in the dialogues, turns out not to cover all of the character’s more 
concrete beliefs about choice and value. The dramatic action consists in the 
‘separation’ of the character from his false beliefs through painful learning, the 
working-through of his ill-sorted beliefs. In the end he arrives at the truth of 
what he most deeply believes, or at least he acknowledges his own deep 
perplexity. (The reader, of course, should be engaged in a similar sorting 
process.) Even when the interlocutor does not progress beyond perplexity to 
truth, the elenchos separates him, as the Sophist puts it, from the tumorous 
growth of arrogant false belief, preparing the way for healthy growth.80
practical epideictic speaker, to give a long speech; what he could not do, or could not do well, 
was to enter into a responsive exchange of views about its content. He lacked both dedication 
and humility; and these features of his character were displayed as defects that left him ill- 
prepared for the activity of self-scrutiny.
79 One should bear in mind, however, Nussbaum’s judgement:, ‘What we find in the middle- 
period dialogues, then, is theater; but theater purged and purified of theater’s characteristic 
appeal to powerful emotion, a pure crystalline theater of the intellect.... In Plato’s anti-tragic 
theater, we see the origin of a distinctive philosophical style, a style that opposes itself to the 
merely literary and expresses the philosopher’s commitment to intellect as a source of truth. By 
writing philosophy as drama, Plato calls on every reader to engage actively in the search for 
truth. By writing it as anti-tragic drama, he warns the reader that only certain elements of him 
are appropriate to this search....’ (Fragility, p. 134).
80 Soph., 230b-d.
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But is Socrates’ refusal of his interlocutors’ yearning for conclusions not 
teasing? Is it not similar to the sophist’s or eiron’s affected omniscience? As 
hinted at earlier, Plato’s Socrates does not teach conclusions. He feigns 
ignorance, not knowledge.8* This, of course, is a trait that immediately 
distinguishes him from the sophists. Even when, by his dexterity and 
virtuosity, the accomplished orator wins conviction, he typically leaves those 
who ‘believe’ hesitant to admit that his contentions are their own. With the 
elenchos the case is different: the interrogator and the respondent are jointly 
engaged in sifting the evidence and following, step by step, the unfolding 
import of the argument. They ‘plant seeds’ in one another, and are ‘parents’ of 
truth and understanding in one another.82 It is for this reason that the elenchos 
more closely resembles the true art of persuasion.
Ill
Plato’s critique of the prevailing conception of rhetoric is found in a number of 
dialogues but especially in the Gorgias and the Phaedrus. It is for this reason 
that I now propose to clarify the relation between rhetoric and philosophy with 
reference to these two dialogues. Did Plato ever feel the need (and, if so, in 
which manner) to establish a union between rational knowledge and emotion? 
Or did he remain convinced (as in the Republic and Phaedo) that only the 
intellect can reliably guide a human being towards the good and valuable? If 
not, to what extent, in his view, is the essence of philosophy not exhausted in 
the typical rational process (episteme)? And, finally, could it be that we will 
find here a deeper meaning of rhetoric?
The subject of the Gorgias is rhetoric, in particular the ‘true persuasive 
art’, as opposed to the bad or false rhetoric practised (if we believe Plato’s 
portrayal) by Gorgias and his followers. Socrates begins by seeking 
clarification from the elderly, respected Gorgias about the power of his ‘craft’. 
Gorgias tells him that rhetoric rightly ‘encompasses and subordinates to itself
81 See Gorg., 506: ‘For the things I say I certainly don’t say with any knowledge at all; no, I’m 
searching together with you
82 Phaedr., 276e-277a.
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just about everything that can be accomplished’.88 How shall we interpret this 
‘everything? Gorgias’ answer is to attain the greatest and most important of all 
things human (i.e., health, richness, beauty). All are subsumed within the 
overarching aim of rhetoric. But is rhetoric really capable of attaining such 
gifts? The doctor, for example, will deny that a person can be cured merely 
through speech, without special knowledge. Socrates, therefore, tries to find 
out ‘w h a t... this persuasion produced by oratory is, and what it’s about’.8-* He 
distinguishes between true and false belief or conviction (doxa), and proves 
that there can be no true or false knowledge (episteme), only true or false 
belief.85 Why? Because episteme is rooted in grounds, in reasons, and is thus 
never false. It follows that rational knowledge and rational speech are 
superior, because it admits no form of opinion besides itself, no form that is 
not covered by grounded knowledge. And since rhetoric does not persuade by 
means of such episteme, it always remains in the realm of pseudo-knowledge.
But is this radically negative judgement Plato’s definitive attitude towards 
rhetoric? I suggest that it is not. After all, knowledge alone, as a rational 
process, can neither move the human being nor motivate him to certain 
actions. Consider, for example, the manner in which Gorgias answers Socrates 
with the following objection:
‘Many a time I’ve gone with my brother or with other doctors to call on some 
sick person who refuses to take his medicine or allow the doctor to perform 
surgeiy or cauterization on him. And when the doctor failed to persuade him,
I succeeded, by means of no other craft than oratory. And I maintain too that 
if an orator and a doctor came to any city anywhere you like and had to 
compete in speaking in the assembly or some other gathering over which of 
them should be appointed doctor, the doctor wouldn’t make any showing at 
all, but the one who had the ability to speak would be appointed . . . ’. 86
Both the doctor and the philosopher, therefore, need Gorgias’ services, 
because bitter pills can be swallowed more easily with a sweet coating. So one 
does need rhetoric.
The dilemma we raised earlier, then, seems insurmountable: on one side 
an ineffectual (in the sense of non-motivating) rational knowledge, on the
88 Gorg., 456b. 
8-* Ibid., 453c.
88 Ibid., 454d-e. 
86 Ibid., 456b-c.
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other speech as pure ‘seduction’. However, as the discussion that follows 
attempts to clarify, the relationship between philosophy and rhetoric is more 
complex than this kind of complimentarity suggests. The distinction between 
surface and depth in human affairs is not such that it can be reduced to the 
sweet coating and bitter contents of a drug, or, for that matter, to the pompous 
clothes and naked bodies of souls facing judgement. But before we enter into 
that discussion, we must take a closer look at the type of rhetoric so 
memorably condemned in Plato’s dialogues.
Generically considered, Plato defined the prevailing conception of 
rhetoric, according to function, as a producer of persuasion.8? It was mostly 
employed in law courts and in the public assembly with the purpose of 
winning conviction on any subject dear to the orator’s heart or prescribed by 
party interests. It is important to emphasise, however, that for Plato the 
stigma attached to rhetoric had little to do with its character as persuasion. 
Socrates himself had well understood the power of words:
‘[T]he soul... my dear friend, is cured by means of certain charms, and these 
charms consist of beautiful words. It is the result of such words that 
temperance arises in the soul, and when the soul acquires and possesses 
temperance, it is easy to provide health both for the head and the body’. 88
So words are ‘charms’ by which the soul can be cured of its ignorance and 
nurtured in virtue. In the Gorgias, as in the Crito, Plato makes Socrates assert 
that whoever teaches anything must, necessarily, in the course of teaching, 
also persuade.8® Instruction ought to carry conviction in either the cobbler’s art 
or in mathematics, because both kinds of knowledge distinguish truth from 
falsehood and are persuasive in regard to the truths of their respective 
subjects. Plato’s animus, therefore, is not directed against persuasion as a 
concomitant of instruction. (After all, if it is true that there is no teaching or 
learning in the absence of persuasion then his own paideusis must somehow 
include the art of persuasion.) But he does repudiate the craft which has no 
distinctive subject-matter (except the ‘knack’ of persuasion itself®0), and which 
makes inculcation of partisan belief its exclusive concern. In fact, Plato
87 Gorg., 453a; Phaedr., 260c; Soph. 222c-d.
88 Charmides, 157a.
8® Gorg., 453d; Crito, 5ib-c.
®° Cf. Gorg., 453a.
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concludes that it is neither a science nor a true art (techne), but a Tmack’ 
devoid of art.’1
The most damaging blight upon rhetoric (as the sophists had taught it), is 
that it is polemical and contentious in both spirit and intent.’2 It promoted the 
forensic temper which prizes success in verbal combat above responsibility to 
truth. Whether it is, as in the Phaedrus, the speech of Lysias, or that of a Solon 
or Pericles, the orator begins with a presumed truth or an unexamined thesis.” 
He proceeds to support and enforce it, never appraising its validity. His whole 
intent is in contriving by every persuasive trick at his command to get others 
to share the opinions he promotes for some ulterior reason. How, except by 
some incredible good fortune, can one expect truth to emerge concerning 
affairs either small or great? When understood in this manner rhetoric is 
clearly a form of ‘flattery’, and that is precisely how Plato regularly describes 
it.”  In the effort to win his case, we are told in the Gorgias, the orator 
invariably appeals to the predilections of his audience and dangles before it 
what was most pleasant to hear.” In other words, rhetoric’s method of 
producing persuasion is by accommodating argument to the ingrained 
prejudices and unexamined opinions of minds largely controlled by clamorous 
desires*6 rather than by a love of truth. And because it accommodates itself to 
the prevailing ethos it leaves human life unexamined and unchanged. What is 
more, the orator may succeed in inculcating beliefs, but in so doing he merely 
accomplishes a transfer of one person’s opinions to another person’s mind. So 
rhetoric, as practised, also stands condemned when measured by its results.
However, in the Gorgias there is passing reference to a different kind of 
persuasion: ‘the persuasion that comes from teaching, concerning what’s just 
and unjust’.’? It is this kind of rhetoric that produces knowledge in the
’l Ibid., 465a; Phaedr., 26oe. Aristotle will provide a valid answer to Socrates’ demand that 
rhetoric have some subject matter particular to itself in the opening chapters of the Rhetoric. 
Rhetoric, he insists, is (like dialectic) a verbal, intellectual tool {Rh., 1.1.1). Although it has 
artistic techniques and a method special to itself, it borrows the ideas and premises it uses from 
popular forms of other disciplines, especially politics and ethics 
’2 Euthyd., 272c; Soph., 225c.
”  Phaedr., 257c ff.
”  Gorg., 463b; Soph., 223a; Rep., 493b-c.
’s Gorg., 464d.
’6 Cf. Rep., 43ia-c; 442a; Laws, 68ga-b.
’? Gorg., 4 5 4 e-4 5 5 a.
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privileged sense (episteme). Plato does not enlarge upon the nature of the 
second kind of persuasion, but at 517a he alludes to a ‘true rhetoric’, which 
even the best of Athens’ orators and statesmen failed to attain and of which, 
presumably, Socrates alone holds the secret. (I propose to show that it is this 
that Plato subsequently identified with dialectic.) We must turn to the 
Phaedrus for his supplementary treatment,»8 where Plato definitively contrasts 
rhetoric, in its contemporary expression, with what he calls ‘the art of the true 
rhetorician, the really persuasive speaker’.^
The problem of madness or mania and the pathos (and with it, of 
rhetoric) in its relationship to epistemic discourse, forms the central theme of 
the Phaedrus. Its first part, as is well known, concerns erotic love (eros).100 
Socrates covers his head in shame and delivers a discourse (modelled on the 
speech written for Phaedrus by his suitor, Lysias) which attacks erotic passion 
as a form of degrading madness and characterises the passions as mere urges 
for bodily replenishment, with no role to play in our understanding of the 
good. Then, uncovering his head, he recants, offering (to a Phaedrus newly 
shaken by the power of feeling) a defence of the benefits of madness. The two 
initial speeches, then, had operated with a simple dichotomy between mania 
and sophrosune (the state of soul in which intellect rules securely over the 
other elements), treating the former as entirely a bad thing, the latter as 
entirely good. But in fact neither of these claims is correct. Certain states of 
madness are not, as has been said, Ijad, pure and simple’. Indeed, madness 
can be a source of the highest goods, of ‘the best things we have’.10*
»8 The following are of general interest: G. Nicholson, Plato's Phaedrus: the philosophy o f love 
(West Lafayette, 1999); and G. Ferrari, Listening to the cicadas: a study o f Plato’s Phaedrus 
(Cambridge, 1987).
99 Phaedr., 26gd.
100 See C. Osborne, Eros unveiled: Plato and the God o f love (Oxford, 1994).
101 Phaedr., 244a. This dialogue, furthermore, is a dialogue whose characters go mad. Socrates, 
for the only time in his life, leaves, his accustomed urban haunts. Following beautiful Phaedrus, 
he walks to a green place outside the city walls and lies down on the grass by the banks of a 
flowing stream. He describes himself as ‘possessed’ by the influence of Phaedrus and the place. 
Phaedrus, too, yields to the influence of beauty and is moved by wonder (Phaedr., 257c). From 
having been the critical and rationalistic ‘speaker’ of Socrates’ first speech (ibid., 244a), he 
becomes the loving and yielding boy to whom the manic second speech is spoken (Phaedr., 
243e). The place has been precisely located see, R. E. Wycherley, "The scene of Plato’s 
Phaedrus’, Phoenix, 17 (1963), pp. 88-98; and D. Clay, ‘Socrates’ prayer to Pan’, in Arktouros: 
Hellenic Studies Presented to Bernard M. W. Knox, ed. G.W. Bowersock, W. Burkert, M.C. 
Putnam (Berlin, 1 9 7 9 ). PP- 3 4 5 -5 3 -
42
There is clearly something new here. The Phaedrus displays a new view of 
the role of feeling, emotion, and particular love in the good life, and this 
change of view is explored inside the dialogue itself. In fact, there are striking 
similarities between the doctrine of Socrates’ first speech (together with the 
speech of Lysias that inspires it) and certain views seriously defended by 
Socrates in the middle-period dialogues. Plato seems to embody important 
features of his own earlier view in the first two speeches, and then both 
‘recants’ and criticises those speeches. And the conclusion about the passions 
will prove to have implications for Plato’s understanding of the role of rhetoric 
and of the connections between rhetoric and philosophy. Persuasion inspired 
by ‘madness’ is defended as a gift of the gods and a valuable educational 
resource. And the style of Socratic philosophising now fuses argument with 
poetry. The pre-Phaedrus dialogues102 consistently attack mania as a ‘simple 
evil’, a state of soul that cannot lead to genuine insight and one that, more 
often than not, produces bad actions.io3 Plato had consistently used ‘mania’ 
and related words to designate the state of the soul in which the non­
intellectual elements (appetites and emotions) are in control and lead or guide 
the intellectual part.10*
The denial of any cognitive value to the non-intellectual elements of the 
soul is not surprising, given Plato’s general view of appetite and emotion in 
middle-period works. In the Republic, for example, the appetites are merely 
brute forces reaching out, insatiably and without any selectivity, each for a
102 There is now general agreement that the Phaedrus is later than both Republic and 
Symposium in date of composition and close to the Theaetetus, which can be dated to not long 
after 369 (since it commemorates Theaetetus’s death in the battle at Corinth in that year). The 
Gorgias is generally considered to be an earlier work -  most scholars would put it in a period 
of transition between early ‘Socratic’ dialogues and ‘middle’ dialogues. It is one of the 
important achievement of T.H. Irwin’s Plato's Moral Theory (Oxford, 1977), to have 
convincingly established the close relationship between Gorgias and the Republic concerning 
the structure of the soul and the nature of desire. The most likely stoiy seems to be that the 
Gorgias opens up questions and sketches arguments which the Republic frequently develops at 
much more considerable length. For more information see, L. Brandwood, The chronology o f 
Plato’s dialogues (Cambridge, 1990); K. Dorter, ‘Questions of Chronology’, in Form and Good 
in Plato’s Eleatic Dialogues (Berkeley, Ca., 1994), pp. 1-9; and R. Hackforth, Plato’s Phaedrus 
(Indianapolis, 1952), pp. 3-7.
103 Mania is called a species of viciousness at Republic 400b2 (cf. Meno, 91c, Rep., 382c). In a 
number of passages it is linked with excessive appetite-gratification, or wantonness {Rep. 
400b, 403; Crat. 404a). It is linked with delusion, folly, and the ‘death’ of true opinion at 
Republic 539c, 573a-b and with the condition of slavery at Rep. 329c, Symp. 2isc-e.
104 It is linked particularly with the dominance of erotic appetite. On madness in Plato and its 
antecedents, see E. R. Dodds, Die Greeks and the Irrational (Berkeley, 1951), esp. chs. 2 and 7.
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characteristic object.10® How could such unteachable forces be indices of the 
good? And emotions, although somewhat more responsive to education, 
require continual control by the intellect (and are always potentially 
dangerous). In the Phaedo, too, both the appetites and emotions were held to 
be unsuitable guides for human action.106 Only the intellect can reliably guide a 
human being towards the good and valuable. ‘The life of the philosopher’, as 
Nussbaum puts it, ‘achieves order, stability, and insight at the price of denying 
the sight of the body and the value of individual love’.10? The picture of moral 
and cognitive development in the middle dialogues, therefore, is one of a 
progressive detachment from the other parts of the personality. The more a 
person can allow the intellect to go off by itself, unmixed, unaffected, the more 
fully will true philosophical understanding be achieved.
However, in the Phaedrus philosophy itself is said to be a form of 
madness, of not purely intellectual activity, in which intellect is guided to 
insight by eros itself and by a complex passion-engendered ferment of the 
entire personality. ‘The best things we have’, Socrates tells us, ‘come from 
madness, when it is given as a gift of the god’.108 In fact, the inspired kind of 
prophecy, mantic, is ‘more perfect and more admirable’ than ‘sign-based 
prediction’, i.e., the prediction of reasonable men.10” Similarly, ‘madness 
(mania) from a god is finer than self-control of human origin’.110 Socrates 
applies these observations to the case of eros: the ‘disturbed’ friend or lover 
(philos) should be preferred to the one who is ‘in control of himself.111 The 
implication here is that the thoroughly self-possessed person, who subdues 
emotion and feeling to techne, will neither aid his city much through prophecy,
105 See D. Roochnik, Beautiful city (Ithaca, N.Y., 2003); C. Baracchi, Of myth, life, and war in 
Plato’s Republic (Bloomington, Ind., 2002); C. Bobonich, Plato’s Utopia Recast (Oxford, 
2002); H. Lawson-Tancred, Plato's Republic and the Greek Enlightenment (Bristol, 1998); and 
R. Kraut, Plato’s Republic (Oxford, 1997).
106 For more information see, G. J. Beets, From time to eternity: a companion to Plato’s 
Phaedo (Baam, 2003); P.J. Ahrensdorf, The death o f Socrates and the life o f philosophy 
(Albany, N.Y., 1995); and K. Dorter, Plato’s Phaedo (Toronto, 1982).
107 Nussbaum, Fragility, p. 201.
108 Phaedr., 244a.
109 Ibid., 244d. On this view of prophecy and its religious background see, Dodds, Greeks and 
the Irrational, ch. 2, and W. K. C. Guthrie, A History o f Greek Philosophy, 6 vols. (Cambridge, 
1962-1981), IV, p. 417 , who argues that the Phaedrus marks an important change in Plato’s 
view.
110 Phaedr., 2446..
111 Phaedr., 245b.
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nor achieve honour and fame as a poetic teacher, nor be the best sort of lover. 
Socrates is claiming, in short, that certain sorts of essential and high insights 
come to us only through the guidance of the passions, which, thereafter, are in 
need of interpretation. What follows will be, he says, a ‘proof of the truth of 
these claims.112
Socrates’ story of the growth of the soul’s wings shows us what lies behind 
this claim. The non-intellectual elements have a keen natural responsiveness 
to beauty, especially when beauty is presented through the sense of sight. 
Beauty is, among the valuable things in the world, ‘the most clearly visible and 
the most loved’.,i3 We ‘grasp it sparkling through the clearest of our senses’,1* 
this stirs our emotions and appetites, motivating us to undertake its pursuit. 
Earthly examples of justice and practical wisdom, since they ‘do not shine out 
through their images’,1* are harder to discern -  and so do not engage the 
guiding appetites and emotions. Occasionally, the sight of beauty arouses only 
a brutish appetite for intercourse, unconnected with deeper feelings.116 
However, in a person of good nature and training, the sensual response is 
linked with (and arouses) complicated emotions of fear, awe, and respect, that 
themselves develop and educate the personality as a whole, making it both 
more discriminating and more receptive.11? As Nussbaum points out, the role 
of emotion and appetite as guides is motivational: they move the whole person 
towards the good. But it is also cognitive: they give the whole person 
information as to where goodness and beauty are, searching out and selecting, 
themselves, the beautiful objects.118 One advances towards understanding, 
therefore, by pursuing one’s complex emotional responses to the beautiful -  
and this would not have been accessible to intellect alone. In order to be 
moved towards beauty a soul must, first of all, be open and receptive. The 
stream of beauty that pours into him through his eyes and waters the growth
112 Ibid., 245c.
“ 3 Ibid., 250e.
•* Ibid., 25od.
“s Ibid., 250b.
116 Ibid., 25oe-25ia.
u? See Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty o f the Good (London, 1970), pp. 59-60, 84-6, where 
these points receive illuminating discussion with reference to the Phaedrus.
118 Nussbaum, Fragility, p. 216.
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of his wings, must be admitted by every part of the soul.11? The whole soul 
seethes and throbs in this condition:
‘Like a child whose teeth are just starting to grow in, and its gums are all 
aching and itching -  that is exactly how the soul feels when it begins to grow 
wings. It swells up and aches and tingles as it grows them’. 120
Receiving the other person’s soul, allowing it to melt the hard or impassive 
parts of him, he feels the sudden release of pent-up liquid within him, which 
makes of him another flowing, liquid light. Thus transformed, he has access to 
insights that are unavailable to the non-lover.121
Here, therefore, intellectual activity emerges as something different in 
structure from the pure and stable contemplation of the Republic. As the 
philosopher reaches out towards truth, his mental aspiration has an internal 
structure closely akin to that of the lover’s sexual yearnings. The story of the 
growth of the wings uses unmistakably sexual metaphors to characterise the 
receptivity and growth of the entire soul. Intellect, no longer separated from 
the other parts, searches for truth in a way that would not meet the demands 
of the middle dialogues for purity and stability. As for Truth, intellect still 
attains to that. However, not all of its most valuable truths will be universal 
accounts or definitions of the sort required by the middle dialogues. Yet 
Socrates insists that it is insight nonetheless, insight crucial to moral and 
intellectual development.
It is also important to note that the action of this dialogue illustrates its 
view of learning122 of true persuasion. It begins when an older man pauses, 
struck by a younger one. He notes a kinship between the young man’s 
character and his own.“3 Their shared aspirations (i.e., love of learning), like 
‘branches of fruit’ held before hungry animals,^ lead him to venture, in 
Phaedrus’ company, outside the city walls. Together they pursue their deep
" 9  Phaedr., 25ib-c.
120 Ibid., 251c.
121 Ibid., 255d.; 239c. See Anne Lebeck, The Central Myth of Plato’s Phaedrus', GRBS, 13 
(1972), pp. 267-90.
122 See Lebeck, ‘Central Myth’, pp. 280-3.
123 Phaedr., 228a.
“ 4 Phaedr., 230d.
46
concerns, receiving the influence of this wild and sensuous place.12® Although 
in some sense Socrates is the teacher, the process of education that we see 
(like the one we hear described) involves, on both sides, madness and 
receptivity. For example, Socrates, going outside his usual haunts, is 
transported through Phaedrus’ influence,126 and Phaedrus leaves aside the 
sheltering structure of his previous assumptions. On both sides we find 
emotions of wonder and awe, a careful concern for the other’s separate needs 
and aspirations. Each discovers more about his own aims as he sees them 
reflected in another soul; each, responding with awe to the other’s soul, elicits 
from his own a deeper beauty. (For wasn’t  it the thought of Phaedrus 
accepting the proposals of Lysias that made Socrates long to express a more 
complicated ideal of rationality?)
In a similar manner, friends or lovers, once they have found one another, 
treat with respect the other’s separate choices, fostering continuing 
development towards the flourishing of their deepest aspirations.12? And 
showing ‘no envy, no mean-spirited lack of generosity’, towards the other, but 
genuinely benefiting him for his own sake. It is of fundamental importance, 
then, that the lover be one who is ‘not pretending [passion]’, but ‘is truly in the 
throes of love’.128 The best human life, therefore, involves ongoing devotion to 
another person. It involves shared intellectual activity, but it also involves 
shared appetite and emotional feeling. However, it is important to note that 
the life of the lover’s madness is not defended as the best life for a god. Rather, 
it is defended as the best life for a human being, a being with human cognitive 
limits and prospects. Here what is most striking is that Plato shows himself (as 
elsewhere in the later dialogues) ready to judge questions about the best life 
from the point of view of the interests, needs, and limits of the being in 
question. The best life for a human being is found not by abstracting from the
125 For partnership in search of truth see, Gorg., 487b, c, e; Protag., 336b; and Meno, 84c. Of 
course, in the instance of Callicles, Socrates is ironical. The opposite is the case -  Callicles is 
neither conscientious nor well-disposed toward the discussion. Nevertheless, Socrates 
describes what is indispensable to fruitful communication and inquiry.
126 Phaedr., 2346,238d, 23ie.
“7 Ibid., 252d-e.
128 Ibid., 253b; 255a.
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peculiarities of our complex nature, but by exploring that nature and the way 
of life that it constitutes.12*
This brings us to the question of the nature and limitations of rhetoric, 
and the conditions under which philosophical dialogue (the only ‘true 
persuasive art’) is possible. Indeed, Plato’s effort to differentiate the inferior 
kind of eros from the divine sort is relevant to the pointed critique of rhetoric 
that pervades the dialogue.^0 Pre-eminently, the true rhetorician (i.e., the 
dialectician) is a participant in higher madness and, therefore, eagerly pursues 
knowledge of ideal realities. Unlike the common pleader before court or 
assembly, he does not marshal his argument in the service of private and 
factional concerns, for he has become liberated from ungenerous love.^1 The 
dialogue’s distinction between two kinds of love^2 is essential for enforcing 
what Plato had already initiated elsewhere, namely, that rhetoric is but an 
instrument of self-advantage. In the Protagoras, for example, rhetoric is 
portrayed as no more than a way of gaining affluence, prerogative, and 
dominion in politics.^ All discussion, private or public, which is motivated by 
jealous self-interest is not an instrument of truth, but, as suggested (but not 
fully explored) in the Republic, merely a tool for the acquisition of power or 
the successful merchandising of singular causes.^ So the incentives 
prompting discourse ought not to be, as with Euthydemus, pride of victory in 
oral combat, or, as deprecated in the Phaedrus, anxious quest for honours and 
fame for eloquence and wisdom.^ The motivation for any discussion or debate 
is endeavour after truth, and on the assumption that it yet remains to be 
found.
It should be clear by now that for Plato the philosopher is the true 
rhetorician. Of him it may be said that, by persuasion and education, he guides 
his fellow seekers along the avenue of truth. He exhibits no jealousy or
l2* See M. Nussbaum, ‘ “This story isn’t true”: poetry, goodness, and understanding in Plato’s 
Phaedrus’, in Plato on Beauty, Wisdom and the Arts, ed. J. Moravcsik and P. Temko (Totowa, 
N.J., 1982), pp. 79-124. Also see, J. Cropsey, Plato’s World (Chicago, 1995).
*3° See Phaedr., 266a.
Cushman, Therapeia, p. 225.
•3“ Phaedr. 266a.
«3 Prota., 3i8e.
J34 Rep., 365d.
»35 Phaedr., 258a-e.
4 8
pettiness toward his companions, but strives earnestly to conduct them in the 
direction of a reality they mutually seek.^ The true persuasive art is comprised 
of ‘fair and free discussions’ whose single purpose is the discovery of truth. 
Plato believes that one important reason for the resolute ignorance of perverse 
humanity was its almost total unfamiliarity with unprejudiced discussion:
‘Nor have they listened sufficiently to fine and free arguments that search out 
the truth in every way for the sake of knowledge but that keep away from the 
sophistications and eristic quibbles that, both in public trials and in private 
gatherings, aim at nothing except reputation and disputation’. «7
In Letter VII Plato asserts that what is required in pedagogy is enquiry after 
truths, ‘pupil and teacher asking and answering questions in good will and 
without envy’.*38 The purpose of discussion, the Philebus insists, is not victory 
in debate but single-hearted devotion to truth: ‘we are not contending here out 
of love of victory for my suggestion to win or for yours. We ought to act 
together as allies in support of the truest one’.^  Philosophical dialogue, 
therefore, is not possible with ju st anyone and under any circumstances. It is 
possible only if each participant is dedicated to the discovery of truth in a free 
and fair discussion, and if each assumes that the other is motivated not by a 
desire to ‘win’ but by love of learning.*0
This fundamental condition of ‘true philosophy’ implies another 
condition: sincerity. Each participant must assent wholeheartedly when he 
assents, or dissent in good faith and defend his dissent with arguments. Thus, 
in the Gorgias, when Callicles says he will assent just so Socrates can proceed 
with his argument, Socrates reproaches him: “You’re wrecking your earlier 
statements, Callicles, and you’d no longer be adequately inquiring into the 
truth of the matter with me if you speak contrary to what you think’.*1 Finally,
*36 Ibid., 253a.
*37 Rep., 499a.
*3® L.VII, 344b.
‘39 Phil, 14b.
140 See C. Perelman, and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric (London, 1969), p. 37: 
‘Dialogue, as we consider it, is not supposed to be a debate, in which the partisans of opposed 
settled convictions defend their respective views, but rather a discussion, in which the 
interlocutors search honestly and without bias for the best solution to a controversial problem’.
141 Gorg., 495a. In these circumstances, it is hardly surprising that dialogue with Callicles is 
impossible, or at least fruitless. He refuses to conform to the general conditions of 
philosophical inquiry, laid down earlier in the dialogue, when Socrates analyses the nature of 
conflict between defenders of rival positions and suggests that they often descend into
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Socratic dialogue is based on the conviction that, as Socrates tells us in the 
Phaedo, ‘when men are interrogated in the right manner, they always give the 
right answer’.1** And the method by which truth is to be sought in dialogue is 
dialectic. ^ 3
But just what is dialectic in Plato?1** It is generally recognised today that it 
began with those dialogues which direct and guide the interlocutor -  the sort 
of dialogue for which Socrates is famous and which made his life such a signal 
event in European history. *5 It is in Plato’s critique of rhetoric in the Phaedrus 
that we find the plainest presentation of dialectic. It is no accident that the 
theory of dialectic should be presented in the context of the critique of 
rhetoric. Indeed, Plato gradually came to acknowledge a measure of similarity 
between the persuasiveness of rhetoric and the work of the dialectician. After 
all, neither could claim to secure incontrovertible truth. ‘However different 
dialectic and rhetoric might be in other fundamental respects’, as Robert 
Cushman puts it, hoth deal with kinds of truth not logically enforceable -  the 
one with matters of doxa, the other with those of noesis’.*6 Although the art of
vituperation and invective because they imagine that every criticism made of their positions 
proceeds from 01-will rather than from the desire to learn the truth (ibid., 457).
142 Phd., 73a-b.
^3 Perhaps the most interesting thing about the Platonic dialogues is Plato’s constant insistence 
that the dialectical method (which is anchored within the matrix of conversational inquiry) is 
itself only properly portrayed through the dialogue form. According to Levi, ‘Philosophy as 
Literature, p. 17, here is where the theory of Plato and that of Wittgenstein join, for they both 
reveal that philosophising is intrinsically dramatic, that the forms of philosophising which are 
concerned with proof are by nature the most ponderous and static, and that those which aim to 
clarify, or discover, or make things ‘shine forth’ are the most brilliant, absorbing, and exciting.
144 In die Meno, with its superb illustration of the method of elenchos, Plato makes it clear that 
the crux of the process is joint-inquiry: ‘he will discover by searching with me’ (84c; cf. ibid., 
8id, 86c; Protag., 352e; Gorg., 472b, 487c; Soph., 218b). For more information see, Gadamer 
Plato’s Dialectical Ethics; id., Dialogue and Dialectic; G. Pendrick, ‘Platon and Dialectic’, 
Rheinisches Museum (1998), pp. 10-24; and Sinaiko, Love, Knowledge, and Discourse in 
Plato, pp. 1-21.
145 However, as Gadamer notes, ‘what we have now generally come to call dialectic can only 
partially be accounted for in terms of its origin in dialogue. The reason we call Hegel’s 
procedure dialectic is not that it can be said to originate in dialogue but that it is based in 
thinking in contradictions. The source here is Eleatic dialectic: the skill of developing the 
consequences of opposed assumptions even while one is still ignorant of the “what” of what one 
is talking about. That is the skill which we find first displayed in Zeno and in Plato’s 
Parmenides and which since Aristotle has been called dialectic’ (Gadamer, Dialogue and 
Dialectic, p. 94).
146 R. Cushman, Therapeia: Plato’s Conception o f Philosophy (Westport, Conn., 1958), p. 221.
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rhetoric strives for persuasion rather than for true shared understanding, it 
reflects the structure of dialectic.1*?
The reader may well object that, unlike the rhetorician, the dialectician 
sets out upon a way of inquiry that is not fully charted -  its end results are 
determined only by the course of the discussion. The bad rhetorician, in 
contrast, pre-determines its goal and then justifies it. ‘He doesn’t even start 
from the beginning, but from the end, making his speech swim upstream on 
its back’.1*8 Moreover, when delivering a speech, the rhetorician addresses 
himself not to an individual -  with whom he might seek to arrive at a 
substantive shared understanding -  but to a crowd, with which a substantive 
shared understanding is impossible.1** But Plato nevertheless shows that the 
skilful mastery of rhetoric itself requires dialectical understanding. Like the 
dialectician, he (being unable to assure himself -  through questioning -  that 
his listeners are with him) must exhibit the facts of the matter as he wants 
them to be understood. The rhetorician, of course, cannot present the facts of 
the matter as they actually stand. In presenting the argument he must, at all 
times, consider who his audience is and what is their opinion. Still, insofar as 
his aim is to bring about understanding of the subject-matter in the manner 
that he himself regards it, the process of its unveiling (an unveiling that 
actually depends on tricks) must be guided by an insight into the matter’s true 
being and its true grounds. In order to be able to deceive, in short, one must 
know what the facts of the matter really are. One must know in what ways 
falsehoods most closely resemble those facts with a view to leading the 
audience, step by step, to the intended deception.^ As Gadamer puts it, 
‘deception is successful only when one gives out in place of the facts of the 
matter something that looks like them’.1*1
•*? Gadamer, Plato’s Dialectical Ethics, p. 84, calls it a ‘semblance’ of dialectic.
148 Phaedr., 264a.
149 If for no other reason than because the crowd cannot answer.
is° Phaedr., 262a-b.
151 Gadamer, Plato’s Dialectical Ethics., pp. 84-5. Still, for Plato (as he makes clear in the 
Republic) there is a difference between ‘lies’ that are unharmfiil and get at the truth (as in his 
pseudos/myth of the metals), and those deceptions that are not only untrue but also harmful. 
Here, in Phaedrus, he is arguing that false rhetoric harms and actually even intends to do this.
51
The first requirement for true dialogue, therefore, is agreement on the 
definition of the theme of the dialogue. Only in this way, Socrates asserts, will 
the dialogue achieve concord:
‘If you wish to reach a good decision on any topic, my boy, there is only one 
way to begin: You must know what the decision is about, or else you are 
bound to miss your target altogether. Ordinary people cannot see that they do 
not know the true nature of a particular subject, so they proceed as if they did; 
and because they do not work out an agreement at the start of the enquiiy, 
they wind up as you would expect -  in conflict with themselves and each 
other’.1®2
So a person who wants to impart good, beneficial advice must first secure a 
uniform understanding of what the discussion is about, which everything 
subsequent must be understood in relation to.1®® If one omits this step the 
discussion is bound to be fruitless.1®* One cannot be certain of remaining in 
harmony either with oneself or with one’s listeners. ‘Just so’, Socrates tells 
Phaedrus, ‘with our discussion of love: Whether its definition was or was not 
correct, at least it allowed the speech to proceed clearly and consistently with 
itself .•s® Only in this way, will we be able to make declarations about ‘love’ 
which are not determined by accidental experiences (and so refutable by the 
same), but instead necessarily apply to it in accordance with its own essence. 
Thus, bringing out and appropriating this unifying point of view is a condition 
of the possibility of true rhetoric.
However, as Socrates’ two speeches demonstrate (in particular the 
substantive contrast between them), a general agreement about the unitary 
essence of love does not necessarily adequately fulfil the requirement of unity. 
‘Madness’ does not yet sufficiently grasp the specific being of love. There are 
other kinds of madness that are not love. So this characterisation has to be 
divided into kinds, in order to grasp the specific essence of love. The 
dialectician, furthermore, must ‘be able to cut up each kind according to its
'®2 Phaedr., 237c.
1®3 Ibid., 263e.
•®4 See Gorg., 457c; Phaedr., 237c, 26sd; Soph., 218c. Furthermore, the power of disputation is 
so great that, ‘many fall into it against their wills’. ‘They think they are having not a quarrel but 
a conversation, because they are unable to examine what has been said by dividing it up 
according to forms. Hence, they pursue mere verbal contradictions of what has been said and 
have a quarrel rather than a conversation’ (Rep., 454a).
•s® Phaedr., 26sd.
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species along its natural joints, and to try not to splinter any part, as a bad 
butcher might do’.^6 In other words, the proposed eidos cannot be divided 
blindly or arbitrarily but at the parts that are inherent in it (its ‘joints’).157 Only 
by such division (of a unity into unities) do we arrive at the oikeios logos or the 
adequate characterisation (‘fitting account’) of its being. ‘A logos that 
characterises’, as Gadamer concludes, ‘[the eidos] in such a way that it 
prevents one person from conceiving what is being addressed in one way and 
another person in another way’.^8 Now, Socrates’ first speech makes an error 
in this process of division. The speech pretends that eveiy kind of madness is 
opposed to prudence, because it is bad. It ignores the fact that madness is not 
absolutely bad. In fact, by passing over god-sent madness, the speech succeeds 
in its aim of disparaging love. The conscious use of such a speech would, then, 
be important for a speaker who (in the example that is discussed) intends to 
win a boy for his erotic enjoyment without presenting himself as being in love 
(and who must therefore persuade the boy that love is something bad). The 
implication here is that dialectic is a pre-requisite for the artful mastery of 
speech. It is, in Gadamer’s words, ‘the ability to draw together the manifold of 
what is experienced into a selfsame single thing and to make the specific eidos 
of the intended thing available with the aid of this universal unity of the horos 
Qimit, definition)’.^  Only on the basis of such knowledge is rhetoric able to 
substitute for the true logos, one which, while false, resembles the true one. 
For ‘it is only from the undisguised thing itself that one can learn what looks 
so similar to it, without being it, that one can pass it off as the thing itself.160
But dialectic also has a special function within the specific activity of true 
rhetoric.161 One of the main objectives of the Phaedrus is to show that a real 
(as distinguished from a pseudo), art of speech does exist, but it needs 
definition. And this is impossible without the help of dialectic, because it is 
involved in the very structure of techne itself. Every techne requires an insight
is6 Phaedr., 265c.
157 Thus, within irrational appetite, Socrates’ first speech distinguished between gluttony,
drunkenness, and, in the third place, love; and likewise, in the second speech, between the four 
kinds of divine madness. 
is® Gadamer, Plato’s Dialectical Ethics, p. 87.
^ 9  Ibid., p. 88.
160 Ibid.
161 Phaedr., 266c ff.
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into the nature of what it deals with. So besides the knowledge of the various 
techniques of speech, the true art of rhetoric requires an insight into the 
nature of what this persuasive speech is supposed to be applied to -  namely, 
the human psyche. As Socrates explains,
‘Clearly, Thrasymachus and anyone else who teaches the art of rhetoric 
seriously will, first, describe the soul with absolute precision and enable us to 
understand what it is: whether it is one and homogeneous by nature or takes 
many forms, like the shape of bodies, since, ... that’s what takes to 
demonstrate the nature of something.... Second, he will explain how, in virtue 
of its nature, it acts and is acted upon by certain things. ... Third, he will 
classify the lands of speech and of soul there are, as well as the various ways 
in which they are affected, and explain what causes each. He will then 
coordinate each kind of soul with the kind appropriate to it. And he will give 
instructions concerning the reasons why one kind of soul is necessarily 
convinced by one kind of speech while another necessarily remains 
unconvinced’.162
Only from a mastery of these elements through dialectic is a true art of 
rhetoric possible. Socrates begins with propositions to which the interlocutor 
assents, and leads him to a conclusion which he must accept if he is not to 
declare himself illogical. His goal is to produce coherence in a person’s beliefs. 
This coherence is necessary both for personal integrity and for spiritual health, 
for, as Socrates tells Callicles,
‘if you leave this unrefuted, then by the Dog, the god of the Egyptians, 
Callicles will not agree with you, Callicles, but will be dissonant with you all 
your life long. And yet for my part, my good man, I think it’s better to have my 
lyre or a chorus that I might lead out of time and dissonant, and have the vast 
majority of men disagree with me and contradict me, than to be out of 
harmony with myself, to contradict myself, though I’m only one person’.163
The aim of dialectic, therefore, is to bring a person’s beliefs and conduct into 
harmony with those truths which he ‘knows’ but does not recognise as 
incompatible with the beliefs he has come to accept because of his 
enslavement to appearances. This harmony or coherence is, as we know from 
Hippocrates, the condition of health,164 and in Plato the dialectician is often 
described as the doctor of the soul.163
162 Ibid., 27ia-b.
163 Gorg., 482b.
164 Hippocrates, On the Nature o f Man; cited in M. Clagett, Greek Science in Antiquity (N.Y., 
1 9 5 5 ), P- 4 0 .
163 Gorg., 475d. The medical metaphor suggests a conception of the Socratic dialogue as 
therapeutic. The doctor’s art is directed to curing individuals, and the therapy applied must be
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So dialectic (and, with it, true persuasion) proceeds from certain premises 
and in an order determined by the background and convictions of the 
interlocutor. It depends as well, as I have suggested, on the individual 
character of the interlocutor. In fact, only if he is the right kind of person can 
he be brought to ‘say the right things’. If this and the other conditions of 
dialogue are met, then we can hope to cause the interlocutor to persuade 
himself by leading him from one proposition which he accepts to others 
logically implied by it. This self-persuasion is the goal of ‘true rhetoric’.166 
Unlike the inadequate kind of rhetoric (which Plato has described as pre­
determining its goal and then justifying it), dialectic sets out upon a way of 
inquiry that is by no means fully charted. Its end results are to be determined 
only by the course of the discussion. It is for this reason that, ‘proceeding by 
any other method would be like walking with the blind’.16? Dialectic is a real 
art, not a ‘knack’; it does not engraft other men’s opinions, instead, it produces 
conviction in the soul.168 (And that conviction is the foundational truth of the 
way things necessarily are and the discussion, all discussion ends.) 
Furthermore, there is Plato’s repeated insistence that the true persuasive art is 
ajoint-inquiiy:
‘Only when all of these things -  names, definitions, and visual and other 
perceptions -  have been rubbed against one another and tested, pupil and 
teacher asking and answering questions in good will and without envy -  only 
then, when reason and knowledge are at the very extremity of human effort, 
can they illuminate the nature of any object’.168
adapted to the particular case being treated. Now, this situationality of the philosopher- 
doctor’s activity suggests a connection between philosophical therapy and rhetoric, and 
indicates the relationship between the ‘dramatic impulse’ in philosophy and a rhetorical 
perspective.
166 It is for this reason that the Socratic pursuit of knowledge is always individual and personal. 
(And it is also the reason that the dialogue is for Plato the only valid form by which to represent 
this pursuit.) The argument must always begin from a premise accepted by the interlocutor -  
and what is acceptable depends upon the individual involved.
167 Phaedr., zjoe; cf. ibid., 269b-c: The reason they cannot define rhetoric is that they are 
ignorant of dialect. It is their ignorance that makes them think they have discovered what 
rhetoric is when they have understood only what it is necessary to learn as preliminaries’.
168 Ibid., 271a; 276e-277a.
168 L.VII, 344b. Also see ibid., 344c: ‘For this reason anyone who is seriously studying high 
matters will be the last to write about them and thus expose his thought to the envy and 
criticism of men. What I have said comes, in short, to this: whenever we see a book, whether 
the laws of a legislator or a composition on any other subject, we can be sure that if the author 
is really serious, this book does not contain his best thoughts; they are stored away with the 
fairest of his possessions. And if he has committed these serious thoughts to writing, it is 
because men, not the gods, "have taken his wits away”.’
55
Plato’s notion of co-operative investigation reveals a distinctive feature of 
dialectic as elenchos or cross-examination, as well as the way in which it is 
truly an irenic art. As shown earlier in this section, a number of Socratic 
dialogues begin with the confident assertion of a general position, made by a 
character over-optimistic about his grasp of certain practical problems. When 
an accounting is demanded, it transpires that this general assertion does not 
to cover all of the character’s more concrete beliefs regarding choice and value. 
The dramatic action consists in the ‘separation’ of the character from his false 
beliefs through painful learning. In the end, even if he does not arrive at the 
truth of what he most deeply believes, at least he acknowledges his own deep 
perplexity.1?0 Put differently, the elenchos separates him from the tumouros 
growth of arrogant false belief, preparing the way for healthy growth:
The people who are being examined ... get angry at themselves, and become 
calmer toward others. They lose their inflated and rigid beliefs about 
themselves that way, and no loss is pleasanter to hear or has more lasting 
effect on them. ... The people who cleanse the soul... think the soul... won’t 
get any advantage from any learning that’s offered to it until someone shames 
it by refuting it, removes the opinions that interfere with learning, and 
exhibits it cleansed, believing that it knows only those things that it does 
know, and nothing more’.1?1
The Socratic discovery is that a person’s average self-understanding contents 
itself with the mere appearance of knowledge and cannot give an accounting of 
itself.172
As refutation, Socrates’ questioning takes the form of irony. As is well 
known, Socrates approaches the other person not in the manner of one who 
knows and who wants (through his superior knowledge) to refute the other 
person’s claim, but rather in apparent inferiority, as someone who does not 
himself know. The irony appears, first, in the fact that he takes the other 
person’s claim to knowledge as one that is fulfilled. A typical form of this irony
‘?° The reader, it is important to remember, should be engaged in a similar sorting process.
171 Soph., 23ob-d.
172 Even when the initial topic of the conversation is not knowledge about a one’s own being but 
a claim to knowledge in a specific area, the Socratic testing of this claim leads back to oneself: 
‘You don’t appear to me to know that whoever comes into close contact with Socrates and 
associates with him in conversation must necessarily, even if he began by conversing about 
something quite different in the first place, keep on being led about by the man’s arguments 
until he submits to answering questions about himself concerning both his present manner of 
life and the life he has lived hitherto’ (Laches i87e).
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is when Socrates declares himself to be satisfied with the other person’s 
answer ‘except for a minor detail’.™ Socrates starts his refutation, therefore, 
not as a refutation but as a request for further information. In other words, he 
takes the answer as an explanation that is in fact derived from an 
understanding of the subject. It is an explanation that implicitly addresses 
what he still does not understand, and only needs to have spelled out in more 
detail. If this supplementary explanation does not materialise in a satisfactory 
form, the thesis itself is refuted. After all, part of the meaning of genuine 
substantive explanation is that it can continually justify and clarify itself by 
drawing on the understanding of the facts of the matter from which it is 
derived.™
Socratic refutation, therefore, has an eristic character. It is important to 
note, however, that this does not mean that this process of entangling the 
opponent in contradictions with logical traps is aimed at exposing him in his 
inability to detect logical errors. In fact, as Gadamer argues, ‘the goal of 
refutation is absolutely the sole motive in the process: the goal, that is, of 
bringing the opponent to grant the validity of a thesis the consequences of 
which prove to be incompatible with his own thesis’.™ So the fact that Socrates 
tries to defeat his opponent not only by means of genuine logical consistency 
but also by means of his own sophistical weapons does not cast doubt on the 
substantiveness of his intentions. It is precisely because what is important to 
him is not refutation per se, but liberating his opponent, that he can dispute 
with him in such a manner. With remarkable psychological insight, Plato (or 
perhaps Socrates) discerned that all argument is trifling and all demonstration 
is superficial which does not really involve the person of the investigator, his 
essential mind and genuine convictions, whether true or false. The 
accomplished rhetorician, even if he wins conviction, typically leaves those 
who ‘believe’ hesitant to admit that his contentions are their own. With the 
elenchos, in contrast, the participants are jointly engaged in sifting the
™ See, e.g., Prot., 329b.
™ A sophistic discourse fails to meet this requirement because the speaker did not acquire the 
thesis with a view to the facts of the matter but rather with a view to its effectiveness in 
impressing the people around him. This is clear, for example, in the fact that the sophist tries to 
make things appear to follow from his thesis that do not follow from it at all.
™ Gadamer, Plato’s Dialectical Ethics, p. 57.
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evidence; they ‘plant seeds’ in one another, and are ‘parents’ of truth and 
understanding in one another:
‘The dialectician chooses a proper soul and plants and sows within it a 
discourse accompanied by knowledge -  discourse capable of helping itself as 
well as the man who planted it, which is not barren but produces a seed from 
which more discourse grows in the character of others. Such discourse makes 
the seed forever immortal and renders the man who has it as happy as any 
human being can be’.1?6
Elenchos, then, approximates more closely the true art of persuasion -  where 
it secures real commitment of the mind of the participants. The results of 
discussion, insofar as they are negative, will not be refutations of opponents, 
but self-refutations of colleagues. As Socrates says to Alcibiades, ‘you are 
impeached of this by your own words out of your own mouth’.1??
But one problem seems yet unsolved -  namely, that the Phaedrus is also a 
dialogue about the making of beautiful speeches. After all, Socrates’ criticism 
of Lysias’ speech is addressed to its style as well as its content, and shows us 
how thoroughly interwoven these are. The education of Phaedrus through the 
great second speech is a development of his stylistic tastes as well as his moral 
imagination. And, as we might expect, Plato’s new thought about madness and 
the passions affects his own stylistic choices.1?8 Before we move on to the next 
section, it is important to recognise the implications of this work for the 
question of philosophy’s style and for the status of Plato’s ongoing argument 
with rhetoric.
In a number of dialogues Plato pointedly contrasts the orator and the poet 
on one hand and the philosopher on the other, rejecting the claim of both of 
the former to genuine understanding.1?’ There is, he remarks, ‘an ancient
J?6 Phaedr., 276e-277a.
17? Alcib., I, 118b; cf. Gorg., 472c; Meno, 8sd; Theaet., isod. If Plato’s Socrates increasingly 
gives up the attitude of the questioner and tester, and if the discussion leader in the later 
dialogues himself becomes the person who claims knowledge, still it is not without reason that 
the dialogue continues to be the form in which this knowledge is effected. After all, even in 
those dialogues it is the leader himself who continually subjects what he says to this testing and 
proves the claim to knowledge which his speech contains by coming to an understanding with 
the others. The dialogue form allows him continually to make sure that the other person is with 
him in the process of opening up the facts of the matter and thus protects his own speech from 
falling into an empty speech that loses the seen object from view. 
i78 Nussbaum, Fragility, p. 223.
•79 See the articles in the collections Plato on poetry, ed. P. Murray (Cambridge, 1996); and 
Plato on Beauty. Also see, Z. Planinc, Plato through Homer (Columbia, 2003); G. Ledbetter,
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quarrel between it [poetry] and philosophy.180 The poet is characterised 
consistently, in the Apology, Ion, Meno, and in Book X of the Republic, as a 
person who works in a state of irrational inspiration, and whose creations are 
expressive of this state. The rhetorician is, of course, not treated any better 
than the poet. He is accused of teaching that ‘what is likely must be held in 
higher honor than what is true’, and of making ‘by the power of their language 
... small things appear great and great things small’.181 Both the sophists and 
the poets are contrasted in a negative manner with the philosophers. Unlike 
them, philosophers ‘are not the servants but the masters of our discussions. 
Our arguments are our own, like slaves; each one must wait about for us, to be 
finished whenever we think fit. We have no jury, and no audience (as the 
dramatic poets have), sitting in control over us, ready to criticise and give 
orders’.182
The Phaedrus, as seen earlier, tells us that all writing is merely a 
‘reminder’: the real activity of teaching and learning goes on not on the page 
but in the souls of people in dialogue and discussion.188 However, our view of 
how a soul learns (and with which parts), will surely affect our view about how 
a written text should perform its own (limited) function. Now, from the very 
beginning of the Phaedrus, one suspects that some reassessment is taking 
place. Phaedrus asks Socrates whether he believes in the truth of the myth of 
Boreas.1* Socrates, in reply, talks harshly of some ‘intellectuals’ who doubt the 
truth of myths and, using some sort of crude science devise rationalising 
explanations for their origin.188 Here it is important to note that while Plato has 
used myths of his own devising to reinforce his philosophical arguments, he
Poetics before Plato (Princeton, N.J., 2003); and J. Walker, Rhetoric and Poetics in Antiquity 
(N.Y., 2000).
180 Rep. X.6o7b.
181 Phaedr., 267a; cf. Euthyd., 272c; Soph., 225c; Gorg., 453a, 457d.
182 Theat., 173c.
183 The Phaedrus’ relation to its own remarks on writing is discussed by many writers,
including C. Griswold, ‘Style and philosophy: the case of Plato’s dialogues’, Monist, 63 (1980),
pp. 530-56; R. Burger, Plato’s Phaedrus (Birmingham, 1980); Sinaiko, Love, Knowledge, and 
Discourse, pp. 22-118; and Derrida, ‘La pharmacie de platon’, pp. 69-197.
184 Phaedr., 229c. According to legend, a virginal girl (Orithuia, daughter of the Athenian king
Erechtheus), who was playing with Nymphs along near the banks of the Ilisus river (the very 
place where Socrates and Phaedrus had their conversation), was abducted by the passionate 
wind-god Boreas, who had fallen in love with her.
188 Ibid., 229d-e.
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has been at the forefront of the attack upon legends of the dubious exploits of 
the gods.186 Indeed, the Republic would have instantly rejected the truth claim 
of this story of a god’s eros. And it would have denounced it further for its 
appeal to the lower parts of the soul. Yet, here Socrates defends the passionate 
myth as a source of insight (in keeping with the new view of insight that he is 
about to develop).
Our next surprise comes in Socrates’ criticism of Lysias’ prose -  where the 
orator is praised for speaking in ‘a clear and concise manner, with a precise 
turn of phrase’, but censured, among other things, for his lack of interest in his 
subject.18? Again, we remember that the orators Oike the poets) had been 
criticised precisely because they wrote in a state of passionate arousal. Now 
Plato appears to be reopening the question regarding the proper relation 
between a view and its author. More significant still, is the role poetry plays in 
Socrates’ second speech. It is said to be the speech ‘of a poet, Stesichorus;188 
and in so saying Socrates assumes a disguise, and lies -  this could not have 
happened in the heroic literature of Ideal City. The mad (thus inspired) poet is 
ranked above the self-possessed craftsmanly poet, and honoured as a person 
whose works instruct and benefit prosperity.18* What is more, Socrates 
presents his teaching about the soul in the form of a ‘likeness’, teaching the 
truth through sensuous images.1*0 And he regards this ability to produce a 
likeness as sufficient to give him the right to call himself a philosopher (only a 
god, he implies, could do better).
So it is hardly surprising to find that, when Socrates later ranks lives in 
order of their excellence, the first place is occupied by a strange hybrid: a 
person who will be ‘a lover of wisdom or of beauty, or some follower of the
186 For more information see, K. Morgan, Myth and Philosophy from  the Presocratics to Plato 
(Cambridge, 2000); Luc Brisson, Plato the myth maker (Chicago, 111., 1998); and R. Zaslavsky, 
Platonic Myth and Platonic Writing (Washington, D.C., 1981).
187 Phaedr., 234e-235a.
188 Ibid., 244a.
189 Ibid., 245a: ‘If anyone comes to the gates of poetry and expects to become an adequate poet 
by acquiring expert knowledge of the subject without the Muses’ madness, he will fail, and his 
self-controlled verses will be eclipsed by the poetry of men who have been driven out of their 
minds’.
■9° See Phaedr., 246a-b: ‘Let us then liken the soul to the natural union of a team of winged 
horses and their charioteer. The gods have horses and charioteers that are themselves all good 
and come from good stock besides, while everyone else has a mixture’.
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Muses and a lover’.1?1 In the Republic, on the other hand, when lives are 
ranked, the philosopher is alone at the top.1?2 Now philosopher, image-maker 
and Muse-follower, lover -  all are seen as possessed types, and madness 
comes at the top.^3 It is important to note that it is unlikely that these changes 
would lead to a rehabilitation of those sophists and poets whose work Plato 
knew. Philosophical activity is still necessary for the highest sort of 
understanding. It is also necessary, as we have seen, for the highest sort of 
love. Hence, the change implies no softening towards the sophist or the non- 
philosophical poet. Yet, philosophy is now permitted to be an inspired magic, 
Muse-loving activity. In this conception it is more intimately related to poetry 
than Plato had hitherto led us to think. For example, it can make use of literary 
devices such as mythic narrative and metaphor in the centre of its teaching; 
and it can, like rhetoric and poetry, contain material expressive of (and 
arousing) a passional excitation. The remainder of the dialogue confirms this 
close relationship.
The myth of the cicadas1?? which follows Socrates’ second speech reminds 
us that philosophy, along with dance and erotic love, is one of the arts that 
made its appearance in the world with the advent of the Muses. The 
philosophical life is said to be a life dedicated to Calliope and Urania, that is, to 
the Muses ‘who preside over the heavens and all discourse, human and divine, 
and sing with the sweetest voice’.w So here philosophy is placed under the sign 
of the Muses. The implication is that Plato now acknowledges that rational 
speech itself starts out from premises that are not rational, because they are
1?1 Ibid., 248d.
192 In fact, his own kind of eros is sharply distinguished from theirs: it is ‘correct’ just because it 
has nothing to do with ‘mania or sexual desire’ (Rep., 403a).
l?3 Compare Rep. IX, 58ie ff., and Phd. 64c ff. In the middle dialogues it is never suggested that
poetry is anything but a very early stage in the future philosopher’s education, to be given up
for dialectic and its pure, non-sensuous deductions (cf. the criticism of the mathematicians for 
their use of sensible likeness). The Phaedo, like Rep. X, expresses uneasiness about this
dismissal of the poet. Socrates worries that he should after all practice the mousike that he has
deposed. (‘Mousike’ is the generic term Plato uses for the poetic-musical education received by 
young citizens, cf. Rep. ii-iii passim; 521b; 522a-b -  it corresponds, as training for the soul, to 
gumnastike as training for the body.) The proper connection between philosopher and the 
Muses is explicitly developed and stressed in the Phaedrus, where it emerges that the genuine
mousikos would not be just any well-brought-up person, but only someone whose life is 
devoted to the new form of philosophical art, which serves Calliope and Urania together.
199 Phaedr., 259b-d. 
l?s Ibid., 259d.
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based on first affirmations.1®6 Furthermore, as shown earlier, the dialogue 
breaks with the Gorgias’ very general condemnation of rhetoric, describing a 
‘true’ rhetorical art in which a central place is given to the knowledge of the 
souls of individuals. And, at the end of the dialogue, Socrates’ message to 
Lysias, Homer, and Solon (and anyone else who composes speeches, poetry or 
laws) tells them that Socrates and Phaedrus have heard the words they relay 
from the ‘spring which is sacred to the Nymphs’.1®? What the nymphs told 
them, apparently, is that
‘[i]f you can defend your writing when you are challenged, and if you can 
yourself make the argument that your writing is of little worth, then you must 
be called by a name not derived from these writings but rather from those 
things that you are seriously pursuing’.1®8
The philosopher, therefore, is the only true rhetorician and/or poet. In other 
words, rhetoric is philosophy if it is combined in the right way with answers 
and accounts, i.e., if pursued using the method of dialectic. What we see 
emerging, therefore, is not so much a rehabilitation of the old rhetoric, as a 
new understanding of philosophy, an understanding that reinterprets the 
distinction between philosophy and rhetoric. Not so much an acceptance of 
Lysias’ logoi, as an announcement that philosophy Oike Socrates), may have a 
more complex soul than has been imagined. In fact, we do not need to rely on 
meta-philosophical remarks to know this. After all, it is apparent that Plato’s 
praise of the inspired poet deeply affects the shape of his own discourse. This 
is clearly the dialogue of an inspired philosopher-poet. It uses metaphor, 
personification, colourful, rhythmic, and elaborate language. It makes its 
appeal to the imagination and the feelings as much as to the intellect. Finally, 
we must acknowledge that the whole of what we read here is a play, a dramatic 
representation. It is not a representation of ideally good or perfect people 
(both characters are self-critical, and both are in the process of growth and 
change). But it is this sort of representation that is now taken to be what the 
developing soul requires.1®® This dialogue may be our first example of the 
philosophical rhetoric that Plato has in mind. Nobody else has ever served the
1®6 E. Grassi, Rhetoric as Philosophy (University Park, Penn., 1980), p. 30-1. 
l®7 Phaedr., 278b-c.
1®8 Ibid., 278b-d.
l®9 See Lebeck, “The central myth of Plato’s Phaedrus’, pp. 267-90.
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Muses adequately together, combining the rigour of speculative argument with 
sensitive responses to the particulars of human experience.
These observations have been crudely general; they have accounted for 
only some features of Plato’s practice as a writer.200 But I hope to have opened 
an inquiry into the relationship between Platonic dialogue form and the 
content of Platonic ethics, an ethical conception in which much of our ordinary 
humanity is a source of confusion rather than of insight, and our lives stand in 
need of transcendence through the dialectical activity of the intellect.
IV
Aristotle, like Plato, developed his understanding of rhetoric as a part of his 
wider philosophical project, but unlike Plato had a high regard for rhetoric. 
Several features of his thought help explain this. For example, the general 
anthropocentrism of his ethics and his rejection of the Platonic external ‘god’s 
eye’ standpoint, leads him to develop a unifying vision of moral virtue, suasive 
speech, and the deliberative activities of the polis. Unlike Plato, Aristotle did 
not believe that there was such a thing as abstract truth about human values.201 
But he also thought that progress could be made towards some consensus 
about the good life on the basis of probable argument through dialectic. For 
Aristotle, the outstanding obstacles to communal agreement are deficiencies in 
judgement and reflection. Put simply, if we are each led individually through 
the best procedures of practical choice, we will eventually agree on the most 
important matters (in ethics as in science). And when, through work on the 
alternatives and through dialogue, we have arrived -  both individually and in 
community with one another -  at a harmonious adjustment of our beliefs,202 
the outcome will be the ethical truth. (On the Aristotelian understanding of 
truth: a truth that is anthropocentric, but not relativistic.) In practice the
200 They have not, for instance, dealt with any of the complexities of comic and tragic speech in 
the Symposium, a dialogue in which the power of the elements beyond which Socrates urges us 
to ascend will make itself felt with a more than propaedeutic force. See, e.g., Robert Mitchell, 
The hymn to Eros: a reading o f Plato’s Symposium (Lanham, Md, 1993).
201G. A. Kennedy, Aristotle On Rhetoric: a Theory o f Civil Discourse (Oxford, 1991), p. 300.
202 Furthermore, when Aristotle speaks of ethical truth, ‘he attaches it to a general argument
that denies our beliefs are linked to objects that are altogether independent of and more stable
than human thought and language’ (Coleman, Ancient and Medieval Memories, p. 28).
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search is rarely complete or thorough enough -  so the resulting view will just 
be the best current candidate for truth.2** Hence his interest in language -  ‘the 
real medium of human being’2** -  and rhetoric or rational persuasion.
It is important to remember that it is to Aristotle that we owe the classical 
definition of the nature of man -  according to which man is the only animal 
who has logos, the gift of speech.2** Consider how Aristotle develops the 
difference between man and animal in the Politics:
‘And whereas mere voice is but an indication of pleasure or pain, and is 
therefore found in other animals (for their nature attains to the perception of 
pleasure and pain and the intimation of them to one another, and no further), 
the power of speech is intended to set forth the expedient and inexpedient, 
and therefore likewise the just and the unjust. And it is characteristic of man 
that he alone has any sense of good and evil, of just and unjust, and the like, 
and the association of living beings who have this sense makes a family and a 
state’.206
A profound thesis. The distinguishing feature of man, therefore, is that he can 
think and he can talk.20? He can make what is not present manifest through his 
speaking, so that another individual sees it before him. And with this his sense 
of the future emerges and the sense for right and wrong is given -  and all
2°3 Nussbaum, Fragility, pp. 10-11.
2° 4 1  borrow the expression from Gadamer, and I believe that Aristotle would have substantially 
agreed with his judgement when he writes: ‘[Ljanguage is the real medium of human being, if 
we ... see it in the realm that it alone fills out, the realm of human being-together, the realm of 
common understanding, of ever-replenished common agreement -  a realm as indispensable to 
human life as the air we breathe’ (‘Man and language’, in Philosophical Hermeneutics, tr. and 
ed. by D. E. Linge [Berkeley, 1976], pp. 59-68, at p. 68).
2°5 Pol, i, 125335-10. References to the Politics are from B. Jowett’s translation in Aristotle, ed. 
S. Everson (Cambridge, 1996). Note that until the recent past the Greek word logos was 
translated as reason or thought. And consequently Aristotle’s definition became canonical in a 
form which stated that man is the animal rationale, distinguished from all other animals by his 
capacity for thought. In truth, however, the primary meaning of this word is language 
(Gadamer, ‘Man and language’, p. 59).
206 Pol, i, 1253310-20; emphasis added.
2°7 We now tend to look at language not as ‘the ineffable essence of human uniqueness’ but as a 
distinct piece of the biological make-up of our brains, ‘a biological adaptation to communicate 
information’, that is far from unique in the animal kingdom. Cognitive scientists have 
described language as a psychological faculty, a mental organ, a neural system, a computational 
module., and, more famously, an ‘instinct’. It conveys the idea, in Steven Pinker’s words, that 
‘people know how to talk in more or less the sense that spiders know how to spin webs. ... In 
nature’s talent show we are simply a species of primate with our own act, a knack for 
communicating information about who did what whom by modulating the sounds we make 
when we exhale’ (Pinker, The Language Instinct [London, 1994], pp. 18, 19). These recent 
developments, however, in no way diminish the wisdom of Aristotle’s original insights about 
language. Furthermore, to a greater extent than his predecessors, Aristotle believed that the 
speculative pursuit of knowledge is a collegial process (a reflective dialogue) in which 
assumptions are continually re-examined, and that there are numerous avenues that have not 
yet been opened up (see, e.g., Rh., 3.1).
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because man, as an individual, has the logos. Language, however, is by no 
means simply an instrument (that we lay aside when it has served its 
purpose)208 or a cultural artifact (that we learn in the way we learn to tell the 
time). ‘The illusion that things precede their manifestation in language’, in 
Gadamer’s words, ‘conceals the fundamentally linguistic character of our 
experience of the world’.208 Indeed, language is so tightly woven into human 
experience that it is scarcely possible to imagine life without it. And if, as Lily 
Tomlin said, man invented language to satisfy his deep need to complain;210 
rhetoric was then invented to satisfy our deep need to influence the actions of 
other individuals.
‘[M]an’, as Aristotle argues, ‘is by nature a political211 animal. And 
therefore, men, even when they do not require one another’s help, desire to 
live together ...’.2i2 To be political, then, is a part of human nature. At its best 
rhetoric has made civilised life possible.2^  Since ‘the end of the state is the 
good life’,21* the proper end of public deliberation is to frame laws and social 
policies that will make such a life possible for the members of the community.
208 ‘For it is in the nature of the tool’, as Gadamer has said, ‘that we master its use, which is to 
say we take it in hand and lay it aside when it has done its service. ... Such an analogy is false 
because we never find ourselves as consciousness over against the world and ... grasp after a 
tool of understanding in a wordless condition.’ (‘Man and language’, pp. 62-3).
2°9 Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, pp. 69-81, at pp. 77-8.
210 Cited in Pinker, The Language Instinct, p. 31.
211 Even though politikon is translated as ‘political’, it is important to remember that it is both 
more concrete and more inclusive than the English word. More concrete, in that it refers above 
all to our aptness or suitability for life in a city or polis -  not in other forms or levels of political 
organisations. More inclusive, because it takes in the entire life of the polis, including informal 
social relations, and is not limited to the sphere of law and institutions.
212 Pol, iii, I278bi9-2i. The polis is brought into being in order that people might satisfy their
social needs, but the political community also has a moral function. For ‘if all communities aim
at some good, the state or political community, which is the highest of all, and which embraces
all the rest, aims at good in a greater degree than any other, and at the highest good’ (ibid., i,
125233-6). Aristotle’s ethical works are meant to show that the best life is -  in principle, under 
ideal circumstances, and in the long run -  also the most pleasant, the most expedient, and the 
noblest (NE, 1140325-28, H42ai-ii; Rh., 1.3.6). As R. McKeon concludes, ‘in the perfect state 
the good citizen would coincide with the good man’ (‘Aristotle’s Conception of Moral and 
Political Philosoph/, Ethics, 51 [April, 1941], pp. 253-90, at p . 265).
213 For more on the relation between politics and rhetoric see, C. Reeve, ‘Philosophy, Politics, 
and Rhetoric in Aristotle’, in Essays on Aristotle’s Rhetoric, ed. A. O. Rorty (Berkeley, Ca., 
1996), pp. 191-205; S. Halliwell, ‘Popular Morality, Philosophical Ethics and the Rhetoric’, in 
Aristotle’s Rhetoric: Philosophical Essays, ed. D. Furley and N. Nehamas (Princeton, 1994); F. 
Miller and D. Keyt (eds.), A Companion to Aristotle’s Politics (Oxford, 1991); and J. P. Euben, 
The Tragedy o f Political Theory (Princeton, 1990).
218 Pol., iii, i28ob39~40. On this topic see, J. Vanier, Made for happiness (London, 2001); A. 
Kenny, Aristotle on the Perfect Life (Oxford, 1992); and N. Sherman, The Fabric o f Character 
(Oxford, 1989).
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And the instrument of that deliberation is rhetoric. However, rhetoric does 
more than articulate an individual (the rhetorician’s) vision of moral truth. It 
is, in addition, a submission of those reasonings to the scrutiny of others. We 
do more than attempt to influence when we seek the assent of others for our 
conclusions; we seek (because of the uncertainty that inevitably attends our 
thinking) confirmation of our own opinions.
In the Rhetoric,2* Aristotle’s advice is directed at aspiring rhetoricians, 
whether or not they intend to speak truthfully on behalf of what is worthy. But 
since he agrees with Plato that the best rhetoric is truthful, he wants to give 
orators advice on how to construct sound as well as effectively form persuasive 
arguments. For Aristotle, in fact, the best orator does not seek to persuade the 
audience of what is ‘debased’.2*6 He does not manipulate beliefs in order to 
make the worse appear to be the better course. Rather, he presents the best 
case in a way that is comprehensive and moving to each type of character.21?
The exemplary rhetorician (as opposed to the merely skilled rhetorician) 
is, then, guided by a sound understanding of what is genuinely useful and 
right. In suiting his arguments to his audience, therefore, the orator need not 
resort to lying. And as long as his rhetoric is also constrained by what is true 
and what is best, he will not ‘warp the ruler’. ‘And if it is argued that great 
harm can be done by unjustly using such power of words’, Aristotle concludes, 
‘this objection applies to all good things except for virtue, and most of all to the 
most useful things, like strength, health, wealth, and military strategy; for by 
using these justly one would do the greatest good and unjustly, the greatest 
harm’.218
In fact, in his view, even the most debased forms of rhetoric presuppose 
some knowledge of logic and ethics.21? The sophist, for instance, must know the 
structure of sound arguments in order to mimic them. He must not only 
convince his audience that his arguments are sound, but also that -  like the
21s For background see, P. D. Brandes, A History o f Aristotle: 'Rhetoric’: With a Bibliography 
o f Early Printings (Metuchen, N.J., 1989).
216 Rh., 1.1.12. References to the Rhetoric are from G. A. Kennedy’s translation in Aristotle On 
Rhetoric: a Theory o f Civil Discourse (Oxford, 1991).
21? Rh., i.3.6ff.; cf. NE, ni3a30ff.
218 Rh., 1.1.13.
21? SeeT. Irwin, Aristotle’s First Principles (Oxford, 1988), p. 332.
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physician -  he has their real interests at heart.220 To be persuasive, then, the 
orator must know how to present himself as substantively intelligent and 
virtuous, rather than merely as cleverly skilled at rhetoric. Aristotle’s point 
regarding the ethical directions of rhetoric is not the overly strong claim the 
exemplary orator must be a philosopher or phronimos. Instead, he needs to be 
able to take advice from a philosophically oriented phronimos, such as 
Aristotle himself.
But it is also not the relatively weak claim that rhetoric should (at all 
times) be directed to its most successful exercise.221 To see how Aristotle charts 
a middle ground, we must now turn to the three types of rhetoric and their 
primary instruments of persuasion. In Rhetoric 1.3.3 Aristotle identifies three 
kinds of rhetoric -  deliberative, judicial or forensic, and epideictic or 
ceremonial. They are distinguished by their audiences (whether the audience 
is a judge222 or spectator), and a characteristic ‘time’ and ‘end’223 assigned to 
each. (If the audience is asked to judge an action in the future, the speech is 
deliberative; if an action in the past, judicial. If the audience is not asked to 
make a judgement about a past or future action, the speech is epideictic.) 
These differences prescribe some specialised strategies of argumentation and 
some specialised knowledge.22-* That said, many forms of argument (e.g., 
dialectic and the enthymeme) and some kinds of knowledge (e.g., psychology,
220 Topics, tr. with commentary by R. Smith (Oxford, 1997), loibsff.
221 This is not the way in which Aristotle has always been understood. The Rhetoric has been 
accused of advocating a kind of rhetoric that is devoid of any link with the right and the good. 
See, e.g., Whitney J. Oates, Aristotle and the Problem o f Value (Princeton, N.J., 1963), pp. 335, 
341; Forbes Hill, ‘The Amorality of Aristotle’s Rhetoric’, GRBS, 22 (1981), pp. 133-47; J- Olian, 
The Intended Uses of Aristotle’s Rhetoric’, SM, 35 (1968), pp. 137-48; and B. Fuller, History o f 
Greek Thought: Aristotle (N.Y., 1931), p. 294. For literature which sees a fundamental 
connection between ethics and rhetoric in Aristotle’s thought, see Eugene Garver, Aristotle’s 
Rhetoric (Chicago, 1994); J. Cooper, ‘Ethical-Political Theory in Aristotle’s Rhetoric’, in 
Aristotle’s Rhetoric, ed. Furley and Nehamas; Lois Self, 'Rhetoric and Phronesis: The 
Aristotelian Ideal’, Phil. Rh., 12 (1979), pp. 130-45; Theresa Crem, The Definition of Rhetoric 
According to Aristotle’, in Aristotle, ed. K. Erickson (Metuchen, N.J., 1974), pp. 52-71.; and R. 
McKeon, ‘Aristotle’s Conception of Language and the Arts of Language’, CP, 41 (1946), pp. 193- 
206 and 42 (1947), pp. 21-50.
222 By judge (krites) Aristotle means a member of the assembly or of a jury. In Athenian legal 
procedure there were no professional judges in the modem sense. The democratic juries of the 
Athenian courts ranged in size from 201 to 5,001, drawn by lot from the male citizen body 
(Kennedy, Aristotle On Rhetoric, p. 42 n. 58).
223 See, e.g., Rh., 1.3.5.
224 Ibid., 1.2.21, l.3.7ff.
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knowledge of how various political systems22* shape the beliefs and desires of 
their citizens) are common to them all.
In 1.1.10 Aristotle identifies deliberative rhetoric as the finest form. He 
thus discusses it first and demotes judicial rhetoric (with which the 
handbooks were most concerned226) to last. Deliberative rhetoric22? is political 
discourse, that is, directed to those who must decide upon a course of action 
(e.g., members of a council or assembly) about public matters that affect 
themselves. Put simply, it is a matter of convincing the audience of the 
necessity or risk entailed by doing or not doing a certain action concerning the 
economic and political future of the community.228 The deliberative orator has 
the immensely difficult task of aligning his audience’s conceptions of their 
eudaimonia with his own judgement about how various policies are likely to 
affect their welfare, whatever their beliefs may be.229 Furthermore, since the 
counsel of the rhetorician implies predictions about the outcomes of various 
policies, his conclusions are in principle testable.
22* ‘[I]t is necessary to know how many forms of constitution there are and what is conducive to 
each and by what each is naturally prone to be corrupted .... By characteristic forces o f 
corruption I mean that except for the best constitution, all the others are destroyed by 
loosening or tightening [their basic principles of governance]; for example, democracy not only 
becomes weaker when [its principle of equality is] relaxed so that finally it leads to oligarchy 
but also if the principle is too rigidly applied. ... [I]t is useful ... not only to know what 
constitution is advantageous on the basis of past history but also to know the constitutions in 
effect in other states, observing what constitutions are suitable to what sort of people’ (ibid., 
1.4.12-13). Later Aristotle adds, ‘The ... most important of all things in an ability to persuade 
and give good advice is to grasp an understanding of all forms of constitution ... for all people 
are persuaded by what is advantageous, and preserving the constitution is advantageous’ (1.8.1- 
3). There are four forms of constitution: democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, monarchy, which 
Aristotle discusses in Rh. 1.8.3-6 and at greater length in Books III and IV of the Politics (bk. V 
analyses the forces leading to corruption of constitutions). Aristotle studied many constitutions 
but only his account of the Constitution o f Athens survived. Ideally, ‘a “state” that has a 
minority or rich and a minority of poor, but with a predominant majority of the middle sort of 
people, would best satisfy the “state’s” aim to consist of those who are similar and equal. 
Aristotle calls this a middle constitution’ (Coleman, HPT, pp. 218-9). Also see, S. Salkever, 
Finding the Mean (Princeton, 1990).
226 Aristotle chides the authors of earlier handbooks on rhetoric for concentrating on judicial 
situations to the neglect of the other kinds of rhetoric. They focused primarily on techniques for 
swaying the emotions of judges and legislators to the neglect of showing how to use logical 
argument. (Rh., 1.1.3-4; cf. Phaedr., 266d-67d).
227 See Rh., 1.10-15.
228 Ibid., 1.4.7: ‘The important subjects on which people deliberate and on which deliberative 
orators give advice in public’, Aristotle writes, ‘are mostly five in number, and these are 
finances, war and peace, national defence, imports and exports, and framing of laws’.
229 Arguments from vivid and well-known examples of similar events -  events that are 
presumed to indicate what is likely to happen in the future -  are the best sorts for deliberative 
rhetoric (cf. Ibid., 2.2off.).
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So if the rhetorician wishes to retain his reputation (as trustworthy) he 
must pay attention to what is actually likely to happen. It is this feature of 
deliberative rhetoric (i.e., that it is bound more tightly by reasonable 
expectations about the future) that marks its vital character. It most clearly 
reveals the primary importance of truth as it functions within the craft of 
rhetoric itself, and it is for this reason that Aristotle makes it the focus of his 
analysis. He can make the best case for his complex position by concentrating 
on deliberative rhetoric as the kind of discourse intended to affect action- 
decisions whose merits are capable (at least in principle) of independent 
evaluation. This also explains why Aristotle treats epideictic rhetoric as 
exhortation, rather than as the brilliant showpieces they had become in the 
hands of sophists. Epideictic speeches^ are addressed to a general audience in 
praise or blame of someone or something, often on a ceremonial occasion such 
as a funeral. Their aim is to correct, modify, or strengthen an audience’s belief 
about civic virtue or the reputation of an individual. As hinted at earlier, in this 
context the audience is not called upon to take a specific action, in the way an 
assemblyman or juryman is called upon to vote. Having said that, in certain 
circumstances epideictic discourse may be viewed as an oratorical contest,^* 
and in this sense the spectators are also judges.5*2
To persuade an audience to celebrate what is noble and to condemn what 
is shameful, the orator must be familiar with what the audience takes as 
indications of those virtues which they find exceptionally useful (e.g., justice 
and courage).233 But for Aristotle epideictic rhetoric also has an important 
practical and educational function and that is why he brings some of its uses
23° See Rh., 1.9. The definition of epideictic discourse has remained a problem in rhetorical 
theory, since it becomes the category for all forms of discourse that are not specifically 
deliberative or judicial. Later ancient rhetoricians regarded it as including poetry and prose 
literature, and since Renaissance times it has sometimes included other arts like painting, 
sculpture, and music as well. Aristotle, however, thinks of epideictic rhetoric only as a species 
of oratory as he knew its forms in Greece, including funeral orations like that by Pericles in 
Thucydides’ History o f the Peloponnesian War (2.35-46) and the Encomia of Helen by Gorgias 
and Isocrates (Kennedy, Aristotle, p. 48 n.77). Today we would include under the heading of 
epideictic discourse the advertising message, which effectively consists of a eulogy of a given 
product see, Umberto Eco, La struttura assente (Milan, 1968).
23‘ See, e.g., Isocrates, Panegyricus, ed. and tr. by S. Usher (Warminster, 1990), I.
232 See Rh., 2.18.1.
233 Ibid., 1.9.1-8.
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under the aegis of deliberative rhetoric.28* After all, in practice, speakers 
usually praise past actions with the interest of celebrating timeless virtues and 
inculcating them as models for the future. In short, since praise and blame 
motivate as well as indicate virtue, they are also implicitly intended to affect 
future action. In fact, ‘praise and deliberations are part of a common species 
[eidos] in that what one might propose in deliberation becomes encomia when 
the form of expression is changed’.288 Thus, Aristotle asserts, ‘when you want to 
praise, see what would be the underlying proposition; and when you want to 
set out proposals in deliberation, see what you would praise’.288
Finally, Aristotle tackles judicial or forensic rhetoric,28? where he 
introduces much of his own ethical theory to provide premises for the kind of 
judicial rhetoric that had become a highly formalised and specialised legal 
oratory. It consists of speeches of prosecution (kategoria) or defence 
Capologia) in a court of law (and as such directed to judges) seeking to 
establish individuals as guilty or innocent of specific actions alleged to have 
taken place in the past. Here, to be persuasive, the orator’s arguments must 
take into account the commonplace psychological opinions (endoxa) of typical 
judges, their beliefs about the motives of various types of characters and the 
occasions on which they might be tempted to break the law.238 In addition, to 
construct a plausible accusation or defence the rhetorician needs to represent 
the psychology of the wrongdoers and those wronged.28? Like his epideictic 
counterpart, the judicial orator relies on a theory of voluntary action, but to 
establish the guilt or innocence of the accused, he needs to characterise the 
individual’s motives in some detail. ‘People do everything they do’, Aristotle 
asserts, ‘for seven reasons’: chance, nature, compulsion, habit, reasoning,
28* See Rh., 1.9.35-37, where Aristotle points out how epideictic premises can be converted into 
deliberative ones by applying them to advice for future action rather than praise of what has 
been done in the past.
288 Ibid., 1.9.35.
286 Ibid., 1.9.36. 
w  See ibid., 1.10-15.
288 Amelie O. Rorty, ‘Structuring Rhetoric’, in Essays on Aristotle’s Rhetoric, pp. 1-33, at p. 12. 
288 The judicial orator has to grasp three things: ‘first, for what, and how many, purposes 
people do wrong; second, how these persons are [mentally] disposed; third, what kind of 
persons they wrong and what these persons are like’ (Rh., 1.10.2). Motives are discussed in 
1.10-11, the mental disposition of wrongdoers and those wronged in 1.12.
70
anger, and longing.2*0 After swiftly dismissing chance, nature, and 
compulsion,2*1 he turns to a long description of the many kinds of activities 
and situations whose pleasures might lure a person to injustice.2*2 What 
matters in this context is the likelihood of whether the accused (an impulsive 
young man, in debt and disowned by his family), has voluntarily broken the 
law.
We can now turn, as Aristotle himself does, to a brief discussion of the 
pisteis, or the means of persuasion that all orators share and the kinds of 
knowledge that they all require independently of their specific aims and 
audiences.2*3 Aristotle identifies three artistic modes of persuasion,*** deriving 
from the factors in any speech situation: (i) presentation of the trustworthy 
character (ethos) of the speaker; (ii) the emotional effect (pathos) created by 
the speech/text on the audience/reader; and (iii) the logical argument set out 
in the speech/text (logos).2** Each of these interdependent avenues of 
persuasion are of fundamental importance because,
‘[EJven if we were to have the most exact knowledge, it would not be very easy 
for us in speaking to use it to persuade some audiences. Speech based on 
knowledge is teaching, but teaching is impossible [with some audiences]; 
rather, it is necessary for pisteis and speeches [as a whole] to be formed on 
the basis of common [beliefs], as we said in the Topics [1.1.2] about 
communication with a crowd’.2*6
For Aristotle, therefore, the accomplished rhetorician should, first, present 
himself as having a trustworthy ethos, ‘for we believe fair-minded people to a 
greater extent and more quickly [than we do others]’ on all subjects.2*? Next, he 
must address the interests of his audience persuasively -  lead them to feel 
emotion (pathos) by the speech, because ‘we do not give the same judgement
2*° Rh., 1.10.8.
^  Ibid., 1.10.11; cf. 1.10.12-14.
^  Ibid., 1.11.
2*3 For more information see, T. Conley, ‘Pathe and Pisteis: Aristotle, Rhet. II 2-11’, Hermes, 
110 (1982), pp. 300-15; and J. Lienhard, ‘A Note on the Meaning of Pisteis in Aristotle’s 
Rhetoric’, AJP, 87 (1966), pp. 446-54.
24* See Rh., 1.2.2-3, where Aristotle distinguishes between artistic (arguments constructed from 
the evidence, situation, and character of those involved), and non-artistic (evidence the 
speaker uses but does not invent) pisteis.
^  Ibid., 1.2.3-6.
^  Ibid., 1.1.12
2*? Ibid., 1.2.4; cf- i-9 -i and 2.1.5-7. One should note that the extended discussion of types of 
character in Rh., 1.12-7 relates to the somewhat different matter of the adaptation of the 
character of a speaker to the character of an audience.
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when grieved and rejoicing or when friendly and hostile’.2*8 Finally, in order to 
be persuasive, the orator must provide some basic premises for his arguments. 
‘Persuasion occurs through the arguments [logoi]', Aristotle tells us, ‘when we 
show the truth or the apparent truth from whatever is persuasive in each 
case’.2*9
According to Aristotle, therefore, this theory of argumentation constitutes 
the principal axis of rhetoric and at the same time provides the decisive link 
between rhetoric and demonstrative logic and therefore with philosophy. How 
so? As seen above, pisteis is the substance of rhetorical persuasion, and ‘pistis 
is a sort of demonstration [apodeixis] (for we most believe when we suppose 
something to have been demonstrated) and ... rhetorical apodeixis is 
enthymeme (and this is, generally speaking, the strongest of the pisteis) and 
the enthymeme is a sort of syllogism ...\28° It was Aristotle, of course, who 
invented the probable argument in dialectic281 called ‘syllogism’. And since 
‘rhetorical syllogism’ or enthymeme ‘is the “body” of persuasion’,282 rhetoric as 
a whole must be centred on the persuasive power attached to this kind of 
proof.288 ‘The result’, Aristotle concludes, ‘is that rhetoric is a certain kind of 
offshoot of dialectic and of ethical studies (which it is just to call politics)’.284 
He also calls it an antistrophos288 or counterpart to the art of dialectic.286
248 Rh., 1.2.5.
249 Ibid.,.2.6.
280 Ibid., 1.1.11.
281 Sovereign and synoptic science in Plato, dialectic is merely the general theory of 
probabilistic argumentation with Aristotle. Jacques Brunschwig, in his introduction to 
Aristotle’s Topics, argues that it would be impossible to overemphasise the humbling, the loss 
of prestige’, that dialectic suffers in passing from Plato’s hands to those of Aristotle (‘Aristotle’s 
Rhetoric as a “Counterpart” to Dialectic’, in Essays in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, pp. 34-55). Also see, 
Erik Krabbe, ‘Meeting in the House of Callias: Rhetoric and Dialectic’, Argumentation, 14 
(2000), pp. 205-217; Coleman, HPT, pp. 136-46; Robin Smith, ‘Aristotle on the Uses of 
Dialectic’, Synthese, 96 (1993), pp. 335-58; and Brad McAdon, ‘Rhetoric is a Counterpart of 
Dialectic’, Phil. Rh., 34:2 (2001), pp. 113-49.
282 Rh., 1.1.3.
288 For a full discussion of the enthymeme see, Lloyd Bitzer, ‘Aristotle’s Enthymeme Revisited’, 
in Landmark Essays on Aristotelian Rhetoric, ed. R. L. Enos and L. Agnew (Mahwah, N.J., 
1998), pp. 179-92; and M.F. Bumyeat, ‘Enthymeme: Aristotle on the Rationality of Rhetoric’, in 
Essays on Aristotle’s Rhetoric, pp. 88-115.
284 Rh., 1.2.7.
288 On the possible interpretations of antistrophos see, D. Green, ‘Aristotelian Rhetoric, 
Dialectic, and the Traditions of Antistrophos’, Rhetorica 8 (1990), pp. 5-27.
286 Rh., 1.1.1. Aristotle divided intellectual activity into (i) theoretical sciences (mathematics,
physics, theology); (ii) practical arts (politics, ethics); and (iii) productive arts (fine arts, the
crafts, medicine). In addition, there are (4) methods or tools (organa), applicable to all study 
but with no distinct subject matter of their own. Logic and dialectic belong to that class. For
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Rhetoric resembles and is linked to dialectic in a number of ways. Like 
dialectic, rhetoric does not have a distinctive, specific subject.2*? It deals with 
‘popular truths’ (i.e., the accepted opinions of the majority of the people), and 
it does not require any special training, since ‘all people, in some way, share in 
both; for all, to some extent, try both to test and maintain an argument [as in 
dialectic] and to defend themselves and attack [others, as in rhetoric]’.2** The 
orator, furthermore, relies on the methods and the skills of dialectic. Like the 
dialectician (and the sophist), the successful orator must be able to construct 
contrary arguments: he must first represent and then refute the considerations 
that appear to weigh against his position.2**
But this is not to say that there are no differences between rhetoric and 
dialectic. Although rhetoric absorbs the skills of logic, dialectic, and sophistical 
argument, it differs from them in some important respects.260 It differs from 
logic in that it addresses contingent particulars,261 and from dialectic in having 
more specific aims. Dialectic encompasses both theoretical as well as practical 
inquiry: it can serve as ‘a process of criticism that provides a path to a general 
principle’.262 Rhetoric, on the other hand, is more narrowly practical: it comes 
into play in concrete situations (the deliberations of a political assembly, 
judicial judgement, public orations that praise or censure), and it attempts to 
bring an audience to a decisive judgement in such a way that they will not 
easily be swayed to a different course.26* This explains why rhetoric cannot 
become absorbed in a purely ‘argumentative’ or logical discipline -  because it
Aristotle rhetoric is a mixture -  it is partly a tool, like dialectic, but partly a practical art which 
derives its subject matter from ethics and politics (ibid., 1.2.7; cf-1.2.1). He therefore avoids the 
fallacy of Plato’s Gorgias where Socrates is obsessed with finding some kind of knowledge 
specific to rhetoric. In reading the Rhetoric one perceives a gradual shift of focus, moving from 
the use of rhetoric as a tool in 1.1 to its theoretical aspects in 1.2, its political and ethical content 
in the rest of bks. I and II, and its productive aspects in bk. III. 
w  Ibid., 1.1.1.
2*8 Ibid., 1.1.1.
^  Ibid., i.i.i4ff.
260 ibid., 1.4.4 ff--
261 See, e.g., Coleman, HPT, pp. 128-32; and Robin Smith, ‘Logic’, in Cambridge Companion to 
Aristotle, ed. J. Barnes (Cambridge, 1995), pp. 27-65.
262 Topics, l0lb3-4.
26* See ibid., i04bi-4; Rh., 1.2.11-12,1.4.7ft.
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is directed to the ‘the hearer’.268 A hearer, moreover, who in Aristotle’s opinion 
one must assume is ‘morally weak’26s and ‘a simple person’.266 It is for this 
reason that the orator ‘should condense enthymemes as much as possible’.26? 
The audience, in other words, is not capable of the complexities of thought 
that comprise demonstrative or dialectical deduction:
“That the enthymeme is a sort of syllogism had been said earlier and how i t ... 
differs from those of dialectic; for [in rhetoric] the conclusion should not be 
drawn from far back, nor is it necessary to include everything. The former is 
unclear because of the length [of the argument], the latter tiresome because of 
stating what is obvious. This is the reason why the uneducated are more 
persuasive than the educated before a crowd, just as poets say the uneducated 
are more “inspired by the Muses” in a crowd; for [the educated] reason with 
axioms [koina] and universals, [the uneducated] on the basis of what 
[particulars] they know and instances near their experience’.268
A rhetorical argument, thus, needs to take into account both the degree to 
which the matter under discussion seems to be true and its persuasive 
effectiveness (which depends on the quality of the speaker and hearer). On the 
other hand, the rhetorician does not need to know whether the things that 
usually make people angry ought to do so, or whether their beliefs about what 
is fearful are in fact true -  that is the business of Aristotle’s ethical writings. 
However, he needs to know what really produces emotion, and the underlying 
assumption of the whole rhetorical enterprise is that belief and argument are 
at the heart of the matter.268
Aristotle, like Plato, believes that emotions are individuated not simply by 
the way we feel, but, more importantly, by the kinds of judgements or beliefs 
that are internal to each. A typical Aristotelian emotion is defined as a 
composite of a feeling of either pleasure or pain and a particular type of belief
2fi4 ‘its [rhetoric’s] function [ergon] is concerned with the sort of things we debate and for 
which we do not have [other] arts and among such listeners as are not able to see many things 
all together or to reason from a distant starting point’ [Rh., 1.2.12).
26s Ibid., 3.14.8.
266 Ibid., 1.2.13.
267 Ibid., 3.18.4.
268 Ibid., 2.22.2.
268 M. C. Nussbaum, ‘Aristotle on Emotions and Rational Persuasion’, in Essays on Aristotle’s 
Rhetoric, pp. 303-23, at p. 305. Cf. in the same collection, S.R. Leighton, ‘Aristotle and the 
Emotions’, pp. 206-37; J- M. Cooper, ‘An Aristotelian Theory of the Emotions’, pp. 238-57; and 
G. Striker, ‘Emotion in Contexts’, pp. 286-302. Also see, Sherman, Fabric; and W. 
Fortenbaugh, ‘Aristotle’s Rhetoric on Emotion’, in Articles on Aristotle, ed. J. Barnes, M. 
Schofield, and R. Sorabji (London, 1979), pp. 133-53.
74
about the world. For example, anger is a composite of painful feeling with the 
belief that one has been wronged.2?0 The feeling and the belief are not just 
incidentally linked: the belief is the ground of the feeling.2?1 However, as seen 
in section III, the Plato of the middle dialogues devotes great energy to defence 
of the view that responses of sense and emotion have a powerfully negative 
and no redeeming positive role to play in the moral and intellectual life of the 
human being. And that good human development is best promoted by 
‘separating’ the intellectual part of the soul from these responses. Conversely, 
for Aristotle emotions are not blind animal forces, but intelligent and 
discriminating parts of the personality. This is not to say that emotions are 
always correct, any more than beliefs or actions are always correct. They need 
to be educated, and brought into harmony with a correct view of the good 
human life (what is appropriate, of course, is set down by the general ethical 
theory).2?2 But, well trained, they have in themselves a sense of value. The role 
of emotions and appetite as guides is cognitive as well as motivational: they 
not only move the person towards the good, but give him information as to 
where goodness and beauty actually are. It is precisely because emotions are 
intrinsic to the process of judgem ent^ that the accomplished rhetorician must 
learn about what produces emotions. It is important to remember, however, 
that Aristotle’s theory does not allow for the manipulation of the emotions in 
affecting judgement. The immediate aim of rhetoric, he remarks, ‘is not to 
persuade but to see the available means of persuasion in each case ...’.2?4 Its 
aim, then, is to perceive in any given situation those elements that may be 
used to influence the process of judging. Put differently, rhetoric is a faculty of 
discovering those factors that will lead the hearer to give reasoned assent to a
2?° Rh., 2.1.9.
2?1 Nussbaum, Fragility, p. 383.
2?2 This ethical theory is critical of much that Aristotle’s society teaches. People often value too 
many of these external things, or value them too highly, or not enough. Thus, they have too 
much emotion in connection with money, possessions, and reputation, sometimes not enough 
in connection with the things that are truly worthwhile. An important role for philosophical 
criticism is to insist on the central role of virtuous action, which can usually be controlled by 
one’s own effort. But this control is not absolute. The emotions recognise worth outside 
oneself; in so doing, they frequently recognise the truth’ (Nussbaum, ‘Aristotle on Emotions, 
pp. 316-7).
2?3 The emotions are those things through which, by undergoing change, people come to differ 
in their judgements...’ (Rh., 2.1.8).
2?4 Ibid., 1.1.14; cf. 1.2.11.
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particular proposition. This is clearly not the way in which Aristotle has always 
been understood.2?6
Aristotle clearly wishes to establish a link between the exercise of moral 
virtue and excellence in persuading. This is apparent, for instance, when he 
characterises rhetoric in terms of its moral purpose. The art is useful, “because 
the true and the just are by nature stronger than their opposites, so that if 
judgements are not made in the right way [the true and the just] are 
necessarily defeated [by their opposites]. And this is worthy of censure’.2?6 In 
Aristotle’s view, therefore, rhetoric serves the cause of truth and justice 
because it enables us to discover and expose specious or unfair arguments. 
Furthermore, he points out,
‘one should be able to argue persuasively on either side of a question, just as 
in the use of syllogisms, not that we may actually do both (for one should not 
persuade what is debased) but in order that it may not escape our notice what 
the real state of the case is and we ourselves may be able to refute if another 
person uses speech unjustly’.2??
The activities of the rhetorician should be constrained by his commitment to 
use only the ‘real’ means of persuasion: i.e., arguments upon which intelligent 
decisions can be based. (It is this that distinguishes rhetoric from sophistry.) 
Aristotle’s rhetorical theory is thus grounded in and guided by the principles 
developed in his ethical writings. Moreover, it could be argued that the activity 
of the practical intellect is essentially rhetorical in nature. Indeed, I tend to 
think that the person of practical wisdom is identical in some respects to the 
best orator. The person of practical wisdom has the capacity to deliberate well 
and, as seen earlier, invariably approaches a concrete situation prepared to 
respond to it emotionally in the appropriate ways. The orator, similarly, is 
engaged in a practical art and is concerned with such matters as we deliberate 
upon them. And since the best orator seeks to facilitate reasoned judgement,
2?S As W. Grimaldi argues, ‘to call [Aristotle’s] Rhetoric a “rhetoric of persuasion” with the 
understanding of “persuasion at any cost” is wrong. He was aware of the fact that person 
speaks to the person, to the “other” in whom resides the tension between self-possession and 
its possible loss which may be incurred in any decision made toward further growth in
understanding. In this matter of “persuasion” Aristotle’s thesis is simply that good rhetoric
effectively places before the other person all the means necessary for such decision making. At 
this point the person must exercise his own freedom’ (‘Studies in the Philosophy of Aristotle’s 
Rhetoric’, Hermes, 25 [1972], pp. 1-151, at p. 5).
2?6 Rh., 1.1.12.
2?? Ibid., 1.1.12.
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one can argue that it aims at excellence in practical deliberation. Put 
differently, in seeking to lead his audience to intelligent decision-making, the 
orator implicitly fosters the capacity to deliberate well (for intelligent 
judgement rests upon this ability). Furthermore, it seems to me that practical 
deliberation involves a notable exercise of rhetorical skills. Excellence in 
deliberation is excellence in the discovery and assessment of the grounds of 
reasoned choice.2*5 It involves the capacity for finding and evaluating 
arguments for and against any possible line of conduct. Practical deliberation 
involves, in sum, the faculty for observing in any particular case the available 
means of persuasion. Hence, insofar as the activity of the practical intellect is 
the capacity to deliberate well about practical matters, it is rhetorical in 
character. When the person of practical wisdom deliberates about conduct 
with a view toward choosing among competing alternatives, he employs a 
kind of internal rhetoric.2?8
Ironically, Aristotle, despite being the author of the first complex, 
systematic rhetoric, is not (unlike Plato) visibly rhetorical himself. In section II 
I pointed out that Plato’s own style of writing reveals an acute self- 
consciousness about the relationship between choice of a style and the content 
of a philosophical conception. Thus the adoption of a related ethical position 
caused Plato, in the Phaedrus, to modify his own philosophical style so as to 
include emotive and rhetorical elements associated with poetry. Aristotle 
clearly does not do this. Although he embraces rhetoric and poetiy,280 Aristotle 
does not alter his own style. A style which, to the majority of readers, appears
2?8 In the Ethica, Aristotle describes deliberation as a kind of inquiry or search, involving 
calculation and reasoning: ‘For the person who deliberates seems to investigate and analyse ... 
(ni2b20-23)’; ‘...deliberation is the inquiry into a particular kind of thing’ (1142831-32); and *... 
excellence in deliberation ... is correctness of thinking about actions’ viewed as means to 
desired ends’ (ii42b8-i3).
279 As Isocrates persuasively maintained, ‘the arguments by which we convince others when we 
speak to them are the same as those we use when we engage in reflection. We call those able to 
speak to the multitude orators, and we regard as persons of sagacity those who are able to talk 
things over within themselves with discernment’ (To Nicholes, sec. 8); cited in C. Perelman and 
L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric, p. 41.
280 w e know that his ethical views make him hospitable to tragic poetry and its style as sources 
of illumination. For more on Aristotle’s views on tragic poetiy, see the excellent analysis in 
Nussbaum, Fragility, part III. On the role of poetry in Aristotle’s views about education see, 
Sherman, Fabric, who asserts that, in Aristotle’s view, excellence of character comprises both 
the sentiments and practical reason. She focuses particularly on four aspects of practical reason 
as they relate to character: moral perception, choice-making, collaboration, and the 
development of those capacities in moral education.
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spare and unemotive in the extreme. So does this mean (rather disturbingly), 
that Aristotle was superficial about style? That he thought there was a neutral 
philosophical style in which all claimants to ethical truth can be equally and 
impartially assessed?
The questions are hardly fair, because we know far too little about the 
status of Aristotle’s works as written texts. His published works, including 
many dialogues, were famous in antiquity for their copious and flowing style.281 
But these works are forever out of reach, only meagre fragments survive. 
Moreover, the works we do have are probably lecture notes for deliveiy to an 
audience of specialised students. So even the internal content of the chapters 
themselves is likely to be, in many places, only a sketch of the delivered lecture 
-  which would have been fleshed out, like any set of lecture notes, with 
examples, jokes, and dramatic material. Finally, it is important to remember 
that the arranging and editing of his work was done by a later hand.282 Even 
about the style of these lecture notes there is a great disagreement. A number 
of scholars find it austere, forbidding, even drab. Kennedy asserts that 
Aristotle’s style is ‘compressed in the extreme’,283 while Nussbaum finds in his 
style, ‘a courageous straightforwardness and directness’.28-* Yet, hardly ever has 
it been suggested that it is precisely the invisibility of Aristotle’s rhetoric that 
makes his work in general and the Rhetoric in particular, deeply persuasive. C. 
Jan Swearingen believes that Aristotle should be deemed ‘a rhetorician per
281 Cicero speaks of a ‘golden river’, of a later writer of discourse ‘overflowing with controlled 
eroticism’ (Academica, tr. H. Rackman [Cambridge Mass., 1933], II.119).
282 The geographer Strabo (The Geography o f Strabo, tr. H. L. Jones [London, 1917-32], 
i 3 -i-5 4 )» a writer of the late first century BC, and Plutarch (‘Sulla’, in Six Lives, tr. R. Warner 
[Harmondsworth, 1972], 26.1-2), writing a hundred years later, are the major sources for the 
early history of the text of the works of Aristotle. The Aristotelian works were re-edited and 
extensively studied in later antiquity, beginning with Alexander of Aphrodisias around A.D. 
200, but the Rhetoric was given little attention. The Rhetoric poses a particular challenge 
because Aristotle wrote different parts of the work at different times and his point of view 
changed as he taught different groups of students. There are also difficulties resulting from 
uncertainty about what Aristotle wrote, since we are dependent for the text on hand-written 
copies made in the Middle Ages, which do not always agree. See Carnes Lord, ‘On the Early 
History of the Aristotelian Corpus’, AJP, 107 (1986), pp. 137-61; and Kennedy, Aristotle, pp. 
2 9 9 -3 0 5 .
283 Kennedy, Aristotle on Rhetoric, p. xi.
28« Nussbaum, Fragility, p. 392.
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exemplum’.2* Indeed, one of the most recurrent bits of advice in the Rhetoric 
is that the most successful rhetoric does not appear to be rhetorical:
‘[A]uthors should compose without being noticed and should seem to speak 
not artificially but naturally. (The latter is persuasive, the former the opposite; 
for [if artifice is obvious] people become resentful, as at someone plotting 
against them, just as they are at those adultering wines)’.286
Since the audience in a rhetorical situation already suspects that the speaker 
has a ‘design’ on them, the speaker must appear natural, spontaneous, and 
without craft. Thus rhetoric is most successful when not obviously rhetorical. 
In book III Aristotle defines the virtue or excellence (arete) of prose style and 
civic oratory as ‘clarity’, but with the requirement that a writer or speaker seek 
a mean between ordinary language and poetic language as appropriate for the 
subject.28? The emphasis on clarity is, of course, consistent with his stress on 
logical proof in the earlier books and his dislike of the style of the sophists.288
In Plato’s Phaedrus and in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, there is an agreement that 
the pursuit of practical wisdom is fostered by works that contain poetic and 
rhetorical elements and address themselves to the emotional ‘part’ of the soul. 
In both there is also, implicitly, agreement that the pursuit of wisdom requires 
another more reflective and explanatory sort of style. But the resemblance 
ends here. Plato blends these two styles together into a subtly interwoven 
whole. His prose moves seamlessly from the spare and formally explanatory to 
the lyrical, and back again, breaking down traditional genre distinctions. 
Aristotle, in contrast, commends and venerates the works of actual poets, and 
confines his own writing to the reflective and explanatory function. So what is 
the meaning of this difference?288 To begin with, it is worth noting this may be
288 C. J. Swearingen, Rhetoric and Irony (Oxford, 1991), p. 120.
286 Rh., 3.2.4.
287 In 3.5, Aristotle will add a requirement of grammatical correctness and in subsequent 
chapters will discuss various forms of ornamentation. These concepts were reformulated by his 
student Theophrastus in a treatise, now lost, On Lexis, as ‘correctness, clarity, propriety, and 
ornamentation’, and appear in some form in most subsequent Greek and Roman treatments of 
rhetoric. See, e.g., Cicero, De oratore, tr. E. W. Sutton and H. Rackham, 2 vols. (London, 1959), 
3.37; id., Orator, tr. G. L. Hendrickson and H. M. Hubbel (Cambridge, Mass., 1952), 79; and 
Quintilian, Institutio oratorio, tr. H. E. Butler, 4 vols. (London, 1963), 8.1-2.
288 See S. Consigny, ‘Transparency and Displacement: Aristotle’s Concept of Rhetorical Clarity’, 
RSQ, 17 (1987), pp. 4 1 3 -1 9 -
288 For further discussion of these two alternatives see, M. Nussbaum, ‘Flawed crystals: James’s 
The Golden Bowl and literature as moral philosophy, Love’s Knowledge (N.Y., 1990), pp. 125- 
4 7 -
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less of a philosophical difference than a difference of personality and talent. 
‘For if one genuinely honours the claim of great literature to explore the truth’, 
as Nussbaum asserts, ‘one will not lightly attempt to produce literature. One 
will know that the ethically valuable elements of such a work are inseparable 
from the poetic genius of their production’.2*0 Plato was unquestionably a 
literary artist of genius, and so he was able to adopt the poetic task into his 
own style. But Aristotle was not such an artist, or, if he was, we do not know. 
So when Aristotle confines his own prose to a more conventional style (and 
turns for poetic learning to the works of Sophocles and Euripides), he would 
actually be showing his respect for the literary art. Furthermore, despite 
Plato’s partial rehabilitation of rhetorical and poetic art, he lacks respect for 
actual sophists and poets. He performs part of their job himself. But what he 
does not do, even in the Phaedrus, is to commend their actual works as a 
source of insight. Aristotle, despite remaining opposed to the writings of the 
sophists, allowed poetic works to exist apart as sources of insight in their own 
right. And, consequently, ‘shows himself to be not less, but more responsive 
than Plato to their claim to tell the truth to human souls’.2*1 The acceptance of 
an Aristotelian conception should lead to the recognition that the humanities 
are the core of our public culture, and that other techniques of reasoning are 
tools whose place is to assist them in their task of revealing and enacting a full 
and rich sense of human life and its public requirements.
2*° Nussbaum, Fragility, p. 392. Thus, unlike Iris Murdoch, Nussbaum tuns to Henry James’ 
works instead of writing her own.
291 Ibid., Fragility, p. 393.
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Praise of rhetoric:
Cicero and the making of the ideal orator
I
The Romans, like the ancient Greeks, essentially regarded rhetoric as a 
political tool.2?2 The first rhetoricians, the Sophists, offered their art as 
education in persuasive speaking for prospective leaders, and they saw 
themselves as performers (in the tradition of the poets and rhapsodes) 
engaged in battles of words. Roman rhetoric is equally political, although the 
forensic variety carries the most weight with the subject of this chapter, 
Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43 BC).2”  Inscribed in his rhetoric is a particular 
political model, a republican one in which orators, all theoretically equals, 
engage in a free competition in the public arena, aiming for victory over their 
fellow orators.294 T ull/s forensic temper, prizing success in verbal combat 
above responsibility to truth has long been widely acknowledged. Less 
appreciated is that rhetoric, for Cicero, is understood differently from simply 
elegant or ornate forms of statement. Eloquence, in the way he most often 
conceives it, does not refer to the beauty of the words that a writer or speaker 
may use, although these are of considerable importance. It refers instead to 
the ability to speak about the whole of the subject. True eloquence is rare 
precisely because it requires wide knowledge as well as the numerous other 
attributes essential for an orator.2”  I suggest that, for Cicero, the orator can 
employ the voice of a tragedian, the gestures of the greatest actors, but he also 
requires the acumen of the dialectician and the ethical knowledge of 
philosophers.2?6 Moreover, the orator works for the good of the state and 
cannot rest in the floweiy excursus of the pedant who performs before his
292 M. L. Clarke, Rhetoric at Rome (N.Y., 1963), 2.
2”  In general see, A. Everitt, Cicero: a turbulent life (London, 2001); and. A. Garcea, Cicerone 
in esilio (Hildesheim, 2005).
2”  See R. Radford, Cicero: a study in the origins o f Republican philosophy (Amsterdam, 
2002).
2”  De oratore, tr. E. W. Sutton H. Rackham, 2 vols. (London, 1959),1.6-20, esp. 17-18.
296 De or., 1.27.
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students or a select group of admirers. In his practice, therefore, Cicero might 
use the arts and crafts of rhetoric to make the worse cause appear the better, 
and might boast of having thrown dust in the eyes of the jury,2*? but in his 
theory oratory was purely a power for good. I also hope to suggest that the 
long-standing influence of Cicero’s youthful treatise, De Inventione, seems to 
have distracted attention to his reformulation of rhetoric as much more than a 
simple translation of Greek technical rhetoric into Latin. Although clearly 
thoroughly conversant with rhetoricial precepts, in Cicero’s hands, the rules 
merely allow him to vary, break, or transcend them, while endeavoring to 
persuade an audience.^ In other words, Cicero did not adhere strictly to the 
rules of rhetoric, which he thought were only of limited value in real-life 
situations. For him a great deal more is required of a good orator, a point that 
he reiterates time and time again in his mature rhetorical works,2« and vividly 
illustrates in practice in his speeches before the courts. Cicero says (through 
his interlocutors) that his contemporaries cannot think carefully because they 
are being taught reductive and corrupt versions of rhetoric and virtually no 
philosophy. Among other aims, his transformations have the clear purpose of 
reuniting rhetoric and philosophy, ‘tongue and brain’, which he says had 
increasingly diverged during the period between 300 to 100 BC. For Cicero this 
partitioning began with Socrates, was extended by Aristotle, and has been 
damaging at both theoretical and practical levels.3°° His dialogues on rhetoric 
again and again focus on the history and harmful effects of the partitioning of 
the artes liberates^01 Cicero tries to eliminate this divide, that for him is 
characteristic of Greek philosophy, which is directed exclusively to the 
derivation of principles. It is for this reason that rhetorical techniques, in 
Cicero’s proposed curriculum, come last, following the training of character 
and the acquisition of knowledge through having ‘investigated and heard and 
read and discussed and handled and debated the whole of the contents of the
2’7 Quintilian, Institutio oratoria, tr. H. E. Butler, 4 vols. (London, 1963), 2.17.21. References 
from Quintilian are from this edition.
298 See A. Vasaly, ‘Cicero’s Early Speeches’, Brill’s Companion to Cicero: Oratory Rhetoric, ed. 
J.M. May (Leiden, 2002), pp. 71-111; and F. Solmsen, ‘Cicero’s First Speeches: A Rhetorical 
Analysis’, TAPA, 69 (1938), pp. 542-56.
2«9 See, e.g., De or., 1.19,145-46; 2.78-84; 3.24, 75-76, 92-93,103,121,125,188.
3°° Ibid., 1.60-64,3.58-60; Orator, 12,15.
301 De or., 3.69-77,125; id., Academica, tr. H. Rackman (Cambridge Mass., 1933), 1.3-24.
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life of mankind’.3°* The idea of education Cicero advocates in his dialogues, 
therefore, might best be summed up in relation to the intersection of three 
terms: sapientia, eloquentia, and prudentia. For Cicero sapientia or human 
wisdom, refers to the achievement of self-knowledge. Self-knowledge does not 
refer to some form of psychological introspection or to any form of 
introspection at all. It means instead that the student should study the entire 
curriculum of thought, and take the whole of human knowledge as his 
province. If the object of wisdom is the whole of a subject, then the object of 
eloquence, for Cicero, is to speak in a manner that will present the nature of 
this whole in words. Hence Cicero’s assertion that, ‘eloquence is wisdom put 
into language’.3 °3 Res and verbum, thing and word, are to be joined in the act 
of philosophical speech. The love of wisdom which is to be the goal of the 
student, must also be love of the word (as the medium of wisdom) or the love 
of eloquence. Finally, for Cicero the love of wisdom or philosophy is in essence 
the love of prudent or wise conduct in the civitas.*0* But the knowledge of how 
to live, that is, the knowledge of proper human action, requires that the 
individual grasp the whole of any situation or subject that is important to him, 
and that this whole be put into words (so it can be objectified and understood). 
It follows, then, that the vision that prudentia (phronesis or practical wisdom) 
introduces in human affairs requires the person to have sapientia, a wisdom of 
the whole, and to be able for himself and for others to put this whole into 
words, to have eloquentia. Put differently, the foresight required for prudence 
requires that the totality of a situation be understood and expressed 
completely and articulately. For Cicero, therefore, sapientia, eloquentia, and 
prudentia are three aspects of a total process of the human mind that should 
be the true aim of education. This is a rhetorical conception of human 
knowledge tied to how we make sense together as language-using animals. It 
stands in opposition to the Cartesian conception of education, which advocates 
the reduction of all thought and language to a single method of right
302 De or., 3.54.
3°3 De partitione oratorio, ed. tr. H. Rackham, 2 vols. (London, 1942), 23.79.
3°4 So he opposes those philosophers who, like Socrates, were ‘themselves copiously furnished 
with learning and with talent, but yet shrinking on deliberate principle from politics and 
affairs, scouted and scorned this practice of oratory* (De or., 3.59).
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reasoning, such that anything that was not subject to placement within the 
steps of this method was excluded from human knowledge, or at least 
discounted as illusion or as basically unimportant.
II
As seen in chapter 2, in Rhetoric 1.3 Aristotle identifies three species of 
rhetoric: deliberative, epideictic or ceremonial, and forensic or ju d ic ia ls  
Some traits are common to all three species of rhetoric: (i) they are directed to 
the concrete; (ii) they are popularly oriented; (iii) they appeal to emotions; and 
(iv) they are agonistic.306 That rhetoric is directed to the concrete means that 
the rhetorician tries to guide his audience to action. ‘[I]t is with action, as 
Quintilian says, ‘that [rhetoric’s] practice is chiefly and most frequently 
concerned’^ 0? It indicates, in addition, that rhetoricians concern themselves 
with specific matters, not ambiguous questions. This is especially so in the 
Roman Republic. For example, in his De Re Publica,3 ° 8 and the Tusculan 
Disputations,3°9 Cicero repeatedly suggests that Greek theories have proved 
inferior to the military, political, and moral practices of the Romans.3*° This 
point is echoed in Quintilian’s assertion, ‘Greek superiority in moral precept is 
matched by Roman pre-eminence in examples of conduct -  which is the 
greater thing’.3»
Civil rhetoric is also characterised by a popular audience: assemblies, 
juries, and crowds gathered for special occasions. Cicero, therefore, counsels
3°5 See also Cicero, De inventione, tr. H. Hubbell (London, 1949), 1.5-7; and Inst., 3.12-15. 
Cicero had probably read the Rhetoric, even though this cannot be proved. Among the signs 
that he did is a passage from Book II of De oratore, where he makes Antonius say, among other 
things, that he read the books in which Aristotle gave his own views on rhetoric (2.160), which 
must refer to the Rhetoric -  it is hard not to take this as an indication on Cicero’s part that he 
did the same himself. For more information see, W. W. Fortenbaugh, ‘Cicero’s Knowledge of 
the Rhetorical Treatises of Aristotle and Theophrastus’, in Cicero’s Knowledge o f the Peripatos, 
ed. W. W. Fortenbaugh and P. Steinmetz (New Brunswick, 1989), pp. 39-60.
306 b. Vickers, In Defence o f Rhetoric (Oxford, 1988), pp. 53-4.
3°7 Inst., 2.18.2-5. This relationship between rhetoric and action is clear in the traditional three 
officia oratoris, or duties of an orator: to prove (probare) or instruct (docere), to please 
(delectare), and to stir (movere). Of the three officia, it is the last duty that receives Cicero’s 
highest praise: ‘it is the one thing of all that avails most in winning verdicts’ (Or., 21.69-70).
308 gee De Republica, ed. J.G.F. Powell (Oxford, 2006), bks. 2 and 1.2.
3°9 See Tusculan Disputations, tr. J. E. King (Cambridge, Mass., 1950), bks. 1-3.
310The ‘Greeklings’ are said to be ‘fonder of argument than of truth’ (De or., 1.47-48).
3“ Inst., 12.2.30.
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the prospective rhetorician to accommodate himself to the language and 
beliefs of the people:
‘the whole art of oratory ... is concerned in some measure with the common 
practice, custom, and speech of mankind, so that, whereas in all other arts 
that is most excellent which is farthest removed from the understanding and 
mental capacity of the untrained, in oratory the very cardinal sin is to depart 
from the language of everyday life ...’.312
The discipline of public discourse, thus, entails significant appeal to the 
emotions. After all, as Quintilian says,
‘We [rhetoricians]... have frequently to speak before an audience of men who, 
if not thoroughly ill-educated, are certainly ignorant of such arts as dialectic: 
and unless we force, and occasionally throw them off their balance by an 
appeal to their emotions, we shall be unable to vindicate the claims of truth
and justice’.3‘3
Cicero, like Quintilian, gives special emphasis to the rhetorical appeal to the 
emotions, success in which, he holds, constitutes the chief excellence of the 
o r a t o r . 3 1 4  Why? Because ‘men’s judgments’, he explains, ‘are more often 
formed under the influence of hatred, love, desire, anger, grief, joy, hope, fear, 
misconception or some other emotion, than by truth or ordinance, the 
principles of justice, the procedure of the courts or the l a w s ’ . 3>s The 
significance of the appeals to emotions in classical rhetoric is indicated by 
their status amongst the different modes of persuasion or proofs. As seen in 
the previous chapter, Aristotle distinguishes three interconnected dimensions 
of persuasion (pistis): ethos, pathos and logos.316 Only logos or logical 
explanation, is directed to the listener’s reason; ethos and pathos appeal to the 
e m o t i o n s .3*7 Of the three proofs, it is pathos, the stirring up of an audience’s 
vehement emotions (and thus the most emotionally charged), that is most
3“ De or., 1.3.12.
3*3 Inst., 5.14.29.
314 Brutus, tr. G. Hendrickson and H. Hubbel (Cambridge, Mass., 1952), 89, 279; Or., 128.
3«s De or., 2.178.
316 Aristotle, Rh. i356ai-4. Ethos persuades when ‘the speech is so spoken as to make us think 
[the speaker] more credible, [since] we believe good men more fully and more readily than 
others’ (135833-13). Pathos succeeds ‘when the speech stirs the emotions’, for ‘our judgements 
when we are pleased and friendly are not the same as when we are pained and hostile’ 
(1356313-19).
3*7 Inst., 6.2.8. For more information see, J. Wisse, Ethos and Pathos from  Aristotle to Cicero 
(Amsterdam, 1989).
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highly valued by Cicero. In fact, he portrays pathos as the quintessential 
rhetorical talent:
‘[Efveiy one must acknowledge that of all the resources of an orator far the 
greatest is his ability to inflame the minds of his hearers and to turn them in 
whatever direction the case demands. If the orator lacks that ability, he lacks 
the one thing most e s s e n t i a l ’ .818
Cicero repeatedly asserts that such emotional appeal is the most important 
factor for winning cases,3*9 and he was justly proud of his own skill in this 
regard. Ciceronian orations are rich in passages of high emotion, several going 
as far as to end with the orator in tears, barely able to continue.320 in Orator, 
Cicero discusses his own abilities in stirring the emotions of an audience and 
some of the methods that he employs:
‘[T]he appeal for pity [is not] the only way in which the feelings of the jurors 
should be aroused -  though I have generally employed it so passionately that 
I have even held a baby in my arms during the peroration, and in another case 
involving a noble defendant, I filled the forum with wailing and lamentation 
by calling him forward and raising up his small son, -  but the juror must be 
made to be angry or appeased, to be ill-or well-intentioned, to despise or 
admire, hate or love, desire or loathe, hope or fear, to feel joy or sorrow. ... 
Indeed, there is no conceivable method of arousing or soothing the mind of a 
listener that I have not tried -  I would say brought to perfection, if I judged it 
were so, and if it were true, I would not fear the charge of conceit’.821
For Cicero the renowned defence of Norbanus, described in De oratore, stands 
as a paradigm of a speech that combines effectively both ethos and pathos.322 
Sulpicius, the prosecutor, not only has everything going for his case, but has 
also employed pathos so much to his advantage, that he ‘turned over to
3lS Brutus, 80.279.
3>9 See, e.g., De or. 1.17,30,53, 6o, 2.215, 3 3 7 . 3  5 5 ,105; Or., 128-133.
320 See, e.g., the perorations of Cicero’s Pro Sulla, 92; Pro Plancio, 104; Pro Rabirio Postumo, 
48; and Pro Milone, 105; cf. Pro Caelio, 60.
321 Or., 131-132; cf. De or., 2.l94b-i96, where Cicero describes the famous defense by M. 
Antonius of the old general Manius Aquillius. Having sensed that the jurors were moved at the 
sight of a former consul and decorated military commander now in court, weakened, grief- 
stricken, and dressed in mourning clothes, Antonius raised up his client and tore open 
Aquillius’ tunic, laying bare the scars that he had sustained on behalf of them and the state. 
Cicero himself appears to have imitated this emotional ploy in his own defence of C. Rabirius; 
see A. Dyck, ‘Dressing to Kill: Attire as a Proof and Means of Characterization in Cicero’s 
Speeches’, Arethusa, 34 (2001), pp. 119-130, at p. 121.
322 De or., 2.197 ff- For a detailed analysis of this speech see, Wisse, Ethos and Pathos, pp. 269- 
282.
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Antonius not a court case (iudicium), but a conflagration (incendium)\’s2* He 
then tells us how Sulpicius’ opponent, Antonius, extinguished the ‘fire’:
[W]hat a remarkable prologue you used! What fear, what indecision! With 
what slowness and hesitation your words came!... How well you paved a way 
for yourself in this first stage, and secured yourself a hearing! But look, just 
when I was thinking that you had accomplished nothing more than making 
people think that you deserved to be excused for defending a wicked citizen 
because of your bond with him, you began, imperceptibly, to worm your way 
out -  others were not yet suspecting it, but I was already beginning to be 
much afraid. You defended what had happened by saying that it had not been 
sedition caused by Norbanus, but an outburst of anger on the part of the 
Roman people, and not an unjust one at that, but one that was very well- 
deserved. After that, what commonplace did you fail to employ against 
Caepio? How you filled all of the proceedings with hatred, indignation, and 
pity! And this not just in your actual speech, but even in dealing with Scaurus 
and my other witnesses. You countered their testimony not by refuting them, 
but by resorting to the same point about the outburst of popular violence’.*2*
In section 201, Antonius explains that his strategy in this case relied almost 
entirely upon ethos and pathos. He says that he ‘only touched quite briefly and 
quite superficially’ the implications of the law and the charge of high treason. 
Yet, the two elements of a speech, ‘one that recommends (i.e., ethos), the other 
that excites (i.e., pathos)’, played constant and primary roles. ‘This implied’, 
Antonius explains, ‘giving the impression both of being very passionate when 
rekindling the indignation against Caepio, and of being very mild when 
demonstrating my character in my dealings with those to whom I am bound. 
So, Sulpicius, I bested your accusation in that case not so much because the 
jurors were informed, but because their minds were affected’. It is hardly 
surprising, therefore, to find that Cicero at times goes as far as to advise the 
student to prefer emotion to reason. The hearer, he tells us, should be ‘so 
affected as to be swayed by something resembling a mental impulse or 
emotion, rather than by judgement or deliberation. For men decide far more 
problems by hate, or love, or fear, or illusion, or some other inward emotion, 
than by reality’.*2*
*2* De or., 2.202. 
a2* Ibid., 2.202-203.
*2* Ibid., 2.42.178.
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But it is important to note that this kind of persuasion that finds its source 
in pathos is, for Cicero, closely related to persuasion that is based on ethos . 328 
Ethos or persuasive appeals which are based on character, was also an 
extremely important element of the oratory of the late Republic. In fact, 
character was a very significant component in the social and political milieu of 
Cicero’s Rome, and it exerted a considerable amount of influence on native 
Roman oratory.327 After all, a people who built their history on the deeds of 
great forebears, a people who were bound by the close ties of the client-patron 
relationship, and to whom personal authority (auctoritas) was of utmost 
concern, were likely to be influenced in their decisions by the force of 
individual character. Cicero, of course, was very much aware of the great 
potential that proof based on character (ethos) offered the orator for 
persuading a Roman audience. In De oratore, he discusses this potential in 
some detail:
‘[T]he character, the customs, the deeds, and the life, both of those who do the 
pleading and of those on whose behalf they plead, make a veiy important 
contribution to winning a case. These should be approved of, and the 
corresponding elements in the opponents should meet with disapproval, and 
the minds of the audience should, as much as possible, be won over to feel 
goodwill toward the orator as well as toward his client. Now people’s minds 
are won over by a man’s prestige, his accomplishments, and the reputation he 
has acquired by his way of life. Such things are easier to embellish if present 
than to fabricate if totally lacking, but at any rate, their effect is enhanced by a 
gentle tone of voice on the part of the orator, an expression on his face 
intimating restraint, and kindliness in the use of his words; and if you press 
some point rather vigorously, by seeming to act against your inclination, 
because you are forced to do so. Indications of flexibility, on the part of the 
orator and the client, are also quite useful, as well as signs of generosity, 
mildness, dutifulness, gratitude, and of not being desirous or greedy. Actually 
all qualities typical of people who are decent and unassuming, not severe, not 
obstinate, not litigious, not harsh, really win goodwill, and alienate the 
audience from those who do not possess them. And these same considerations 
must likewise be employed to ascribe the opposite qualities to the 
opponents’.328
Here the importance of character (not only the character of the litigants, but 
also that of their advocates) is eloquently stressed. The audience’s hearts are 
won over by a speaker’s prestige, his past accomplishments, the reputation of
328 See, De or., 2.182-214, esp. 185 and 212; Or., 128-133; Inst., 6.2.8-17.
327 See J. May, Trials o f Character (Chapel Hill, 1988), pp. 1-12.
328 De or., 2.182.
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his life. Cicero’s actual speeches are replete with proof based on character, not 
only that of his client and his opponent(s), but to his own dignitas, blatant 
appeals to his auctoritas, and repeated mention of his greatest 
accomplishments .329
The manner in which the orator appeals to passions alludes to rhetoric’s 
agonistic nature. The orator excites the audience’s passions both to persuade 
them of his position and, in deliberative and forensic oratory, to defeat his 
opponent, ‘to prove one’s own case and demolish the adversary’s ’.33° People 
use rhetoric, as Aristotle says, ‘to defend themselves and attack [others]’^  
The contentious character of political speech is suggested by the fact that the 
Greek word agon not only means ‘contest’ or ‘struggle’, but also denotes 
‘public assembly’ and ‘assembly place’^  In the Roman conception of rhetoric 
the contest always takes place before a iudex, the judge in a courtroom, or 
before iudices, the judges who are the people or the orator’s fellow senators.333 
Cicero places the judge metaphorically above the competing speakers, thus 
reinforcing the notion of oratory as contest: he is the dominus or “lord’, whose 
bias or irrational hostility often defeats the orator’s finest efforts .334 So the 
orator must defeat him, just as he does the other orators he faces. For 
Quintilian such triumphs, in which one is able to sweep away the judges and 
lead them to adopt the position one wishes, so that one truly dominates them, 
are rare.335 But he believes, like Cicero, that in the endlessly repeated contest of 
oratory such triumphs can at least sometimes be engineered by the skilful. To 
present this model, both Cicero and Quintilian apply related metaphors of 
military combat, gladiatorial contests, and athletic games. For example, in 
Cicero’s De oratore, Antonius sees the orator not as ruling the wills of others
329 In fact, on occasion these concerns seem to overshadow the real issue of the case. For a 
detailed analysis of how Cicero employs ethos in his speeches see, May, Trials o f Character.
330 Or., 25.122.
331 Aristotle, Rh., 13531-2.
332 p. Rahe, Republics Ancient and Modem  (Chapel Hill, 1992), p. 43.
333 See De or., 2.29.128-29; Inst., 6.2.1-7. Aristotle similarly sees all rhetoric as performance 
before a judge (krites), and he includes even epideictic speeches in this generalisation, for that 
sort of speech, he says, ‘is put together with reference to the spectator as if he were a judge’ 
(2.18.1).
334 De or., 2.17-72.
335 Inst., 6.2.3-4.
8 9
but as capturing (excipiendas) them,336 and using weapons to do so.337 And 
Quintilian refers on numerous occasions to the “battle in the forum’ (the 
pugnam forensem) or to some equivalent idea.338 The idea of oratory as 
essentially a combat or contest, a fight (pugna), is a notion that Tacitus would 
later insist on in his Dialogus,339 even though he believed that the art was 
degenerating into mere spectacle, and that Saint Augustine would reiterate in 
his Confessions, where he identifies rhetoric as possessing arma.**0 What is 
more, the word omamenta, which the Latins used for the tropes and figures of 
speech of rhetoric, also had the sense o f‘soldier’s gear’l l
It is worth noting that frequent analogies of orators as public performers, 
such as actors and gladiators, indicate that the audience of a speech, just as 
that of a play or gladiatorial show, expected an entertaining performance from 
the orator. For example, in De oratore, Cicero has Antonius tells us that 
entertainment and showmanship are vital in speech-making:
‘In this regard I am always surprised ... by Philippus, who ... usually stands up 
to speak without actually knowing what word he will utter first. He claims 
that it is his habit to fight only after warming up his arms. But he does not 
notice that the very gladiators from whom he draws this analogy hurl their 
first spears so gently, that they not only attend to preserving their strength for 
what follows, but that the effect is also graceful in the extreme. And there is ... 
no doubt that the introduction of a speech seldom needs to be forceful and 
combative. But if, in the actual life-or-death struggle between gladiators, ... 
many things ... happen before the actual engagement which seem to have the 
potential not for inflicting wounds, but for putting on a display, how much
336 Deor., 2.8.32.
337 ibid., 2-7.2-293; cf. 1.8.32,1.32.147,1.34.157, 2.20.84,3.54.206.
338 Inst., 5.12.17,22; 4.3.2; 10.1.33,79.
339 Tacitus, Dialogus de oratoribus, tr. W. Peterson, rev. M. Winterbottom (London, 1970), 31- 
33-
340 Augustine, Confessions, tr. W. Watts (Cambridge, Mass., i960), 9.2. Augustine (A.D. 354- 
430) is the most important Christian writer who is indebted to Cicero. Augustine claims that 
the first stage in what was his eventual conversion to Christianity originated with reading 
Cicero: ‘In the usual order of study I came to a book of a certain Cicero, whose tongue almost 
all admire, but not his heart to the same extent. But there is a book of his containing an 
exhortation to philosophy and called Hortensius. That book changed my perception and 
changed my prayers, O Lord, to you’ (3.4.7). In the period immediately following his 
conversion, Augustine wrote a series of Christianising philosophical dialogues in Ciceronian 
style (these include Adversus Academicos, De Vita Beata, De Ordine, and De Magistro). His 
great work, De Doctrina Christiana (A.D. 397-426), is a Christian hermeneutics and rhetoric, 
intended to help teachers and preachers to understand and expound the Bible. In Book 4, sec. 
27-58, he explicitly draws on Cicero’s discussion of the duties of the orator (to teach, to delight, 
and to move), and their relation to the three kinds of style (plain, middle, and grand), as 
described in Cicero’s Orator.
34* W. J. Ong, Ramus: Method and the Decay o f Dialogue (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), p. 277.
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more should this be expected to happen in a speech, where the audience 
demands pleasure rather than violence!’^
Elsewhere, the speaker is compared both to a gladiator and a boxer in the 
palaestra: ‘... we must shape our orator with respect to both words and 
thoughts, so that he will act like those who fight with weapons or in the 
palaestra: they believe that they should not only take account of how to strike 
and dodge, but also of how to move with grace . . . ’ .343 And in a striking passage 
from the Brutus, he likens the ideal orator to the great Roscius, Rome’s most 
eminent actor:
‘I want my orator to have this experience: When people hear that he is to 
speak, all the places among the benches are taken, the tribunal is full, ... the 
crowd is varied, the juror intent. When he rises to speak, silence is signalled 
by the crowd, followed by repeated applause and much admiration. They 
laugh when he wishes; when he wishes they cry; so that if someone should 
catch sight of these proceedings from afar -  even if he were unfamiliar with 
the case at issue -  he would still recognize that an orator was pleasing his 
audience and that a Roscius was on the s tag ed
In De oratore, Cicero explains that ‘it is impossible for the hearer to feel grief, 
hatred, prejudice, apprehension, to be reduced to tears and pity, unless all the 
emotions which the orator wishes to arouse in the juror are seen to be deeply 
impressed on the orator himself .345 Like the actor, therefore, the orator lives 
his part.346
But it is important to note that Cicero’s characterisation of the rhetoric he 
advocates is more complex than has been suggested so far. For example, while 
admiring the skill of the actor Roscius and wanting the ideal orator to take him 
as a model, Cicero also declares that actors can offer pleasure only to the ear, 
whereas the orator’s cause should hold his audience by also appealing to its 
in t e l le c t .3 4 7  The orator can employ the voice of a tragedian, the gestures of the
342 De or., 2.316-317; cf. 2.325.
343 Ibid., 3.200.
344 See also, e.g., ibid., 1.124-130, 259, 2.338, 3.214, 217 ff.; De amicitia, 97; and Brutus, 6. For 
more information see, F.W. Wright, Cicero and the Theater (Northampton, MA, 1931); K. 
Geficken, Comedy in the Pro Caelio (Leiden, 1973); V. Poschl, ‘Zur Einbeziehung anwesender 
Personen und sichtbarer Objekte in Ciceros Reden’, in Ciceroniana, ed. A. Michel and R. 
Verdiere (Leiden, 1975), pp. 206-26; A. Vasaly, ‘The Masks of Rhetoric: Cicero’s Pro Roscio 
Amerino’, Rhetorica 3 (1985), pp. 1-20.
345 Deor., 2.189.
346 Ibid., 2.191,193.
347 Ibid., 1.59.251, 259.
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greatest actors, but he requires also the acumen of the dialectician and the 
ethical knowledge of p h i lo s o p h e r s .3 4 8  w hat is more, elsewhere Cicero says that 
the orator should use the mimicry of the actor only in passing, because that 
technique is insufficiently liber a l e , thus revealing a fear of social 
debasement. Like Cicero, Quintilian acknowledges the similarities between the 
orator and the actor, especially where delivery is concerned, but stresses the 
need for the former to maintain his distance from the latter. He urges the 
orator to keep the use of theatrical gestures under control ‘lest, when we would 
capture the elegance of the actor, we lose the authority of a good and dignified 
man [viri boni et gravis auctoritateni]’.35° Quintilian’s reference to ‘a good and 
dignified man’ here echoes his general definition of the good orator as a vir 
bonus dicendi peritus, and serves to underscore not only the moral excellence 
of the orator, but his upper-class status as one of the viri boni (the Taest 
people’ or optimates).
The fear of social degradation also surfaces whenever Cicero and 
Quintilian strive to distinguish the orator from the athlete, whom he so closely 
resembles. Both prefer the orator to be a warrior, vanquishing his enemies on 
the b a t t l e f i e l d , 35* rather than an athlete (Isocrates’ i d e a b s * ) ,  who for them was 
unable to compete in the real world:
‘[Ljike bodies accustomed to the oil of the training school, which for all the 
imposing robustness which they display in their own contests, yet, if ordered 
to make a day’s march with the troops, to carry burdens and mount guard at 
night, would faint beneath the task and long for their trainers to rub them 
down with oil and for the free perspiration of the naked limbs’.353
In a similar vein, they prefer the grand style to the more polished one 
associated with Isocrates.354 While speaking of digressions, Quintilian tells us 
that it is permissible to use in them a certain grace or elegance of style. But
348 De or., 1.27.
349 Ibid., 2.62.252. It is important to note that liberale here indicates the upper-class status of 
the free man (liber) as opposed to the status of the slave.
350 Inst., 11.3.184.
3si £)e or > 1.24.157, 2.20.84; Or., 13.42. See D.K. Shuger, Sacred Rhetoric (Princeton, N.J. 
1988), pp. 21-3.
352 In Isocrates, the orator becomes the athlete struggling against his opponent in the 
gymnasium (Panegyricus, 45-46).
353 Inst., 11.3.26-27.
354 See Shuger, Sacred Rhetoric, p. 22.
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only as long as the orator remembers that in the portions of the speech 
dealing with the main topic, he should display not the swollen body of an 
athlete but the sinews of a soldier. What is more, he should not wear a multi­
coloured cloak (that is, use a flowery style) little suited to the dust of the 
forum .355 In the third book of De oratore, one of Cicero’s spokesmen, who has 
been praising the ornate style, pauses to qualify his recommendation, warning 
that human beings tire of such pleasures quickly and will feel disgust if there 
is no variety in them. He goes on: ‘And one is offended all the more quickly by 
the curls and rouge of the orator and the poet because ... in writing and speech 
painted faults are detected not only by the judgement of the ears, but even 
more by that of the m i n d ’.ss* Cicero’s ‘curls and rouge’ are the sign, not of an 
affected woman, but of an effeminised man, just as they are throughout 
Roman literature.
When Cicero attacks the excessive use of tropes and figures of speech as 
‘effeminate’, or warns that certain gestures and facial expressions may be 
criticised with the same term, it is clear that he is worried that the rhetorician 
may be emasculated by the art he practices, turned into an effeminate man: a 
charge that in the Roman world evoked the spectre of homosexuality. In fact, 
both Cicero and Quintilian are decidedly nervous about what they see as the 
effeminising aspects of rhetoric, in particular because Roman men normally 
defined themselves through action rather than talk. Cicero tries to solve this 
problem by displacing it onto the Greeks, condemning them for idleness and 
incessant loquacity and contrasting them with the Romans, who display the 
virtues of industry and decorum. Although the latter must produce speeches 
in order to practise their profession, Cicero claims that they, unlike the 
chattering Greeks, speak only enough and at just the right m o m e n t .3 5 7  Thus, 
he creates an aura of masculinity for his orators by contrasting them with the
3ss Inst., 10.1.33.
356 De or., 25.100.
357 See ibid., 2.4.17-18. Cicero’s interlocutors repeatedly single out as a Greek trait the ‘gross 
habit’ of dialectic, which the Romans prefer to avoid if not eradicate entirely (2.18). Crassus 
says, ‘for what is sillier than to talk about talking, since talking in itself is ever a silly business, 
except when it is indispensable?’ (3.112). However, Cicero’s intimation that Crassus’ anti-Greek 
views are pretence (2.4), seems to be evidence that Romans who were learned, especially in 
Greek philosophy, avoided showing it for fear they would be thought disdainful towards 
Romans. For more information see, M. A. Trouard, Cicero’s attitude towards the Greeks (PhD 
Thesis, University of Chicago, 1942).
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less than masculine Graeculi, or ‘Greeklings’ . 338 His diminutive suggests the 
lack of seriousness of Greek culture when compared with the Roman. It 
indicates, in addition, the Greeks’ inferiority in political power, and reminds 
one that many Romans owned Greek slaves. Moreover, it identifies the Greeks 
as boys (or boy-men), thereby evoking the vision of passive homosexual 
activity, which for the Romans (as for the Greeks themselves) demeaned adult 
males and rendered them effeminate. Quintilian is just as nervous about 
rhetoric as Cicero is. In particular because by the late first century A.D., when 
Quintilian was writing, rhetoric had relatively little to do with the actual 
political life of the state (the management of which had traditionally been an 
important means for Roman men to define their identities). Revealingly, 
Quintilian directs harsh criticism at the rhetorical practices of his 
contemporaries. Why? Because of their predilection for extravagant and 
unnatural language, for words that are sordida, lasciva, ejfeminata. Indeed, 
he goes on in the same passage to compare such a practice to using curling 
irons on one’s hair and applying cosmetics on one’s face.33* Quintilian wants to 
restore the virile eloquence of the age of Cicero, and like him produce an 
image of rhetoric as an art of combat and competition fit for soldiers and 
gladiators. In short, they defend their profession by creating a dramatic, 
masculine vision of the Roman rhetorician, in order to counter that of an 
effeminised, Greekified chatterer who, with his curly hair and rouge, plays the 
despised role of cinaedus (or sodomitical)>° What is more, both Cicero and
358 De or., 1.22.102. The Romans had a word for the serious-minded Greek wrapped up in his 
logical puzzles, namely boro, block-head or simpleton.
359 Inst., 2.5.10-12; cf. 8.Pr.l9-20.
360 However, as John Boswell and others have argued, homosexuality was not only widespread 
but generally tolerated throughout the urban culture of the ancient Mediterranean world. The 
Romans, like the Greeks, accepted it as a normal practice. In fact, even the early Christian 
Church did not condemn it per se (Christianity, Social Tolerance, and Homosexuality 
[Chicago, 1980], pp. 61-206). There are, of course, texts from both ancient cultures that 
criticise homosexual practices; the Roman satirists, in particular, attacked them as 
effeminising and linked them to what they saw as a decline in civilisation. However, what the 
Greek and Roman critics were objecting to was the acceptance by the adult male of the passive 
role in the relationship (a role normally played by a child or a slave). Such behaviour was 
attacked not because it was homosexual per se, but because it threatened to turn the social and 
political world topsy-turvy by having superiors and inferiors change places. Moreover, Roman 
satirists disliked any sort of excessive indulgence in erotic or sensual activity, so that when they 
condemned people for being cinaedi or effoeminati, they were more concerned with 
promiscuity than with sexual preference. Thus, both ancient cultures accepted homosexuality
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Quintilian refer to some notion of rhetoric as ruling or dominating. Quintilian 
defines the perfect orator as one ‘who can guide [regere] cities by his counsels, 
establish laws, and purge vices by his decisions as a judge’ , » 61 and he claims 
that when the orator’s emotional power dominates the court, this form of 
eloquence rules.3 6 2  Because of its enormous power, Cicero (citing the words of 
Pacuvius), celebrates rhetoric as a queen, regina, and a ‘commander’, 
im p e ra to r .3 6 3  Elsewhere he asks rhetorically what is ‘so ... kingly, so worthy of 
a free man’s^ as the power that helps suppliants, gives security, and maintains 
men in the city. Nevertheless, despite such occasional references to rhetoric as 
rule, both Cicero and Quintilian chiefly imagine the art, using metaphors of 
combat, as a contest among free citizens. Cicero was, after all, a staunch 
republican and defender of his city-state run by free men (liberi). Hence his 
praise for rhetoric as ‘worthy of a free man’ (liberate) in the last quotation. 
Since he was unable to abide kings, one can only conclude that his calling it 
Tangly’ (regium) must be a matter of mere metaphor. The rhetorician’s power 
over others is so great that he resembles a king in that regard, even though he 
otherwise remains a citizen like all the other free men in the state. Put 
differently, in Cicero and Quintilian, although there is a recognition that 
rhetoric means power and dominance over others,36s ultimately what counts is 
the competition among orators in the forum or Senate. Thus Cicero writes 
that eloquence ‘has especially always flourished and ruled [dominata] in every 
free people, and especially in peaceful, tranquil cities’.366
and criticised it only if it was excessive or involved an inversion of what was considered proper 
social hierarchy.
36> Inst., l.Pr.10.
362 Ibid., 6.2.4.
3^ 3 De or., 2.44.187.
3ft4 Ibid., 1.8.32: ‘tam ... regium, tam liberale’.
36s In the Renaissance, as seen in the next chapter, just the reverse is true: even though a 
connection between rhetoric and republicanism may be occasionally acknowledged, the 
emphasis really falls on the power that rhetoric gives the orator to control his audience and 
that makes him a king, a Caesar (as Cicero appeared to be), even in a free state.
366 Deor., 1.8.30.
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Cicero’s most comprehensive rhetorical work, De Oratore, is a philosophical 
treatment of rhetoric, not a technical manual for orators. In it his (ambitious 
and unprecedented) aim is to heal the breach between philosophy and 
rhetoric, the ‘reprehensible severance of tongue and brain’, for which he 
blames S o c ra te s> 7  Socrates is said to have usurped the term ‘philosopher’, 
hitherto common to both sides. Crassus, Cicero’s mouthpiece in the dialogue, 
observes that in the old days the same system of instruction seems to have 
imparted education both in right conduct and in good speech. Nor were 
professors in two separate groups, but the same masters gave instruction both 
in ethics and in rhetoric. For example, the great Phoenix in Homer, who tells 
us that he was assigned to the young Achilles by his father Peleus to 
accompany him to the wars, in order to make him ‘a speaker of words and a 
doer of deeds’ > 8  Since Socrates’ time the philosophers had despised oratory 
and the orators philosophy, and this, in turn, has afflicted the entire society 
with two sets of teachers, ‘one to teach us to think, and another to teach us to 
speak’.s6? For Cicero, philosophers often fail to teach ‘thought’ not only because 
they are removed from ‘the common life’, but also because they are unable to 
use language that can communicate effectively:
‘If anyone likes, he may, so far as I am concerned, give the name of orator to 
that philosopher who supplies us with a rich fund of matter and expression, 
or if he prefers to apply the name of philosopher to this orator of ours whom I 
declare to possess wisdom combined with eloquence, I have nothing against 
it; provided that it is agreed that no praise is due to the speechlessness of the 
man who has knowledge without being able to express it, or to the ignorance 
of him who has a supply of words without matter. If one must choose, I 
should prefer tongue-tied wisdom to loquacious folly; but if we are looking 
for the ideal, the palm must be given to the learned orator. And if the 
philosophers admit him to their number, there is an end of the controversy; if 
on the other hand they maintain the distinction, they must be judged inferior 
for this reason, that all their knowledge is to be found in the perfect orator, 
whereas philosophic knowledge does not necessarily imply eloquence, and 
eloquence, however much they may despise it, surely adds a sort of crowning 
grace to their s c i e n c e ’.37°
3*7 De or., 3.16.59-61.
368 ibid., 3.15.57; Homer, Iliad, 9.443. Cf. Inst., 2.17. 8.
369 De or., 3.59-61.
370 Ibid., 3.142-3; emphasis added.
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Cicero, therefore, thinks that philosophers need to see rhetoric as inevitable. 
When they are indifferent to rhetoric, philosophers are robbed of a vehicle of 
communication and thus fail to transmit knowledges In fact, as Aristotle had 
said, everyone practices rhetoric and dialectic to some extent, since everyone 
finds it necessary to criticise or to defend an argument (logos) . B u t  while 
Cicero wants philosophers to adopt the insights of rhetoric, he also criticises 
those orators who are unconcerned with truth, who saw their art as a merely 
practical techne, and determined its merit solely by its persuasive success, 
without regard for the truth. Put differently, though critical of ‘the 
philosophers’ on many points, Cicero opposes with equal force any teaching of 
rhetoric that is severed from the study of philosophy. ‘Whatever ability I have’, 
he says, ‘comes not from the workshops of the rhetoricians but from the 
spacious grounds of the A c a d e m y ’^
In an emphatic rejection of his own training, Cicero opens De Oratore 
with a retraction of the technical rhetoric that his youthful De Inventione 
would transmit to subsequent c e n tu r ie s .3 7 4  Cicero tells his brother that he will 
not ‘recall from the cradle of our boyish learning ... a long string of precepts’. 
Instead, he will ‘repeat the things I heard of as once handled in a discussion 
between men who were the most eloquent of our nation.... You will forgive me 
if I prefer to Greek instruction the authoritative judgement of those to whom 
the highest honours in eloquence have been awarded by our own fellow 
c o u n tr y m e n ’,375 He goes on to say that De oratore is a replacement for ‘the 
sketchy and unsophisticated work’ of his youth, and emphasises that it must 
be ‘worthy of my present age and of the experience I have acquired from 
pleading so many momentous c a s e s ’ . 3 7 6  Cicero now thinks that oratorical 
excellence cannot be achieved by relying on the standard rules and exercises, 
but only T)y means that are of a quite different o r d e r ’,377 After all, ‘the virtue in
371 De or., 3.143-44.
372 Aristotle, Rh. 1.1.135433-6; cf. Or., 64: ‘All speech is oratory, yet it is the speech of the orator 
alone which is marked by this special name’.
373 De or., 12-13.
374 For a fine history of De Inventione see, G. A. Kennedy, The A rt o f Rhetoric in the Roman 
World: 300 B.C.-A.D. 300 (Princeton, N.J., 1972), pp. 103-26.
375 De or., 1.2.
376 Ibid., 1.5.
377 ibid., 1.19.
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all these rules is, not that orators by following them have won a reputation for 
eloquence, but that certain persons have noted and collected the doings of 
men who were naturally eloquent: thus eloquence is not the offspring of the 
art, but the art of eloquence’^
Towards the end of the prologue, Cicero says that the work will be a 
dialogue involving great Roman s p e a k e r s .379 The main interlocutors in the 
dialogue are the two great examples from Cicero’s youth, Lucius Licinius 
Crassus (a distant relative of the more famous later triumvir), and Marcus 
Antonius (the grandfather of Mark Antony). In fact, in the prologues to Books 
II and III, Cicero tells us that the work is a monument to Crassus’ (who had 
taken an interest in young Cicero’s e d u c a tio n s so )  an(J Antonius’ m e m o r y .381 This 
is underlined by the dramatic date: the dialogue is set some ten days before 
Crassus’ death in September 91 B.C. In the third prologue, Crassus’ last 
appearance in the Senate and his death are emotively recalled;3 82 as are the 
violent deaths of most of the other interlocutors (with Antonius dying in a 
‘purge’ in 87).383 But the emphasis in the prologues on the real Crassus and 
Antonius, does not imply that the opinions expressed in De oratore are theirs. 
The resemblance with Cicero’s own views elsewhere, in particular in Brutus 
and Orator, make this clear enough. Moreover, he implies in one of his letters 
that he spoke ‘through the character’ of his interlocutors -  in line with the 
conventions of the dialogue g e n re s  The majority of readers, therefore, will 
have interpreted the work as an expression of Cicero’s own ideas.385
As a number of passages make clear, one of the chief subjects of De 
oratore is the ideal o r a t o r ,386 putting the orator before the readers’ eyes in
378 De or., 1.32.146; cf. Inst., 2.17.6,3.2.3.
379 De or., 1.23. That is, Cicero’s views will be developed through them, in the course of the 
three separate conversations (corresponding to the three books of the work) that make up the 
dialogue.
380 gee ibid., 2.2.
381 Ibid., 2.7-9; 3.14-16.
382 ibid^ 3.1-16.
383 ibid., 3.10.
384Adfam., 7.32.2.
385 On the interplay of reality and fiction in the dialogue see, On the Ideal Orator (De Oratore), 
tr. and intr., J. May, and J. Wisse (N.Y., 2001), pp. 13-8; and J. Hall, ‘Persuasive Design in 
Cicero’s De oratore’, Phoenix 48 (1994), pp. 210-25.
386 see, e.g., De or., 1.64,118; 3.83-85. For background see, E. Fantham, The Roman world o f 
Cicero’s De oratore (Oxford, 2004); and W. Gorier, ‘From Athens to Tusculum: Gleaning the 
Background of Cicero’s De oratore’, Rhetorica 6 (1988), pp. 215-35.
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perfect form, and thus inspiring them to strive for oratorical excellence 
themselves. The experience Cicero had acquired ‘from pleading so many 
momentous cases’ ,3 8 7 had taught him that classical rhetorical rules (as he had 
recorded them in De inventione) are too inflexible to cover the difficulties of 
the cases facing an orator in real life.388 At best, they are useful as a point of 
re fe re n c e ,b u t are generally too rigid to be of any real help in composing an 
effective speech. For example, among the doctrines that are criticised, 
especially by Antonius in Book II, are the detailed rules for the parts of a 
speech, which were central to virtually all rhetorical handbooks. Why, 
Antonius asks, do they prescribe that in the prologue we should make the 
hearers ‘well disposed to us, receptive, and attentive’? Surely, he replies, we 
should do so throughout our speech?3 9<> These and other rules reveal how 
utterly impractical these rhetoricians are: ‘they should ask themselves what it 
is that they want, whether they are going to take up arms for sport or for 
battle’.3 9 i Rhetorical theory, then, is not enough . 8 ? 2 What good and successful 
oratory requires is wide-ranging knowledge, with particular emphasis upon 
civil law,393 history,394 and philosophy. In fact, ‘[t]here is no subject which
387 De or., 1.5.
388 Ibid., 1.6-20. See F. Solmsen, ‘Aristotle and Cicero on the Orator’s Playing upon the 
Feelings’, CP, 33 (1938), pp. 390-404; id., “The Aristotelian Tradition in Ancient Rhetoric’, AJP, 
62 (1941), pp. 35-50.
88« De or., 1.145.
3?° Ibid., 2.80-82.
391 Ibid., 2.84. In Brutus, Cicero illustrates the paucity of wisdom that is inculcated by technical 
rhetoric by recounting his days in the senate. During his tenure as praetor, he met no other 
peer whose ‘studies had embraced philosophy...; no one who had mastered ... the civil law ,... 
no one who knew thoroughly Roman history, from which as occasion demanded he could 
summon as from the dead most unimpeachable witness’ (322).
392 See esp. De or., 3.81. This applies to Cicero’s own rhetorical theory which is mainly 
presented by Antonius in Book II. For more on Cicero’s rhetorical theory see, J. Wisse, ‘De 
Oratore', in Brill's Companion to Cicero, pp. 375-98, at pp. 383-89.
393 De or., 1.160-203. It is worth noting that pleaders in a Roman court of law were not ‘lawyers’ 
in the modem sense of the word. Most speakers who appeared in court had little or no 
expertise in law, a condition which Cicero laments with considerable regret (see ibid., 1.166-97; 
Or., 120). The rhetorical schools did not include the study of law, and many pleaders must have 
approached their task well equipped to argue, let us say, for or against the letter of the law, but 
ill informed about the actual details of Roman law and judicial procedure (ibid., 1.169, *7 3 ,184; 
Or., 120). As Antonius points out, they could always apply to the professional jurist where their 
knowledge was deficient (ibid., 1.249-50). Cicero was indignant at the ignorance of many of his 
fellow advocates; he delighted in the study of Roman law, which he had studied in great detail 
under the mentorship of the great jurists of his day, the Scaevolas. For more information see, J. 
Powell, and J. Paterson, Cicero the advocate (Oxford, 2004); F. Wieacker, Cicero alsAdvokat 
(Berlin, 1965). Also see, Cicero, Political speeches, tr. and intr. D. H. Beriy (Oxford, 2006).
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demands dignified and serious treatment that is not proper to the orator’.395 
What is more, ‘[n]o one can hope to be an orator in the true sense of the word 
unless he has acquired a knowledge of all the sciences and all the great 
problems of life’.as6‘For eloquence’, as Crassus explains,
‘is one of the supreme virtues ... which, after compassing a knowledge of facts, 
gives verbal expression to the thoughts and purposes of the mind in such a 
manner as to have the power of driving the hearers forward in any direction 
in which it has applied its weight; and the stronger this faculty is, the more 
necessary it is for it to be combined with integrity and supreme wisdom, and 
if we bestow fluency of speech on persons devoid of those virtues, we shall not 
have made orators of them, but shall have put weapons into the hands of
madmen’.397
Eloquence, therefore, not only requires substantial knowledge, but also cannot 
be separated from wisdom and v ir tu e s  The orator’s aim is to instruct his 
hearers in the good, and he must be a virtuous man himself. Otherwise, ‘we 
shall not have made orators of them, but shall have put weapons into the 
hands of m adm en’,399 undermining both the reputation of all the practitioners 
and the capacities of the art. For Cicero, therefore, the ideal orator possesses 
the highest virtue and authority, and eloquence to adorn these qualities and 
protect the states0 0 Put differently, the good and wise should not leave political 
life to the clever and bad, but should acquire enough eloquence to make 
themselves effective. In fact, for him, the link between rhetoric and the vita 
activa was fundamental. De Oratore includes numerous passages praising 
rhetoric in glowing terms for giving those who master it the power ‘to get hold 
on assemblies of men’:
394 History was chiefly of use in providing examples to prove or emphasise a point: ‘The 
recalling of past history and the production of instances from the past gives great pleasure and 
at the same time adds authority and credibility to a speech’ (Or., 120; cf. De or., 1.18, 256).
395 De or., 1.5, 2.34.
396 Ibid., 1.20; cf. ibid., 1.72; 2.68; 3.93; 3.124.
397 ibid., 3-55-
398 This point was also emphasised by the Stoics. But it is worth noting that Cicero’s rhetorical 
theory appears to be more Stoic in sympathy than it actually is. He does not subscribe to the 
Stoic conception of the sage as the only truly good orator; nor does he support the Stoic stylistic 
norms of brevity, restraint, minimal decoration, and the exclusive appeal to the intellect of the 
audience. Instead, he maintains repeatedly that rhetoric has the triple objective of teaching, 
delighting, and persuading its audience, and that it ought to appeal to the emotions as well as 
to the intellect.
399 De or., 3.55.
4°o ibid., 1.5.
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‘In every free nation, and most of all in communities which have attained the 
enjoyment of peace and tranquillity, this one art has always flourished over 
the rest and ever reigned supreme.... What function is so kingly, so worthy of 
the free, so generous, as to bring help to the suppliant, to raise up those who 
are cast down, to bestow security, to set free from peril, to maintain men in 
their civil rights? ... The wise control of the complete orator is that which 
chiefly upholds not only his own dignity, but the safety of countless 
individuals and of the entire State’.*01
The positive image of citizenship put forward by Cicero, therefore, centred on 
the figure of the bonus civis or vir civilis, i.e., the man who knows how to 
plead in the law courts for justice, and to deliberate in the councils and public 
assemblies of the res publica, in such a way as to promote policies at once 
advantageous and honourable. This is a figure who also emerges as the hero of 
Cicero’s De officiis:
“While the life of those who cultivate otium is undoubtedly easier, safer, and 
less of a burden or trouble to others, the life of those who apply themselves to 
public affairs and the handling of great matters is at once more valuable to 
mankind and is better suited to winning us greatness and fame’.*02
The connection between rhetoric and political life, reiterated so frequently by 
Cicero (and so influential in the Renaissance), is also found in Quintilian’s 
Institutio Oratorio:
‘I want the person whom I am educating to be wise in the truly Roman sense, 
and thus to be capable of showing himself a true vir civilis in the work and 
experience of government, and not merely in disputations of a purely private 
kind’.*°3
The man who is truly civic, the true vir civilis, is the man who is suited to the 
administration of public as well as private affairs. The highest form of virtue is 
that of the citizen who, having entered the political process in pursuit of his 
particular good, now found himself joining with others in the pursuit of 
universal good.
*D1 De or., 1.8.30-4; cf. 1.46.202,1.48. 211 and 214, 2.8.33, 2.9.35, 2.82.337-8, 3.4.13, 3.15.57, 
3.16.1, 317-63, 3 1 9  7 2 , 3 20.74, 3 32.131; Brutus, 2.6-7, 6.22, 12.45, 1 4 -5 4 , 76. 265, 9 4 -3 2 4 , 
96.328-31; Or., 41141-2,4 3 1 4 8 .
*02De off., 1.21.70.
*°3 Inst., 12.2.7; cf. ibid., 11.1.35,12.2.6,12.7.1,12.11.1.
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Of the general learning the orator must acquire philosophy is only an 
element, but a very important one, nevertheless.** As Cicero says in the 
Orator,
‘Let us first of all lay it down ... [that] the perfect orator whom we are 
searching for cannot exist without philosophy ..., ... without philosophy no 
one can speak with breadth and fulness on great and varied themes .... Nor 
can one without philosophical training discern the genus and species of 
things, or define and analyse them, or judge between true and false, see 
logical contradictions and discern ambiguities. What shall I say of physics, 
which supplies much material to speeches, and of all the branches of moral 
philosophy, for the understanding and treatment of which a profound study 
of such matters is necessary?’**
The ideal orator, therefore, must be trained in philosophy if he is to achieve his 
(rhetorical) aims.-*06 The discipline may contribute to rhetoric in at least two 
ways: (i) directly, through philosophical inquiry into the nature of the art,*0? 
and (ii) indirectly, through the application to rhetoric of doctrines drawn from 
philosophical fields.408 Cicero’s emphasis on the importance of philosophy is, 
therefore, partly to do with pragmatic concerns. As seen in the previous 
section, he stresses time and again the importance of pathos (the emotional 
manipulation of the audience), and for this it is essential to master psychology 
(then a part of ethics). As Crassus asks, ‘can speech be applied to kindle the 
emotions or to quench them again -  precisely the thing most essential for an 
orator -  without having investigated with the utmost care all the theories that 
the philosophers have developed about human character and behavior?’40* 
What is more, the orator must impress his audience, and ‘send shivers down 
their spines’; the more he knows, the more successful he will be at that. 
Crassus likens him to an aedile, who has to provide ‘elaborate provisions’ for 
his games, because it is impossible to ‘satisfy our Roman people with ordinary, 
homebred material’.410 Another consideration is that an orator (and certainly
404 Originally, Cicero did not conceive philosophy as especially germane to rhetoric. In De 
inventione, for example, he distinguished philosophical from rhetorical subject matters (1.8) 
and argued that speakers needed to know little philosophy in order to master rhetoric (1.1.33, 
77,86).
4°5 Or., 14-16.
406 De or > 1.53-54,1.60; cf. 1.84.
4°7 Or., 7-19; Part. 139-40; Fin., 4.5-6,10; Brut., 120.
408 De or. 1.56-57,1.67-69,3.122-124.
4°» Ibid., 1.60; cf. 1.17,48,53, 69,87,165; 3.72,76.
410 Ibid., 3.53, and 92; cf. 3.105-107,120.
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the ideal orator) needs to be able to address eveiy possible topic, and to argue 
both sides of any issue. He must, therefore, have encompassing knowledge, for 
‘what can be more insane than the hollow sound of even the best and most 
distinguished words, if they are not based upon thought and knowledge?’411 
But Cicero also demands that the orator master philosophy, because of less 
pragmatic reasons. He hopes, for example, that philosophy will act as a moral 
force, guaranteeing that the orator will not abuse his rhetorical skills.412 (This 
is not to say that Cicero supposes that philosophy can turn bad people into 
good ones. Like Aristotle, he believes that the responsibility for the abuse of 
rhetoric should be placed in the individual’s morality and integrity.) What is 
more, a reunited philosophy and rhetoric forming the basis of education can 
both direct and generate liberal studies, which in turn will allow the creation 
of improved history, law and philosophy. These in turn will improve the polis, 
civitas, the common life.
It is important to note that by claiming that the good orator needs 
philosophy, Cicero involves himself in the contemporary dispute between 
philosophers and rhetoricians. In short, the problem arose out of the 
(mutually exclusive) claims of the rhetoricians and the philosophers to be the 
educators of the young. And the point on which they centred was whether the 
general questions of a philosophical (or quasi-philosophical) nature which the 
orator may often have to handle, belonged to the province of rhetoric or were, 
instead, the property of philosophy. It was often formulated in terms of the 
distinction between theses and hypotheses, i.e., between general and specific 
questions. Hypotheses included court cases, which were covered by rhetorical 
theory, and they were generally considered the ‘property’ of the rhetoricians. 
The theses, on the other hand, included typically philosophical and semi- 
philosophical questions, such as ‘What is justice?’, ‘Should one marry?’ and
411 De or. 1.51; cf. 1.17,20,48,50-51,54; 3.19.
412 Here he seems to resemble Plato. For the 'Platonic' interpretation of Cicero see, e.g., T. M. 
Conley, Rhetoric in the European Tradition (N.Y., 1990), p. 37; C. J. Classen, ‘Ciceros orator 
perfectus: ein vir bonus dicendi peritus?’, in Commemoratio. Studi difilologia in ricordo di 
Riccardo Ribuoli, ed. S. Prete (Sassoferrato 1986), pp. 43-55; and W. L. Grant, ‘Cicero on the 
Moral Character of the Orator’, CJ, 38 (1943), pp. 472-78. It is worth emphasising that the 
discussion in De oratore begins with a reference to the beginning of the Phaedrus, and ends 
with an allusion to its end (1.28; 3.228-30). And philosophers like Charmadas often refer to 
Plato (1.47; 3.122,129; cf. 1.57,87).
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others (belonging to the realm of ethics), or questions such as ‘What is the size 
of the sun?’ (belonging to the domain of physics). Rhetoricians usually began 
their treatises by dividing rhetorical matters into theses and hypotheses, thus 
arguing that their theories also covered the philosophical substance of the 
former. However, since they offered no actual treatment of the theses, they 
failed to deliver on those claims .*‘3 The philosophers took this opportunity for 
counterattack, and ridiculed the rhetoricians’ claims; matters of ethics and 
political theory were, they said, clearly their property, not that of the 
rhetoricians.*1* Moreover, apart from the theses, some of them argued 
(possibly with Plato’s Phaedrus in hand), that the importance of emotional 
appeal in oratory necessitated knowledge of psychology, a philosophical 
subject again not covered by the r h e t o r ic ia n s .^
The quarrel is illustrated in De oratore’s Book I, when Crassus and 
Antonius pass through Athens en route to or from their Roman provinces, and 
take part in debates with philosophers on this subject.-*16 It is clear from these 
passages that there were fierce controversies, and that Charmadas, the 
energetic debater from the Academy (so vividly portrayed by Antonius in Book 
I), took a prominent part in them.*1? The quarrel is also central in Book III. It is 
here that Crassus remarks that the clash can be traced back to Socrates’ 
hostility towards rhetoric, which caused philosophy and rhetoric to be split 
apart, and that he makes a plea for the restoration of the original unity of the 
two.*'6 Cicero both agrees and disagrees with each opposing camp; so he 
combines what he regards as the best arguments on both sides in order to 
support his own position. A significant part of what is said in Book III about 
the orator’s mastery of all subjects is formulated in terms of the theses,™
Some restricted themselves to claiming the ethical questions, others seem to have claimed 
even the physical ones. See De or., 2.65-66.
4*4 See ibid., 1.41-44,85-86.
4*s See ibid., 1.87.
4*6 Ibid., 11.45-47 and 57; 1.82-93.
4*7 Ibid., 1.82-93.
418 Ibid., 3.56-73. In Orator Cicero demands a knowledge of logic (though the subject, naturally 
dull, needed die application of a little polish see, 115), and of physics, the latter because the 
contemplation of the heavenly bodies will supposedly result in his speaking in a more lofty and 
magnificent manner (119; the idea was probably taken from Plato, Phaedrus, 270a). In De 
Oratore, however, he says that logic and physics can be left on one side (1.68); it is enough to 
have a thorough knowledge of moral philosophy.
™ De or., 3.107-125.
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which for Cicero, should fall under the orator’s competence. He thus agrees in 
principle with the rhetoricians’ claim on the theses; yet simultaneously 
subscribes to the philosophers’ criticism that the rhetoricians have nothing to 
offer to substantiate their claim. He believes, in addition, that knowledge of 
philosophy is necessary if the orator is to be able to speak about the theses, 
and if he is to be successful in arousing his audiences’ emotions. To these 
arguments Cicero adds a few others, but it is these conspicuous borrowings 
from the two opposing camps that signal that his view is a synthesis, which 
should resolve the quarrel. The key ideal is that of the orator as the true vir 
civilis, the man who is suited to the administration of public as well as private 
affairs. With this synthesis he hopes to restore the original unity that existed 
before Socrates, to heal the ‘rupture between the tongue and the brain’.*20 For 
Cicero, therefore, ‘talking well’ is not merely a rhetorical ideal, it also means 
saying the right thing. ‘If, as Crassus says, ‘they [the philosophers] allow that 
he [the learned orator] is also a philosopher, the quarrel is over’.-*21
IV
Cicero, as an advocate of rhetoric, is constantly forced to confront the charge 
that to play the orator is to lie. In response, he almost invariably adopts 
Aristotle’s strategy, who, after admitting that rhetoric can be employed for 
both good and ill, insists that only the man who uses it for morally 
praiseworthy ends is a true rhetorician. In essence, he ‘solves’ the ethical 
problem his art produces simply by defining it out of existence, by proclaiming 
that the orator is what Quintilian, following Cato, calls him, ‘a good man 
skilled in speaking’,-*22 and that his fraudulent double is not an orator at all. 
Ironically, while trying to respond to Plato’s criticisms of rhetoric in the 
Phaedrus and the Gorgias, Cicero (and later Quintillian) reaches a 
surprisingly similar position to the Plato of those two dialogues.-*23 One main 
difference does remain, however: for Plato, the philosopher was the only true
420 De or., 3.61.
421 Ibid., 3.143.
422 Inst., 1.2.1.1: vir bonus dicendi peritus; cf. De part. orat. 23.79: ‘eloquence is wisdom put 
into language’.
423 De invent., 1.2.3; Inst., i.Pr.9-20; 12.1.1-32. For more on Plato position see, chapter 2 above.
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rhetorician; for Cicero, on the other hand, the ideal orator is the true vir 
civilis, the citizen who combines eloquence with universal knowledge. The old 
Aristotelian distinction between practical and theoretical knowledge is 
relevant here (a distinction which cannot be reduced to that between the true 
and the probable). Practical knowledge or phronesis, as Hans-Georg Gadamer 
has shown, is another kind of knowledge; primarily, it means that it is directed 
towards the concrete situation, and thus it must grasp the ‘circumstances’ in 
their infinite variety.424 This is exactly what Cicero emphasises about it. It is 
this idea, propounded by Aristotle against Plato’s ‘idea of the good’, to which 
Cicero’s references to wisdom and sensus communis go back to. His main 
concern was, of course, to show that this kind of knowledge is outside the 
rational concept of knowledge. But even though the practice of this virtue 
means that one distinguishes what should be done from what should not, it is 
not simply practical shrewdness and general cleverness. The distinction 
between what should and should not be done, for Cicero, includes the 
distinction between the proper and the improper (and thus presumes a moral 
attitude). What is more, his reasoning on the importance of emotional appeals 
in a large gathering does not depend solely on his belief in the intellectual 
superiority of the elite, but on a more fundamental assumption about human 
nature. Cicero attributes a pivotal role to the passions in oratory because he is 
very much aware that political deliberation must conclude in action, and that 
human passions cannot be governed by the universal prescriptions of 
reason.425 As the figure of Scaevola concedes in De oratore, in cases where we 
cannot look for certainty (as in most of the arguments characteristic of civic 
life), the need for eloquence becomes paramount. You cannot do without it, he 
says,
‘if you want the case you are pleading in the courts to seem the better and 
more plausible one, or if you want the speeches you deliver in the assemblies 
to have the greatest persuasive force, or if you merely want your utterances to 
appear truthful to the uninstructed and skilful to the wise’ .* 26
t2* H.-G. Gadamer, Truth and Method (1997), pp. 27-8.
*2s ‘In this sphere one needs, rather, convincing examples as only history can offer them. That is why 
Bacon describes historia, which gives these examples, almost as another way of philosophising (alia 
ratio philosophandi)’ (ibid., p. 33)
-t26 De or., 1.10.44
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If, in short, your arguments fall in any way within the purview of scientia 
civilis, you will always find it necessary to supplement your reasoning with the 
force of eloquence.
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Rhetoric is not what it seems:
The discourse of rhetoric in the Renaissance
I
Renaissance humanism is defined in large part in terms of its idealisation of 
classical culture and its attempts to imitate (or ‘revive’) the ancient Romans 
and Greeks in moral, social, and political as well as literaiy terms. It is also 
defined by the cluster of disciplines that trained a scholar to interpret and 
produce literary texts in Latin. The studia humanitatis, or ‘the humanities’, 
referred to the first two parts of the Medieval trivium, grammar and rhetoric, 
together with moral philosophy, poetry, and history. Having displaced logic or 
dialectic from the pre-eminent position that subject enjoyed in late Medieval 
culture, rhetoric was hailed as the queen of the sciences.-*2? In fact, it would be 
an understatement to say that rhetoric was important to the Renaissance. 
From the early Italian humanists to the mid-seventeenth century, rhetoric was 
considered an essential part of education, vital for the well-rounded 
individual, and it later came to hold a place of honour at the university and as 
the culminating stage of training at schools and colleges. James J. Murphy has 
calculated that more than a thousand treatises, handbooks, commentaries, 
and the like (texts written in virtually all the languages of Western Europe), 
were produced on the subject in the period.-*28 Despite attacks from critics, 
debates over correct styles, and the more radical ‘reformation’ recommended
For the development of humanist scholarship see J.J. Murphy, Latin rhetoric and education 
in the Middle Ages and Renaissance (Aldershot, 2005); Luis Gallardo, El humanismo 
renacentista (Madrid, 2000); Rebecca W. Bushnell, A Culture o f Teaching (Ithaca, 1996); P. 
Mack (ed.), Renaissance Rhetoric (N.Y., 1994); R. Weiss, The Renaissance Discovery o f 
Classical Antiquity (Oxford, 1988); Marc Fumaroli, L’Age de Veloquence (Geneva, 1980); Also 
see, Craig W. Kallendorf (ed.), Humanist educational treatises (Cambridge, Mass, 2002).
428 J. J. Murphy, ‘One Thousand Neglected Authors: The Scope and Importance of Renaissance 
Rhetoric’, in Renaissance Eloquence, ed. J. J. Murphy (Berkeley, 1983), pp. 20-36. See also id., 
Renaissance Rhetoric: A  Short-Title Catalogue o f Works on Rhetorical theoiy from  the 
Beginning o f Printing to A.D. 1700 (N.Y., 1981); id., ‘Rhetoric in the Earliest Years of Printing, 
1465-1500’, QJS, 70 (1984), pp. 1-11; and J. J. Murphy, and Martin Davies, ‘Rhetorical 
Incunabula: A Short-Title Catalogue of Texts Printed to the Year 1500’, Rhetorica, 15 (1997), 
PP- 3 5 5 -4 7 0 .
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for it by the Ramists, it retained its central place in the culture throughout the 
Renaissance. Indeed, one thing that characterises rhetoric in the Renaissance 
(as in virtually all periods of Western history), is its embattled status, its 
exposure to criticism and attack. The discourse of rhetoric in the period is, in 
fact, anything but monolithic in its attitudes and values, rather it is very 
complex, replete with interpretative puzzles. So even though Renaissance 
rhetoric constitutes a recognisable, definable discourse, it is marked by 
profound ambiguities, contradictions, and divisions. My aim in this chapter is 
not to supply a finished narrative, but to show why the interpretative puzzles 
are intractable yet so interesting. Indeed, I hope to suggest that if we are to 
adequately give an account of what happened to rhetoric during this period, 
we must first take a position on at least one key set of issues which underlies 
not only the cultural history of the Renaissance, but the history of culture as 
such: what does it mean to belong to a linguistic community? How do our 
beliefs depend on the languages in which they are expressed? And how do they 
depend on the social and intellectual communities which speak those 
languages? To be more precise: this chapter deals with the ways in which 
Renaissance thinkers represented rhetoric to themselves, with how they wrote 
about it and how they perceived its powers and its limits, its value to society 
and to the individual, its relation to other fields and occupations. In the 
Renaissance, rhetoric is a distinctive discourse, constituted in the vast number 
of discussions of the subject which appear not only in individual treatises and 
handbooks, but also in texts from other domains.*2’ Throughout the discourse, 
rhetoric is most frequently portrayed as the art of persuasion, i.e., language 
(accompanied by supporting looks and gestures) as it is used to move people. 
Occasionally writers approach the art of rhetoric in a more reflective and 
Aristotelian manner, analysing the ways in which persuasion occurs. But more 
often than not, their treatises and handbooks are practical and goal-oriented, 
describing the tools and techniques by means of which we can get others to
The implication here is that classical humanism was a means of grasping and 
conceptualising politics, rather than a monolithic and detailed plan or strategy; it was not ‘a 
programme’, but ‘a mode of discourse’ or ‘a political vocabulary1. See J. G. A. Pocock, ‘The 
concept of a language and the metier d’historien: some considerations on practice’, in The 
Languages o f Political Theory in Early Modem Europe, ed. A. Pagden (Cambridge, 1987); and 
id., Virtue, Commerce, and History (Cambridge, 1985), ch. 1.
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obey our will. In other words, for them rhetoric is concerned not only with 
communication as it serves to articulate one’s thoughts and transmit them to 
others, but also with shaping those of others, determining their ideas and 
values and directing their b e h a v io u r . 4 3 0  As the Renaissance conceives it, 
therefore, rhetoric is no language game. It is a serious business that aims to 
affect people’s beliefs and produce real action in the world.
This chapter differs from traditional accounts in that it puts to one side 
the issue of diachronic development within the Renaissance. I do not attempt 
to build an account of the stages through which the discourse of rhetoric 
develops between the second half of the fourteenth century (usually taken to 
be the beginning of the Renaissance) and the middle of the seventeenth (its 
equally conventional e n d ) .431 I hope instead to suggest that the Renaissance 
discourse of rhetoric displays important continuities throughout the period, 
and that the similarities are sufficiently great to warrant their being treated as 
constituent elements in a single (albeit less than monolithic), reconstructed 
discourse. Put differently, the discourse of rhetoric in the Renaissance 
manifests something like a period style. Writers from the beginning to the end 
of the era conceive their subject in roughly similar terms: rhetoric is not only 
defined as an art of persuasion directed at effecting action in the world, but 
also seen as a peculiarly political art. The argument that rhetoric is political in 
the Renaissance has, of course, been made by a number of scholars. But many, 
such as Paul O. Kristeller, Hans Baron, and Quentin Skinner, tend to limit the
430 As the German rhetorician Bartholomew Keckermann, following Aristotle, puts it: “The 
word persuasion is to be interpreted broadly to mean a moving of the heart and emotions, so 
that the auditor is impelled not only to believe, but also to act [non tantum ut credat, sed etiam 
ut agat aliquid]’ (Systema Rhetorices [Hanover, 1608], 9).
43> Such a history would, for example, begin by tracing the revival of Ciceronian rhetoric by 
Italian humanists and proto-humanists (such as Petrarch in the late fourteenth and early 
fifteenth centuries). It may outline the enriching of the discourse through the rediscovery of 
Greek texts, and then examine the debate over Ciceronian style which begins at the end of the 
fifteenth century and continues for another hundred years or so. It would analyse the Ramist 
reform in the mid-sixteenth century which threatens to reduce rhetoric to style and delivery. It 
might say something about rhetoric in the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation and, 
finally, it would deal with the impact on rhetoric of Cartesian rationalism and the New Science. 
For a diachronic history of at least one segment of Renaissance rhetoric see, Wilbur S. Howell, 
Logic and Rhetoric in England, 1500-1700 (Princeton, 1956). Most accounts treat the subject 
globally, paying less attention to developments within the period than to the continuities that 
allow Renaissance rhetoric to be differentiated from its Medieval predecessor. For examples 
see, John Monfasani, ‘Humanism and Rhetoric’, in Renaissance Humanism: Foundations, 
Forms, and Legacy, ed. A. Rabil, J., 3 vols. (Philadelphia, 1988), III, pp. 171-235; and B. 
Vickers, Classical Rhetoric in English Poetry (London, 1970).
110
identification between rhetoric and politics to the earliest phases of the Italian 
R e n a i s s a n c e ^  others, such as Marc Fumaroli, stress the affiliation between 
rhetorical styles and political p o s i t i o n s .4 3 3  However, I suggest that rhetoric is 
political in the Renaissance not simply because of the uses to which it is put or 
the styles it engenders, but because, in the imagination of the period, the 
relationship between rhetorician and audience is conceived fairly consistently 
in political terms as one between ruler and subject (and that that conception of 
rhetoric remains central to the discourse throughout the entire period).
It is important to note that this chapter, even though it does not pretend 
to offer a comprehensive histoiy of Renaissance rhetoric, is clearly concerned 
with the historical distinctiveness of its subject. I argue not merely that the 
conception of rhetoric shared by thinkers from the Renaissance differs from 
the one held by their Medieval predecessors, but also that it differs (albeit in 
quite subtle and nuanced ways) from the conceptions of classical writers to 
whom it nevertheless owes so much. The Renaissance is, of course, often 
spoken of as a revival of classical antiquity, but in the course of this chapter I 
hope to show that the discourse of rhetoric in the Renaissance is historically 
distinct from everything that precedes it.434 Renaissance rhetoricians, even if 
merely commenting on, editing, or teaching ancient texts, necessarily saw 
those texts not with the eyes of Greeks and Romans, but with those of 
Renaissance Europeans. There are, of course, significant repetitions of 
classical materials in their works. However, those materials are ‘adapted’ 
(whether consciously or unconsciously) to suit the needs and biases, the 
assumptions and ideological emphases of their own time. It follows that I 
disagree with those scholars, to whom Renaissance rhetoric seems particularly 
contemporary because of its attempt to grapple with the loss of absolutes. For 
Nancy Struever and Victoria Kahn, Joel Altman and Thomas O. Sloane, for
432 See P. O. Kristeller, The Humanist Movement’, in Renaissance Thought (N.Y., 1961), 323; 
id., ‘Rhetoric in Medieval and Renaissance Culture’, in Renaissance Eloquence, ed. Murphy, 
pp. 1-19; H. Baron, The Crisis o f the Early Italian Renaissance (Princeton, 1966); Q. Skinner, 
The Foundations o f Modem Political Thought (Cambridge, 1978), I, pp. 3-40.
433 See Fumaroli, L'age de Veloquence; id., ‘Rhetoric, Politics, and 800161/, in Renaissance 
Eloquence, ed. Murphy, pp. 253-73.
434 For examples of commentators who see Renaissance rhetoric as a revival of classical 
rhetoric, see Vickers, Classical Rhetoric, p. 117; J. O’Malley, Praise and Blame in Renaissance 
Rome (Durham, N.C., 1979), p. 5; and W. Kennedy, Rhetorical Norms in Renaissance 
Literature (New Haven, 1978), pp. 1-14.
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example, the rhetoric of the period is remarkable for its connections to 
scepticism, its sense of the contingency and uncertainty of the world of 
experience, its recognition of the gap between language and reality, and its 
resulting commitment to dialogue and debate rather than dogmatic 
a s s e r t i o n .4 3 5  Hence, sceptical works such as Erasmus’s Praise o f Folly, open- 
ended dialogues such as More’s Utopia and Castiglione’s Book o f the Courtier, 
and plays such as Shakespeare’s (which debate issues that are unresolved), are 
celebrated as the ultimate expression of the mentality created by Renaissance 
rhetoric. What is more, there is an implicit tendency in the work of some 
scholars to align that rhetoric with a democratic or republican form of politics, 
a tendency made explicit by Hans Baron, Quention Skinner, and Eugenio 
Garin, who link the revival of rhetoric in the Renaissance to the democratic 
debates that were the lifeblood of the Italian communes in the twelfth and 
thirteenth centuries.^* While I acknowledge that the actual training students 
received in rhetoric during the Renaissance may have encouraged scepticism 
and a dialogic view of life, I suggest, instead, that the treatises and handbooks 
themselves see the student engaged in what is essentially a one-sided 
argument in which he does the speaking and his audience (overwhelmed by 
his eloquence), agrees to do what he wants them to do. Put differently, they 
conceive rhetoric as a political instrument, but not one whose main purpose is 
to enable free political debate and discussion. Finally, this imperial and regal 
conception of rhetoric as rule should not really be surprising. After all, 
Renaissance culture was, for the most part, hierarchical and monarchical or 
oligarchical, and the period is generally marked by the gradual centralisation 
of states under single rulers who increasingly controlled them in absolutist 
fashion.
435 N. Struever, The Language o f History in the Renaissance (Princeton, N.J, 1970); V. Kahn, 
Rhetoric, Prudence, and Skepticism in the Renaissance (Ithaca, N.Y., 1985); J. Altman, The 
Tudor Play o f Mind (Berkeley, 1978); and T. O. Sloane, Donne, Milton, and the End of 
Humanist Rhetoric (Berkeley, 1985). See also A. Kinney, Continental Humanist Poetics 
(Amherst, 1989); T. Cave, The Comucopian Text (Oxford, 1979); and J. E. Seigel, Rhetoric and 
Philosophy in Renaissance Humanism  (Princeton, 1968).
436 See Baron, Crisis; Skinner, Foundations; E. Garin, Medioevo e Rinascimento, 2d edn. (Bari, 
1961); and id., Italian Humanism: Philosophy and Civic Life in the Renaissance, tr. P. Munz 
(Oxford, 1965).
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II
Renaissance culture memorably acknowledged itself through simplified 
metaphorical or ideological formulations -  such as the well-known concept of 
the ‘rebirth’ of scholarship from the ‘rust’ or ‘shadows’ of the past, or of the 
contrast between ‘learned’ and ‘unlearned’. Such self-description should leave 
us sceptical, however. Just as the ‘novatores’ of the seventeenth century owe 
more to Renaissance humanism than their claims to bold originality suggest, 
so too the humanists proclaimed their scorn for and independence from the 
scholastics while drawing on many of their methods and b e l i e f s . 4 3 7  It is 
important to remember that, the ‘dark’ or ‘middle’ ages is a pejorative coinage 
of Italian humanists, beginning with Petrarch, to designate (and to denigrate) 
the time between classical antiquity and its modem r e c o v e r y . « s  in fact, recent 
scholarship has shown that twelfth-century authors had a much greater 
appreciation of ancient philosophy than was previously thought. Under the 
influence of Plato’s Timaeus (the only substantial Platonic text known before 
the fifteenth century) and associated galenic and hermetic texts, the natural 
dimensions of the human condition were given new p r o m i n e n c e . « 9  Man was 
seen as a kind of universe, a ‘microcosm’, a concept that opened up a world of 
anthropological analogies (particularly when combined with the psychology 
deriving from Aristotle’s De Anima).w  The ancient debate over the nature 
(and human condition) of ideas became the centre of dispute and the
437 it  is no coincidence that fitienne Gilson, concluding his discussion of Medieval philosophy 
with an exposition of Leonardo Bruni’s De studiis et litteris (with its recommended series of 
good authors), observes, ‘We have most assuredly entered a new world’. To which he 
immediately adds, ‘through a continuous evolution rather than a revolution’ (La philosophie au 
moyen age [Paris, 1952], pp. 737 ft.).
438 The centuries between Augustine and Petrarch, painted dark by the humanists, were 
blackened further by Protestant scholars. As D.R. Kelley has shown, Lutheran historians of 
philosophy, in particular, took over this concept in their own efforts to define the ‘modem’ 
period of their canon. This tripartite division -  the philosophy of ancients (veteres), authors of 
the middle ages (medium aevum), and modems (modemi, recentiores, or novatores) 
beginning with the ‘restoration of the letters’ -  was inherited by Brucker from his predecessors, 
refined to admit subdivisions and non-western authors, and passed on to later historians of 
ideas {The Descent o f Ideas [Ashgate, 2002], p. 53).
439 See J. Hankins, Humanism and Platonism in the Italian Renaissance (Rome, 2003); and T. 
Gregory, "The platonic inheritance’, in History o f Twelfth-Century Philosophy, ed. P. Dronke 
(Cambridge, 1988), pp. 54-80.
440 See S. Spence, Texts and the self in the twelfth century (Cambridge, 1996); and F.E. Cranz, 
‘Perspectives de la Renaissance sur le “De Amina”,’ in Platon et Aristote a la Renaissance 
(Paris, 1976), pp. 3 5 9 -7 6 .
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foundation of science,**1 though not accompanied by the interest in Pre- 
Socratic thought shown by Plato and Aristotle. But the past of philosophy was 
not forgotten in the middle ages.**2 With the recovery of Greek science in the 
twelfth century Medieval intellectuals extended their knowledge of auctores 
and so access to the philosophical past. Not only authority but also reason and 
method were employed in the examination of this ancient legacy. The chief 
instrument of the new science was Aristotelian dialectic, which divided the 
generations and cast Christian learning into centuries of discord. ‘For’, as 
Adelard of Bath told his nephew, ‘I have acquired one type of learning, with 
reason as my guide, from my teachers, while you, fettered by the appearance of 
authority, follow another, as a halter. . . ’.**3 Aristotelian dialectic (the key to this 
new rationalism), was taught by the Medieval scholasticus (the immediate 
source of ‘scholasticism’) and transmitted from the ‘trivial’ arts to the high 
sciences.*** Along with this rationalism came a new sympathy with ancient 
authors who were allowed, by readers like Peter Abelard, ‘to speak truer than 
they knew’ -  and in a way to ‘prefigure’ later ideas.**® True, on the whole, as 
fitienne Gilson concluded, ‘The masters of the thirteenth century were making
*** In the form of the ‘problem of universals’ taken up by Abelard and others; see, e.g., D.E. 
Luscombe, ‘Peter Abelard’, in History o f Twelfth-Century Philosophy, pp. 279-307.
**2 To say that Medieval scholars lacked ‘a sense of the past’, as Janet Coleman says, is ‘akin to 
arguing that cultures that admire artists who paint iconically in two-dimensions have no 
capacities to see and live in a three dimensional world’ ([Ancient and Medieval Memories 
(Cambridge, 1992), p. 275, see also pp. 274-304, 558-66. Also see, G. Althoff, et. al. (eds.), 
Medieval Concepts o f the Past (Cambridge, 2002); M. Carruthers The Book o f Memory 
(Cambridge, 1990); and F. Yates, The A rt o f Memory (London, 1966), pp. 50-81.
**3 Adelard of Bath, Quaestiones naturales; cited in P. Dronke (ed.), ‘Introduction’, in History 
o f Twelfth-Century Philosophy, p. 11.
44* As a historical construct scholasticism took shape first as an invidious humanist stereotype 
and later as a Protestant caricature which represented it as producing a divorce between 
language and thought. Indeed, the Lutherans followed humanists in promoting the black 
legend of scholastic philosophy, and interpreting it as a kind of second ‘barbarism’. According 
to Cario’s sixteenth-century chronicle (which became a quasi-official Lutheran history in 
Melanchthon’s editorial hands), The Scholastics invented a new doctrine designed to attracted 
and entice men into error and superstition’ (Kelley, Descent o f Ideas, p. 93). In general see, J. 
Overfield, Humanism and Scholasticism in Late Medieval Germany (Princeton, N.J., 1984); 
and Erika Rummel., The humanist-scholastic debate in the Renaissance and Reformation 
(Cambridge, Mass, 1995).
**s W. Wetherbee, ‘Philosophy, cosmology, and the twelfth-century Renaissance’, in History o f 
Twelfth-Century Philosophy, pp. 21-53, at p. 38. Abelard was a leading champion of this new 
science. Like Adelard of Bath, he contrasted reason with authority and mere ‘opinion’; and his 
Sic et Non revived many old heresies through questions raised presumably in order to refute 
them. For more information see, D. E. Luscombe, ‘Peter Abelard’, ibid., pp. 279-307; and 
Coleman, Ancient and Medieval Memories, pp. 233-73.
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history, not writing it’.446 Yet their writings constituted as much a critical 
history of commentaiy as an achievement of ‘science’. Moreover, long before 
humanism, Franciscan critics denounced the source of this science, Aristotle 
himself, as the ‘worst philosopher’.447
If we turn to rhetoric, it has been customary for scholars to interrogate the 
question of how rhetoric, in the Middle Ages, all but dies as a vital art and how 
we must wait for the Renaissance for the resumption of substantial work in 
rhetorical theory. Many, perhaps most, scholars subscribe in some degree to 
the complaint that the works handed down to us are nothing more than a 
‘misapplication and perversion ... of the terms traditional in ancient 
rhetoric’.448 Whether reduced to a catalogue of figures (the colores rhetorici) or 
to the mechanical formulas of the ars dictaminis, Medieval rhetoric was a poor 
and diminished thing by comparison with its classical forebear. Even the art of 
preaching, though arguably a form of primary rhetoric in its concern with oral 
persuasion in the service of moral virtue, turns out to be just as guilty of the 
sterile formalism and the divorce of theory from practice, part from whole, and 
form from function that vitiated its secondary sister arts. During the long 
Medieval interregnum the full and authentic rhetoric lay dormant, preserved 
in a few precious copies of the De oratore and the full text of Quintilian buried 
in monastic libraries. Or it lived at best a shadow existence in technical 
treatises such as the De inventione and the Rhetorica ad Herennium, which 
generations of scribes and teachers copied and even glossed without fully 
understanding their contents or applying them to the practical affairs of 
Medieval life.449 In recent times, Medieval historians have begun to challenge 
this traditional view from a variety of angles. The Middle Ages were not so 
monolithic as non-medievalists like to assume, and the fortunes of ‘primary 
rhetoric’ were not identical for every time and place. In northern Italy, for
446 Gilson, History o f Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (London, 1955), pp. 266-72.
447 ibid., p. 427.
44® C. S. Baldwin, Medieval Rhetoric and Poetic to 1400 (N.Y., 1928), p. 152, pp. 191-3. He 
laments that there was ‘no medieval rhetorician who really advanced the study’ (ibid., p. 62). 
See also John Monfasani, ‘Humanism and Rhetoric’, in Renaissance Humanism III, pp. 171- 
235; B. Vickers, In Defense o f Rhetoric (Oxford, 1988); J. J. Murphy, Three Medieval 
Rhetorical Arts (Berkeley, Ca., 1971); and G.A. Kennedy, Classical Rhetoric and Its Christian 
and Secular Tradition, 2nd rev. edn. (Chapel Hill, 1999), pp. i83ff.
449 A recent version of this argument appeared in Vickers, Defense, pp. 214-53.
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instance, at least by the late eleventh century, rhetoric was already well on its 
way towards recovering many important elements of its classical identity, and 
elsewhere there were periods of revival as well. Margareta Fredborg and John 
Ward have shown that Medieval scholars understood the classical treatises far 
better than has been recognised, even if it is not always clear how students 
would have applied what they learned from those teachers.«o Others, notably 
Marjorie Woods, attacked the established view at its source, arguing that the 
concept of primary rhetoric is too restrictive, even for the period that the term 
was coined to describe. Chronologically, socially, and pedagogically, written 
literary rhetoric is every bit as primary as oral persuasive rhetorics* What is 
more, if we are to have a proper appreciation of rhetoric at this time, we must 
move its consideration beyond the well-worked ground of tracing Cicero’s 
influence on Medieval arts of composition and performance. Once we do so, 
we find that rhetoric proceeds along other, less obvious, lines of development 
in this period.
As Richard McKeon poignantly argued over sixty years ago, to confine 
rhetoric to a single subject matter denies it its vital history, in the Middle Ages 
or at any time: ‘The many innovations which are recorded during that period 
in the arts with which [rhetoric] is related suggest that their histories might 
profitably be considered without unique attachment to the field in which their 
advances are celebrated’^  We must take issue, therefore, with those who 
claim that, in the Middle Ages, ‘there was a detachment of rhetoric from its 
social and political context’.^  if Medieval rhetoric was distinct from that of 
the Renaissance, it is merely because the requirements of the period were 
different. Each period in history ‘gets the rhetoric it deserves’ or, more 
precisely, the rhetoric it needs. This should come as no surprise. This thesis,
<5° See, e.g., K. Fredborg (ed.), Thierry o f Chartres. The Latin Rhetorical Commentaries 
(Toronto, 1988); and J. O. Ward, ‘From Antiquity to the Renaissance: Glosses and 
Commentaries on Cicero’s Rhetorica’, in Medieval Eloquence, ed. J. J. Murphy (Berkeley, Ca., 
1978), pp. 25-67.
45* See esp. M. Woods, The Teaching of Writing in Medieval Europe’, in A Short History o f 
Writing Instruction, ed. J. J. Murphy (Davis, CA, 1990), pp. 77-94.
452 R. McKeon, ‘Rhetoric in the Middle Ages’, in Rhetoric, ed. M. Backman (Woodbridge, CT, 
1987), pp. 121- 66 at p. 166.
453 Vickers, Defense, p. 225. See also Kennedy, Classical Rhetoric, p. 183: ‘As the cities of the 
empire were destroyed or depopulated in the face of barbarian attack from the early fifth 
century, the study of rhetoric almost succumbed to the collapse of its native environment’.
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after all, operates on the assumption that the discourse of rhetoric is anything 
but ‘pure’, detached from other human concerns, merely a set of rules for 
public oratory or an array of techniques for managing interpersonal 
communication. It shares the assumption of such scholars as Marc Fumaroli, 
Nancy Struever, and Patricia Parker that rhetoric is deeply implicated in the 
social and political order that produces it.454  But the discourse of rhetoric is 
‘impure’ in another sense as well: it is contaminated, interpenetrated, by other 
discourses. Indeed, most of its key terms Oike many key terms in any 
discourse) are metaphors, and as such they immediately invoke other domains 
of human experience.
Cicero did fix the influence and oriented the interpretation of ancient 
thought (Greek as well as Latin) during the Middle Ages.455 However, as 
McKeon has shown, Medieval rhetorical principles also developed in two other 
traditions. There was, first, the Augustinian tradition, a blend of Platonism 
with Cicero (the most important from both the theological and philosophical 
viewpoints until the late Middle Ages);4se and, second, one based on a fusion of 
Aristotle’s dialectic/logic (of terms and propositions) and Cicero (on 
definitions and principles). The point we must bear in mind here is that 
Medieval thinkers in all the arts and sciences turned to rhetoric for methods,
454 See Fumaroli, L’age de Veloquence; Struever, The Language o f History; and P. Parker, 
Literary Fat Ladies (London, 1987).
455 in general see, C. Nederman, "The union of wisdom and eloquence before the Renaissance: 
the Ciceronian orator in medieval thought’, JM H 18 (1992), pp. 75-95. Cicero’s De inventione 
and the pseudo-Ciceronian Rhetorica ad Herennium, were the primary sources of general 
rhetorical theory throughout the Latin Middle Ages. The two texts were often found combined 
in manuscripts, of which Ward estimates that ‘between 1,000 and 2,000 copies’ survive, 
‘making them the major works of Latin antiquity for the Middle Ages’, and ‘arguably the most 
widely used classical Latin writings of all time’ (‘From Antiquity to the Renaissance’, pp. 25-67, 
at p. 54 n.74; and id., ‘Renaissance Commentators on Ciceronian Rhetoric’, in Renaissance 
Eloquence, ed. Murphy, pp. 126-73, at p. 127). Some Medieval scholars also had access to 
Cicero’s Topica and fragmentary versions of his De oratore and Orator were also known (J.J. 
Murphy, Rhetoric in the Middle Ages [Berkeley, Ca., 1974], pp. 122-23). Some scholars even 
had access to Cicero’s Partitiones oratoriae; for Thierry of Chartres and the Partitiones 
oratoriae see ibid., p. 117. Quintilian’s Institutiones oratoriae, though known only in a 
mutilated text (with Books 5 to 8, 9, 10, and 12 missing completely or in part) was generally 
available after the revival of classical learning in the eleventh century.
456 a. Platonism formulated in terms refurbished and simplified from Cicero’s rhetorical 
distinctions. Augustine differentiates two eloquences, much as Plato proves rhetoric a pseudo­
art in the Gorgias and yet illustrates the method of the true rhetoric based on dialectic in the 
Phaedrus. For more information see, J. Mazzo, ‘St. Augustine Rhetoric of Silence’, JHI, 23:2 
(1962), pp. 175-96; and J. Coleman, "The Christian Platonism of St. Augustine’, in Platonism 
and the English imagination, ed. A. Baldwin and S. Hutton (Cambridge, 1994).
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distinctions, and conceptions (importantly, not simply the ancient subject 
matters or vocabularies) to vivify their w o rk .4 5 7  The influence of McKeon’s 
piece is still great despite its age, but his work has often been misappropriated. 
For instance, Vickers makes extensive use of the essay in his chapter on 
Medieval rhetoric in his In Defense o f Rhetorics# Yet, he repeatedly distorts 
and misrepresents McKeon’s analysis in order to advance his own views. 459 So, 
for example, Vickers writes that McKeon ‘noted the increasingly “perfunctory” 
treatment of rhetoric in the Middle Ages, despite the increased knowledge 
available’; and he quotes the following passage of the essay to illustrate his 
assertion:
‘The translation of the Rhetoric of Aristotle, of the pseudo-Aristotelian 
Rhetorica ad Alexandrian, and of the De elocutione of Demetrius in the 
thirteenth century would seem to have had ... no effect comparable to that of 
other translations of the century in stimulating interest in its subject; and the 
return of rhetoric to prominence during the Renaissance is explained only on 
the supposition that men’s minds were turned once more, after a long 
interval, to literature and life’.*60
Now, what Vickers somewhat shockingly fails to mention (and willingly omits 
from the quotation) is that in this excerpt McKeon is not referring to his own 
position. In fact, he is making a frontal attack on the orthodox history of 
Medieval rhetoric in the West. The full passage cited above by Vickers actually 
reads as follows:
‘The translation of the Rhetoric of Aristotle, of the pseudo-Aristotelian 
Rhetorica ad Alexandrian, and of the De elocutione of Demetrius in the 
thirteenth century would seem to have had, by this account, no effect 
comparable to that of other translations of the century in stimulating interest
457 McKeon, ‘Rhetoric in the Middle Ages’, p. 166.
«7 See ibid., pp. 260-1.
458 Vickers adopts McKeon’s four-part periodisation of the fortunes of rhetoric until the 
Renaissance, remarking that ‘McKeon’s analysis has been challenged on points of detail, but 
still seems the most perceptive general account of the reason for rhetoric’s vicissitudes in the 
Middle Ages’ (Defence, p. 221).
459 Jerrold Seigel is also guilty of taking out of context one of McKeon’s assertions. In the 
chapter on Medieval rhetoric in his Rhetoric and Philosophy in Renaissance Humanism  
(Princeton, 1968), Seigel asserts that, ‘So pervasive was this diffusion of rhetoric in medieval 
intellectual life that [as McKeon] insists “if rhetoric is defined in terms of a single subject 
matter -  such as style, or literature, or discourse -  it has no history during the Middle Ages”. 
As rhetoric gave up many of its earlier functions to the other disciplines, its own purpose was 
reduced to the mere providing of ornament’ (p. 179). Cf. McKeon, ‘Rhetoric in the Middle 
Ages’, p. 166 -  it is clear that McKeon is, in fact, arguing against authors like Seigel, who insist 
on defining rhetoric in terms of a single subject.
460 Cited in Vickers, Defense, p. 255.
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in its subject; and the return of rhetoric to prominence during the 
Renaissance is explained only on the supposition that men’s minds were 
turned once more, after a long interval, to literature and life’.-*61
And in the phrase immediately before this one, he wrote that if we are to 
believe the history of rhetoric as it has been written since the Renaissance:
"The sequence of development is fortuitous and even implausible, for the 
treatment of rhetoric becomes more perfunctory as erudition in the works of 
rhetoricians increases, and rhetoric disappears abruptly when knowledge of 
it is at a maximum, particularly from the works of the authors who 
acknowledge the influence of Cicero and Quintilian’.*62
An adequate history of rhetoric, therefore, must not regard the art as ‘a simple 
verbal discipline, as the art of speaking well’. Neither must it regard rhetoric as 
‘an art determined to a fixed subject matter (so conceived, rhetoric is usually 
found to have little or no history, despite much talk about rhetoric and even 
more use of it, during the Middle Ages)*1* nor, on the other hand, would it treat 
an art determined arbitrarily and variously by its place in classifications of the 
sciences...’.*6* Instead, such a history should take into account ‘the altering 
definitions, the differentiation of various conceptions of rhetoric itself, and the 
spread of the devices of rhetoric to subject matters far from those ordinarily 
ascribed to it’.*66 Once we heed such advice, we see that despite the ascendancy 
of logic in Medieval times, from the fourth through the fourteenth century 
both the theory and practice of rhetoric greatly contributed, not only to the 
methods of speaking and writing well (such as composition letters and 
petitions, sermons and prayers, legal documents and briefs, poetry and prose), 
but also to vast areas of Medieval intellectual achievement, such as the 
development of the scholastic method, scientific enquiry, psychology and 
medicine. However, as seen in the next section, the Italian humanists did find 
themselves to be in a position to grasp further the importance of language.
*61 McKeon, ‘Rhetoric in the Middle Ages’, p. 121; emphasis added.
*62 Ibid., pp. 121-2.
*63 This is one of the phrases often taken out of context (‘rhetoric is usually found to have little 
or no history, despite much talk about rhetoric and even more use of it, during the Middle 
Ages’) by commentators; another is ‘if rhetoric is defined as a single subject it has no history 
during the Middle Ages’ (ibid., p. 166).
4s* Ibid., p. 124.
*6s Ibid.
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Scholars such as Paul 0 . Kristeller, Eugenio Garin, John Monfasani, and 
Jerrold Seigel have argued that the political re-conceptualisation of rhetoric 
occurs for the first time in northern Italy in the thirteenth century, in 
particular as a result of the appearance in that region during the preceding 
century of urban communes, free city-states that enjoyed republican liberty 
and traditions of political discussion and debate.-*66 Their interest in (and need 
for) public speaking, stimulated a new appreciation of the oratorical culture of 
antiquity, and it prompted significant modifications in one of the most 
important forms rhetoric took during the Middle Ages: the art of letter-writing 
or ars dictaminis. Created in the eleventh century, this art became 
increasingly classical in style over the next two centuries, and simultaneously 
its model letters began to include political advice. In the thirteenth century the 
ars dictaminis was joined by the new art of public speaking or ars arengandi. 
For example, in the early thirteenth century Boncompagno of Siena reluctantly 
devoted a chapter of his Rhetorica novissima to public speaking. He 
condemned it as being beneath the dignity of the learned and associated it 
with what he saw as excessive political liberty. A little later, at Bologna, 
Jacques de Dinant wrote an ars arengandi which summarised the Rhetorica 
ad Herennium; and the two arts (of letter-writing and public speaking), were 
fully combined for the first time in the work of Guido Faba (c. 1190-1240). So 
by the mid-thirteenth century, rhetorical theory included a significant public 
and political component. Notably, it also acquired a specifically political 
purpose, whether it was to be practised by the notary, the lawyer, or the letter 
writer (the dictator). The thirteenth-century Flore del parlare typically 
explains that rhetoric is useful for those who rule as well as for merchants -  
thus linking politics to the class that actually did dominate the cities of 
northern Italy in the period. About the same time Fra Guidotto da Bologna, 
who translated Cicero, pronounces rhetoric an art of civil importance,
466 The following discussion of the rebirth of rhetoric in Italy draws on Kristeller, The 
Humanist Movement’, pp. 3-23; id., ‘Rhetoric in Medieval and Renaissance Culture’, pp. 1-19; 
Garin, Italian Humanism, id., Medioevo e Rinascimento; Monfasani, ‘Humanism and 
Rhetoric’; Skinner, Foundations 1, pp. 3-40; Vickers, Defense; and F. Cossutta, Gli umanisti e 
la retorica (Rome, 1984).
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Giovanni del Vergilio praises its dignity because ‘only the small part of it called 
letter-writing calls forth rustics to the councils of kings, enriches the needy 
with wealth, and adorns the dishonorable with honors’.*6? An anonymous 
dictator declares: ‘Rhetoric, by the grace of God, is the universal mediator of 
the state, the general teacher of consuls, orators, and judges’.*68 Finally, 
Brunetto Latini, who was employed as a notary, was called both dittatore 
(dictator) and arringatore (public speaker) by his contemporaries. He not 
only became the chancellor of Florence (1272-74), but was later praised by the 
chronicler Giovanni Villani as the first person to have instructed the 
Florentines in politics.
According to the influential thesis advanced by Kristeller, Garin, Skinner, 
and others, the dictatores, who overlap with the notaries, were the immediate 
ancestors of the humanists. Both groups held up classical Latin language and 
culture as ideals to be imitated; both gained social and political advancement 
through their learning; both worked principally as secretaries or as teachers of 
rhetoric; both were dedicated to some version of the active life in society (the 
vita civile), and saw the orator as occupying a position of central importance 
within it. Indeed, dictators and notaries came to see themselves in classical 
terms, and although humanists such as Salutati and Bruni were trained as 
notaries, they came to prefer the honorific, classical ‘orator’ to the traditional 
‘notarius’ or ‘dictator’ as a title. Notaries and humanists alike, in particular 
after 1300, were deeply immersed in the public, political world and, in the 
fullness of time, came to dominate the bureaucracies of the Italian towns 
where they worked. Initially, notaries had primarily composed documents for 
businessmen. But as the latter became generally better educated in the later 
Middle Ages and had less need of such services, public employment offered 
itself as an important alternative (especially as the administrative 
bureaucracies of towns were also expanding in this period). Considering, 
therefore, the actual social roles that notaries and humanists played, as well as 
the ideology of political service they were exposed to in the writings of
*6? Cited in P. O. Kristeller, ‘Un “ars dictaminis” di Giovanni del Vergilio’, IMU, 4 (1961), p. 
1 9 3 -
*68 Cited in J. Monfasani, George ofTrebizond (Leiden, 1976), p. 260.
121
treasured authors such as Cicero and Quintilian, it is hardly surprising that 
they would themselves develop such an ideology in their works. Neither is it 
surprising that they would see rhetoric as a primarily political instrument 
essential for the active life in society.
While the thesis of the revival of a singularly political rhetoric by 
dictatores, notaries, and humanists in the communes of northern Italy has 
much to recommend it, I think it has several shortcomings. First, it 
acknowledges no difference whatsoever between the conception of rhetoric 
shared by the late Medieval dictatores and notaries, and that of the humanists 
and their followers. Next, it misleads because it implicitly accepts a presumed 
identity between the rhetorical theories of classical authors and those of their 
Renaissance successors. Lastly, it posits a necessary connection between 
republican liberty and the rise of rhetoric in the Renaissance. In fact, most 
northern Italian city-states had turned to despotism by 1300, exactly at the 
time when many late Medieval authors were beginning to maintain the 
essentially political character of rhetoric. In other words, the thesis fails to 
explain why rhetoric continued to be thought of as political, both inside and 
outside Italy, throughout the Renaissance, in states which were anything but 
republics (and many of which were becoming increasingly absolutist in 
character). Even though notaries and dictatores are the ancestors of the 
humanists, the two groups have somewhat different notions of rhetoric as a 
political instrument. For the first group, rhetoric is concerned in a general way 
with ‘civil matters’; it enables the individual to enter into political discussion, 
to participate in the dialogue of power occurring in the state. By contrast, for 
the humanists (as for those who came after them in Italy and throughout 
western Europe), rhetoric is identified in the political terms we have already 
discussed: it is seen as an instrument of rule. Francesco Petrarch (1304-74) is, 
by most accounts, a liminal figure, half Medieval and half Renaissance/6? but 
in a letter in praise of rhetoric to Tommaso da Messina, he sounds more like
"The work of Petrarch in his youth, although a unique prelude to things to come, did not lead 
directly to the Renaissance ideas of the Quattrocento, and his own final view of life represents 
one of the great semi-Medieval syntheses characteristic of the Trecento’ (H. Baron, ‘Petrarch’, 
in Florilegium Historiale, ed. J. G. Rowe and W. Stockdale [Toronto, 1971], pp. 19-51, at p. 46). 
See also, C. Trinkaus, The Poet as Philosopher (New Haven, 1979). For a contrasting view see, 
Riccardo Fubini, Humanism and Secularization from  Petrarch to Valla (Durham, 2003).
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the Medieval notaries and dictatores: although he alludes to the myth (popular 
among humanists) of the orator civilizer, he speaks merely of the pleasure that 
eloquent writing provides, not of the political role of the orator in ruling the 
city.470 By contrast, the notary, humanist, and Florentine chancellor Coluccio 
Salutati, writing less than a half-century after Petrarch, says:
‘For how  [can one] dom inate more than  by m eans of the em otions, bend the 
listener where you might wish and lead him  off with grace and desire where 
you would move him ? Unless I am deceived, this is the force of eloquence; 
this its effort; to  this goal all the force and power of rhetoricians’ la b o u r ’.471
Petrarch thinks in general terms about the civic role of oratory, whereas 
Salutati thinks of it specifically as a means to dominate others through their 
emotions. This conception of the art, as a means of ruling others, will mark it 
throughout the Renaissance. Obsessed with their cultural programme of 
recovering classical antiquities, the Italian humanists do not initially produce 
original treatises on rhetoric.472 However, when the first one appears in Venice, 
in 1433 or 1434, it opens in a way that confirms the conception we have seen in 
Salutati. By means of rhetoric, George of Trebizond’s Rhetoricorum Libri V 
proclaims, one establishes laws, protects others with counsel, and frightens off 
enemies, ‘nor could the state be governed without if .4 7 3  Every eminent 
rhetorician who succeeded George in the Renaissance was to define rhetoric in 
this manner, i.e., identifying the art as the instrument of government.
There are, of course, profound similarities between this rhetoric and that 
of the ancient world. But a comparison of the two will show that they contain 
rather different political visions. The ancient Greeks and Romans essentially 
regarded rhetoric as a tool for political persuasion.474 The Sophists offered 
their art as education in persuasive speaking for prospective leaders, and they 
saw themselves as performers (in the tradition of the poets and rhapsodes)
470 see Petrarca, Lefamiliari, ed. V. Rossi (Florence, 1933-42), no. 9.
47* C. Salutati, Epistolario (Rome, 1891-1905), 3:15.
472 Poggio Bracciolini, for instance, discovered a complete Quintilian in 1416, and Bishop 
Gerardo Landriani of Lodi found Cicero Brutus, De oratore, and Orator in 1421.
473 George of Trebizond, Rhetoricorum Libri V  (Venice, 1523), lr. Coleman suggests that such 
beliefs were already implied in Giles of Rome’s De regimine principum, see Coleman, HPT, II, 
p. 69
474 M. L. Clarke, Rhetoric at Rome (N.Y., 1963), p. 2.
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engaged in battles of w o r d s . 47s Roman rhetoric is equally political;^ inscribed 
in their rhetoric is a republican model in which orators (all theoretically 
equals), engage in an open competition in the public arena, aiming for victory 
over their fellow orators.477 To put forward this model, both Cicero and 
Quintilian use related metaphors of military combat, gladiatorial contests, and 
athletic games. For example, in Cicero’s De oratore, Antonius sees the orator 
not as ruling the wills of others but as capturing them, and using weapons to 
do so .*78 Quintilian, similarly, refers on numerous occasions to the 1 )3 1 1 1 6  in 
the forum’, or to some equivalent idea.479 Both authors prefer the orator to be a 
warrior rather than an athlete, just as they prefer the grand style to the more 
polished one associated with Isocrates.*80 Quintilian remarks of digressions, 
that it is permissible to use in them a certain elegance of style, provided the 
orator bears in mind that, in the portions of the speech dealing with the main 
topic, he displays, not the swollen body of an athlete, but the sinews of a 
soldier, and that he should not wear a multi-coloured cloak (i.e., use a flowery 
style) little suited to the dust of the forum .*81 For these ancient writers, 
therefore, oratory is essentially combat or contest, a fight. In his Dialogus, 
Tacitus would later insist on this notion, even though he feared the art was 
degenerating into mere spectacle.*82 And Saint Augustine would reiterate it in 
his Confessions, where he identifies rhetoric as possessing arma.*83 It is worth 
noting that the word omamenta, which Romans used for rhetoric’s tropes and 
figures of speech, also had the meaning of ‘soldier’s gear’.*8* What is more, in 
the Roman conception of rhetoric, the contest always takes place before a 
iudex (the judge in a courtroom), or before iudices (the judges who are the
*75 G. B. Kerferd, The Sophistic Movement (Cambridge, 1981), pp. 24-5; W. J. Verdenius, 
‘Gorgias’ Doctrine of Deception’, in The Sophists and Their Legacy, ed. G. B. Kerferd 
(Wiesbaden, 1981), pp. 118-22; and W. K. Guthrie, The Sophists (Cambridge, 1971), pp. 42-3.
*76 Although the forensic variety carries the most weight with both Cicero and Quintilian, who 
were the chief transmitters of rhetorical theory to the Renaissance.
*77 See J. L. Kinneavy, Greek Rhetorical Origins o f Christian Faith (N.Y., 1987), pp. 35, 39.
*78 Cicero, De oratore, 2.8.32,2-7.2-293; cf. 1.8.32,1.32.147,1.34.157,2.20.84,3.54.206.
*79 Quintilian, Institutio, 5.12.17, 22; 4.3.2; 10.1.33,7 9 -
480 See D. K. Shuger, Sacred Rhetoric: The Christian Grand Style in the English Renaissance 
(Princeton, N.J., 1988), p. 22.
481 Quintilian, Institutio, 10.1.33.
482 Tacitus, Dialogus de oratoribus, tr. W. Peterson, rev. M. Winterbottom (London, 1970), pp. 
3 1 -3 3 .
*83 Augustine, Confessions, tr. W. Watts (Cambridg, Mass., i960), 9.2.
*8* W. J. Ong, Ramus: Method and the Decay o f Dialogue (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), p. 277.
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people or the orator’s fellow senators) .* 88 Cicero places the judge 
metaphorically above the competing speakers, thus reinforcing the notion of 
oratory as contest: he is the dominus or lo rd’, and his bias often defeats the 
orator’s finest e f f o r t s . * 88  So the orator must defeat the judge, as he does the 
other orators he faces. For Quintilian such triumphs -  when one is able to 
sweep away the judges and lead them to believe what one wishes -  are rare.*8? 
But his premise is, like Cicero’s, that in the contest of oratory such triumphs 
can at least sometimes be engineered by the truly gifted.
If Cicero and Quintilian think of rhetoric in republican terms as a 
competition among equals (albeit in a highly unequal society), the 
Renaissance tends to see it instead as a matter of ruling. The political model 
inscribed in this rhetoric, as Wayne Rebhom has shown, is hierarchical in a 
very particular way. It does not pit the rhetorician against his equals, but 
implicitly sets him above his spectators, whom he aims to dominate by means 
of his art. These spectators are seldom conceived as judges, because that would 
suggest their superiority to the orator, whereas he practices oratory precisely 
in order to make himself ruler over those he addresses. George of Trebizond’s 
Rhetoricorum Libri V, for example, identifies rhetoric as the art of rule. After 
considering the difficulty of joining philosophy and eloquence, he argues that 
if one wishes to know the truth of things, one should pursue the former, but ‘if 
one seeks the glory of governing the state, one should apply oneself to 
rhetoric’.*88 George’s Oratio de laudibus eloquentie, makes similar claims: 
‘[Jjust as no ship ever sailed correctly without a steersman, so no state has 
ever been well governed if eloquence has been expelled from it’.*88 He then 
flatters his Venetian audience by saying that their flourishing state, because 
governed by eloquence, exemplifies the truth of his idea. George is, of course, 
not alone in voicing such sentiments in the Renaissance. The Milanese Anto
485 See Cicero, De oratore, 2.29.128-29; Quintilian, Institutio, 6.2.1-7. Aristotle also sees all 
rhetoric as performance before a judge (krites), and he includes even epideictic speeches in this 
generalisation, because that sort of speech, ‘is put together with reference to the spectator as if 
he were a judge’ (Rh., 2.18.1).
*86 Cicero, De or., 2.17-72.
*87 Quintilian, Institutio, 6.2.3-4.
*88 George, Rhetoricorum Libri V, 6or.
*89 Id., Oratio de laudibus eloquentie, in George ofTrebizond: A Biography and a Study o f His 
Rhetoric and Logic, by J. Monfasani (Leiden, 1976), pp. 365-69, at p. 368.
125
Maria de’ Conti, writing in the mid-sixteenth century, whilst alluding to the 
many excellent things rhetoric can accomplish, speaks of how it governs 
cities.-*?0 But some writers go as far as to present the political model of 
autocratic, imperial government. Rhetoric, Guillaume Du Vair asserts, ‘reigns 
among peoples, and establishes for itself a violent empire over the spirit of 
men’.-*?1 Johann Heinrich Alsted uses similar language when analysing the 
impact that eloquence has on the minds of those exposed to it. He asks 
whether rhetoric enjoys an imperium over men and answers his own question 
affirmatively: ‘Because if it makes a great difference whether those whom one 
commands do something of their own free will or unwillingly, I see that the 
power of orators is greater than that of the greatest kings’ .*?2 In this context, it 
is hardly surprising to find that the rhetorician is often portrayed as someone 
(by nature and training) bound to rule -  a lord, a king or an emperor. Lorenzo 
Valla, for instance, sees him as the ‘guide and leader of the people [rector et 
duxpopuli] ’,*93 and in the sixteenth century, Daniel Barbaro calls him the lord 
[signore] and possessor of each person’s spirit’.-*?* Eloquence itself is often 
imaged as a q u e e n ,495 and Juan Luis Vives tells us how such a personification 
of rhetoric helps define the orator as a royal ruler: ‘He clearly reigns [regnat] 
among men who is best equipped to speak; and rightly the tragedian Euripides 
named eloquence a queen’.*?6 For Henry Peacham, rhetoric gives men an even 
loftier position: it makes the orator ‘in a maner the emperour of mens minds &
*?° A. M. de’ Conti, De eloquentia dialogus, in Trattati di poetica e retorica del Cinquecento, 
ed. B. Weinberg, (Bari, 1970), 15.2. Also see, N. Caussin, De Eloquentia sacra et humana, 3rd 
edn. (Paris, 1630), p. 757; Vives, De Causis, pp. 152-53, and De Ratione, p. 89; Poliziano, 
‘Oratio super Fabio Quintiliano et Statii Sylvis’, in Prosatori latini del quattrocento, ed. E. 
Garin, (Torino 1977), pp. 882-44; P- Ramus, Dialectique (Paris, 1555; rpt. Geneve, 1972) p. 
134; J. Rainolds, Oratio in laudem artis poeticae, ed. W. Ringler and W. Allen, Jr. (Princeton, 
1940), p. 44; J. H. Alsted, Rhetorica, Dedication, 2v, 7v; id., Rhetorica (Herbom, 1616), p. 1; 
Luis de Granada, Ecclesiastica Rhetorica (Cologne, 1582), p. 5; and Keckermann, Systema, p. 
126.
*?* Guillaume du Vair, Traitte de VEloquence Franqoise, in Oeuvres (Paris, 1641; rpt. Geneva,
1 9 7 0 ), pp. 389-410, at p. 393
*?2 Alsted, Rhetorica, Dedication, 8r.
*?3 L. Valla, Dialecticae Disputationes, p. 694; cited in J. McNally, ‘Rector et Dux Populi: 
Italian Humanists and the Relationship between Rhetoric and Logic’, MP, 67 (1969), p.171.
*?* D. Barbaro, Della Eloquenza, in Trattati di poetica e retorica del Cinquecento, ed. B. 
Weinberg (Bari, 1970), II, pp. 3 3 5 -4 5 1 , at p. 356.
4?s A. Fureti&re builds an entire allegory on the basis of this traditional image see his Nouvelle 
allegorique, ou Histoire des demiers troubles arrives au royaume dEloquence, ed. E. van 
Ginneken (Geneva, 1967).
4?6 vives, De Ratione, p. 93.
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affections, and next to the omnipotent God in the power of p e rs w a s io n ’.w  
Antonio Llull of Mallorca, vicar general of the diocese of Besangon in the mid­
sixteenth century, goes even further, declaring that eloquence lets the orator 
rule (regnare) among men as if he were a kind of god (veluti Deum 
quemdam').*'#
It is important to note that the Renaissance insistence on rhetoric as rule 
is not without classical precedents. The notion that eloquence could be divine 
goes back to the Greek goddess Peitho, ‘P e r s u a s io n ’.®®® And Tacitus in his 
Dialogus laments the decline of that eloquence which was once the mistress 
(domina), of Roman life.s°° What is more, both Quintilian and Cicero refer to 
some notion of rhetoric as ruling or dominating. Quintilian defines the perfect 
orator as one ‘who can guide [regere] cities by his counsels, establish laws, and 
purge vices by his decisions as a judge’. He claims, in addition, that when the 
orator’s power dominates the court, this form of eloquence rules.®01 Given its 
enormous power, Cicero celebrates rhetoric as a queen (regina), and a 
‘commander’ (imperator). Elsewhere, he asks what is ‘so ... kingly, so worthy 
of a free man’ as the power that helps suppliants, gives security, and maintains 
men in the city.s°2 However, both Cicero and Quintilian imagine the art chiefly 
as a contest among free citizens. The different emphases given to the politics of 
rhetoric by ancient Romans and Renaissance writers is startlingly clear when 
we compare statements made about the power of rhetoric to rule peaceful 
cities. Cicero says that eloquence ‘has especially always flourished and ruled in 
every free people, and especially in peaceful, tranquil cities’.s°3 By contrast, 
although Giovanni Tuscanella (a professor at Bologna in the 1420s), praises 
the subject in phrases that echo Cicero’s, there are small, yet significant, 
differences. ‘Eloquence’, he writes, ‘always obtained sovereignty [principatum]
497 H. Peacham, The Garden o f Eloquence (1577), intr. W. G. Crane (Gainesville, 1954), p. iiiv.
498 A. Llull, De oratione libri septem (Basel, n.d. [1554-58?]), p. 12; cited in Antonio Marti, La 
preceptiva retdrica espahola en el siglo de oro (Madrid, 1972), p. 132. On the orator's quasi­
divinity also see, T. Wilson, The Arte o f Rhetorique,for the use o f all suche as are studious o f 
Eloquence, sette forth in English (1554, n.p.), 161.
499 On the Greek goddess Peitho see, Kinneavy, Greek Rhetorical Origins o f Christian Faith, 
PP- 3 4 -5 -
50° Tacitus, Dialogus, 32.4.
501 Quintilian, Institutio, i.Pr.10,6.2.4. 
s°2 Cicero, De or., 2.44.187,1.8.32. 
s°3 Ibid., 1.8.30.
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and has always dominated in every peaceful and free city*.*0* So in Tuscanella 
the city-state is free, not its citizens; and whereas Cicero says eloquence 
flourishes, Tuscanella says it obtains sovereignty.®0® Later in the Renaissance, 
in his dedicatory letter to Cypriano Soarez’s De Arte Rhetorica (1589), 
Federico Cerutus rewrites Cicero’s sentence, declaring that eloquence ‘always 
flourished and ruled in a well established state’.®06 Similarly, Philip 
Melanchthon, in his Encomium eloquentiae, asserts that eloquence always has 
a place ‘in a peaceful city’.®0? Neither Cerutus (a Counter-Reformation 
Catholic), nor Melanchthon (a founding father of Protestantism), make any 
reference to a free people. For them, as for the Renaissance in general, rhetoric 
is synonymous with control by one man or one class over those lower in the 
hierarchy -  supposedly ‘in their interest’ and on behalf of ‘natural governors’. 
So even though the Venetian Raphael Regius links rhetoric with republican 
liberty, he does not identify it with the cut and thrust of debate. Instead, he 
characterises it as rule and dominion, and praises Cicero for having reigned in 
Rome as the most eloquent man of his age.®°8 So rhetoric, as it has been 
defined from antiquity on, is neither entirely republican nor 
monarchical/absolutist in character. Rather, it is both (at least potentially). In 
Cicero and Quintilian there is a clear acknowledgement that rhetoric means 
power and dominance over others, but what matters most is the competition 
among orators in the forum or Senate. The opposite is true in the Renaissance: 
the link between rhetoric and republicanism is occasionally acknowledged, but 
the emphasis falls on the power that rhetoric gives the orator to control his 
audience (and that makes him a king, a Caesar). Some writers go as far as to 
claim that the expansion of the Roman empire paralleled, or even caused by, 
the flourishing of eloquence. For example, Guillaume Du Vair claims that
5°4 Karl Milliner (ed.) Reden und Briefe italienischer Humanisten (Vienna, 1899; rpt. Munich, 
1970), p. 196.
®°® Tuscanella’s ‘principatum’ can simply mean something like ‘the first place’. However, in its 
fifteenth-century, Bolognese context, it cannot be divorced from association with princely rule. 
®°6 See Cypriano Soarez, DeArte Rhetorica Libri Tres (Verona, 1589), A41.
®°? P. Melanchthon, Encomium eloquentiae, in Werke in Auswahl, ed. R. Stupperich, 
(Giitersloh, 1961), III, pp. 43-62, at p. 52.
®°8 Raphael Regius, De Laudibus eloquentiae panegyricus (Venice, 1485), fw. Similarly, 
Walter Haddon praises Cicero for his rhetorical prowess by recalling how he was famed as the 
Tdng’, the rex, of Rome (De laudibus eloquentiae, in Lucubrationes passim collectae, ed. T. 
Hatcher (London, 1567], pp. 1-9, at p. 5).
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eloquence reached a high point in imperial Rome, because when it ‘was used 
even by the emperors and by the Great, it breathed a loftier and fuller 
majesty’.*0* He then cites a list of Roman leaders and emperors whom he 
admires for their eloquence, including Pompey, Augustus, Antony, Caligula,
Claudian, and Titus. And in a work written in 1431 the Italian friar Antonio da
Rho declares that practically the entire world became part of the Roman
empire ‘no less by eloquence than by arms’, thus identifying rhetoric as an
instrument of empire.*10 By now it should be clear that the common notion that comment [Ai]7
Renaissance rhetoric constitutes a straightforward revival (or repetition) of
ancient rhetoric is clearly inadequate. In the next section, I question the
equation of rhetoric, humanism, and republican liberty that lies at the heart of
Baron’s, Garin’s, and others’ interpretations of the early Italian Renaissance.
IV
In the 1920s and after, Hans Baron argued in pioneering articles that the 
humanists had found in the ancients and recovered for modern use a vision of 
civic life that proved essential to the Florentine elite of the fifteenth century.**1 
He memorably argued that the ideals of civic humanism faithfully represented 
the democratic reality of Florentine republicanism.**2 However, Baron’s
*°9 Du Vair, Traitte, p. 399.
**° Milliner (ed.) Reden und Briefe, p. 165; cf. Richard Rainolde, The Foundacion o f Rhetorike 
(London, 1563; rpt. Amsterdam, 1969), iir: ‘the state of Rome could by no meanes have growen 
so mervailous mightie, but that God had indued the whole line of Cesars, with singuler vertues, 
with aboundaunt knowlege and singuler Eloquence’. For other identifications of kings or 
emperors as ideal orators see, F. Bacon, Advancement o f Learning, intr. J.E. Creighton, rev. 
edn. (N.Y., 1900), p. 33; Vives, De Ratione, p. 95; and Caussin, Eloquentia sacra, pp. 39,170.
*** In The Crisis o f the Early Italian Renaissance, Baron formulated one of the twentieth 
century’s most influential arguments for the impact of politics on the intellectual life of the 
early Quattrocento. He identified the territorial aggression of the tyrannical Milanese Visconti 
as a critical catalyst for the birth of Florentine civic humanism. To make sense of their lonely 
stand against the awesome power of Visconti’s Milan, Baron argued that the Florentines were 
forced into a process of rigorous self-analysis that affirmed the values for which they were 
fighting: freedom of speech, free access to political office, equality of all citizens before the law, 
and self-government. In short, the fundamentals of modern democracy. Only the unexpected 
death of Duke Giangaleazzo in 1402 saved the Florentine republic from becoming yet another 
addition to the growing territory of despotic Milan. Florentines saw their salvation as a human 
triumph of freedom over tyranny, republicanism over despotism. Baron thought that the 
republican philosophy of civic humanism grew out of this perception, thereby ensuring the 
transmission of democracy from antiquity to the modem era.
**2 For valuable recent critiques of Baron’s thesis and comprehensive bibliographies see essays 
by James Hankins, John Najemy, and Alison Brown, in Renaissance Civic Humanism, ed. J. 
Hankins (Cambridge, 2000); and contributions in AHR, 101 (1996), esp. pp. 107-29, 142-44.
129
argument about the vitality of civic humanism and its close relationship with 
political reality was faced with an enormous problem: sixty years of Medicean 
political hegemony in the Quattrocento. He tried to address this difficulty with 
the general statement that from the ‘1430s onward, republicanism and civic 
Humanism were waning in Florence, and soon the philosophical and religious 
trends of Neoplatonism would take its place’.®1® This argument gained 
widespread acceptance with the backing of Eugenio Garin, who argued that 
Medicean political reality (its electoral manipulation, patronage, and private 
character), deprived civic humanism of its guiding purpose, that is, the 
encouragement of citizens to participate in the political life of the r e p u b l i c s  
The rise, in the second half of the century, of contemplative and politically 
withdrawn Neoplatonism, merely reflects the shrewd intellectual patronage of 
the Medici, and the disillusionment and crushed republican morale of 
Florentine humanists. For Baron and Garin, therefore, the relationship 
between civic humanism and the Medici was adversarial; Medici power had 
severed the symbiosis between the active political life and c u l t u r e . 515 Baron 
continued his analysis of humanism only after 1494 and the expulsion of the 
Medici, after which he could declare ‘democratic republicanism’ to have 
flourished again. Recent interpretations, however, see civic humanism as 
evidence of the triumph of oligarchic and elitist republicanism.®16 John Najemy
Also see J. Hankins, “The Baron Thesis’ after Forty Years’, JHI, 56 (1995), pp. 309-38; A. Rabil, 
Jr., The Significance of “Civic Humanism” in the Interpretation of the Italian Renaissance’, in 
Renaissance Humanism I, pp. 141-74. There is little consensus on which aspects of The Crisis 
remain viable today and what, fundamentally, was Baron’s most important contribution to 
Renaissance studies. Contrary to Riccardo Fubini’s statement (‘Renaissance Historian: The 
Career of Hans Baron’, J. Mo. H., 64 [1992], pp. 541-74) that continuing discussion about the 
validity of Baron’s thesis has contributed to ‘misdirecting Renaissance historical research’, I 
agree with the tentative 1958 prediction of W. K. Ferguson that Baron’s most important 
contribution ‘will prove to be the stimulus his ideas will give to future research’ (The 
Interpretation of Italian Humanism’, JHI, 19 [1958], pp. 14-25). 
s1® Baron, Crisis, p. 435.
®14 Garin, Italian Humanism, pp. 78-9; id., Portraits from  the Quattrocento (N.Y., 1963), pp. 
3-29 and pp. 55-117; Baron, Crisis, pp. 435-39; A. Brown, The Medici in Florence (Firenze, 
1992), pp. 215-46; and Lauro Martines, The Social World o f the Florentine Humanists, 1390- 
1460 (Princeton, 1963), pp. 295-302.
s1® However, Baron (albeit briefly) did suggest that the relationship may have been more 
complex than outlined above, when he acknowledged the need to examine the ‘precise role of 
civic humanism for Medicean Florence’ (‘Moot Problems of Renaissance Interpretation’, JHI, 
19 (1958), pp. 26-34 at p. 27).
®16 This argument can be found in the epilogue to J. Najemy, Corporation and Consensus in 
Florentine Electoral Politics, 1280-1400 (Chapel Hill, 1982), pp. 301-17. Also see, id., The 
dialogue of Power in Florentine Politics’, in City States in Classical Antiquity and Medieval
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appears to have provided the most sustained and explicit argument for this 
interpretation. He presents the history of political thought in Florence up to 
the Quattrocento as a struggle between two rival republican ideologies: (i) the 
republicanism of the communal era (the elder of the ideologies), which was 
rooted in the guilds, favouring wide participation in government councils and 
defining political representation as a function of class and corporate identity; 
and (ii) the oligarchic republicanism of the post-Ciompi era (1378), which 
undermined the legitimacy of communal corporate politics, favouring the 
politics of consensus and the participation of only a select few wealthy old 
families in the government. Leonardo Bruni and his humanist contemporaries, 
according to Najemy, helped formalise and refine oligarchic republicanism. 
How? By turning it into a philosophy of ‘dutiful passivity*, in which citizens 
who had once received office according to the established rights of their class, 
could now only receive office as a reward for their ‘personal virtue’, and 
attachment to powerful local civic families and their interests. Civic 
humanism, therefore, is a consolation prize with which the supporters of the 
failed guild-based vision of politics rationalised their political acquiescence to 
a restricted oligarchy. In other words, humanistic exaltation of the scholar 
statesman and humanistic interpretations of wealth, history, and ideal 
government buttressed and extended the political implications of Cosimo’s 
reputation for prudence, wisdom, generosity, and learning. Civic humanism, 
in short, accommodated Medici p o w ers  Moreover, recent work by Jill Kraye, 
Arthur Field, and James Hankins has considerably undermined the 
Neoplatonic argument put forward by Garin and his followers. They have all 
argued that the roots of Neoplatonism were already solidly established by the 
time Cosimo began to commission Platonic works from Marsilio Ficino. Kraye 
has suggested that humanists such as Ficino were drawn to the study of Plato
Italy, ed. A. Molho, K. Raaflaub, J. Emlen. (Stuttgart, 1991), pp. 169-88; and M. Jurdjevic, 
‘Civic Humanism and the Rise of the Medici’, RQ, 52:4 (1999), pp. 994-1020. According to 
Najemy, another important supporter of civic humanism as a ‘strategically pursued 
legitimation of the hegemony of the ruling group’ is Niccolo Machiavelli (‘Baron’s Machiavelli 
and Renaissance Republicanism’, AHR, 101 [1996], pp. 119-29, at p. 126).
517 Janet Coleman, Lauro Martines, Anthony Grafton, and Lisa Jardine make similar, though 
more general, arguments regarding civic humanism’s ideological support of the ruling elite; see 
Coleman, HPT, II, p. 233; L. Martines, Power and Imagination: City-States in Renaissance 
Italy (N.Y., 1979), pp. 191-201; A  Grafton and L. Jardine, From Humanism to the Humanities 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1986), p. 24.
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because it was not central to the entrenched interests of professional 
university philosophers. Unlike Aristotle, Plato had made few inroads into the 
universities, so humanists were free to apply their philological techniques to 
Plato without opposition from university-based philosophers.®* Field has 
shown that Florentine Platonic humanists were far from politically withdrawn: 
they wrote, lectured, and preached in the city centre, not in a rural villa, and 
they directed their ideas to the political community.®* Hankins has 
persuasively argued that the Medici did not support Platonism over 
Aristotelianism, and has thrown considerable doubt on the popular theory that 
the Medici founded a formal academy or institution dedicated to the study of 
Plato. What is more, the rebirth of speculative philosophy in Florence took 
place during the 1450s, a time when Cosimo was in the midst of a political 
crisis (caused by the temporary fragmentation and collapse of his party) and, 
as a consequence, could not have organised the isolation of Florentine 
intellectuals outside the city.®20
These new arguments about civic humanism as an oligarchic ideology and 
the rise of Neoplatonism independent of Medicean patronage suggest, 
therefore, that Baron and Garin misinterpreted the relationship between civic 
humanism and Medici ascendancy. In fact, because of the importance of 
northern Italian cities for the early development of humanism, scholars such 
as Lauro Martines have gone back to the Burckhardtian notion that humanism 
and despotism, not republicanism, made the best bedfellows in the early 
Renaissance.®21 A less extreme position has been advanced by the Italian 
scholar Fabio Cossutta, who notes that there were really two humanisms, one 
in Florence and one in Lombardy, although he also argues that what
®l8 J. Kraye, ‘Philologists and Philosophers’, in CCRH, pp. 142-60 at pp. 142-50; also see id., 
‘Lorenzo and the Philosophers’, in Lorenzo the Magnificent, ed. M. Mallett and N. Mann 
(London, 1996), pp. 151-66.
®* See A. Field, The origins o f the Platonic Academy o f Florence (Princeton, N.J., 1988), pp. 1- 
2 4 -
®20 See J. Hankins, ‘Humanism and the origins of modern political thought’, in Cambridge 
Companion to Renaissance Humanism, ed. J. Kraye (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 131-33; id., 
‘Lorenzo de’ Medici as a Patron of Philosophy’, Rinascimento, 34 (1994), pp. 15-54; id-, Plato in 
the Italian Renaissance, 3rd edn. (Leiden, 1994), pp. 3-17; id., ‘Marsilio Ficino as a Critic of 
Scholasticism’, VH, 5 (1994), pp. 325-33 at 330-31; id., ‘The Myth of the Platonic Academy of 
Florence’, RQ, 44 (1991); and id., ‘Cosimo de’ Medici and the “Platonic Academy”,’ JWCI, 53 
(1990), pp. 144-62.
®21 Martines, Power and Imagination, pp. 191-206.
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humanism tended to exalt everywhere was personal freedom, which would 
enable one to achieve individual excellence, rather than communal liberty.*22
The mistaken identification of rhetoric with republicanism in the late 
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries in Italy has also led scholars to see a 
‘decline’ in rhetoric as a political instrument during the course of the 
Renaissance. Their argument brings to mind Tacitus’s thesis in his Dialogus, 
concerning the decline of rhetoric in Rome, and it does have antecedents in 
the Renaissance itself. According to Tacitus, oratory was used to rule during 
the days of the Republic;*2* it was a source of power and influence and 
effectively enabled the advancement of merit. However, by the end of the first 
century (when the Dialogus was most likely written), Tacitus’ spokesmen 
claim that rhetoric has been thrust from the forum and the Senate into the 
triviality of mere performances in schools of declamation, that men get ahead 
not by their mastery of the art of speaking but by currying favour with Caesar. 
Even though Tacitus concedes that in a state where the wisest of men -  i.e., 
the emperor -  decides matters, there is no need for oratory (which is really 
necessary only in countries suffering from licence and sedition), this 
concession seems largely ironic, an attempt to avoid reprisals, because of his 
implicit criticisms directed at the Rome of Domitian.
Many versions of Tacitus’ thesis are reproduced by Renaissance writers. 
For example, in the Panegyric to the City o f Florence and the History o f 
Florence, Leonardo Bruni dated the onset of Roman cultural decline to the rise 
of the Caesars and the transition from republicanism to imperial government. 
‘Virtue, nobility, and genius’, he argued, can only flourish among politically 
free people;*2-* so when Roman citizens gave up their liberty, their virtue also 
passed away.*2* Similarly, Juan Luis Vives says that rhetoric is stronger in a
s22 Cossuta, Gli umanisti, pp. 45-49, 80-90.
*2* Tacitus, Dialogus, 32.4.
*2* L. Bruni, History o f Florence, Book I, in Humanism and Liberty, ed. and tr. by R. Watkins 
(Columbia, SC, 1978), pp. 27-91 at pp. 45-7. According to Hankins, in his history of Florence, 
Bruni ‘worked out an entire theory of historical development which identified the highest 
moments of human culture with its moments of greatest political freedom: Periclean Athens, 
late republican Rome and the modern Florentine republic’ (‘Humanism’, p. 131).
*2* ‘Before the day of the Caesars, character was the route to honor, and positions such as 
consul, dictator, or other high public offices were open to men of magnanimous spirit, strength 
of character, and energy* (L. Bruni, Laudatio Florentinae Urbis, in From Petrarch to Leonardo 
Bruni, by H. Baron [Chicago, 1968], pp. 217-63 at p. 46).
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popular government than in a state where one man rules, since eloquent 
speech will have little effect in the latter case. He notes, in addition, that 
rhetoric only flourished in fifth-century Athens and republican Rome.326
The Tacitean thesis has attracted a number of scholars of the Renaissance. 
Eugenio Garin, for example, asserts that after the Council of Trent (1545-63) 
secular oratory had no place in European governments.32? Marc Fumaroli 
argues that Tacitus’ line of argument (though only after the Plantin edition of 
his works in 1574) spoke to the Europe of the Age of Absolutism in which 
poetry had replaced oratory as the favoured mode of self-expression^ 
According to Vasile Florescu and George A, Kennedy, in the latter stages of the 
Renaissance, rhetoric became little more than a mere ornament of the prince’s 
court, and was eventually reduced to the cultivation of style and philological 
culture.^ And Debora K. Shuger suggests that even though sacred rhetoric 
continued to flourish throughout the period, secular rhetoric had little place in 
absolutist states.530 Even Fabio Cossutta, who acknowledges that there is an 
absolutist version of rhetoric flourishing in Quattrocento Lombardy (matching 
the supposedly republican rhetoric of Florence), concludes that rhetoric had 
no place where signorial rule was the norm.531
I believe that there are at least three basic flaws in such arguments. First, 
even if one agrees with the notion that deliberative rhetoric yielded the palm 
to epideictic after the death of the Italian communes, it does not mean that 
rhetoric ceased to be political. After all, courtiers (who practised epideictic 
oratory), though not engaging in debates like the senators of republican Rome, 
nevertheless played political roles in relationship to the monarchs they served 
(they offered advice, served on councils of state, and pursued their own 
political advancement). Second, the Tacitean thesis fails to account for the fact 
that most Renaissance writers on rhetoric, down to the end of the period, 
continued to think that their art was political, concerned with ruling. After
526 vives, De Causis, pp. 152-54. For other examples see, Fumaroli, ‘Rhetoric, Politics, and 
Society’, in Renaissance Eloquence, ed. Murphy, pp. 255-58.
327 Garin, Medioevo e Rinascimento, p. 148.
528 Fumaroli, L'age de I'eloquence, pp. 63-70.
529 v. Florescu, La retorica nel suo sviluppo storico (Bologna, 1971), pp. 84-5. See Kennedy, 
Classical Rhetoric pp. 200-03.
530 Shuger, Sacred Rhetoric, p. 12.
531 Cossutta, Gli umanisti, pp. 112-19.
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emphasising the interconnection of rhetoric and politics for the Italian 
humanists of the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, John Monfasani 
remarks that, ‘[tjhere cannot be any doubt that by and large sixteenth-century 
Italian authors continued to believe, teach, and preach that, in Conti’s words, 
“eloquentia civitates gubem ari” (“cities are governed by eloquence”)’.^2 What 
Monfasani says about Italy can and should be applicable to the rest of Europe. 
Vives, Cavalcanti, Patrizi and others, may insist that rhetoric is essentially 
linked with republican rule and free statess^ (scarce things in the Europe in 
which they lived), but nevertheless produced the subject to contemporaries 
who lived under signorial or monarchical governments. What is more, no 
matter what their political persuasion, Renaissance writers on rhetoric 
generally identify their art with ruling. The vast majority of them would have 
agreed with M. Le Grand’s statement (at the height of absolutist rule in 
France), that ‘the art of speaking well, and the sovereign eloquence of which I 
speak, is the most important part of politics’^  The identification of rhetoric 
and politics in Renaissance minds is underscored by the fact that most 
rhetorical texts were addressed to members of the ruling class, and that they 
repeatedly presented their teachings as key weapons in the arsenals of actual 
rulers. In the early Quattrocento, the Sienese doctor Andrea Benzi, states that 
kings and princes have never thought they could rule without rh e to ric s  Later 
the Paduan professor Giason Denores begins his Breve Trattato dell’Oratore 
(1574) with the statement that although rhetoric is fit for all, it is especially 
appropriate for those ‘who legitimately have occasion to rule and govern 
peoples and cities’^  Luigi Carbone, a Jesuit professor of theology at Perugia 
in the sixteenth century, calls rhetoric the monarchical art par excellence, 
because it guarantees the authority of the prince and makes it manifest to
532 Monfasani, ‘Humanism and Rhetoric’, p. 209.
533 it is worth noting, however, that various scholars who study, for instance, fifteenth and 
sixteenth century German cities, insist on this language of ‘free states’, but its meaning is 
clearly hierarchical, oligarchic and magisterial and certainly not democratic or with a wide, 
active power based beneath ruling, often mercantile, oligarchies.
534 M. Le Grand, Discours, n.p.
535 Miillner (ed.), Reden und Briefe italienischer Humanisten, p. 111.
536 G. Denores, Breve Trattato dell'Oratore, in Trattati di poetica e retorica del Cinquecento, 
ed. B. Weinberg (Bari, 1970), III, pp. 101-34, at p. 103.
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all.s37 sir Balthazar Gerbiers, writing during the Interregnum in England, 
thinks along similar lines: ‘This Science may be properly compared unto 
Justice in Monarchs, and Princes, as being most powerfull to keep Subjects in 
a due obedience, and absolutely necessaiy in the great Body of the State; for 
that well speaking in a Princes mouth, is that which above all other things 
captivates the hearts and affections of his Subjects’^  Jean Breche goes even 
further in his Premier livre de Vhonneste exercice du Prince of 1544 (which he 
dedicates to Francois I), when he declares that only kings possess true 
eloquence.539 But two treatises intended for Henri III of France probably 
constitute the most dramatic example of the tendency to see rhetoric as the art 
of kings: the Rhetorique frangoise faicte particulierement pour le Roy Henry 
3 (in all likelihood written by Germain Forget in 1580-83); and Jacques 
Amyot’s Projet de VEloquence royale, compose pour Henry III, roi de 
France.**0 Echoing the Tacitean thesis, at the beginning of his work Amyot 
says that ancient republics gave the reins of government and the greatest 
rewards to eloquent men, whereas in monarchies (where one man rules and 
distributes honours as he chooses), there is generally little concern for 
eloquence.^ However, he goes on to suggest that it ought to be sought out in 
monarchies nevertheless, for it is
‘greatly recommendable, profitable, indeed necessaiy to the ministers of a 
great king and principally to the king; and if he knows how to use it with 
dexterity and appropriately, he will establish, maintain, and augment his state 
with it, as much as or more than by any other means by which kingdoms and 
great signories are maintained’.^
537 Cited in Fumaroli, L'age de Veloquence, p. 183.
538 Balthazar Gerbiers, The A rt o f Well Speaking (London, 1650), p. 5.
539 Jean Breche, Premier livre de Vhonneste exercice du Prince (Paris, 1544).
mo Kees Meerhoff, Rhetorique etpoetique au XVJe siecle en France (Leiden, 1986), p. 257.
J. Amyot, Projet de I'Eloquence royale, compose pour Henry III, roi de France (Versailles, 
1805), p. 3.
542 Ibid., p. 4. It is, of course, revealing that Breche, Amyot and others, should have addressed 
to an actual king a treatise specifying the regal nature of oratory. George of Trebizond and 
Raphael Regius directed their works to the gubematores of the Venetian state; and English 
authors dedicated their treatises to eminent noblemen. For example, Richard Rainolde’s The 
Foundacion ofRhetorike (1563) is dedicated to Robert Dudley (Elizabeth I’s favourite); Henry 
Peacham’s 1593 edition of his Garden o f Eloquence, to John Puckering, Lord Keeper of the 
Great Seal; Charles Butler’s Rhetoricae Libri Duo of 1598, to Thomas Egerton, Lord Keeper of 
the Privy Seal; and Angel Day’s 1599 edition of his manual of letter writing, The English 
Secretary, to Edward de Vere, Earl of Oxford.
136
Amyot then provides a list of rulers (including Pyrrhus and Julius Caesar), 
who did more by means of eloquence than by arms, and concludes by praising 
the kings of Persia who spoke to the people themselves rather than through 
their ministers, since they knew that ‘the word of a King is a principal part of
his p o w e r’.s43
It is important to note that, in the Renaissance, the identification of 
rhetoric and politics, of orators and kings, is not restricted to rhetoric manuals 
and treatises. It is also reproduced and developed by political theorists and 
literary writers. In fact, diverse texts reveal that the discourse of rhetoric was 
not confined to those works that proclaimed to study the art, but extended into 
other discourses (which it helped to shape and which, in turn, helped to shape 
it). Such texts help us to draw a more complete picture of what Renaissance 
people thought about the art that was so central to their culture. They reveal 
that rhetoric was seen as regal because thinkers acknowledge that monarchical 
rule is indeed a matter of rhetoric; of rulers’ using language and spectacle to 
generate (and maintain) the allegiance of their subjects.544 These texts confirm, 
in addition, the importance of the discourse of rhetoric in providing a language 
to shape this notion of politics. For example, Justus Lipsius’ (1547-1626) 
Politico, a classic statement of political theory, argues that monarchy is the 
best form of government and, following Sallust, claims that human nature 
desires to be ruled.545 Men are ordinarily wild beasts who must be tamed, and 
the best way to tame them is to use prudence (the key faculty of judgement 
operative in rhetoric), rather than to rely on force. Lipsius speaks of prudence 
much as rhetoricians speak of the power of eloquence, and he concludes that 
‘in government’, prudence ‘is clearly the stronger, because it alone is the gentle 
bridle, by which those who are free [voluntarii] are brought within the 
compass of obedience’.^  He devotes Book VI to the problem of civil war, a 
burning issue in the Europe of the late sixteenth century, and he recommends
543 Amyot, Projet de I'Eloquence royale, p. 7.
544 On Renaissance rulers’ use of rhetorical spectacles see, e.g., Roy Strong, Splendour at Court 
(London, 1973); and S. Orgel, The Illusion o f Power (Berkeley, 1975).
545 j .  Lipsius, Politico -  Six Books o f Politics or Political Instruction, ed. J. Waszink (Assen, 
2004), 2.2.4.
546 Ibid., 3.1.46. Note that the image of the bridle is often implied when rhetoricians talk of how 
the orator controls the auditor.
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dealing severely (by any means, fair or foul) with factions and sedition. Lipsius 
suggests keeping people disunited, corrupting opponents with money, and, 
most of all, using fair words, for ‘it is said that you cannot hold the wolf by the 
ears; but we may most easily lead the people and whole cities by them’.547 For 
him, therefore, rhetoric is the art of kings. And in the troubled times of the late 
sixteenth century transcends other means for maintaining the peace of the
s ta te .548
The idea that politics is a matter of rhetorical manipulation is ever-present 
in Machiavelli’s works. His princes are creators of spettacoli, of a procedure 
based on the deeply rhetorical assumptions that the world is a place of 
appearances, that all truths are contingent, and that one can impose one’s will 
on others by manipulating the image (ethos) one projects.549 Machiavelli uses 
words such as colore and colorire to describe princely behaviour, terms that 
commonly refer not only to ‘colour’ or ‘pretext’, but also to ‘rhetorical 
ornament’. So in IIprincipe, he says that the prince must know how to colorire 
his ambitious nature by making it seem virtuous; accordingly, he praises the 
fox-like qualities of Roman emperor Septimus Severus, who persuaded his 
troops to capture Rome under the colore of avenging the death of the old 
emperor. Machiavelli’s central admonition to the prince is, in fact, that he 
should endeavour to be a lion and a fox, playing the parts of both those two 
animals.s5° For him the prince’s display of his ethos is analogous to the 
rhetorician’s when creating one of his speeches: he uses the right ornaments, 
the right colori, to engage others in a rhetorical exchange that leads them to do 
one’s bidding. In the Discorsi, Machiavelli insists that leaders should have the
547 Lipsius, Politico, 6.4. To draw the people by the ears is, of course, to practice oratory, as 
Fray Luis de Granada knows when he translates the same passage, which comes from Plutarch: 
They say that the wolf cannot be held by the ears, but it is very fitting that the people be led in 
that way (Ecclesiastica Rhetorica, p. 5).
548 Rebhom persuasively argues that Lipsius’s recognition of the importance of rhetoric for 
monarchical rule is matched by that of Jean Bodin, the thinker usually considered the chief 
theoretician of Renaissance absolutism (Emperor o f Men’s Mind, esp. pp. 52-3). On Bodin see, 
J. Franklin, Jean Bodin and the Rise o f Absolutist Theory (Cambridge, 1973). On Renaissance 
absolutism see, P. Anderson, Lineages o f the Absolutist State (London, 1974); Ellery Schalk, 
‘Under the Law or Laws unto Themselves’, HR/RH, 15 (1988), pp. 279-92; and D.R. Kelley, The 
Beginning o f Ideology (Cambridge, 1981), pp. 181-99.
549 See N. Machiavelli, The Prince, tr. R. Price, ed. Q. Skinner, (Cambridge, 1988), 7.57; and id. 
Discorsi Sopra la Prima Deca di Tito Livio, ed. S. Bertelli (Milan, i960), 1.15.172.
55° Id., Prince, 18.73, 19-81, 18.72-73
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ability to use words to inspire their followers,ss* and he praises Castruccio 
Castracani for his masteiy of verbal arts. In the Istorie fiorentine, he recounts 
a speech that Lorenzo de’ Medici delivered to the Florentines, noting that 
Lorenzo’s eloquence reduced his audience to te a r s .5 5 2  However, it is important 
to note that Machiavelli often assigns a limited role to language in the prince’s 
performance. In fact, he spends relatively little time detailing how his prince 
will acquire the art of using words other than by reading history (which is in 
true Ciceronian terms, rhetoric), and learning from these histories of Moses, 
Theseus, and other ‘great men’ (not about who these men really were but who 
they appeared to be). Instead, Machiavelli emphasises that the prince’s 
education should be more a matter of learning how to act like a soldier than to 
study rhetoric. After all, he tends to associate the art, as part of the trivium, 
with princes’ loss of dominion and with the degeneration of the state.“3
By contrast, in Machiavelli’s comedy, La mandragola, the protagonist 
Callimaco uses language to persuade Nicia, the chief dupe of the play, to 
accept him as a doctor and to follow his advice in adopting a ‘cure’ for the 
supposed sterility of Nicia’s wife. Greatly impressed by Callimaco’s verbal 
powers, Nicia exclaims, ‘[t]his is the worthiest man one can find’, ^  thus 
showing himself the rhetorician’s ideal audience. Later, in response to 
Callimaco’s request for his fede, his ‘trust’ or ‘faith’, Nicia responds earnestly: 
‘Go ahead and talk, for I am ready to honour you in everything and to believe 
in you more than in my c o n f e s s o r ’ .s s s  Callimaco obtains from Nicia precisely 
what rhetoricians throughout the Renaissance sought from their listeners -  
his trust. What is particularly striking is that because Callimaco delivers his 
speech in Latin rather than Italian, it is unlikely that Nicia understands very 
much of what is being said. So Nicia is moved to accept Callimaco’s authority, 
not because the stylistic niceties of his speech persuade him to do so, but 
simply because his speech is uttered in an exotic and prestigious language. For
551 Machiavelli, Discorsi, 3.33.475.
552 Id., La vita di Castruccio Castracani, pp. 36-40, and Istorie fiorentine, pp. 525-28; both 
texts in Istoile fiorentine, ed. F. Gaeta (Milan, 1962).
ss3 See id., Istorie fiorentine, p. 325.
554 id., La mandragola, in II teatro e tutti gli scritti letterari, ed. F. Gaeta (Milan, 1965), 2.2.71.
555 ibid., 2.6.75.
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Machiavelli, therefore, the rhetoric of politics clearly extends beyond words.ss* 
In fact, it often seems more heavily weighted in favour of the persuasive effect 
of appearances than most rhetorical treatises are. For example, in the Discorsi, 
Machiavelli tells us how Francesco Soderini (then bishop of Volterra), stopped 
a mob in its tracks when they were about to sack his family’s home. He did so 
primarily by means of the splendid visual impression he created: ‘Having 
heard the noise and seen the crowd, and having put his most honourable 
clothes on and over them his bishop’s chasuble, he approached those armed 
men and stopped them with his presence and his words’.557 Words, therefore, 
come only after the bishop’s careful, actor-like preparation of the show he puts 
on. But in II principe Machiavelli relates an even clearer example of a 
persuasive princely spectacle that privileges the eye over the ear: the one 
involving Cesare Borgia’s lieutenant, Remirro de Oreo, who was executed by 
his master. ‘He [Borgia]’, Machiavelli tells us, ‘had him placed one morning in 
two pieces in the piazza at Cesena, with a piece of wood and a bloody knife 
beside him. The ferocity of that spectacle made the people at the same time 
both satisfied and astounded’.558 The spectacle devised by Borgia is gripping, 
acutely persuasive, and full of meaning for both the citizens of Cesena and the 
readers of Machiavelli’s text.559
556 it is important to note that authors of rhetoric manuals and treatises also recognise a 
significant non-verbal element in their art. Whenever they write about delivery (actio), they 
acknowledge that personal appearance, facial expressions, and gestures all play a role in the act 
of persuasion. John Bulwer, who composed an entire treatise on the use of the hand in delivery, 
insists that gestures are more important than words in expressing the speaker’s ideas, that the 
mouth is useless without the hand, and that by means of the latter, ancient orators ‘extorted 
approbation from their auditors, and ,... invading the mind through the eye, with easy accesses 
put themselves into the possession of the people’ (Chirologia: or the Natural Language o f the 
Hand and Chironomia: or the A rt o f Manual Rhetoric, ed. J. W. Cleary. [Carbondale, 111., 
1974], 160).
557 Machiavelli, Discorsi, 1.54.253.
558 Id., Prince, 7.37
ss9 For an excellent account of this spectacle see, Wayne A. Rebhom, Foxes and Lions: 
Machiavelli's Confidence Men (Ithaca, N.Y., 1988), ch. 3; for Machiavelli's rhetorical 
manipulation of his readers see, ibid., ch. 5. Also see, V. Kahn, Machiavellian Rhetoric 
(Princeton 1994). Shakespeare shares a similarly broad view of rhetoric, stressing the 
enormously persuasive force of visual displays. His Machiavellian kings and princes are aware 
that silent spectacles can often accomplish as much as a torrent of words. Richard III, for 
example, works on the lord mayor and citizens of London by appearing before them silently 
reading a prayer book between two bishops (Richard III, 3.7). Although Renaissance 
rhetoricians generally prefer to avoid facing the issue of their relative powerlessness, the same 
cannot be said about the fiction writers of the period. In a variety of works they offer us 
wandering rogues, clever peasants, merchants, courtiers, aspiring noblemen -  all of them
140
In the world of the Renaissance, when traditional loyalties have been 
effaced, when propaganda has become an essential tool of the church, and 
monarchs recognise that their success (and longevity) as rulers depends to a 
considerable extent on their ability to display power and magnificence in 
elaborate spectacles, the art of rhetoric has clearly become indispensable. But 
as its critics insisted, much of the disorder of their time was also due to 
rhetoric. In the following section we shall see how its advocates propose to re­
establish order by using good rhetoric.
V
Throughout the Renaissance the discourse of rhetoric is continually afflicted 
by problems of ethics. To begin with, rhetoric’s advocates are constantly forced 
to face the charge that to play the orator is to lie .®60 In response they commonly 
adopt Bartolomeo Cavalcanti’s approach, who, after acknowledging that 
rhetoric can be used for both good and ill, insists that only the individual who 
uses it for morally praiseworthy ends is a true rhetorician.®6* This strategy 
derives from Aristotle’s Rhetoric, where he tries to respond to Plato’s 
criticisms of the art in the Phaedrus and the Gorgias.®62 Renaissance advocates 
of rhetoric, therefore, ‘solve’ the ethical problem their art creates by claiming 
that the orator is, in Quintilian’s words, ‘a good man skilled in speaking’ ,®63 and 
that his fraudulent double is not an orator at all. But it is important to note
needy, dependent, and aware of their relative powerlessness, and all of them relying primarily 
on their skill with words in order to overcome the social limits imposed on them.
®6° For examples see, J. Jewel, Oratio Contra Rhetoricam, in TTie Works, ed. J. Ayre 
(Cambridge, 1850), IV, pp. 1283-91, at p. 1286; G. Pico della Mirandola, ‘Epistola Hermolao 
Barbaro, June 1485’, in Opera Omnia, intr. C. Vasoli, (Basel, 1557; rpt. Hildesheim, 1969), pp. 
351-58, at p. 352; F. Patrizi, Della Retorica died dialoghi (Venice, 1562), p. 40r; H. C. Agrippa, 
De Incertitudine et vanitate sdentiarum etartium, in Opera (Lyon, 1600 [?]; rpt. Hildesheim, 
1970), II, p. 27; M. de Montaigne, ‘De la vanite des paroles’, in Oeuvres completes, ed. A. 
Thibaudet and M. Rat (Paris, 1962), p. 292; and Ramus, Dialectique, pp. 128-29.
661 B. Cavalcanti, La retorica (Ferrara, 1559), pp. 5-6; cf. Alsted, Rhetorica, p. 2; Keckermann, 
Systema, p. 504; Peacham, Garden, pp. 35, 52, 68-69, 75, 79, 167; Ermolao Barbara's letter to 
Giovanni Pico delia Mirandola, in Prosatori latini, p. 854; de’ Conti, De eloquentia dialogus, 
pp. 154-55; and Soarez, Arte, p. 9.
®62 Aristotle, Rh., 1.1.13: ‘And if it is argued that great harm can be done by unjustly using such 
power of words, this objection applies to all good things except for virtue, and most of all to the 
most useful things, like strength, health, wealth, and military strategy; for by using these justly 
one would do the greatest good and unjustly, the greatest harm’. Also see ibid., 1.1.12, i.3.6ff.; 
and NE, Ili3a30ff. When addressing such questions Quintilian and Cicero draw on Aristotle: 
cf. Cicero, De inventione, 1.2.3; Quintilian, Institutio, l.Pr.9-20; 12.1.1-32.
®63 Quintilian, Institutio, 1.2.1.1: vir bonus dicendi peritus
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that even though Renaissance writers echo the defence of rhetoric put forward 
by Aristotle and his Roman followers, often citing their very words, their 
conception of bad rhetoric often has a non-classical flavour. For example, 
when Francesco Patrizi condemns oratory as lying, he sees this tendency as a 
result of humanity’s loss of its original, Edenic language, a loss that has 
produced ‘deceptions, injuries, litigation, judges, lawyers, laws, tribunals, and 
orators’.®6* In keeping with this Christian view, Johann Heinrich Alsted 
contrasts bad eloquence, which for him is ‘dog-like and clearly diabolical’ and 
ought to be banished, with good eloquence, which is sweet and useful and 
must be preserved as the weapon God gives people to fight against the 
monsters who obscure the sun of truth.®6® He suggests that perverse, lying 
rhetoric be cut off by fire and water, so that the purified rhetoric left behind 
can perform its essential: curing ‘souls corrupted by the fall’ .®66 In a world 
where Protestants and Catholics were competing for the allegiance of the 
populace, it is hardly surprising that the rhetoric used by each group to solidify 
its faith would at the same time be feared as supporting a bogus religion. 
Cypriano Soarez, a Counter-Reformation rhetorician, is typical in wanting 
Christian principles to purge rhetoric of its errors. He urges the reader to cut 
off its “license to lie’, as well as its ‘repulsive vice of wounding others’, so that 
the beauty of the Christian eloquence practised by the saints can be restored .®67 
The enemies of rhetoric also denounce it as a rabble-rousing performance 
that lowers the orator to the level of the mob. As a result, the Renaissance 
discourse of rhetoric is permeated by a fear of social degradation. That anxiety 
surfaces whenever writers attempt to distinguish the orator from the actor, 
whom he clearly resembles. As seen in the previous chapter, even though 
Cicero admires the Roscious’ talent and says in De oratore that the aspiring 
orator should take him as a paragon, he simultaneously remarks that actors 
only give pleasure to the ear, whereas the orator should also appeal to the 
intellect of his audience.®68 Elsewhere in the dialogue, he adds that the orator
®6* Patrizi, Della retorica, p. 31
®6® Alsted, Rhetorica, Dedication, 3r, 6v.
®66 Ibid., 3,5-
567 Soarez, Arfe, pp. 9-10.
®68 Cicero, De or., 1.59.251, 259
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should employ the mimicry of the actor in passing only, because that 
technique is insufficiently liberale^ (a term which in this context indicates the 
upper-class status of the liber or free man, as opposed to that of the slave), 
thus disclosing a fear of social debasement. Quintilian, like Cicero, accepts that 
there are similarities between the orator and the actor (particularly in 
delivery), yet emphasises the important of the former maintaining his distance 
from the latter. The orator, he says, should keep the use of theatrical gestures 
under check lest, when we would capture the elegance of the actor, we lose the 
authority of a good and dignified man’.s7° It is clear that Quintilian’s allusion to 
‘a good and dignified man’, not only reiterates his description of the good 
orator as a vir bonus dicendi peritus, but also highlights the orator’s moral 
worth, and his upper-class status as one of the viri boni, the Taest people’ or 
optimates.
The rejection of bad rhetoric as theatre continues in the Middle Ages. 
Alain de Lille, for example, dismisses sermons involving buffoonery and 
rhythmic melodies as fit only for the theatre or the pantomime,57* and 
Martianus Capella insists that the rhetorician must avoid the gestures of 
actors.572 In the Renaissance, a time when the theatre undergoes an enormous 
development, such views proliferate. Pico della Mirandola wants the writing of 
philosophy, which he memorably characterises as a higher form of rhetoric, to 
have nothing ‘theatrical, applause-inciting, or popular’ about it.573 And Vives 
suggests that Roman oratory declined in the Empire partly because people 
started going to hear speeches ‘as if to an entertainment in the theatre’.574 
Francis Bacon concurs when he praises the Jesuits for using drama as a means 
to teach boys various skills, but says that the theatre in general is
s69 Cicero, De or., 2.62.252.
57° Quintilian, Institutio 11.3.184
571 Alain de Lille, Summa de arte praedicatoria, in Readings in Medieval Rhetoric, ed. J. M. 
Miller, M. H. Prosser, and T. W. Benson (Bloomington, IN, 1973), p. 231.
572 M. Capella, Martianus Capella and the Seven Liberal Arts, tr. W. H. Stahl, R. Johnson, and 
E. L. Burge (NY, 1977), p. 205. See also Thomas Waleys De Modo Componendi Sermones Cum 
Documentis, in Artes Praedicandi, ed. Th.-M. O. P. Charland (Paris, 1936), p. 373. On the 
Medieval recognition of the close relationship between oratory and theatre see, Jody Enders, 
Rhetoric and the Origins o f Medieval Drama (Ithaca, 1992).
573 Pico, Epistola, p. 354.
574 Vives, De Causis, p. 168.
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‘disreputable’.575 But it is when rhetoricians consider actio or delivery that 
concerns about the orator’s theatricality surface most often. Trebizond insists 
that the orator’s gestures should not be those of ‘actors’,576 and more than a 
century later Luis de Granada voices the same view: one should not imitate 
theatrical manners for fear of ‘degenerating to the gesticulating and frivolity of
actors’ .577
As Renaissance rhetoricians make the ideal orator the source of 
civilisation,578 so their dread of social degradation is linked with a fear of 
barbarism. Richard Sherry defines the stylistic fault called ‘Barbarie’ as that 
‘whych tum eth the speche from his purenes, and maketh it foule and rude’. He 
goes on to provide examples, which for him have been produced by barbarous 
m e n .5 7 9  In this passage, ‘barbarism’ is a historical category, the set of rhetorical 
and linguistic practices of the preceding age, which rhetoricians claim to have 
transcended, as they rehearse the belief that their culture has surpassed that of 
the Middle Ages and instigated a rebirth of the classical world. ss° The sense of
575 Bacon, Adv. L., p. 208; cf. D. Erasmus, Ciceronianus, in Erasmus von Rotterdam, 
Ausgewdhlte Schriften, ed. W. Welzig (Darmstadt, 1972), VII, p. 88.
576 Trebizong, Rhetoricorum, sgr.
577 Luis de Granada, Ecclesiastica Rhetorica, p. 369
578 The many Renaissance renditions of the myth of the orator-civilizer can be traced back to 
passages found in texts written by Isocrates, Cicero, Horace, and Quintilian; see Isocrates, 
Antidosis, in Works, tr. G Norlin (Cambridge, Mass., 1929), pp. 254-56; Cicero, De oratore 
1.8.33; Horace, Ars poetica, in Opera, ed. E. Wickham and H. Garrod, 2nd edn. (Oxford, 1929), 
PP- 391-401; and Quintilian, Institutio, 2.16.9. But the most influential of the ancient versions 
occurs at the beginning of Cicero’s De inventione, and its general outline parallels what one 
finds in Renaissance texts. In the beginning, Cicero writes, men wandered like animals guided 
only by brute strength, not reason. Lacking religion, marriage rites, and laws, they satisfied 
their desires through the abuse of physical force (1.2.2). Then a great man appeared who 
brought men together from the fields and woods and, through reason and eloquence, tamed 
them and taught them to observe justice, to work for the common good even at the cost of 
personal sacrifice, and to accept their social equality with others. Such a man is identical with 
Cicero’s ideal orator, i.e., one who combines wisdom with eloquence and stands forth as the 
most useful and devoted citizen in the state (1.1.1). For Renaissance versions of the myth see, 
e.g., Raphael Regius, Panegyricus (1492), pp. fiv-fiir; George Puttenham, The Arte o f English 
Poesie (1589), ed. G. Willcock and A. Walker (Cambridge, 1936), pp. 22-3; Joan de Guzman, 
Primera Parte de la Rhetorica (1589), ed. and intr. by B. Perinan (Pisa, 1993), 3iv, Du Vair, 
Traitte, p. 395.
579 R. Sherry, A Treatise o f Schemes and Tropes (1550), intr. H. W. Hildebrandt (Gainesville, 
1961), pp. 35-36. See also Puttenham, Arte, pp. 257-58.
580 The humanists consistently characterised their project of reviving classical Latin as a 
struggle against barbarism. For them foreign invasion and occupation was the cause of the 
original cultural decline and the effort to reverse this decline would, to a considerable extent, 
involve purifying the contemporary culture of foreign influences. The humanist preoccupation 
with barbarism can, of course, be traced back to classical Greece -  the term is said to be 
onomatopoeic in origin; to the Greeks, the incomprehensible speech of rival tribes made a 
noise that sounded like Tiar-bar’ (see A. Pagden, Peoples and Empires [N.Y., 2001], pp. 12-13).
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Medieval corruption and decay was already articulated by Boccaccio, in a letter 
to Jacopo Pizzinghe from around 1370. He begins by writing in admiring tones 
about how ancient Rome achieved a total civilizational unit, which combined 
military triumphs with artistic, philosophical and moral ones, and then 
proceeds to complain that ‘our ancestors’ neglected all of these achievements 
‘with Godlike irresponsibility’, and ‘allowed them to be defiled, to be snatched 
away or shamefully destroyed by foreign peoples’.®8* For Philip Melanchthon 
only true speech is eloquent speech, and says that individuals in the previous 
age, who living ‘in eternal darkness’, lacked the eloquence that the Romans 
classified as part of humanitas (so-called because it could bring one out of 
barbarism).®82 In a similar vein, M. Le Grand observes that even though his 
countiymen possessed native sources of eloquence that went back to the 
ancient Druids, the barbarian invasions of the Middle Ages impaired the 
development of rhetoric until Renaissance writers such as Ronsard and Du 
Bellay found ways to ‘pronounce their thoughts more clearly’.®8® And it is to 
this ‘myth of the Renaissance’, that the Venetian humanist Ermolao Barbaro 
refers in the letter he wrote to the Florentine Neoplatonist Giovanni Pico della 
Mirandola, praising him for his learning and eloquence, while attacking the 
Scholastics, the ‘Germans’, for their lack of a ‘shining and elegant style’. The 
letter prompted what would become a famous letter to Barbaro.®8'* Pico, who 
had spent six years studying the writings of men Barbaro dismisses as 
‘barbaric’, responds first by thanking him for his kind words and then by 
devoting most of the letter to a hypothetical speech that the maligned 
Germans might deliver in their own defence. In it Pico makes two
From a certain perspective, the Romans regarded their entire history as one long struggle 
against barbarianism, and this theme found its way into Roman accounts of eloquence. The 
Renaissance, therefore, had ample classical precedent for thinking about political conflict as 
involving a struggle against barbarianism. Italian thinkers, in particular, were aware of the fact 
that it was ‘barbarian’ Germanic tribes from the north who had brought about the final demise 
of the Roman Empire.
®81 Giovanni Boccaccio, ‘Letter to Jacopo Pizzinghe’, in The portable Renaissance reader, ed. 
J. B. Ross and M. M. McLaughlin, rev. edn. (Harmondsworth, 1978), pp. 125-6.
®82 Melanchthon, Encomion, pp. 48,50.
®8® Le Grand, Discours, n.p.
®84 Pico della Mirandola, ‘Epistola Hermolao Barbaro’, at p. 358. For the phrase from Barbara's 
letter see, Q. Breen, ‘Giovanni Pico della Mirandola on the Conflict of Philosophy and Rhetoric’, 
JHI, 13 (1952), pp. 393. Also see, J. R. Henderson, ‘Humanist Letter Writing: Private 
Conversation or Public Forum?’ in Self-Presentation and Social Identification, ed. T. Van 
Houdt and J. Papy (Leuven, 2002).
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complementary moves: he criticises rhetoric, focusing on the issue of elegant 
style, and he exalts the philosophical writing of the Scholastics. There is a clear 
tongue-in-cheek quality about Pico’s defence, for he not only writes in an 
extremely elegant Latin style (as Barbaro himself would later note), but 
declares at the conclusion that his speech is a mock encomium, and that his 
aim has been to bring Barbaro to compose a praise of eloquence (just as Plato’s 
Glaucon praised injustice in The Republic in order to goad Socrates to the 
praise of justice). Still, Pico’s letter assembles some of the most telling 
arguments the Renaissance would make against rhetoric. He denounces it as 
deception and lies, as a trivial kind of theatricality, and as a vulgar display fit 
only for fools or the mob.®8®
If throughout the Renaissance the good rhetorician is a hero, then bad 
rhetoric is a monster, a grotesque body, to be driven away or slain. 
Shakespeare’s Falstaff and Moliere’s Tartuffe provide fine examples of a 
correlation between physical grotesqueness and defective rhetoric. Both (albeit 
in quite different ways) indulge in verbal excesses that match their physical 
bulk. But perhaps the most grotesque figure of all appears in Thomas Nashe’s 
satirical novel The Unfortunate Traveller. Jack Wilton, the work’s protagonist, 
at one point listens to a ridiculous oration delivered in honour of the Duke of 
Saxony -  it is packed with foolish redundancies, absurd puns, pedantic jokes, 
and obscure terms. However, the physical attributes of the man who delivers 
the oration are even more grotesque:
‘A bursten-belly inkhom orator called Vanderhulk they picked out to present 
him [the Duke] with an oration, one that had a sulphurous, big, swollen, large 
face like a Saracen, eyes like two Kentish oysters, a mouth that opened as 
wide every time he spoke as one of those old knit trap doors, a beard as 
though it had been made of a bird's nest plucked in pieces which consisteth of 
straw, hair, and dirt mixed together’.s86
This passage stresses the appropriately named Vanderhulk’s grotesqueness in 
a number of ways: it emphasises his monstrous size; it makes him appear half­
human and half-animal; associates him with disease and evil (his ‘sulphurous’ 
face); links him to the barbarous (‘Saracen’); and mocks him as dirty and
585 Pico, Epistola, pp. 352,354,355.
s85 T. Nashe, The Unfortunate Traveller, in Elizabethan Prose Fiction, ed. M. Lawlis (N.Y., 
1967), p. 480.
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disorderly. In this portrait are present virtually all the negative features 
symbolised by the deformed body of bad rhetoric.
If bad rhetoric has a monstrous body, good rhetoric must have a beautiful 
one. George of Trebizond, writing about dispositio or arrangement, compares 
the members of an oration to the parts of the body, saying that all should be in 
their proper places, as they are in Cicero’s works.®8? Similarly, Bartholomew 
Keckermann says that, ‘an oration ... ought to be similar to a beautiful body, in 
which we marvel not so much at the members themselves as at their mutual 
joining together’.®88 And for Thomas Wilson comeliness should also 
characterise the actual body of the ideal orator:
“The head to bee holden upright, the forehead without frowning, the browes 
without bending, the nose without blowing, the eyes quicke and pleasant, the 
lippes not laied out, the teeth without grenning, the armes not much cast 
abroade, but comely set out, as time and cause shall best require: the handes 
sometimes opened, and sometimes holden together, the fingers pointing, the 
breast laied out, and the whole bodie stirring altogether, with a seemely 
moderation. By the which behaviour of our bodie after such a sorte, we shall 
not onely delite men with the sight, but perswade them the rather the trueth 
of our cause’.®8’
Wilson, therefore, thinks that such a body will not only delight the audience 
but persuade them in and of itself to believe in the truth of the orator’s cause.
Even so, Renaissance rhetoricians clearly fail to protect good rhetoric from 
charges of immorality. What is more, they fail to ensure its upper-class status, 
because they often make the art of kings appear like the spectacle of a lower- 
class swindler. Yet, this slippage is hardly surprising. After all, like bad 
rhetoric, good rhetoric is intended for all kinds audiences; so the danger of 
contamination by contact with the ‘low’ type is inevitable. One good example 
of Renaissance anxiety about the protean nature of rhetoric can be found in 
Antonio Riccobono’s Oratio pro studiis humanitatis. After alluding to 
Aristotle’s remark that the province of rhetoric encompasses all subjects, he 
says:
‘Although the special function of the orator is to treat of civil matters, 
nevertheless eloquence has not been circumscribed with railings, has no fixed
®8? George, Rhetoricorum, 5 4 V .
®88 Keckermann, Systema, p. 128.
®89 Wilson, Arte, 221.
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borders and established limits for itself. It wanders and sallies forth wherever 
it pleases, and disputes of all things even pertaining to other disciplines so 
that it makes them its own. Nor should one think it has gone outside its limits 
and seized those things which belong to others . . . ’.59°
For Riccobono, as for so many others in the Renaissance, rhetoric is the 
supremely imperial art, and he thus celebrates it for its malleability and 
power. But despite his enthusiasm, when he insists that rhetoric’s violation of 
boundaries should not be seen as such (because rhetoric cultivates the 
territory it invades), we can discern a certain misgiving about the art’s capacity 
for boundary violation to surface. In fact, his attempt at rationalisation 
highlights the potential immorality involved in violating boundaries. After all, 
by crossing boundaries rhetoric can potentially create intellectual, social, and 
political confusion -  a problem rhetoricians generally prefer to ignore. The 
critics of rhetoric lambasted it precisely because of this capacity, which they 
associated with sedition and rebellion. Such attacks prompted its defenders to 
insist that their art was a source of order, a cure for the ills which, ironically, 
rhetoric itself helped to produce. Still, many acknowledged these issues and, as 
a consequence, sought to reform the art.
This effort partly explains not merely the endless production of rhetoric 
books in the period (all promising to correct the defects of their predecessors), 
but also the radical reform of the discipline undertaken by the protestant 
martyr Pierre de la Ramee (1515-72), better known as Petrus Ramus .59* Ramus 
and his followers, who attained considerable influence in Cambridge as well as 
Paris, urged educational authorities and students to take up a new, pragmatic 
version of dialectic and rhetoric. His proposed reorganisation of the liberal 
arts was rooted in Ramus’ conviction that the traditional curriculum 
(especially the teaching of the trivium), had become filled with redundancies
59° A. Riccobono, Oratio; cited in G. Mazzacurati, La crisi della retorica umanistica nel 
cinquecento (Naples, 1961), p. 176.
59* His polemical career came to a violent end when Ramus, an early convert to Huguenotism, 
was murdered in the massacre of St Bartholomew’s Day in 1572 . He was educated at the 
College de Navarre of the University of Paris during the late 1 5 2 0 s , a crucial period for the 
teaching of dialectic in the University. For more on Ramus and Ramism see, Ong, Ramus, 
Method, and the Decay o f Dialogue; P. Sharratt, ‘Ramus 2 0 0 0 ’, Rhetorica, 18 ( 2 0 0 0 ) ,  pp. 3 9 9 -  
4 5 5 ; K. Meerhoff and J.-C. Moisan (eds.), Autor de Ramus: texte, theorie, commentaire 
(Quebec, 1 9 9 7 ); J. Freedman, "The Diffusion of the Writings of Petrus Ramus in Central 
Europe, C I5 7 0 -C I6 3 0 ’, RQ, 4 6 :1  (1 9 9 3 ) , pp. 9 8 -1 5 2 ; J. C. Adams, ‘Ciceronianus and the Place of 
Peter Ramus’ Dialecticae libri duo in the Curriculum’, RQ, 4 3 :3  (1 9 9 0 ) , pp. 5 5 1 -6 9 ; and N. 
Bruyere, Methode et dialectique dans I’oeuvre de La Ramie (Paris, 1 9 8 4 ) .
148
and overlapping categories.®** It is worth noting that Ramus was building on 
the pioneering work undertaken by Rudolphus Agricola (1443-85),593 who was 
dismayed at the great confusion, the ‘filthiness’, which he saw afflicting the 
realm of learning. ‘All things, as though they had sprung out of a cave’, 
Agricola complains, Tiave burst through the rightful bounds of their 
neighbours, nor do we learn almost anything at this time in its proper p la c e ’.s** 
Here his view of boundary violation is purely negative: it is filth and confusion 
and an assault against what is right ( iu s ) .^ s
However, as seen earlier, rhetoric is by its very nature a boundary violator, 
so even though it may be liberating in some constructions, it will always be 
threatening (despite the best efforts of rhetoricians to make it appear 
otherwise). Whether good or bad, therefore, rhetoric will always be a monster, 
and to banish the monster means nothing less than to banish rhetoric itself. 
But such a move is clearly impossible, for as Vives and many others knew, 
rhetoric is infused in all things, present wherever language is in use. To banish 
the monster of rhetoric would be to banish communication, to banish human 
society.
VI
592 w ith its businesslike stress on method and analysis and its de-emphasis of rhetoric, 
Ramism had a strong appeal to the class of rising bourgeois who in England and in the 
continent were inclined to embrace Calvinism. In fact, Ramus’ works enjoyed particular favour 
not in highly sophisticated intellectual circles but rather in elementary or secondary schools or 
along the fringe where secondary schooling and university education met. See W. J. Ong, 
‘Ramist Method and the Commercial Mind’, in his Rhetoric, Romance and Technology (Ithaca, 
N.Y., 1971), pp. 165-89, at p. 165. Neal Gilbert suggests that Ramism appealed to the Protestant 
ethic by providing a way of training students ‘to make useful contributions to the betterment of 
man’s estate in the shortest possible time’ (‘Review of W. J. Ong, Ramus, Method, and the 
Decay o f Dialogue and Ramus and Talon Inventory’, RN, 12 [1959], pp. 269-71, at p. 271).
593 For more on Agricola see, L. Jardine, ‘Inventing Rudolph Agricola’, in The Transmission o f 
Culture in Early Modem Culture, ed. A. Grafton and A. Blair (Philadelphia, 1990), pp. 39-86; 
for a critique see, J. Monfasani, ‘Lorenzo Valla and Rudolph Agricola’, JHI, 28 (1990), pp. 181- 
200.
SM R. Agricola, De Inventione dialectica libri tres (Cologne, 1528; rpt. Hildesheim, 1976), pp. 
142-43. Book II is devoted to dialectic and the place of rhetorical invention in it. Agricola 
endorses the Stoic analogy of the difference between logic and rhetoric as that between the 
closed and the open hand. He thinks that rhetoric differed from logic only in that it presented 
more prettily and loosely what logic had demonstrated in a stricter fashion.
®95 Ramus is also obsessed with the idea of maintaining sharp boundaries between discrete 
subjects, an obsession that helps to explain the drive behind his programme of reform. See 
Attack on Cicero: Text and Translation o f Ramus’s Brutinae Quaestiones, ed. J.J. Murphy, tr.
C. Newlands (Davis, Ca., 1992), pp. 22,42.
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The domain of rhetoric in the Renaissance was truly enormous. As seen above, 
in the thinking of the period rhetoric is not limited to the three varieties 
traditionally associated with the art (by means of the formal situations in 
which it is practised): forensic rhetoric for the law courts, deliberative rhetoric 
for political discussions, and demonstrative or epideictic rhetoric for speeches 
of praise and blame. Rhetoric had already migrated into poetics in the Middle 
Ages, and the Renaissance continues to conflate the two, just as it follows the 
former period in conceiving letter-writing and preaching as branches of the 
art. What is more, many Renaissance writers take their cue from Aristotle and 
Cicero and do not limit rhetoric to formal speeches. Instead, they conceive of it 
in the widest terms as being present practically wherever communication and 
persuasion occur. In an insightful article on Renaissance culture, William J. 
Bouwsma has shown that the breakdown of boundaries between conceptual 
and social spheres generated both a certain cultural anxiety and a new 
freedom and mobility for individuals. ‘Renaissance rhetoric’, he says, ‘was ... 
valued for its plasticity, its ability to flow into and through every area of 
experience, to disregard and cross inherited boundaries as though they had no 
real existence, and to create new but always malleable structures of its own’.s*6 
Polymorphous and ubiquitous, therefore, rhetoric could serve practically all 
individuals and fit practically all situations as it blithely crossed boundaries 
among disciplines, professions, and social classes.
In the Renaissance rhetoricians were, in general, men striving to rise 
above the social stations they inherited at birth, an advancement that their 
talents and training were supposed to make possible. The acquisition of 
rhetorical (and other) skills in the process of education did enable many of 
them to gain positions, not just as schoolmasters, but as bureaucrats and 
legislators, notaries and lawyers, secretaries and courtiers. In other words, a 
training in rhetoric and the other liberal arts enabled people from the lower 
and middling classes to move up the social ladder and, in some cases, even to 
associate with the elite. What that training normally could not do, except in 
the rarest of instances, was to allow them to actually become part of the elite.
596 W. J. Bouwsma, ‘Anxiety and the Formation of Early Modern Culture’, in After the 
Reformation, ed. B. Malament (Philadelphia, 1980), pp. 215-46, at p. 234.
Comment [A2]:
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Sir Thomas More’s rise to the rank of Lord Chancellor is the exception that 
proves the rule. Renaissance rhetoricians, like the vast majority of those they 
trained, remained in the middle, above the bulk of the population (consisting 
of peasants and craftsmen), but distinctly below the nobles and merchant- 
magnates who ruled states and city-states throughout Europe.
The deeply conflicted desire for social advancement felt by most 
Renaissance men, surely lies behind their fantasies about the power of oratory, 
and their clear identification with ancient figures such as Demosthenes, 
Cicero, and, more revealingly, Caesar. Perhaps the most dramatic revelation of 
the orator’s ultimate powerlessness -  unless, of course, he was not already 
sovereign ruler -  is a simple historical fact, which rhetoricians seem unable to 
keep out of their works. For example, in his Foundation ofRhetorike, Richard 
Rainolde celebrates the eloquence of Cicero and Demosthenes as enabling 
their social advancement and even allowing them to rebuke tyrants. He adds, 
however, a section on how both ‘wer put to death’ on the order of tyrannical 
r u le r s .5 9 7  Rainolde, thus, acknowledges what every rhetorician in the 
Renaissance knew: Cicero may have been the king and consul of Rome 
because of his eloquence, but that fact did not prevent Mark Antony’s soldiers 
from murdering him and placing his severed head and hands on the rostra in 
the f o r u m .5 9 8  As such anecdotes show, Renaissance rhetoricians knew full well 
that they were dependent on the great and powerful, and that the political, 
legal, and military power of their rulers (whether kings or tyrants), constituted 
an absolute limit for them. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that faced with 
such a reality they would make exaggerated claims about the power of their 
art. Even though their intermittent complaints about mistreatment and low 
salaries, and their occasional references to Cicero’s death, expose those claims 
as the product of a compensatory fantasy.
597 R. Rainolde, Foundation ofRhetorike, xlviiiv.
598 when Antony, Lepidus, and Octavian met near Bologna in 43 BC to form the Second 
Triumvirate and decided to draw up proscription lists to get money to reward their troops, 
Antony demanded that Cicero’s name be put first. He was killed trying to escape to Greece to 
join the forces of Brutus and Cassius, and Antony had his hands and head cut off and nailed to 
the speaker's platform in Rome, from which Cicero had delivered many of his speeches against 
Antony (the so-called ‘Philippics’). See The Cambridge Biographical Encyclopedia, ed. D. 
Crystal, 2nd edn. (Cambridge, 1999); and C. W. Wooten, Cicero's Philippics and Their 
Demosthenic Model (Chapel HU1, NC, 1983).
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We have seen that in the ‘Machiavellian’ world of the Renaissance -  when 
traditional allegiances have been effaced, when propaganda is becoming an 
essential tool of the church, and monarchs recognise that their success as 
rulers depends in good measure on their ability to display power and 
magnificence in elaborate spectacles -  the art of rhetoric had become 
indispensable. However, as the critics of rhetoric insisted, much of the 
disorder of the contemporary world was also due to rhetoric. Its defenders, 
tried to re-establish order, not by banishing rhetoric altogether, but by using 
more rhetoric -  this time good rhetoric, to replace or drive out the bad. Yet, in 
the Renaissance (as in the modem world), medicine and poison are often 
indistinguishable. Put differently, rhetoric, characterised in such terms, is 
simultaneously both cure and disease.
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The rhetoric of reason:
Philosophy and rhetoric in Hobbes and Locke
I
Of the many philosophers and political theorists who have railed against 
rhetoric, Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) and John Locke (1632-1704) surely 
count as two of its staunchest opponents. In a well-known passage in his 
Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), Locke sets the arts of 
rhetoric at odds with the pursuit of knowledge. ‘[I]f we would speak of Things 
as they are’, he says, ‘we must allow, that all the Art of Rhetorick, besides 
Order and Clearness, ... are for nothing else but to insinuate wrong Ideas, 
move the Passions, and thereby mislead the Judgement; and so indeed are 
perfect chea t...’. Because of this, in ‘all Discourses that pretend to inform or 
instruct’ and ‘where Truth and Knowledge are concerned’, rhetoric is ‘wholly 
to be avoided’ and ‘cannot but be thought a great fault...’.599 Hobbes shares 
Locke’s distrust and, in De Cive (1642), he specifically denounces the 
practitioners of the Ars rhetorica as among the most dangerous enemies of 
social stability. For Hobbes, one reason why creatures such as ants and bees 
are capable of living sociably without government, while humans can never 
hope to do so, is that, ‘such animals lack that art of words by means of which 
good can be represented to the mind as better, and evil as worse, than is truly 
the case’.600 The corresponding passage in Leviathan (1651) is even more 
bitterly phrased. The ‘art of words’ is such that its advocates can ‘augment, or 
diminish the apparent greatnesse of Good and Evill’ whenever they like, 
‘discontenting men, and troubling their Peace at their pleasure’.601 In a similar 
vein, Locke remarks in the Essay that ‘If we consider, in the Fallacies, Men put
599 J. Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford, 1975), 
III.x.34, p. 508; emphasis added.
600 T. Hobbes, De Cive, ed. H. Warrender (Oxford, 1983), III.v.v., p. 133.
601 Id., Leviathan, Or The Matter, Forme, and Power o f a Common-Wealth Ecclesiasticall and 
Civill [1651], ed. R. Tuck (Cambridge, 1996), XVII, pp. 119-20.
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upon themselves, as well as others, and the Mistakes in Men’s Disputes and 
Notions, how great a part is owing to Words, and their uncertain or mistaken 
Significations, we shall have reason to think this no small obstacle in the way 
to Knowledge ...’.6oa Even though they did not always practice what they preach, 
we must take seriously Hobbes’s and Locke’s frequent statements against 
ornamentation and in favour of a plain, undogmatic style. They attacked 
scholastic language, appropriating and elaborating the humanist critique of 
scholasticism. Another target was the copious and highly ornamented language 
associated with Renaissance poetry and rhetoric.
In this chapter, I suggest that Hobbes’s and Locke’s arguments against 
rhetoric allow us to grasp why the art was thought to be so powerful in the 
field of civil philosophy. Both philosophers believe that rhetoric represents a 
dangerous threat to the basis of political life, and continually emphasise how 
citizens are often swayed by bad or false rhetoric into believing in false politics. 
In Behemoth or the Long Parliament, a set of dialogues written in the 1660s, 
Hobbes says he regards the interregnum as one of the nadirs of British history: 
a time when superstition, irrationality, hypocrisy and self-conceit reigned 
supreme. He blames two groups in particular for this poisonous intellectual 
climate: the Presbyterians and other ‘Fanatick Ministers’, and the ‘democratic 
gentlemen’ in the House of Commons. Despite always being a minority in the 
House, the rhetorical training of those MPs made them ‘great Haranguers’ and 
they were thus able to impose any amount of folly and vice on the majority and 
to win over and betray the common people. For Hobbes the same applies with 
even greater force in the case of the Presbyterians and their allies, whose ‘long 
practised Histrionick faculty preached up the rebellion powerfully’.6^  In the 
Preface to his Two Treatises o f Government (1689), Locke complains that the 
clergy have adopted Filmer’s absolutist doctrine and arrogated to themselves 
the role of teachers of civic ideas. Locke says they have ‘done the Truth and the 
Public wrong’ and we thus have ‘reason to complain of the Drum
602 Locke, Essay, III.ix.21, pp. 488-9.
603 j .  Hobbes, T. Behemoth or the Long Parliament, ed. F. Tonnies, 2 nd edn., intr. M. M. 
Goldsmith (London, 1969), p. 363. "To Hobbes’, as Quentin Skinner concludes, ‘the English 
revolution appears as a victory for the irrational but overwhelming power of neoclassical and 
antinomian rhetoric over the small power of science and rationality” (Reason and Rhetoric in 
the Philosophy o f Hobbes [Cambridge, 1996], p. 435).
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Ecclesiastick’, for ‘there cannot be done a greater Mischief to Prince and 
People, than the Propagating wrong Notions concerning Government’.60'* And 
in the Essay, Locke maintains that the ‘artificial Ignorance, and learned 
Gibberish’ of scholastic ‘Disputants’ or ‘all-knowing Doctors,’ had ‘prevailed 
mightily in these last Ages’ to mislead the citizenry.60*
For Hobbes and Locke, in short, times of political turbulence in their 
respective lifetimes appear as a victory for the irrational but overwhelming 
power of rhetoric. In this context, it is hardly surprising that, for them, the 
question of how to resolve the problem of rhetoric and language ambiguity 
remains one of the major tasks facing any civil philosophy worthy of the name. 
In the remainder of this chapter, which falls into two main parts -  dealing 
with Hobbes and Locke respectively -  I show how their main works exhibit a 
quasi-Platonic antagonism towards rhetoric. Like Plato in the Gorgias, Hobbes 
and Locke may also be said to uphold genuine truth against rhetoric’s 
apparent truth, the only difference being that for Plato the villains are the 
Sophists and for Hobbes and Locke, the scholastics and certain Puritan 
preachers. Again like Plato, neither Hobbes nor Locke condemn rhetoric tout 
court. Their animus is not directed against persuasion as a concomitant of 
instruction, but against the forensic temper which prizes success in verbal 
combat above responsibility to truth. I suggest not only that both philosophers 
use rhetoric to fight rhetoric, but that in their works two forms of persuasion, 
echoing Plato, are alluded to: (i) a rhetoric that produces persuasion in the 
absence of knowledge, and (ii) a genuine or ‘true’ art of rhetoric, the sort that 
produces knowledge (episteme) in the privileged sense.606
Notwithstanding the similarities of Hobbes’s and Locke’s animus towards 
rhetoric and rhetoricians there is, of course, a deep and significant difference 
in the two teachings. The bulk of Hobbes’s political writings, in Leviathan 
and elsewhere, is dedicated to the proposition that ‘the supreme power must 
always be absolute’.60*' The argument that it is necessary to obey the sovereign
604 J. Locke, Two Treatises o f Government, ed. P. Laslett (Cambridge, 1988), 31-51.
6o* Id., Essay, III.x.9, p. 495.
606 See, e.g., Plato, Gorgias, 454e; and Phaedrus, 269d. Also see ch. 2 above, esp. pp. 3 7 -5 9 -
6°7 Behemoth, p. 112.
155
(who must become the commonwealth’s final ‘Arbitrator or judge’608) and keep 
the peace -  no matter how inconvenient -  depends on the assumption that the 
alternative to obedience is general conflict. The only ‘true’ or ‘good’ rhetorician 
for Hobbes is, therefore, the absolute sovereign. For a radical such as Locke, 
Hobbes’s absolutism was repugnant, overriding as it necessarily did individual 
civil liberty. So it is hardly surprising that, in his view, any truly free and 
rational individual can -  at least in theory -  be a good rhetorician. This is 
clearly the kind of genuine rhetoric Locke expects from the people’s elected 
representatives. As Locke says in the Two Treatises, they ought to ‘freely act 
and advise, as the necessity of the Commonwealth, and the publick Good 
should, upon examination, and mature debate, be judged to require’.6** As I 
suggest in the second part of this chapter, Locke’s stress on honesty and 
boldness -  provided it is governed by impartial judgement -  contrasts sharply 
with the sycophantic rhetoric of courtiers, as well as with the delusive rhetoric 
of the scholastics and certain enthusiastic preachers. And his strand of 
theorizing constitutes an attempt to replace the culture of authoritarianism 
with a culture which emancipates citizens to follow reason. Locke took from 
the ‘new philosophy’ of Hobbes, Descartes and Malebranche an understanding 
of the need to suspend assent to any authoritative belief until it has been 
thoroughly examined. But he moves beyond anti-dogmatism, grafting a 
different notion of liberty onto it.6i° Put differently, Locke’s assault on *bad’ or 
‘false’ rhetoric goes hand in hand with his anti-Hobbesian view of liberty. He 
attacks the ars rhetorica, not in order to replace the ethical and legal norms of 
politics with an unscrupulous realpolitik, but in order to rescue a classical 
understanding of politics as deliberative co-operation among equals, which 
requires truthful and open discourse.
608 See The Elements o f Law Natural and Politic, ed. F. Tonnies, 2nd edn. (London, 1969), pp. 
90-1; Leviathan, V, pp. 32-3; VI, p. 39.
6<* Locke, Two Treatises, II.222.44-6.
610 According to Quentin Skinner, Locke’s understanding of civil liberty is ‘neo-roman’ (Liberty 
before Liberalism [Cambridge, 1998]). In the history of political thought, variants of this 
notion of liberty run from Aristotle to Karl Marx and beyond, and are in opposition to Hobbes’s 
version of negative liberty, which has served to underpin what may be termed liberalism and 
possessive individualism. Also see, C. B. Macpherson, The Political Theory o f Possessive 
Individualism: Hobbes to Locke (Oxford, 1962).
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II
One of the most important development in Hobbes scholarship in recent times 
has been the recovery of the centrality of rhetoric for the development of his 
political philosophy. Some scholars, like Leo Strauss, distinguish between a 
humanistic period (1608 to circa 1630) and a scientific period (1630 to 1679) in 
Hobbes.611 He famously contends that there is an apparent disjunction between 
the years leading up to Hobbes’s exposure to geometry, which are typically 
humanistic, and the years following his Euclidean ‘revelation’. In the early period 
-  exemplified by Hobbes’s translation of Thucydides’s Peloponnesian War6'2 -  
history is the source of knowledge; in the later, science (particularly geometry), is 
the basis of genuine knowledge. Other scholars, such as Miriam Reik and David 
Johnston, dismiss the presumed discontinuity between Hobbes’s humanist and 
scientific periods.613 They argue that Hobbes’s humanistic concerns did not 
disappear: his devotion to literature persisted, as in his end-of-the-life 
translations of Homer’s Iliad and Odyssey into English. In addition, they 
emphasise the implausibility of a forty-one-year-old philosopher totally breaking 
with his previously held ideas -  ideas held for over twenty years.
In the past decade, it is Quentin Skinner who has most substantially and 
notoriously explored the domain of rhetoric in Hobbes’s political philosophy. 
Skinner associates his argument with Johnston’s, and distinguishes it from 
that of Leo Strauss.61-* According to Strauss, Skinner tells us, Hobbes’s interest
611 It is important to note that even though Strauss states that Hobbes broke with his humanist 
past before he wrote any of his major works, he also argues that the essence of Hobbes's 
political theory derives from his humanist period. See his The Political Philosophy o f Hobbes: 
Its Basis and Its Genesis, tr. E. M. Sinclair (Chicago, 1952), pp. 27-9.
612 See Eight Bookes o f the Peloponnesian Warre Written by Thucydides ... Interpreted ...By  
Thomas Hobbes (London, 1629). In this work, Hobbes stressed that he had attempted to 
achieve ‘the highest standards of humanist textual scholarship’ (Skinner, Reason and rhetoric, 
p. 239). For information on the Thucydidean character of Hobbes’s mature philosophy see, 
Gabriella Slomp, ‘Hobbes, Thucydides and The Three Greatest Things’, HPT, 11:4 (1990), p. 
566; George Klosko and Daryl Rice, Thucydides and Hobbes’s State of Nature’, HPT, 6:3 
(1985), p. 405; and Clifford Brown, Jr., Thucydides, Hobbes, and the Derivation of Anarchy’, 
HPT, 8:1 (1987), pp. 5 3 -5 -
613 M. Reik, The Golden Lands o f Thomas Hobbes (Detroit, MI, 1977), esp. ch. 2; D. Johnston, 
The Rhetoric o f Leviathan: Thomas Hobbes and the Politics o f Cultural Transformation 
(Princeton, 1986), esp. ch. 1.
6u* Q. Skinner, ‘"Scientia Civilis” in classical rhetoric and in the early Hobbes’, in Political 
Discourse in Early Modem Britain, ed. N. Phillipson and Q. Skinner (Cambridge, 1993), pp. 
7 7 -8 .
157
in rhetoric was confined to his ‘humanist’ period, which ends with the 1620s. 
After this Hobbes returned to his youthful philosophical studies, made his 
epoch-making (if confusing) ‘discovery’ of geometrical method, and turned to 
the preoccupations characteristic of his ‘mature period’ as a political 
scientist.618 The main line of Skinner’s argument may be put quite simply. 
Hobbes began as a humanist who accepted, with most of his contemporaries, 
the importance of the ars retorica.6i6 But he came to reject the cornerstones of 
rhetorical practice: (i) to ‘start by securing so far as possible the goodwill and 
favourable attention of our audience’;61? (ii) to elicit ‘wise guidance in practical 
affairs ... from a study of history’,618 and (iii) the willingness to accommodate 
‘arguments to generally accepted beliefs and their expression in common 
speech’.61® This shift, which occurred in the 1630s, was caused by his discovery 
of the geometrical method, his pursuit of his scientific interests through his 
association with Sir Charles Cavendish and his friends, and his introduction to 
the Parisian scientific circle of Marin Mersenne. He now conceived philosophy 
(and politics as one of its parts), as a rigorous deductive science modeled on 
mathematics and the natural sciences, in which the linguistic devices of 
rhetoric had no place, and which, spurning eloquence, relied solely on the 
power of reason to teach the truth. The product of this stage was his two 
earliest political treatises, The Elements o f Law in 1640 and De Cive in 1642. 
Then with the publication in 1651 of Leviathan, Hobbes reversed his position 
again, claiming a distinction between moral and natural sciences and 
demonstrating that in the moral sciences eloquence must be employed as 
support for demonstrative reasoning. In this stage, which proceeded from his 
reflections on the experience of the English civil war,620 Hobbes came to
618 While this account of Strauss’s position correctly registers what he took to be a development 
of Hobbes’s method, it probably under-emphasise Strauss’s general argument, i.e., that this 
must not obscure some fundamental continuities. Thus Strauss argues that there was no 
change in the essential content of the argument and aim of Hobbes’s political philosophy from 
the introduction to his translation to Thucydides up to the latest works (Political Philosophy o f 
Hobbes, p. 112).
616 Skinner focuses on rhetoric, but he emphasises that the young Hobbes was extremely well 
versed in the other characteristically humanist disciplines, such as poetry and history (Reason 
and Rhetoric, pp. 215-49).
617 Ibid., p. 257.
618 Ibid., pp. 259-60.
6l® Ibid., p. 263.
620 Richard Ashcraft argues that not only is the Civil War to be understood as the background to
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acknowledge that reason by itself was incapable of persuading people of the 
truth or of making his own political ideas acceptable.621 Skinner tells us that as 
Hobbes came to believe that ‘interest’ could undermine reason, he ‘reverts to 
the humanist ideal of a union between rattio and orattio\ 622 And he did so in 
such a way that, according to Skinner, Leviathan is ‘a belated but magnificent 
contribution to the Renaissance art of eloquence’.62*
It is important to note, however, that neither the proponents nor the 
critics of the ‘break hypothesis’ maintain their position absolutely.62* Hobbes’s 
‘discovery’ of science involved both his abandonment of some previously held 
ideas and his retention of others. Strauss thus acknowledges that Hobbes’s 
focus upon the passions as motives of war (a question Thucydides had posed) 
established a ‘fundamental moral attitude’ which defined the ‘essential 
content’ of his later works. As the passions underlay war, so they would 
furnish (in ‘fear of death’) the motive for peace.62* Similarly Hobbes’s ‘post­
humanist’ break with Aristotle’s philosophy stood in contrast to a 
preoccupation with his rhetoric (which Hobbes described as ‘rare’) which 
spanned the 1630s and profoundly influenced his later writings.626 Even 
though Skinner presents Hobbes’s paraphrase of Aristotle’s Rhetoric627 as one 
of the main achievements of his humanism, he also acknowledges that the 
work is the earliest example of Hobbes’s ‘misgivings’ about eloquence. And a 
citation Skinner gives to illustrate Hobbes’s ‘sweeping attack’ on the intrinsic 
link between rhetoric and sedition, refers to Hobbes’s ‘Life of Thucydides’,
Hobbes’s political views, but that it shapes the substance of his political theory (‘Ideology and 
Class in Hobbes’ Political Theory’, PT, 6 [1978], pp. 27-62).
621 Skinner quotes from Leviathan’s A  Review and Conclusion’: ‘In all Deliberations, and in all 
Pleadings, the faculty of solid Reasoning is necessary: for without it the Resolutions of men are 
rash, and their Sentences unjust: and yet if there be not powerfull Eloquence, which procureth 
attention and Consent, the effect of Reason will be little’ (ibid., p. 352).
622 Ibid., p. 347.
62* Ibid., p. 4.
62* Thus Strauss speaks of a humanist essence that remains throughout Hobbes’s later political 
theory, while Reik and Johnston find new emphases and interests. Yet, Reik deems ‘the path 
that led from ... humanistic studies to political and scientific concerns ... a natural one for the 
seventeenth-century mind, just as it was natural then for a poet like Milton to write a textbook 
in logic as well as his poems’ (Golden Lands, p. 51).
625 Strauss, Political Philosophy o f Hobbes, pp. 42,108-13,170.
626 Ibid., pp. 35-43, 170. The emphasis on Aristotle is noted by Conal Condren, ‘On the 
Rhetorical Foundations of Leviathan’, HPT, 11 (1990), pp. 703-20.
627 Published anonymously as A Briefe o f the A rt o f Rhetorique in c. 1637. Text published in 
The Rhetorics o f Thomas Hobbes and Bernard Lamy, ed. J. Harwood (Carbondale, 111., 1986).
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written in 1629, i.e., before the about-face. Skinner himself is, of course, aware 
that Hobbes’s re-conversion to rhetoric in Leviathan is problematic: ‘He 
continues to harbour many of his earlier anxieties about its deceiving nature 
and its potentially pernicious effects on the proper conduct of public life’.628
My own position here owes most to Skinner’s, and yet I believe that his 
analysis might have benefited, had he not tried so hard to confine himself to a 
very narrow and indeed technical understanding of rhetoric. Skinner’s 
argument derived from his conception of rhetoric as ‘a distinctive set of 
linguistic techniques ... derived from the rhetorical doctrines of inventio, 
dispositio and elocutio, the three principal elements in classical and 
Renaissance theories of written eloquence’.628 However, rhetoric is more than a 
set of linguistic techniques -  it is also a culture, outlook, and philosophy. 
Skinner does acknowledge the broader meaning of rhetoric as more than 
rhetorical devices. He discusses argument in utramque partem, scepticism, 
and the ‘politics of eloquence’,153° as part of the rhetorical tradition. But in the 
Leviathan Hobbes continues to reject these aspects of the rhetorical tradition: 
he continues to view argument in utramque partem  as politically dangerous; 
he retains the scientific, non-rhetorical goal of demonstration in Leviathan;*** 
and he persists in his attack of the republican, and rhetorical, ideal of the vir 
civilis. Hobbes’s returns to rhetoric in Leviathan must, therefore, be further 
qualified because of Hobbes’s rejection of the non-stylistic elements of 
rhetoric.
I suggest that if we attend more to the philosophic response to the dangers 
posed by rhetoric for politics as set out, for example, in Plato’s Gorgias or even 
in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, we are more likely to arrive at a better understanding of 
why and how Hobbes moves from an view of politics in which rhetoric is
628 Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric, p. 343. Skinner chronicles the general expressions of 
hostility toward, and specific criticisms of the classical theory of eloquence contained in 
Leviathan (pp. 344-46). Hobbes ‘renews his attack on inventio’, ‘raises a number of doubts 
about rhetorical elocutio’, and assails rhetorical deliberation.
628 Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric, p. 6. This definition of rhetoric as a ‘set of linguistic 
techniques’ allows Skinner to argue more easily that Hobbes returned to rhetoric in Leviathan. 
In contrast to the anti-rhetorical Hobbes, who avoided the trappings of eloquence in The 
Elements and De Cive, Hobbes in Leviathan abandons ‘the severely scientific prose of The 
Elements’ for a ‘highly “ornamental” style’ and the use of omatus in Leviathan (ibid., p. 363).
63° That is, republican virtue as a rhetorical ideal.
63‘ Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric, pp. 335-36.
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condemned as a cause of civil strife, to his confidence in Leviathan that the 
internal causes of civil strife can be altogether eliminated. We can also show 
more conclusively that Hobbes’s very conception of civil science is based upon 
his understanding of rhetoric. I also hope to suggest that it is easy to 
exaggerate the tension between science and rhetoric to be found in Hobbes’s 
writings.632 The truth is, I think, that Hobbes’s politics always combined 
rhetoric and science, but that it took some time for his philosophy of science to 
acknowledge this fact and allow that science and rhetoric were reconcilable. 
Finally, I argue that it is in speech in general, and in the misuse of words, that 
Hobbes finds the sources of conflict and sedition. Put differently, his view of 
rhetoric as a danger to civil society is intimately related to his mistrust of 
language in general.
In all three of his political treatises Hobbes takes issue with Aristotle’s 
comparison of political man to other gregarious animals.633 He advances six 
objections to the tenet that man is by nature a political animal like the bees or 
ants. First, unlike bees, men compete for precedence and honor, and for the 
‘acknowledgment of wisdom’ which can be a source of honor, and thus fall into 
hatred and disputes. Second, man’s private good lies in being eminent in 
‘dominion, superiority, and private wealth’, and thus is not identical with the 
common good. Third, having high opinions of their own wisdom, men claim to 
invariably perceive defects in governments and devise schemes for altering 
them. Fourth, men (unlike bees634) possess the ‘art of words’ by which things 
can be made to appear better or worse than they actually are, and hence are 
able to ‘instigate one another to faction’. Fifth, men alone can quarrel over 
differing conceptions of right and wrong, and distinguish between ‘injury’ and
632 It seems to me that Johnston is guilty of exaggeration when he claims that Hobbes chose a 
scientific presentation of his politics in The Elements o f Law and was only converted to the 
uses of rhetoric in Leviathan (p. 61). At times, however, even Johnston finds himself reluctant 
to deny that Leviathan is a work of science or that The Elements o f Law  has flashes of 
eloquence. This undercuts his claim that a fundamental dilemma faced Hobbes’s political 
philosophy and that a choice had to be made between rhetoric and science.
633 EL, 1.19.5; De Cive, V.5; Leviathan, XVII, p. 111. Tom Sorell argues that, even though the 
essentials remain the same in all three political treatises, the presentation changes in De Cive 
and Leviathan (‘Hobbes’s Persuasive Civil Science’, PQ, 40:160 [1990], pp. 342-51).
634 in fact Aristotle argues in the Politics (125381-18) that it is precisely speech that 
differentiates men from bees. Politics for Aristotle is to a large degree contestation in words 
over doctrines of justice.
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mere ‘damage’. Finally, the union of men is artificial, while that of bees is 
natural.
It is important to note that four of the six human traits Hobbes puts 
forward as proof that men are naturally unsociable -  a principle which is 
essential to his civil science -  are associated with language. I believe this to be 
indicative of Hobbes’s concern with words and doctrines as sources of conflict 
and sedition. ‘The tongue of man’, Hobbes says, is a trumpet of war and 
sedition’.**8 This is true not only in the state of nature (which is characterised 
by an ‘anarchy of meanings’ as well as the absence of sovereign power**6), but 
also in the imperfectly constituted commonwealths whose experience, in his 
view, comprise most of history. In all his treatises on the nature of the state he 
conceives the task of civil science as one of reconstituting the state as artifice, 
by human will.**7 And the success of his project depends to a large extent on the 
correct application of language -  from the form of words in the founding 
covenant to the sovereign’s authority to promulgate right doctrine. It is also a 
precarious one, threatened at every stage by failure to reach agreement or 
abide by the rules established. And while Hobbes points to the persistence of 
private opinion (grounded in private passions) as the ultimate source of 
conflict, verbal disputes are its most common immediate and manifest 
cause.**8
Despite his extreme individualism and materialistic motivation, the 
Hobbesian man is not so much acquisitive as he is avid for power, honor, and 
preeminence.*** And Hobbes presents the manipulation of words as an 
important -  perhaps even the primary -  means to both of these ends. Men 
achieve power by persuading others to follow them or their cause; men achieve 
eminence through the reputation of cleverness or wisdom. In either case, 
disputes arise over differences of opinion, which may often be reduced to
63s De Cive, V.5.
**6 Sheldon Wolin, Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political 
Thought (Boston, i960), p. 257.
637 M. Oakeshott, Hobbes on Civil Association (Berkeley, CA., 1975), p. 7.
638 On the Hobbesian covenant as a “bypass of [private] political opinion’ see, Harvey C. 
Mansfield, Jr., ‘Hobbes and the Science of Indirect Government’, APSR, 65 (1971), pp. 97-110, 
at p. 100.
63* For an different view see, Macpherson, Political Theory o f Possessive Individualism. The 
place of ‘vanity* in the motivation of Hobbesian men is stressed most notably by Strauss, The 
Political Philosophy o f Hobbes, pp. 10-13.
162
differences over the meaning of words. Hobbes goes so far as to say that ‘all 
controversies’ stem from contradictory use of such appellations as 
meum/tuum, just/unjust, good/evil.640 He emphasises the danger in his own 
day not only of pernicious doctrines, but also of the impact and emotive 
overtones of a single word:
‘From the reading ... of such books, men have undertaken to kill their Kings, 
because the Greek and Latine writers, in their books, and discourses of Policy, 
make it lawfull, and laudable, for any man so to do; provided before he do it, 
he call him Tyrant. For they say not Regicide, that is, killing of a King, but 
Tyrannicide, that is, killing of a Tyrant is lawfull’.6*1
Hobbes’s England endured a ferocious civil war and a republic declared by 
Puritan regicides. Writing in an age of severe ideological conflict, he was one 
of the first modern political philosophers to stress again and again the force of 
words as political weapons. Words can both exacerbate conflicts of interest 
and generate new conflicts of principle with a momentum of their own. Yet, 
Hobbes admits that differences of opinion, which prevent cooperation or a 
natural union of men, are inevitable. This is a consequence of certain 
psychological mechanisms connected with the pleasure attached to honor:
‘[W]hen every man follows his own opinion, it is necessary that the 
controversies which rise among them, will become innumerable and 
indeterminable; whence there will breed among men, who by their own 
natural inclinations do account all dissension an affront, first hatred, then 
brawls and wars ...\6*2
This partly explains why Hobbes thinks that unrestrained liberty of opinion is 
incompatible with civil peace, and that ‘in the well-governing of opinions 
consisteth the well-governing of men’s a c t i o n s ’.6** His experience with civil war 
led him to conclude that, if chaos was to be avoided, knowledge had to be 
based on unequivocal foundations.6** On everyday concerns such as weather -  
do the clouds signify rain? -  there is no harm in uncertainty and diversity. But 
in religion and morals, Hobbes believes, epistemological uncertainty spells
640 De Cive, VI.9; cf. J. W. Watkins, Hobbes’s System o f Ideas (N.Y., 1968), p. 151
6*1 Leviathan, XXIX, p. 226.
642 De Cive, XVII.27.
*>*3 Leviathan, XVIII, p. 116.
644 See R. Ashcraft, ‘Ideology and Class in Hobbes’ Political Theory’, FT, 6 (1978), pp. 27-62. 
Ashcraft argues that the Civil War should be understood not only as the background to 
Hobbes’s political views, but that it shapes the substance of his political theory.
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social ruin. In these areas, it is necessary to have knowledge that can compel 
assent.6** The function of the sovereign, after wielding the ‘sword of justice’ 
and the ‘sword of war’, is to ‘make some common rules for all men, and to 
declare them publicly, by which every man may know what may be called his, 
what another’s, what just, what unjust, what honest, what dishonest, what 
good, what evil ..A6*6 The authoritative definition of all such politically 
sensitive or disputed terms is thus claimed as a prerogative of the sovereign in 
the state.647 In fact, before the establishment of sovereign authority there 
cannot even be said to have existed any common sense of such words, whose 
only public meaning, Hobbes maintains, ‘proceeds from the right of the 
magistrate’.6'*8 He nevertheless believes that philosophers such as himself (who 
follow ‘right reasoning’ and therefore practice ‘good’ rhetoric) have an 
important role to play. They may, for example, provide counsel to the 
sovereign when one exists, teach true principles in times of disturbance, and 
unmask fallacies or abuses of words and reasonings at all times. ‘In the right 
definition of names’, Hobbes says in Leviathan, ‘lies the first use of speech; 
which is the acquisition of science’.6** And from correct definitions proceeds 
correct political science, and thence, peace in the commonwealth. I shall turn 
later to Hobbes’ conception of science as one of the proper uses of language; 
first, I shall examine his criticisms of its various improper uses and the 
dangers thereby arising in society.
Hobbes lists various abuses of language. Men can speak passionately, or lie, 
or use language metaphorically, wresting words from their true signification 
‘either to adorn or deceive’, and using words as weapons ‘to grieve one another’. 
People may also speak without thinking, out of habit, or through reliance on
648 ‘For Hobbes, there was no philosophical space within which dissent was safe or permissible. 
... The aim of philosophy was the highest degree of certainty that could be obtained. ... The 
production of certainty would terminate disputes and secure total assent’ (S. Shapin and S. 
Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life [Princeton, 
1985], PP-107-08).
646 De Cive, VI.9. Watkins discusses the ways in which Hobbes anticipates modem linguistic 
philosophy, particularly with reference to Austin's account o f‘performatives’ (Hobbes's System 
o f Ideas, p. 153). Also see David R. Bell, ‘What Hobbes Does with Words’, PQ, 19 (1969), pp. 
1 5 5 -5 8 .
647 See Wolin, Politics and Vision, pp. 254-56, 259-60.
648 De Cive, XII.l.
649 Leviathan, VHI, p. 22.
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unexamined authority.6®0 For the most part these abuses seem to be perversions of 
legitimate functions of language. The principal such function is rational thought, 
including science, or the formation and communication of true or hypothetical 
propositions, and the prudential or probable knowledge that is derived from 
reflection on experience. Even though Hobbes claims that, in the end, all 
reasoning is at the service of the passions,6®1 he nevertheless maintains the 
possibility of exact and demonstrable science (geometry being the prototype), 
and of dispassionate, precise reasoning on any subject (given prior agreement 
on first principles). Corresponding to this use of language is a class of abuses that 
may be called errors or fallacies, which are more characteristic of the written 
word. The pernicious influence of dubious philosophical doctrines in religion and 
politics stands out as a major example of this kind of perversion.
Hobbes does acknowledge that speech is legitimately used to express certain 
passions, such as appetites (as in interrogation, requesting, prayer) and will (as in 
promising, threatening, and commanding). But he warns that speech functions 
like these may be easily transformed into perverted forms, such as instigation and 
appeasement or persuasion and exhortation beyond the limits of rational 
discourse.6®2 Hobbes calls this kind of abuse ‘passionate’ speech, which occurs 
when speech is immediately in the service of passions (especially of passions other 
than fear or prudence).6®® The principal danger of this sort of abuse lies in the 
spoken word, with eloquence appearing as a frequent villain.
If we look first at Hobbes’ theory of the passions6®* and language abuse, it 
is important to note that for him every word is a name that signifies a 
conception in the mind of the speaker. For him, words can only stand for our 
conceptions of things; all ‘names or appellations of things’, he already asserts 
in The Elements o f Law, consist of nothing more than ‘the voyce of a Man,
6®° De Homine, X.3; EL 1.5.14; De Cive, XVIII.4; Leviathan, IV, p. 19.
651 Leviathan, VIII, p. 46.
6®2 EL, 1. 13.6-7; cf. also Leviathan, VI, p. 38.
6®3 Strauss argues that, although all reason is in the service of passion, Hobbes can maintain a
notion of ‘right reason’ as reason in the service of the greatest passion, fear (The Political 
Philosophy o f Hobbes, p. 150; and id., Natural Right and History [Chicago, 1953], p. 201).
6®* The impact of Aristotle’s Rhetoric on Hobbes’s thinking is clear when he examines the 
character of the ‘affections’ in chapters 8 and 9 of The Elements o f Law. John Aubrey’s 
biography tells us that, ‘Even though Hobbes declares Aristotle to be ‘the worst teacher that 
ever was, the worst politician and ethick’, he nevertheless acknowledges that his Rhetoric was 
‘rare’” (‘Brief Lives’, chiefly o f Contemporaries, set down by John Aubrey, between the years 
1669 and 1696, ed. A. Clark, 2 vols. [Oxford, 1898], I, p. 357).
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arbitrarily imposed, for a mark to bringe to his minde some Conception 
concerning the thinge on which it is imposed’.^  The meaning of words, 
therefore, is not pre-existent. It is derived from our own arbitrary impositions: 
‘the first truths were arbitrarily made by those that first of all imposed names 
upon thing’.**6 If meaning is derived from each individual’s arbitrary 
impositions, it is also subject to the influence of his particular set of passions. 
Unfortunately, our passions often obstruct right reasoning, and thus Hobbes 
commonly refers to them as ‘perturbations of the mind’. ‘And therefore in 
reasoning’, he concludes in chapter 4 of Leviathan,
‘a man must take heed of words; which besides the signification of what we 
imagine of their nature, have a signification also of the nature, disposition, 
and interest of the speaker; such as are the names of Vertues, and Vices; For 
one man calleth Wisdome, what another calleth feare, and one cruelty, what 
another justice; one prodigality, what another magnanimity; and one 
gravity, what another stupidity, &c. And therefore such names can never be 
true grounds of any ratiocination’.6®7
In the absence of an objective basis for moral epithets, man (given the 
freedom) will define his terms subjectively, according to his passions. People’s 
diverse prejudices inevitably lead them to different conceptions of the same 
term: ‘For one man calleth Wisdome, what another calleth feare; and one 
cruelty, what another justice; one prodigality, what another magnanimity; 
and one gravity, what another stupidity, &c’.6®8 What is more, like Montaigne, 
he also thinks that our affections are in turn shaped by the power of custom 
and habit. In fact, Hobbes at times seems to regard this point as even more 
crucial to an account of how the same action can always be described in 
morally contrasting ways. ‘Ratio’, he maintains in The Elements o f Law, ‘now, 
is but Oratio, for the most part’, because ‘Custome hath so great a power, that 
the minde suggesteth onely the first word, the rest follow habitually5. His 
account of the laws of nature in De Cive stresses that differences in custom
656 EL, p. 18; cf. Leviathan, IV, p. 31: ‘[A]U names are imposed to signifie our conceptions.’
686 Thus, Hobbes explains, while it is true that ‘man is a living creature’, it is only true by virtue 
of our having imposed the name “living creature’ on a certain class of things (Elements o f 
Philosophy, 1.3.8, p. 36); Wolin, Politics and Vision, p. 246. This arbitrariness of science, as 
seen in the following section, makes geometry -  as opposed to experimentation and empirical 
observation -  the model of science.
667 Leviathan, IV, p. 31; cf. De Homine XII. 1.
6®8 Leviathan, IV, p. 31.
166
and individual sensibility will always affect the use of evaluative language.6®® In 
Leviathan he similarly observes that, ‘Good and Evill, are names that signifie 
our Appetites, and Aversions; which in different tempers, customes, and 
doctrines of men, are different’.660
This explains, in part, why Hobbes denies that the moral order can be 
viewed as an aspect of the order of nature. In all versions of his civil science he 
denies any suggestion that the virtues (and thus the laws of nature), can be 
treated as a part of the eternal harmony of things. The laws of nature, as 
Hobbes asserts most forcefully in chapter 15 of Leviathan, are improperly 
called laws. They are simply dictates of reason, i.e., prudential maxims 
referring to the achievement and preservation of peace.661 He is even more 
insistent about the impossibility of reaching general agreement about the 
correct judgements to be placed on individual actions or states of affairs.
One of the main problems of passionate speech, therefore, pertains to 
names of ‘inconstant signification’. The most dramatic instances of this 
invariable feature of experience and thinking are words (concepts, notions) such 
as ‘good’, ‘evil’ and related terms central to morals and politics and thus to civil 
science. While for Hobbes all language is, in a superficial sense, artificial and 
arbitrary,662 it is evaluative (as opposed to simple) ‘naming’ that preoccupies 
him most, since most disputes arise from such words. In chapter 6, he explains 
that these words have no objective qualities:
‘But whatsoever is the object of any mans Appetite or Desire; that is it, which 
he for his part calleth Good: And the object of his Hate, and Aversion, Evill; 
And of his Contempt, Vile, and Inconsiderable. For these words of Good,
6®« Leviathan, Ill.xxxi, p. 119.
660 Ibid., XV, p. 110.
661 Ibid., XV, p. 111. The problem for Hobbes, as seen below, is that we cannot turn these 
prudential maxims into Laws until we set up, by contract, the third party sovereign as coercive 
enforcer.
662 Hobbes was of course a nominalist. But his nominalism included an out-of-hand rejection of
all ‘referential’ or ‘object-word’ theories of meaning, i.e., all theories according to which the 
meanings of words are or could be given by reason or rationally derived from the ‘things’ 
themselves. On Hobbes’s nominalism and its implications for ethics and politics see, Gordon 
Hull, ‘Hobbes’s Radical Nominalism, Epoche, 11:1 (2006), pp. 201-23; G. K. Callaghan, 
‘Nominalism, Abstraction, and Generality in Hobbes’, HPQ, 18:1 (2001), pp. 37-56; J. W. N. 
Watkins, ‘Philosophy and Politics in Hobbes’, in Hobbes Studies, ed. K. C. Brown (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1965), pp. 255-57; id., Hobbes’s System o f Ideas (N.Y., 1968), esp. pp. 104-7, 144-50; 
and M. M. Goldsmith, Hobbes's Science o f Politics (NY, 1966), pp. 63-64. For background see,
D. Sepkoski, ‘Nominalism and constructivism in seventeenth century mathematical 
philosophy*, Historia Matkematica, 32:1 (2005), pp. 33-59.
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Evill, and Contemptible, are ever used with relation to the person that useth 
them: There being nothing simply and absolutely so; nor any common Rule of 
Good and Evill, to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves ....663
Due to such disagreements, Hobbes concludes, the names of the virtues and 
vices ‘can never be true grounds of any ratiocination’.66* This list may be 
extended to include the names of the passions themselves, each of which has 
two names, as ‘glory’, depending on one’s feelings, is equivalent to ‘pride’.6** 
Hobbes includes, in addition, names that depend on judgments about moral 
accidents, such as the contraries ‘democracy/anarchy’, ‘aristocracy & 
oligarchy’, and ‘monarchy & tyranny* -  which, Aristotle notwithstanding, 
signify not different things but conceptions differing according to the speaker’s 
passions.666 Such words, therefore, cannot be used for ratiocination. (And even 
then their lack of tangible referents renders them liable to inconstancy, or 
shifts of meaning under the influence of the passions.)
Hobbes disapproves of the use of omatus or rhetorical devices in 
reasoning on the same grounds: ‘[A]ll metaphors’, he writes in The Elements 
o f Law, ‘are (by profession) equivocal. And there is scarce any word that is not 
made equivocal by divers contextures of speech, or by diversity of 
pronunciation and gesture’.66? But is important to note that, unlike Plato, 
Hobbes does not condemn literary ‘adornments’ because they are mere 
appearances, imitations of reality.668 For him rhetorical devices are unsuitable, 
because they foster conceptual diversity and, ultimately, civil war. ‘... 
Metaphors, and senslesse and ambiguous words’, he says in Leviathan, are 
like ignesfatui; and reasoning upon them, is wandering amongst innumerable
“ 3 Leviathan, VI, p. 39; emphasis added.
664 Ibid., IV, p. 31.
“ s EL, 1.9.1
666 De Cive, VII.2.
“ ? Ibid., I.5.7, p. 16; cf.: De Corpore, 11.12: ‘every metaphor is by profession equivocal’. For 
Hobbes names can be univocal or equivocal (i.e., they may have precise or variable meanings), 
depending on how they are used. ‘[Fjor some use them properly and accurately for the finding 
out of truth; others draw them from their proper sense, for ornament or deceit’ (EL, I.5.7). This 
suggests that by equivocation Hobbes refers to variability of signification that is normally 
conscious, even intentional. Any word can be made equivocal (Ibid.), a fact that Hobbes 
attributes to the human faculty of quickness of mind, a peculiar verbal ability producing ‘those 
grateful similes, metaphors, and other tropes, by which both poets and orators have it in their 
power to make things please or displease...’ (I.10.4).
668 Plato, Republic, 6oia-c.
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absurdities; and their end, contention, and sedition, or contempt’.66* As seen in 
the previous chapter, such a rejection of ornatus was not unparalleled. In fact, 
there was a long tradition of hostility to the exaggerated use of highly 
ornamented and emotional speech even within the humanistic disciplines.6?* 
Hobbes’s attack on the use of rhetorical ornamentation is clearly indebted to 
that tradition. But Hobbes, especially in The Elements o f Law  and De Cive, 
seems to carry the repudiation of ornatus much further.6?1
Metaphor can of course be employed simply for ornamentation, although 
even in this case it can be dangerous. Hobbes gives the Bible as an example, 
which he insists must receive authoritative interpretation precisely because it 
contains so many metaphors.6?2 He says, for example, that the reader should be 
aware that ‘spirit’ and ‘inspiration’ are used metaphorically, while ‘Kingdom of 
God’ is not. But equivocation can also be used for deliberate political aims, and 
in this regard also Hobbes has concerns about the Holy Scriptures. He points 
out, for example, that the word ‘justice’ occurs frequently in the Greek and 
Latin versions, but that in English this is often subversively rendered 
‘righteousness’, ‘which few understand to signify the same, but take it rather 
for rightness of opinion’. 6?3
A more general problem of elaborate speech, which is usually based on 
equivocation, is elocutio. A summary of Hobbes’s position on this issue is 
found in the section on rhetoric on part II, chapter 8 of The Elements o f Law,
“ * Leviathan, VI, p. 36.
6?° Even the advocates of rhetoric conceded that in the case of scientific (and especially 
mathematical) reasoning, the techniques of powerful speaking are generally out of place. See, 
e.g., Thomas Wilson, The Arte ofRhetorique (n.p., 1554). In the early seventeenth century this 
argument was taken up by many English natural philosophers. See the excellent discussion in 
Barbara J. Shapiro, A  culture o f fact: England, 1550-1720 (Ithaca, N.Y., 2000), pp. 5, 29, 97, 
160-65; and Probability and Certainty in Seventeenth-Century England (Princeton, NJ, 
1983), pp. 227-66.
671 In his first two political treatises, as Skinner has shown, Hobbes denounces the very 
presence of ornatus in expository prose -  both in the natural sciences and in the studia 
humanitatis. Since scientia civilis is a science, he insists we have no need to supplement its 
findings with the techniques of persuasion. In addition, Skinner argues that when Hobbes 
launches his vicious attacks on elocutio and ornatus, his main target were Renaissance 
humanists. In fact, he maintains that one of Hobbes’s fundamental objectives in The Elements 
o f Law and De Cive is to discredit and replace the Renaissance ideal of a union between reason 
and rhetoric, and thus between science and rhetoric. See Reason and Rhetoric, esp. pp. 250- 
56, 294-302; cf. ibid., pp. 250-93 (Hobbes’s rejection of eloquence); and pp. 294-326 
(Hobbes’s scientific style).
6?2 Leviathan, XXXIV and XXXV, pp. 257, 264,269.
6?3 Behemoth, pp. 242-43.
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where he complains that orators not only ‘derive what they would have to be 
believed from somewhat believed already, but also by aggravating and 
Extenuations make good, and bad, right and wronge, appeare greate or lesse, 
according as it shall serve their tumes’. Such techniques, Hobbes regrets, can 
have a remarkable ‘moving’ effect:
‘Such is the power of Eloquence, as many tymes a man is made to believe 
thereby, that he sensibly feeleth smart and dammage, when he feeleth none, 
and to enter into rage and indignation, without any other Cause, than what is 
in the words and passions of the Speaker’.6?*
Hobbes, therefore, launches a particularly vicious attack on the orator’s most 
powerful weapon: his ability to manipulate the (fickle) emotions of his 
audience and moving them to accept his point of view. ‘Eloquence’, he 
concludes, ‘is nothing else but the power of winninge beliefe of what we say, 
and to that end we must have Aide from the passions of the Hearer’.6?s Hobbes, 
therefore, is vehemently against speeches in which ‘a metaphorical use of 
words [is] fitted to the passions’, and that aim at victory rather than truth.6?6
Such eloquence, he emphasises, is particularly dangerous in assemblies of 
men, where becomes a weapon in the competition for eminence.6?? In fact, his 
criticisms of collective counsel as susceptible of kinds of oratorical imprudence 
to which the councillors separately would not be subject,6?8 and of democracy 
as a contentious ‘aristocracy of orators’,6?9 are based on his observations of the 
readiness with which public speaking departs from the proper ‘rational’ 
function of words. It is all too easy, he stresses in The Elements o f Law, for 
powerful orators to rouse and move the passions of their hearers in such a way 
as ‘to inclyne and sway the assembly to their owne ends’.680 ‘Impudence in
6?4 EL, p. 177. The same argument is reiterated in De Cive: The gift of eloquence lies in being 
able to make good and evil, expedient and inexpedient, honourable and dishonourable appear 
to be greater or less than they are in fact, and in being able to make injustice appear to be 
justice (X.xi, pp. 177-78). For an excellent analysis of elocutio, including a detailed account of 
the techniques used by Renaissance humanists to ‘amplify’ their arguments see, Skinner, 
Reason and Rhetoric, esp. pp. 47-51,55-65,138-39,181-82.
6?s EL, p. 177; cf. De Cive, Xll.xii, p. 193.
676 De Cive, XII.12. Where Quintillian presents the ideal of the vir civilis as pleader for the 
truth, Hobbes argues that the ‘goal of eloquence, as all the masters teach, is not the truth but 
victory, so that truth is only attained by accident’ (Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric, p. 265).
677 De Cive, X. 11.
6?8 Leviathan, V, p. 30.
6?« EL, II.2.5.
680 Ibid., p. 120.
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democratical assemblies’, Hobbes adds in Behemoth, ‘does almost all that is 
done ... it is the goddess of rhetoric, and carries proof with it’. ‘For what 
ordinary man’, he concludes, will not, from so great boldness of affirmation, 
conclude there is great probability in the thing affirmed?’681 In this context, 
Hobbes is adamant about the fact that the most likely result from the 
eloquence of demagogues (who invariably compete to flatter the vanity of their 
audiences), are reckless and dangerous policies:682
‘For a man that reasoneth with himself, will not be ashamed to admit of 
timorous suggestions in his business, that he may the stronglier provide; but 
in public deliberations before a multitude, fear (which for the most part 
adviseth well, though it execute not so) seldom or never showeth itself or is 
admitted’.688
Hobbes, therefore, equates this type of eloquence with sedition. In fact, in all 
his political treatises he holds that it was ‘bad’ or ‘false’ rhetoric joined with 
lack of judgment or wisdom which fomented sedition. In The Elements o f 
Law, for example, Hobbes says that ‘when eloquence and want of judgment go 
together, want of judgment, like the daughters of Pelias, consenteth, through 
eloquence, which is the witchcraft of Medea, to cut the commonwealth in 
pieces’.68* And in De Cive, he emphasises that eloquence devoted to truth (i.e. 
‘good’ rhetoric) is almost always linked to wisdom, while eloquence aiming at 
victory (i.e. ‘bad’ or ‘false’ rhetoric) rarely is. He admits that each form has its 
use -  the former in deliberation, the latter in exhortation. But as seen earlier, 
the danger is that foolish or wicked men will use exhortation, rather than 
deliberation in counsel and in assemblies.688
In A Dialogue Between a Philosopher and a Student o f the Common Laws 
o f England, Hobbes points to another area where eloquence contributes to the
681 Behemoth, p. 250.
682 This is one example of one of he many lessons that Hobbes drew from Thucydides. Skinner
says that when he published his translation of Thucydides, ‘he appended an introductory essay 
[‘On the Life and History of Thucydides’] pointing with obvious admiration to the fact that 
Thucydides had despised and detested the public assemblies of his day* (Reason and Rhetoric, 
p. 229). Skinner has shown that the essay takes the form of a classical forensic oration (genus
iudiciale) in defence of the historian’s achievement (ibid., esp. pp. 244-49).
683 ‘On die Life and History of Thucydides’, in Hobbes’s Thucydides, ed. R. Schlatter (New
Brunswick, 1975), p. xvi. Hobbes says that he translated Thucydides to show the English the 
dangers of flatterers and wicked, foolish men who used eloquence to arouse the passions of 
assemblies and lead them into folly (pp. 12-3).
68* EL, p. 178; cf. Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric, pp. 300 ff.
688 De Cive, p. 139.
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ambiguity of words. For example, his attack on the common law (and his 
preference for clearly defined statute law), is partly to do with the prevalence 
of equivocation in pleadings. This arises, in turn, not. only because of the 
vagueness of common law terminology, but also because of the lawyer’s vested 
interest in suits, which induces him to try to ‘wrest the sense of words from 
their true meaning’, and to cultivate a ‘faculty of rhetoric to seduce the jury, 
and sometimes the judge also...’.686 More alarmingly still, political 
controversies feed on the disputatious habits of lawyers, whose profession 
teaches them ‘the art of cavilling against the words of a statute’.68?
In Behemoth, Hobbes launches an attack on the disorders caused by the 
preaching of the itinerant friars of an earlier age, and compares them to the 
Puritan preachers of his own day. He claims such disorders are inevitable 
when private men exercise the liberty of public speaking without license from 
the state. Hobbes believes this to be an invitation to sedition -  and one which 
is unique to Christendom. ‘The heathen kings’, he concludes, ‘foresaw, that a 
few such orators would be able to make a great sedition’.688 Significantly, 
Hobbes describes this kind of religious man in terms of their histrionics, their 
ability to feign inspiration, and their knowledge of how, in speaking, to play on 
the fears and interests of their audience.68*
But rhetoric is a hazard not only of spoken language, nor are Parliament 
and the law courts the only institutions that Hobbes finds guilty of uncritical 
speech. Written discourse also presents dangers, and in this regard, his 
favourite target were the universities and the school philosophy they taught.6*0 
The dogmdid6*» (by contrast to the mathematics), err in starting from
686 A Dialogue Between a Philosopher and a Student o f the Common Laws o f England, ed. J. 
Cropsey (Chicago,i97i), pp. 6-71.
687 Ibid., p. 45.
688 Behemoth, p. 183.
68* Ibid., pp. 193-96.
In his verse Vita, Hobbes recalls the scholastic curriculum with unmixed contempt. See T. 
Hobbes, Vita Carmine Expressa, in Opera Philosophica, ed. W. Molesworth (London, 1839), I, 
pp. lxxxvi-lxxxvii, lines 33-50.
6*‘ The dogmatici are said to put forward their opinions with passion (EL, 1.13.4), like the 
adherents of the various Greek philosophic schools. Of whom Hobbes says: "Their Moral 
Philosophy is but a description of their own Passions;... they make the Rules of Good and Bad, 
by their own Liking and Disliking: By which means, in so great diversity of *tastes,* there is 
nothing generally agreed on; but every one doth (as far as he dares) whatsoever seemeth good 
in his owne eyes, to the subversion of Common-wealth’ (Leviathan, XLVT, p. 461).
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unexamined custom or literary authority. Those who talk about ‘right and 
wronge, good and bad’, as Hobbes says in The Element o f Law, are largely 
content to adopt the opinions ‘of such as they admire, as Aristotle, Cicero, 
Seneca, and others of like authority’. However, these authors have merely 
‘given the names of right and wronge as their passions have dictated; or have 
followed the authority of other men, as we doe theires’.692 The controversial 
forty-sixth chapter of Leviathan (‘Of Darkness from Vain Philosophy and 
Fabulous Traditions’), is at the heart of his critique of the universities. The 
chapter has been shown to be a satirical riposte to a well-established academic 
genre (favoured particularly by Presbyterian authors) praising the antiquity, 
utility, and necessity of the schools.6?3 The ‘Schoolmen’ are also mocked in 
chapter 5, because they ‘take the habitual discourse of the tongue for 
ratiocination’, and proceed without ‘any evident demonstration’:
‘in any business, whereof a man has not infallible Science to proceed by; to 
forsake his own naturall judgement, and be guided by general sentences read 
in Authors, and subject to many exceptions, is a signe of folly, and generally 
scorned by the name of Pedantry*.6**
In chapter 47, Hobbes puts forward several points to reveal who benefits from 
obscurity of language and thought. In the twelfth and final point, he accuses
‘the Metaphysiques, Ethiques, and Politiques of Aristotle, the frivolous 
Distinctions, barbarous Terms, and obscure Language of the Schoolmen, 
taught in the Universities, (which have been all erected and regulated by the 
Pope’s authority,) serve them to keep these Errors from being detected, and 
to make men mistake the Ignis fatuus of Vain Philosophy, for the Light of the 
Gospell’.6?3
Three of the four causes of ‘spiritual darkness’ are doctrines maintained 
through scholasticism: erroneous interpretation of Scripture, the admixture 
with religion of erroneous philosophy, and ‘fained, or uncertain History’.6?6 In 
Behemoth, Hobbes argues that the hopeless incomprehensibility and
692 EL, p. 177.
693 See R. Seijeantson, ‘“Vaine philosophy:” Thomas Hobbes and the Philosophy of the
Schools’, in The Philosopher in Early Modem Europe, ed. C. Condren (Cambridge, 2006), ch. 
5. He also sheds light on one of the key issues in the history of early modern philosophical 
personae: how a self-conscious ‘novator’ such as Hobbes positioned himself in relation to the 
dominant late Aristotelian philosophical culture of the universities.
694 Leviathan, V , p. 37.
696 Ibid., XLVII, p. 477; emphasis added.
696 Ibid., XLIV, p. 418.
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contentiousness of Roman Catholic doctrine is due to its assimilation of 
Aristotelian teachings of the sort perpetuated at the universities. Philosophy is 
said to be a salve for ‘a great many absurd articles ... which ... they thought fit 
to have believed, because they bring, some of them profit, and others 
reverence to the clergy, even to the meanest of them’.6^  In general, as Hobbes 
concludes in The Elements o f Law, all theological controversies involve ‘words 
some of them without meaning, and nothing but the canting of Grecian 
sophisters’.6*8 More alarmingly still, the universities promote subversive 
political doctrines:
‘Studying Greek and Latin, [men] became acquainted with the democratical 
principles of Aristotle and Cicero, and from the love of their eloquence fell in 
love with their politics, and that more and more, till it grew into the 
rebellion’.6**
These philosophers -  ‘Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Seneca, Plutarch, and the rest of 
the maintainers of the Greek and Roman anarchies’?00 -  are guilty of making 
the meaningless verbal distinction between ‘Kings’ and ‘Tyrants’ which 
Hobbes is so at pains to expose.?01 Moreover, the universities instill into their 
students not merely erroneous doctrine, but also (and equally insidiously) an 
overrated sense of their own wisdom, conducing to the dangerous habit of 
political criticism:
‘For it is a hard matter for men, who do all think highly of their own wits, 
when they have also acquired the learning of the university, to be persuaded 
that they want any ability requisite for the government of a commonwealth, 
especially having read the glorious histories and the sententious politics of 
the ancient popular governments of the Greeks and the Romans ...\?02
Hobbes, therefore, was a savage critic of the medieval tradition of Aristotelian 
metaphysics and natural philosophy, and of the Catholic theology that relied 
so heavily on ‘Vain Philosophy*.
These attacks on erroneous or absurd doctrines bring Hobbes’s final 
category of language abuses -  that pertaining to the use of ‘words
^ 7  Behemoth, p. 215.
^  EL, 11.6.9.
699 Behemoth, p. 218.
700 j ) e  a v e i  jai.3.
701 Leviathan, XXIX, p. 214; XLVI, p. 447.
?02 Behemoth, pp. 192-93.
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insignificant’ and words for ‘feigned things’, i.e., words which, though uttered, 
do not signify any coherent conception in the mind, and words which, though 
significant, do not refer to any ‘something’ in the w o r ld .703 Words for ‘feigned 
things’ are clear mental conceptions arrived at through the faculty of 
‘compound imagination’, but which do not correspond to any real object:
‘as when from the sight of a man at one time, and of a horse at another, we 
conceive in our mind a Centaure. So when a man compoundeth the image of 
his own person, with the image of the actions of an other man; as when a 
man imagins himselfe a Hercules, or an Alexander, (which happeneth often 
to them that are much taken with reading of Romants) it is a compound 
imagination, and properly but a Fiction of the mind’.704
Hobbes suggests that words like ‘democracy’ (under whose influence he saw 
his seditious contemporaries acting), are perhaps significant only of 
conceptions imaginatively generated through the association of a variety of 
images. In contrast to these, are words which are strictly insignificant or non­
sensical, even lacking a coherent mental conception, but which are 
nevertheless used to the detriment of used to the detriment of civil peace. A 
contradiction such as ‘round Quadrangle’ falls into this category of ‘senseless 
speech’ that Hobbes calls absurdity.7°s So does the logical error of treating an 
abstraction (i.e., a class of accidents) as if it were a body -  as is done when one 
says (as Roman Catholics do) that ‘faith’ is ‘infused’. Another example of this is 
the case of the common lawyers, who reject the definition of law as command, 
and seek an alternative definition in ‘natural reason’, ‘universal reason’, or 
especially “legal reason’. They define ‘legal reason’ as the ‘artificial perfection 
of reason, gotten [by lawyers] by long study, observation, and experience’. But 
for Hobbes the concept is unintelligible: ‘There is no reason in earthly 
creatures, but human reason’.706
Hobbes’ favorite example of a senseless word, however, is ‘Ghost’, which 
‘signifieth nothing, neither in heaven, nor earth, but the Imaginary inhabitants
7°3 De Corpore, 11.6.
704 Leviathan, II, p. 16. Hobbes suggests that words like ‘democracy’ (under whose influence he 
saw his seditious contemporaries acting), are perhaps significant only of conceptions 
imaginatively generated through the association of a variety of images.
7°s Ibid., IV, p. 26; V, p. 34.
706 Dialogue, pp. 122,22.
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of mans brain’.?0? For him ghosts are mere verbal absurdities, and alleged 
experience of them is ascribed to various freaks of sensation coupled with 
ignorance. Yet, people seem to have a strong inclination to absurdities of this 
sort. Their natural curiosity, aided by imagination, leads them to seek causes, 
but their ability to account for everything materially is limited. Meanwhile, 
phantasms occurring in dreams or in ‘hallowed places’ at night (though in fact 
nothing but motions in the brain?08) are taken for subsisting things -  especially 
by guilty, fearful, or superstitious men -  and identified as ghosts.?0* And from 
the belief in ghosts there arises a ‘Ghostly Authority’ to challenge the civil 
sovereign:
‘working on mens minds, with words and distinctions, that of themselves 
signifie nothing, but bewray (by their obscurity) that there walketh (as some 
think invisibly) another Kingdome, as it were a Kingdome of Fayries, in the 
dark’.?10
Interestingly, Hobbes’s system appears depends on a ‘disenchantment’ of the 
world, because otherwise the fear of violent death would remain secondary to 
the fear of ghosts, and the sovereign edifice would crumble. Thus, he 
concludes that fear of other men is commonly greater than that of ‘Spirits 
Invisible’.?11 Still, certain political actors can exploit the strong inclination that 
common people seem to have to believe absurdities of this sort. For example, 
the belief in ghosts that produced gentile demonology was exploited by the 
Roman Catholic priesthood to justify their ritual practice.?12
Hobbesian science, as I try to show in the following section, is directed 
with full force against all the mythical, customary, and symbolic elements 
which, although once necessary foundations for states, he regards in the 
present as hindrances to peace. But even though Hobbes exposes the greater 
part of such elements as resting on various kinds of language abuse, he
?°? Leviathan, XXXIV, p. 273.
7°s The sort that may be caused by a blow to the eye, refracted light, visual error, or day­
dreaming (Ibid., XLV, pp. 418, 447-48; EL, I.11.5). Note that Hobbes uses ‘phantasms’ as 
generally equivalent to ‘images’ in the mind, the source of which is always physical and 
external, and which usually but not always reflect an external body.
7°9 De Corpore, XXV.9.
710 Leviathan, XXIX, p. 226.
711 Ibid., XIV, p. 99. Yet elsewhere Hobbes contradicts himself, conceding that the civil 
authority will always be troubled by the claims of a spiritual party, “because the fear of 
Darkness, and Ghosts, is greater than other fears’ (XXXIX, p. 227).
712 Ibid., II, p. 18; XLV, pp. 448-49.
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nevertheless cannot offer any reasons to believe that their force among people 
is subsiding.
Ill
In the present section I wish to analyse two Hobbesian prototypes of the 
correct use of language, which stand as counterparts to the perversions 
discussed above: counsel and science. It is in chapter 25 of Leviathan that 
Hobbes discusses the question of counsel. He begins by distinguishing it from 
both command and exhortation. Command he defines as imperative speech 
addressed to someone by a an individual who expects that his will to have 
something done is sufficient reason for the thing to be done.™  Hobbes also 
says that commands are issued for the benefit of the ones doing the 
commanding. By contrast, counsel is imperative speech accompanied by 
reasons why acting on the speech is for the benefit of the one addressed. It is 
should be imparted,
‘as significant and proper language, and as briefly, as the evidence will permit. 
And therefore rash, and  unevident Inferences; ... obscure, confused, and  
am biguous Expressions, also all m etaphoricall Speeches, tending to the 
stirring  up o f  Passion, (because such reasoning, and such expressions, are 
usefull onely to deceive, or to lead him we Counsell towards other ends than 
his own) are repugnant to the Office o f  a Counsellour'
Exhortation is said to be a perverted kind of counsel, because it is counsel that 
is vehemently pressed for the honour or glory of having one’s advice 
followed.™  Counsel, given that it is imperative speech, is essentially 
prescriptive. But it can also be backed by reasons or reasoning -  so it has 
something in common with scientific speech. In fact, Hobbes regards counsel 
as an exemplar of legitimate speech because it is simply an extension of the 
rational faculties, enlarging the ruler’s experience and assisting in his 
reasoning from cause to effect, and from end to means.?16 Counsel thus 
understood presupposes the absence of passion or interest on the part of the
Leviathan, XXV, p. 176. 
Ibid., pp. 179-80.
7« Ibid., XXV, p. 177.
7l6 Ibid., XXV, p. 179.
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counsellor. The end of counsel is the benefit of the ruler of whose reason the 
counsellor is an extension.
Because in practice no counsel can ever be entirely free of passion, this is 
an merely an ideal.™ What purports to be counsel readily shades over into its 
perverted, ‘vehement5 counterpart, exhortation or dehortation. These, while 
attempting to maintain the appearance and forms of ratiocination, are 
varieties of illicit ‘passionate speech5:
‘And therefore they have in their speeches, a regard to the common Passions, 
and opinions of men, in deducing their reasons; and make use of Similitudes, 
Metaphors, Examples, and other tooles of Oratory, to perswade their Hearers 
of the Utility, Honour, or Justice of following their advice’.?18
Hobbes argues that proffering unwanted advice, such as Parliament directed 
at an unwilling king, amounts to exhortation, and in this form it is prohibited 
by the law of nature.?1* Giving false ‘counsel5 may, in addition, be motivated by 
the counsellor's self-interest. But it may also be pressed on an unwilling ruler, 
because -  as with public speaking in general -  it is a source of honour. ‘To 
hearken to a mans counsell, or discourse of what kind soever, is to Honour; as 
a signe we think him wise, or eloquent, or witty5.?20 In fact, it is because of 
men's vanity and passions that Hobbes denies the possibility of ‘good5 or 
genuine counsel being given to a multitude:
‘[T]he passions of men, which asunder are moderate, as the heat of one 
brand; in Assembly are like many brands, that enflame one another 
(especially when they blow one another with Orations) to the setting of the 
Common-wealth on fire, under pretence of Counselling i t . ... [TJhere cannot 
be an Assembly of many, called together for advice, wherein there be not 
some, that have the ambition to be thought eloquent, and also learned in the 
Politiques; and give not their advice with care of the businesse propounded, 
but of the applause of their motley orations, made of the divers colored 
threds, or shreds of Authors ...5.?21
It is for this reason that Hobbes suggests that a sovereign listen to counsellors 
separately and never in an assembly. So even though he offers counsel as a 
type of rational speech or ‘good rhetoric5, he at the same time emphasises its
?*? EL, 11.5.4.
?l8 Leviathan, XXV, pp. 177-78.
?l« EL, 1.17.8.
?20 Leviathan, X, p. 64.
?21 Ibid., XXV, pp. 181; cf. EL 11.5.4.
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tendency to degenerate into its opposite.
It is important note that although Hobbes never identifies the tenets for 
sovereigns and subjects in his treatises as pieces of counsel, they nevertheless 
appear to meet the prescriptions given in chapter 25 of Leviathan. When 
Hobbes tells rulers to exercise to the full the rights of sovereigns, or when he 
names reluctance to exercise sovereignty as one of the causes of the 
dissolution of the state, he is clearly issuing the imperative: ‘Exercise no less 
power than peace requires!’ The imperative is not issued by Hobbes merely for 
his own benefit; and the reasons given for it certainly establish the benefit to 
the commonwealth which the sovereign personifies. The reasons Hobbes gives 
are, therefore, the kind that are supposed to accompany a piece of counsel. 
What is more, the counsel is not vehemently pressed. It is put to the ruler in a 
book largely composed of passionless, syllogistic speeches or demonstrations. 
The science on the basis of which he thinks that Sovereigns should act is, 
therefore, Hobbesian civil science. Similarly, the imperative ‘Obey the law!’ 
that Hobbes addresses to subjects or citizens, was put to his readers in books 
of cool, impersonal demonstrations. That, too, was substantiated by reasons 
why it was beneficial for subjects or citizens to follow the law. Now, it seems to 
me that classifying the advice in Hobbes’s political treatises as counsel enables 
us to resolve the tension that otherwise exists in his writings between the 
concepts of reason and eloquence. Moreover, what else but counsel could have 
come more naturally from a man who throughout his life earned his keep as a 
personal and political counsellor?
One of Hobbes fundamental aspirations in all his treatises on the nature of 
the state is to construct a genuine civil science or, as he puts it in Leviathan, 
‘the science of Vertue and Vice’.?22 His conception of what science should be is 
most eloquently expressed in his critique of Thomas White’s De mundo:
‘It is necessary that Philosophy [i.e. science] should be treated logically. For the 
goal of students of Philosophy is not to move the emotions but to know with 
certainty. So Philosophy has nothing to do with Rhetoric. Moreover the goal is to 
know the necessity of consequences and the truth of universal propositions. So 
Philosophy has nothing to do with history. Much less has it anything to do with
722 Leviathan, XVI, p. 111.
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Poetry; which narrates individual events, and in addition professedly neglects the 
truth’ .7*3
Hobbes says in the Leviathan that such a science is needed because, ‘neither 
Plato, nor any other Philosopher hitherto, hath put into order, and 
sufficiently, or probably proved all the Theoremes of Morall doctrine, that men 
may learn thereby, both how to govern, and how to obey In De Corpore, 
Hobbes speaks with a surprising amount of confidence of the contrast between 
his own knowledge of moral theory and the mere opinions held by ancient 
philosophers on the same subject.^ There were ‘no philosophers natural or 
civil among the ancient Greeks, even though there were men so called’. ‘If we 
think of civil philosophy as a genuinely scientific subject, then it is ‘no o lder... 
than my own book De Cive’s26 Science for Hobbes was not mere dispassionate 
knowledge.72? ‘[T]he Science of Naturall Justice’, he says in the Leviathan, ‘is 
the onely Science necessary for Sovereigns, and their principall Ministers ...\728 
Hobbes’s experience with civil war led him to conclude that, if chaos was to be 
avoided, knowledge had to be based on unequivocal foundations.72? What 
makes knowledge unequivocal is, in his view, human imposition. Hobbes, 
therefore, creates an epistemology and a civil science that, despite having their 
source in nature, achieve their legitimacy through convention, i.e., through 
human construction.^0 Accordingly, all human thinking originates in nature, 
manifested in sense impressions. ‘[T]here is no conception in a mans mind’,
723 Critique du ‘De mundo’ de Thomas White, ed. J. Jacquot & H. Whitmore (Paris, 1973), p. 
107; cited in Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric, pp. 262-63.
724 Leviathan, XXXI, p. 254.
72s The Latin version first appeared in 1655, the English translation in 1656; see H. Macdonald 
and M. Hargreaves, Thomas Hobbes (London, 1952), pp. 41-2.
726 Elements o f Philosophy. The First Section, Concerning Body, in English Works,, I, p. ix. It 
is in The Elements o f Law  that Hobbes first announces that he has discovered the true and only 
foundations for a science of justice and policy (EL, pp. xv, xvi; cf. De Cive, p. 76). In the 
Leviathan he declares that his conclusions in that treatise ‘concerning the Morall Vertues’ are 
‘evident Truth’ (XXVI, p. 191), and that he has ‘sufficiently or probably proved’ the full range of 
the theorems relating to ‘the Science of natural Justice’ (XXXI, p. 254).
727 The usefulness of knowledge is, of course, a Baconian theme. For more information see, S. 
Gaukroger, Francis Bacon and the Transformation o f Early-Modern Philosophy (Cambridge, 
2001); J. Leary, Jr., Francis Bacon and the Politics o f Science (Ames, Iowa, 1994); and J. 
Martin, Francis Bacon, the State and the Reform o f Natural Philosophy (Cambridge, 1992).
728 Leviathan, XXXI, p. 254.
729 Hobbes’s supposedly unequivocal theory of knowledge is, of course, meant to replace the 
rhetorical epistemology (exemplary of equivocation) of the Renaissance humanists.
73° For an excellent discussion of Hobbes’s use of the nature-convention distinction see, Amos 
Funkenstein, Theology and the Scientific Imagination: from  the Middle Ages to the 
Seventeenth Century (Princeton, 1986), pp. 331-38.
180
Hobbes says, ‘which hath not at first, totally, or by parts, been begotten upon 
the organs of Sense’.™
Even though all knowledge must, of necessity, begin in nature, Hobbes 
does not believe that nature alone can produce certain knowledge. Prudence, 
for example, is based on the senses, yet is uncertain.™ Univocal knowledge can 
only be reached through convention and is the product of science. In contrast 
to memory (which is innate) or prudence (which is gotten by experience), 
science is ‘attayned by Industry’.™ Men, therefore, create science. They do so,
‘first in apt imposing of Names; and secondly by getting a good and orderly 
Method in proceeding from the Elements, which are Names, to Assertions 
made by Connexion of one of them to another; and so to Syllogismes, which 
are the Connexions of one Assertion to another, till we come to a knowledge 
of all the Consequences of names appertaining to the subject in hand; and 
that is it, men call SCIENCE’.™
For Hobbes, therefore, scientific truth consists in ‘the right ordering of names 
in our a f f i r m a t i o n s ’.™  But as seen earlier, the meaning of words is not pre­
existent. Meaning is derived from our own arbitrary impositions: ‘the first 
truths were arbitrarily made by those that first of all imposed names upon
731 Leviathan, V, p. 35. It is for this reason that we cannot conceive of anything that is 
imperceptible, like God, because its existence lies outside the natural world (Elements o f 
Philosophy: the first section, Concerning Body, 1.1.8, p.10; Watkins, Hobbes’s System o f Ideas, 
P- 4 5 ).
732 Leviathan, III, pp. 22-3; V, pp. 35-7; VIII, pp. 52-3.
733 ibid., V, p. 35.
734 ibid. It is important to note that there is nothing particularly original about Hobbes’s 
general conception of science. After all, the ideals of certainty and demonstration from evident 
principles had been central to the Aristotelian tradition, and in this respect there are significant 
continuities with Galileo’s conception of demonstrative science. There are also clear analogies 
with the outlook of Mersenne and his circle, and even more with the view of scientific method 
developed by Descartes. An even closer parallel can be drawn between Hobbes’s methodology 
and Bacon who, in his project for the reform of natural philosophy, had already focused on 
mathematical methods. In The Advancement o f Learning, while discussing the various ‘idols’ 
that interfere with the progress of science, Bacon considers ‘the false appearances that are 
imposed upon us by words, which are framed and applied according to the conceit and 
capacities of the vulgar sort’. The solution lies in recognising that, ‘it is almost necessary in all 
controversies and disputations to imitate the wisdom of the mathematicians, in setting down in 
the very beginning the definitions of our words and terms that others may know how we accept 
and understand them, and whether they concur with us or no’ (p. 134). What is more, the idea 
that we ought to seek knowledge by following the precepts of authorities had already been 
criticised by other thinkers, most notably Bacon. For example, in the Novum Organon, he 
complains that even the leaders of the sciences ‘still have not dared to abandon their adherence 
to received beliefs’, but ‘continue to rely on accepted opinions and customs’ (p. 128). Bacon’s 
own philosophy, by contrast, ‘makes no effort to flatter the intelligence by dealing in 
preconceived ideas’ (p. 153). For more information see, Gaukroger, Francis Bacon, passim; and 
in general P. Hoffman, The quest fo r  power (Atlantic Highlands, N.J., 1996).
735 Leviathan, IV, p. 28.
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thingVafi It is because of this arbitrariness that Hobbes becomes convinced that 
geometry, as opposed to experimentation and empirical observation, must be 
the model of science. Like the definitions and figures of geometry, good 
science is artificially constructed. It is not the passive replication of objective 
p h e n o m e n a . ^  By beginning with (humanly devised) settled definitions, 
geometry ends with indisputable c o n c l u s i o n s . 738 For Hobbes, this 
characteristic becomes an inherent quality of truth. It is for this reason that in 
the Leviathan, he declares that ‘Geometry, ... is the onely Science that it hath 
pleased God hitherto to bestow on mankind . . . ’.739 Interestingly, he seems to 
write as if truth and agreement were indistinguishable: ‘Doctrine repugnant to 
Peace, can no more be True, than Peace and Concord can be against the Law of 
Nature’.?*0 It is important to note that, in the same way that Hobbes earlier 
identified “bad’ or ‘false’ rhetoric with discord, he now equates truth with 
unanimity and ‘true’ rhetoric. In his project, science and ‘false’ rhetoric stand 
in antithesis to one another: ‘the signs of this being controversy; the sign of the 
former, no controversy .?**
It is important to note that, for Hobbes, science or ‘the knowledge of 
Consequence’, ‘is not Absolute, but Conditional!’.?*2 Science is conditional 
because it grounded in sense experience: ‘[T]he knowledge of Fact’, after all, ‘is 
originally, Sense; and ever after, Memory’. For Hobbes, therefore, ‘no 
discourse whatsoever can End in absolute knowledge’. Even though Hobbesian 
civil science cannot compel assent in doctrine or morals, it can nevertheless 
clarify the conditions under which a doctrinal and moral consensus can be 
reached. By clear deductions, therefore, Hobbes tries to makes out an entire
?36 Elements o f Philosophy, 1.3.8, p. 36; Wolin, Politics and Vision, p. 246.
?37 Although, as Funkenstein points out, Hobbes sometimes emphasises the arbitrary 
beginnings of science (from definitions) and, at other times, its hypothetical-experimental 
beginnings, nevertheless, his science is arbitrary throughout. Even in experimental science, 
there is never a one-to-one relation between phantasms -  our perceptions of external reality -  
and things; ‘the congruence is guaranteed by the strict material causation in the universe’ 
(Funkenstein, Theology and the Scientific Imagination, pp. 333-34 n. 20).
738 E L, I.13.3, P- 50; Leviathan, IV, p. 28.
739 Leviathan, IV, p. 28. The geometers, Hobbes writes in De Cive, have produced strong 
defence works and marvellous machines. ‘If the moral philosophers, had done their job with 
equal success, I do not know what greater contribution human industry could have made to 
human happiness’ (‘Ep. Ded’., p. 6).
74° Leviathan, XXX, p. 233.
7*‘ EL, I.13.3, P- 5 1 - 
7*2 Leviathan, VII, p. 47.
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body of the law of nature, i.e., the universal, objective principles of right 
action.743 And his view, ‘the true and only moral philosophy’ is the ‘science’ of 
the ‘laws of nature’.™ it was in chapter 6  of The Elements o f Law that Hobbes 
first outlined what he calls the four steps of science that need to be followed if 
we wish to attain the kind of knowledge that will make us wise.™ The tracing 
of these steps, he adds in De Cive, can be described as a matter of following 
right reasoning,746 which in turn consists of “beginning with the most evident 
principles and constructing a discourse by continually drawing out necessary 
consequences’.™ So for Hobbes the same process of thought which guides us 
to a precise insight into the nature of physical body is also applicable to the 
state. We can only succeed in reducing the structure of the state and of society 
to the rule of law and reason by an inquiry into its sources. Society must 
submit to being treated like physical reality under investigation.
However, since men (because their judgement is ever clouded by vanity 
and passions) cannot arrive at any agreement on doctrine or morality on their 
own, Hobbes claims they must create a decisive authority that will do so on 
their behalf.748 Nature, he argues, drives pre-political man to confer his rights 
on a sovereign. Chapter 14 of part I of The Elements o f Law, contains Hobbes’s 
earliest description of the state of nature. Raising the question how secure 
men are by nature -  that is, how secure they are when one considers their 
faculties of physical strength, reason, experience and passion -  Hobbes 
answers, ‘Not secure at all’. For while they are in fact equal to one another in 
most respects, not all of them are willing to admit it and satisfy themselves 
with a share of goods commensurate with their equality. A few are bound to 
deny their equality and try to get by force a bigger share of available goods 
than others, who, wanting only their fair share, will resist and fight in t u r n .7 4 9  
Hobbes, therefore, paints a picture of human behaviour unconstrained by
743 Leviathan, XIV-XV, pp. 91-111.
744 Ibid., XII, p. 79.
745 EL, pp. 26, 66. Hobbes thinks of it as a method, ‘a way of searching out the truth’ (De Cive, 
XVII.xxviii, p. 279).
746 j)e d ve , XVT.i, p. 234.
747 Ibid., XVILxvi, p. 213; cf. Leviathan, V, p. 35.
748 a  conditional statement that reflects Hobbes’s views can be formed as follows: if moral and 
doctrinal consensus is to be reached, then it can only be the result of a common power, 
appointed by us, that will impose such a consensus.
749 EL, I.14; Leviathan, XIII, pp. 88-9; XIV, p. 92.
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coercive law, and he hopes that his readers will find what he depicts so fearful 
that they will prefer life under even a harsh system of law to life under no law 
at all. Natural equality, vainglory, comparison, self-love and the relative 
scarcity of goods general demand make a conflict between people inevitable in 
the state of n a tu re s  What is more, according to The Elements o f Law, there is 
a natural right of each to whatever goods there are, a natural right that leaves 
the means of getting what is wanted up to each individual. Whatever action 
looks as if it will succeed in securing desired goods is permissible, even if the 
action involves depriving potential competitors of their goods.
Yet, Hobbes believes the misery of men’s natural condition alone cannot 
make allegiance to the sovereign absolutely b i n d i n g . ^  In fact, nature as the 
Commonwealth’s sole justification is an unstable foundation for political 
obligation. After all, the passions that drive us often change, and thus some 
men who at present wish to obey the sovereign, may wish to disobey him in 
the future. To ensure univocality Hobbes must, therefore, ground the creation 
of the sovereign in convention. His means for producing this is a covenant, in 
which the covenanting men agree among themselves to give up their rights to 
self-government and authorise a single will -  whether one man or an assembly 
of men -  as the absolute s o v e r e i g n s  In return, the subjects of the 
Commonwealth are protected from the conditions of the state of nature. Like 
all ‘true’ knowledge, the covenant to form the Commonwealth receives it 
univocality from an arbitrary act of the covenanting people. It is an artificial 
c o n s t r u c t i o n s  Thus Hobbes’s description of the Commonwealth as an 
‘Artificiall Man’ and civil laws as ‘Artificiall Chains’, which men ‘themselves, by 
mutual] covenants, have fastened at one end, to the lips of that Man, or 
Assembly, to whom they have given the Soveraigne Power; and at the other 
end to their own E a r s ’.™  The will of the state emerges from the covenant, 
because this will can only be known by, and founded in, the covenant.755 Again,
750 De cive, esp. ch. I and ch. 13.
751 Funkenstein, Theology and the Scientific Imagination, p. 335.
752 Leviathan, XXIX, p. 227.
753 EL, I.19.5, P- 80; Leviathan, XXIX, p. 226.
754 Leviathan, XXXIII, pp. 263-64; cf. V, pp. 32-3, VI, p. 39; EL, pp. 90-1.
755 This, therefore, is the bond which connects Hobbes’s doctrine of nature with his doctrine of 
the state.
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the paradigm here is geometry -  as geometry is demonstrable because it is 
man-made ‘for the lines and figures from which we reason are drawn and 
described by ourselves’, so Hobbes’s civil science ‘is demonstrable because we 
make the commonwealth o u r s e l v e s V s e
But it would be a mistake to think of Hobbes’s sovereign as instituted only 
to terrify his subjects into obedience. He keeps the peace not only by 
threatening subjects with punishment, but also by adjudicating their disputes 
and in giving them the set definitions of words, in law, by which to do this. 
Otherwise the multiplicity of a people cannot become a unified body politic. 
This can only happen through the unity of the sovereign’s person, and only by 
representation by that sovereign. Without such representation, a people do not 
constitute a political body, but only an unorganized multiplicity. The 
distinguishing feature of a commonwealth is that ‘not the Appetite of Private 
men, but the Law, which is the Will and Appetite of the State’ as represented 
by the sovereign, becomes the measure of good and evil, virtue and v i c e . 757 The 
unity guaranteed by the sovereign promises to negate ‘partiality’ in two senses: 
the incoherence of particularism, the chaotic coexistence of a multitude of 
parts without a whole; and (once the people have been united into a body 
politic) the partiality or bias of individual members of that body, who from 
time to time may forget that their own welfare is organically united with the 
welfare of the whole body. Hobbes knows that such absolute power can be 
abused, but he points out that there is no condition of human life without 
inconveniences. In democracy, where each man bears some part of the 
sovereignty, the sum total of those able to enrich and serve themselves at the 
expense of the public interest is at a maximum. In a monarchy there can be 
only one Nero, in a democracy there can be as many Neros as there are orators 
flattering the p o p u l a c e . ^  Monarchy, then, is the best form of g o v e r n m e n t . ^
756 ‘Epistle Dedicatory1 to Six Lessons to the Professors o f Mathematics, One of Geometry, the 
Other of A s t r o n o m y i n  EW, VII, p. 184.
757 Leviathan, XLVI, p. 469.
758 See, e.g., ibid., XXVI, p. 187; cf. De Cive, X, esp. §7, §8, and §15.
759 An aristocracy in this regard stands somewhere between the other two forms. It becomes
better the more it approaches monarchy, worse the more it approaches democracy (Leviathan, 
XXVI, p. 187).
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It is important to note that Hobbes’s ruler or arbitrator, must determine 
not only the definitions but also the proper uses ‘of all names not agreed upon, 
and tending to Controversies60 This must be done by those exercising 
sovereign power because moral epithets are defined by the individual’s 
passions, and thus have no social meaning independent of the 
Commonwealth. As Hobbes puts it in the Leviathan, ‘notions of Right and 
Wrong, Justice and Injustice have there [the state of nature] no place’.?61 It is 
commonly said that such judgements must be made according to right reason. 
But the problem is that ‘commonly they that call for right reason to decide any 
Controversie, do mean their owne’.?62 As with doctrine, the absence of a moral 
arbiter leads inevitably to civil war, in which violence becomes the means of 
settling moral disputes. The implication, as Hobbes remarks in the Leviathan, 
is that those who call for the settlement of moral disputes by reason are calling 
for ‘every of their passions, as it comes to bear sway in them, to be taken for 
right Reason, and that in their own controversies: bewraying their want of 
right Reason, by the claym they lay to it’.** In this context, the only possible 
solution is to appoint someone to make our judgements for us. We must 
institute some person or body of persons whom we agree in advance to accept 
as our final ‘Arbitrator or judge’.** ‘[S]eeing right reason is not existent, as 
Hobbes concludes in The Elements o f Law, the reason for some man, or men, 
must supply the place thereof.?66
The decisions of the ruler or arbitrator will of course, be arbitrary (in 
effect, as God’s was when he named things in Genesis according to HIS will). If 
we wish to avoid coming to blows, we have no alternative but to agree in 
advance to treat it as beyond appeal. To say this is, of course, to say that right 
reason must be supplied by ‘he, or they, that hath the Soveraigne power’. It 
follows that,
?6° EL, p. 189.
?61 Leviathan, XXVI, p. 188.
762 EL, p. 188; cf. De Cive, XIV.xvii, pp. 213-14.
?66 Leviathan, V, p. 33.
?6« EL, pp. 90-1; Leviathan, V, pp. 32-3, VI, p. 39.
?66 EL, p. 188. As Tuck rightly stresses, Hobbes’s claim is thus that moral consensus can only be 
created politically (Hobbes, p. 57).
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‘the civill Lawes are to all subjects the measures of their Actions, whereby to 
determine, whether they be right or wronge, profittable or unprofittahle, 
vertuous or vitious; and by them the use, and definition of all names not 
agreed upon, and tending to Controversie, shall be established’.?66
Hobbes’s last word, therefore, is that if we wish to overcome the threat of 
ambiguous language by fixing our moral language unambiguously onto the 
world, we can only hope to do so by fiat. The sovereign, who is the only true 
orator in the full sense of the word, has the power to create a religious and 
moral consensus where previously there was none. To the extent that it was 
the covenanting individuals who created the sovereign, this consensus can be 
said to derive its validity from those individuals.?6?
Hobbes’s precepts for a civil science can be understood to be persuasive 
whether or not all his inferences are sound. They can also be seen to amount to 
a science and a prime example of Hobbesian ‘true’ rhetoric. For given the two 
fundamental laws of nature -  those enjoining one to seek peace if it can be 
done safely and to lay down rights for the sake of peace -  all of the rest of the 
laws of nature can be deduced. And for Hobbes it is deductive structure that is 
crucial for the scientific status of a doctrine. His system of precepts has 
another claim to scientific status, for it is supposed to uncover what the 
various patterns of behaviour enjoined by moral precepts -  what the various 
virtues -  have in common. What they share, in Hobbes’s view, is that they 
promote peace, and with that, self-preservation. I suggest, therefore, that 
Hobbes’s system of the laws of nature, the precepts about seeking peace, 
laying down rights, keeping covenants, being complaisant, being grateful and 
the rest, amount to a moral philosophy that is both persuasive (and a 
demonstration of what he considered a legitimate use of the art of rhetoric) 
and scientific. Still, Hobbes’s persuasive civil science is a kind of 
embarrassment for his civil science, because he repeatedly emphasised that
?66 EL, pp. 188-9; cf. ibid., pp. 112; De Cive, III.xxix-xxxii, pp. 119-21, Vl.viii-xi, pp. 139-41; 
XIV.xvi-xvii, pp. 213-14; Leviathan, V, pp. 32-3; VI, p. 39; XXVI, pp. 190-1, XLVI, p. 469.
?6? Unlike the humanists, who believed that the whole body of the faithful (that is, the Church) 
continued to express the consensus fidelium, Hobbes allows the men who are to form the 
Commonwealth just a single opportunity to agree that they are incapable of doctrinal and 
moral consensus and thus require an external consensus-maker. After the covenant, their 
personal moral and religious opinions do not matter. Therefore, insofar as they have no right 
after the covenant to question the sovereign’s moral and religious pronouncements, consensus 
is only formally linked to the public.
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science was one thing and rhetoric another. In any event, it is important not to 
exaggerate the tension between science and rhetoric to be found in Hobbes’s 
writings. I believe that he always combined rhetoric and science in his 
treatises, but that it took some time for his philosophy of science to 
acknowledge this fact and recognise that science and rhetoric were 
reconcilable. In The Elements o f Law, not wishing to tar his own writings with 
the brush he applies to the speeches of the movers and authors of sedition, 
Hobbes insists (at least in theory) on a distinction between the two. And in De 
Cive and Leviathan he moves toward a reconciliation.**
IV
When John Locke set out in 1679 to persuade his readers about ‘the true 
original extent and end of civil government’, he produced a book which was in 
some respect like Leviathan. Like Hobbes, Locke believes that rhetoric 
represents a dangerous threat to the moral basis of political life. Like Hobbes, 
he begins with a state of nature without government, and assumes that people 
are in a condition of original freedom and equality.** Like Hobbes, Locke 
views the state as an artificial construct, created by contract in the state of 
nature. The agreement is, again, to relinquish private rights (or liberties) of 
protection, punishment, or vengeance, transferring them to the state. The 
state is ‘authorised’ by its citizens to do the protection and punishing for them. 
Locke’s teaching, furthermore, is not unlike Hobbes’s in the assertion that 
‘civil government is the proper remedy for the inconveniences of the state of 
nature’. Yet, Locke’s work is quite unlike Leviathan in doctrine. Two Treatises 
differed considerably from Leviathan in the form of its argument, because 
Locke had rejected Hobbes’s psychological assumptions and his entirely 
rationalistic, unempirical view of natural law, because of Sir Robert Filmer, 
and because of his beliefs so completely in contrast with the Hobbes’. Hobbes
?68 For an excellent discussion see, Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric, part II.
769 See Two Treatise, II, §4, p. 269: Natural freedom derives from natural equality, ‘there being 
nothing more evident, than that Creatures of the same species and rank promiscuously bom to 
all the same advantages of Nature, and the use of the same faculties, should also be equal one 
amongst another, without Subordination or Subjection
188
argues for the right of the state to control, and the duty of people to obey. 
Locke argues for the right of people not to be controlled, and the duty of the 
state to be tolerant. He shows again and again that absolute arbitrary power is 
no remedy for the evils of the state of nature. Unlike Hobbes, Locke stressed 
that the supercession of partiality is a strenuous process, for magistrates and 
philosophers as well as ordinary people, so many are the obstacles placed in 
the way of the human understanding’s efforts to rise above its biased and 
partial perspectives.
Locke looks as if he is striking a blow for modernity. He seems to be 
arguing for rolling back religion to leave room for the modem, secular state. 
But this general impression is misleading with respect to Locke’s political 
philosophy as a whole. It may be modem, but it is not a political philosophy in 
which God has moved out of the way. The most obvious and significant 
example is his benevolent state of nature, with its theologically-based natural 
law, its consecration of the basic rights of life, liberty and property. In Locke’s 
state of nature ‘though Man ... have an uncontroleable Liberty’, ‘it is not a 
State o f License .... The State o f Nature has a Law of Nature to govern it, 
which obliges everyone’.7?0 And this law, for Locke, is clearly the law of God.?71 
In his view the law of nature is a real law, offering obligatory commands rather 
than pmdential advice.772 Unlike Hobbes, he maintains that the law of nature 
obliges us and lays down what is right and wrong, independently of the 
positive institution or commands of human law-makers. The obligations of the 
law of nature are stated in two ways. Every man is obliged to preserve himself, 
and every man is obliged to preserve all mankind:
‘Every one as he is bound to preserve himself, and not to quit his Station
willfully; so by the like reason, when his own Preservation comes not in
770 Two Treatise, §6, pp. 270-71. cf. ibid., §19, p. 280: ‘Men living together according to reason, 
without a common Superior on Earth with Authority to judge between them, is properly the 
State o f Nature’.
771 It is important to note that even though the law of nature in Locke is more clearly than in 
Hobbes the law of God, he maintains that the law of nature is knowable by reason alone and 
does not depend upon any special revelation. He thus tells us in the Essay that ‘there is a law, 
knowable by the light of nature; i.e. without the help of positive revelation’ (Essay, I.iii.13). 
Later in the Essay, Locke declares that ‘[i]n all Things of this Kind, there is little need or use of 
Revelation, GOD having furnished us with natural and surer means to arrive at the Knowledge 
of them’ (Ibid., IV.xviii.4, pp. 690-91.).
772 Two Treatises, II, § 6, pp. 270-71.
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competition, ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the rest of Mankind, 
and may not unless it he to do Justice on an Offender, take away, or impair 
the life, or what tends to the preservation of the Life, the Liberty, Health, 
Limb, or Goods of another’.™
According to Locke self-preservation and the preservation of humankind are 
rights derived from prior duties imposed upon men by God. ‘For Men being all 
the Workmanship of one Omnipotent, and infinitely wise Maker; ... sent into 
the World by his order and about his business’, he tells us, ‘they are his 
Property, whose Workmanship they are, made to last during his, not one 
anothers Pleasure’.™ And God having planted in man a strong desire of Self- 
preservation, ‘Reason, which was the Voice o f God in him, could not but teach 
him and assure him, that pursuing that natural Inclination he had to preserve 
his Being, he followed the Will of his Maker ...’.™ in pursuing that profound 
desire of self-preservation, therefore, we are also fulfilling our obligation to 
God and nature -  the very definition of reasonable behaviour. In this sense, 
the law of nature is known to all people, and men cannot but follow its 
dictates. But in another sense, that of understanding the means by which that 
desire might be fulfilled, men are ignorant of the law of nature ‘for want of 
study of it’, and unwittingly behave contrary to its dictates, contrary to reason 
(i.e., contrary to their interest in their own preservation).
However the law of nature may be ‘writ in the Hearts of all Mankind’,™ 
therefore, it is unlikely that men in the state of nature can know how to obey it. 
After all, in the state of nature, ‘every one has the Executive Power of the Law 
of Nature’,™ and although the law of nature is ‘intelligible and plain to a 
rational Creature, and a Studier of that Law1,™ ‘yet Men being biassed by their 
Interest as well as ignorant for want of study of it, are not apt to allow of it as a 
Law binding to them in the application of it to their particular Cases’.™ It is 
because of ‘those Evils which necessarily follow from Mens being Judges in
773 Two Treatises, II, §6, p. 271
774 ibid.
775 Ibid., I, §86, p. 323.
776 Ibid., II, §11, p. 274.
777 ibid., §13, p. 275.
778 Ibid., §12, p. 275.
779 ibid., §124, p. 351.
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their own Cases’, that the state of nature is ‘not to be endured’.?80 As Locke 
says,
‘Civil Government is the proper Remedy for the Inconveniences of the State 
of Nature, which must certainly be Great, where Men may be Judges in their 
own Case, since ’tis easily to be imagined, that he who was so unjust as to do 
his Brother an Injury, will scarce be so just as to condemn himself for it
The state, therefore, was formed by social contract because in the state of 
nature each was his own judge, and there was no protection against those who 
lived outside the law of nature.?82 First, in the ‘original compact’, they agree to 
transfer the powers that each had in the state of nature into the hands of the 
community, and then by a second compact, to the government (on the 
condition that the government will protect their ‘property’ -  Locke’s broad 
term for their lives, liberties and estates).?83 But it is worth emphasising that, 
for Locke, the state should be guided by natural law. In fact, the civil laws of 
political society are only so far right as they are founded on the law of nature 
(by which they are to be regulated and interpreted):
‘The Obligations of the Law of Nature, cease not in Society, but only in many 
Cases are drawn closer, and have by Humane Laws known Penalties annexed 
to them, to inforce their observation. Thus the Law of Nature stands as an 
Eternal Rule to all Men, Legislators as well as others. The Rules that they 
make ... must... be conformable to the Law of Nature, i.e., to the Will of God, 
of which that is a Declaration, and the fundamental Law of Nature being the 
preservation of Mankind, no Humane Sanction can be good, or valid against
i t ’.7S4
The relevance of the pre-political to the political is made clear in Locke’s 
remark that ‘the great and chief e n d ... of men’s uniting into Commonwealths, 
and putting themselves under Government, is the preservation o f their 
P r o p e r ty ’. ^  In the state of nature, property is ‘very unsafe, very unsecure’, 
because three things necessary to its preservation are lacking: (i) ‘an 
establish’d, settled, known Law’; (ii) a ‘known and indifferent Judge, with
780 Two Treatises, §13, p. 276.
781 Ibid., §13, p. 276.
782 Ibid., §89, p. 325. Only those who make such an express compact with one another are in 
political society together; those who do not join are, in relation to the society and its members, 
still in the state of nature.
788 Ibid., §87, pp. 323-24.
™ Ibid., §135, pp. 3 5 7 -5 8 .
788 Ibid., §124, pp. 3 5 0 -5 1 -
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Authority to determine all differences according to the established Law’; and 
(iii) the ‘Power to back and support the Sentence when right, and to give it due 
Execution V86 Political society, the opposite of the state of nature, is designed 
to remedy these defects, by providing a power to make law and judge 
controversies, and a power to execute the judgements and punish offenders. It 
is for this reason that the natural powers of individuals in the state of nature 
are transformed, by compact, into the political powers of civil society. 
However, these political powers are limited by the purpose for which they 
were made, i.e., to remedy the uncertainty and danger of the state of nature. 
The people, Locke says, entrust to the government their natural rights, ‘with 
this express or tacit Trust, That it shall be imployed for their good, and the 
preservation of their Property’.787 It follows that the exercise of unlimited 
power is not, and cannot be, considered political power:
‘Absolute Arbitrary Power, or Governing without settled standing Laws, can 
neither of them consist with the ends of Society and Government, which Men 
would not quit the freedom of the state of Nature for, and tie themselves up 
under, were it not to preserve their Lives, Liberties, and Fortunes; and by 
stated Rules of Right and Property to secure their Peace and Quiet. It cannot 
be supposed that they should intend, had they a power so to do, to give to any 
one, or more, an absolute Arbitrary Power over their Persons and Estates .... 
This were to put themselves into a worse condition than the state of Nature, 
wherein they had a Liberty to defend their Right against the Injuries of others, 
and were upon equal terms of force to maintain it ..A788
Locke’s insistence on the limited nature of political power reveals both his 
agreement and very great disagreement with Hobbes. Both philosophers start 
from the principle of self-preservation as the rock-bottom foundation of civil 
society, but unlike Hobbes, Locke shows repeatedly that absolute arbitrary 
power is not a remedy for the evils of the state of nature. This is hardly 
surprising when we consider that the drawbacks of the state of nature differ in 
the two accounts, and consequently the solutions put forward by Locke and 
Hobbes diverge accordingly. For Locke the state of nature is not ‘a state of war’
786 Tw0 Treatises, §124, p. 351.
787 Ibid., §171, p. 381.
788 Ibid., §137, P- 359-
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of every man against every man.?8’ If, as it seems, force will commonly be used 
without right in Locke’s state of nature, it is not because most men are vicious 
or savage and bloodthirsty. He does not, as Hobbes does, speak of every man 
as the potential murderer of every other man. The main threat to the 
preservation of life in the state of nature lies not in the murderous tendencies 
of men but instead in the poverty and hardship of their natural condition.??0 
The main outcome of the differences in the two interpretations is the fact that 
the civil government Locke proposes has a far less violent and absolute 
character than Hobbes’.?’1 For him ‘it is evident that Absolute Monarchy ... is 
... inconsistent with Civil Society, and so can be no Form of Civil Government 
at all’.?’2 Locke argues that the absolute monarch cannot be a legitimate 
political authority, because the concentration of legislative and executive 
power in one figure prevents his being a separate, impartial, and indifferent 
judge:
‘For [the Absolute Prince] being suppos’d to have all, both Legislative and 
Executive Power in himself alone, there is no Judge to be found, no Appeal 
lies open to any one, who may fairly and indifferently, and with Authority 
decide, and from whose decision relief and redress may be expected of any 
Injury or Inconvenience, that may be suffered from the Prince or by his 
Order’.?’8
To be subject to a ruler’s arbitrary power without the right or strength to 
defend oneself against him is a condition far worse than the state of nature, 
and it cannot be supposed to be that to which men consented freely, for ‘no 
rational Creature can be supposed to change his condition with an intention to 
be worse’.?”  The government, therefore, is merely a trustee of the people’s 
political power; should it dishonour the people’s trust, its power (which is only 
a ‘Fiduciaiy Power’), reverts to its original owners.?’8 It is important to note
?8’ In fact, he does not equate the states of nature and war; he tells us that they ‘are as far 
distant, as a State of Peace, Good Will, Mutual Assistance, and Preservation, and a State of 
Enmity, Malice, Violence, and Mutual Destruction are one from another’ (ibid., §19, p. 280).
?’° For more information see, A  Tuckness, Locke and the legislative point o f view (Princeton, 
N.J., 2002).
?’* The most obvious sign of the difference is the much greater attention Locke gives to the 
subject of property.
?’2 Two Treatises, II, §90, p. 326.
?’3 Ibid., §91, p. 326.
?”  Ibid., §131, p. 3 5 3 - 
?’s Ibid., §149, p. 367.
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that Locke’s argument for the separation of powers by ‘ballancing the Power of 
Government, by placing several parts of it in different hands’,?’6 rests not a 
little on his suspicion of the rhetorical trope by means of which absolute 
monarchs of the Renaissance could claim or feign impartiality.”? According to 
Sir Edward Coke, the eminent common lawyer, the function of the ‘plenary 
and entire power’ concentrated in the king as head of the body politic was ‘to 
render justice and right to every member of this body ... otherwise he should 
not be a head of the whole body’.?’8 Coke clearly believes that there is no 
inconsistency between the king’s wielding sole and undivided power, his 
constituting a part of the body politic, and his judicial impartiality. In 
rhetorical terms, Coke’s absolute sovereign is an ideal synecdoche, a part of 
the body politic that also embodies or represents the whole; for Locke this is a 
dangerous synecdoche, a (necessarily) partial member of the body politic who 
may impose his partial understanding and interests upon the whole.
Another important consequence of the divergence between the Locke’s 
and Hobbes’ accounts is the fact that the solution on how to overcome the 
dangers of rhetoric that Locke puts forward is much less authoritarian than 
Hobbes’. As hinted at earlier, both philosophers believe that rhetoric 
represents a dangerous threat to the moral basis of political life, because 
people are often swayed by bad or false rhetoric into believing in false politics. 
For them, accordingly, the question of how to resolve this problem, is one of 
the major tasks facing civil philosophy. We saw in the previous section that 
Hobbes’s last word on this issue is that, if we wish to overcome the threat of 
rhetoric and ambiguous language, we can only hope to do so by fiat. The 
sovereign must become the commonwealth’s final ‘Arbitrator or judge’,?”  the 
only true rhetorician. But for Locke the suggestion that the only possible 
solution is to appoint someone to make our judgements for us is simply 
repugnant. Instead, he held that political debate must be purified of ‘false
?96 Two Treatises, §107, p. 338; cf. §91,326-27.
?’? On the importance of the category of wholeness to the organisation of knowledge in the 
Renaissance see, M. Foucault's section on the Renaissance episteme in his The Order o f 
Things: An Archaeology o f the Human Sciences (NY, 1970). On the vogue for ‘anatomies’ 
aiming to portray a unified order’ and their significance as a way for organizing knowledge in 
the Renaissance, see Devon L. Hodges, Renaissance Fictions o f Anatomy (Amherst, 1985).
?’8 Cited in C. Weston and J. Greenberg, Subjects and Sovereigns (Cambridge, 1981), p. 8.
?”  See EL, pp. 90-1; id., Leviathan, V, pp. 32-3; VI, p. 39.
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rhetoric’, and society at large cleansed of cultural conventions and institutions 
which sustain it -  such as the teaching of poetry to the youth. So the political 
manifesto Locke famously presents in Two Treatises o f Government and in A  
Letter Concerning Toleration, is paralleled by the manifesto of cultural reform 
he presents in the Essay. Seen together, these three works attempt to offer the 
citizenry an education to liberty by instructing them both in the principles of 
politics and in the art of political discourse. Locke can be seen to have engaged 
in what might be termed a Kulturkampf, pervading politics, education, and 
religion.
But what are Locke’s specific arguments for considering rhetoric such a 
dangerous weapon? In a well-known and often-quoted passage in his Essay, 
he says that, ‘where Truth and Knowledge are concerned’, the ‘Art of Rhetorick 
cannot but be thought a great fault, either of the Language or Person that 
makes use of them’.800 Locke condemned rhetoric as an instrument of deceit 
and error whose sole purpose was to insinuate false ideas, excite the passions, 
and mislead the judgement. So it is hardly surprising to find Locke portraying 
rhetoric as the ‘Abuse of Words,’ and rhetoricians as those ‘whose business is 
only the vain ostentation of Sounds’.801 For him this is ‘perverting the use of 
Words’, which nevertheless Locke reluctantly accepts ‘have their place in the 
common use of Languages...’.802 To which he immediately adds:
‘It looks like too much affectation wholly to lay them by: and Philosophy it 
self, though it likes not a gaudy dress, yet when it appears in publick, must 
have so much Complacency, as to be cloathed in the ordinary Fashion and 
Language of the Country, so far as it consist with Truth and Perspicuity’.8°3
These are, of course, the familiar complaints of the man of reason and 
advocate of plain speech, who can barely conceal his disdain for those who 
require serious ideas to be dressed up in pleasing rhetorical form. Put 
differently, Locke expresses the view widely held among philosophers, that 
‘[t]o resort to images and metaphors, to the full set of implements proper to
800 Essay, III.x.34, p. 508.
801 Ibid., 111.x, pp. 490-508; III.xi.7, p. 512.
802 Ibid., III.ii.5, p. 407; II.xxi.20, p. 243.
8°3 Ibid., II.xxi.20, p. 243.
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rhetoric ... merely serves to make it “easier” to absorb rational truth’.80* Often 
ignored is the fact that rational thinking and speaking is parasitic on the very 
rhetorical (passionate, affective) speech Locke would like to exclude in 
discourses in which ‘we would speak of Things as they are’ (i.e., where 
knowledge is at stake). In fact, political theorists have commonly interpreted 
Locke’s works as monuments to rational speech and to a subject that searches 
for knowledge of things as they really are.808 He is portrayed as a man ever 
vigilant over the incursion of unexamined belief into the chamber of the 
enlightened understanding (the slayer of the ‘Idols of the Mind’). But such 
accounts, though not without merit, tend to neglect those aspects of Locke’s 
thought that call into question the power of reason and rational language in 
the adjudication of political and philosophical debates. Moreover, as shown 
below, his disavowal of false rhetoric actually stems both from the traditional 
anti-rhetorical posture of philosophy, and out of the certainty that his own 
theories represent a (much needed) renovation of philosophic discourse.
Rhetoric takes hold of men’s minds in early childhood, usually at the 
hands of a woman. Locke’s argument against the existence of innate 
principles, as William Walker has shown, traces the origin of notions of sacred 
truth onto the figure of the woman as gatekeeper of Idols.806 Whilst trying to 
explain why men are willing to die rather than abandon what they take for 
truth, Locke writes:
‘This, however strange it may seem, is that which eveiy days Experience 
confirms; and will not, perhaps, appear so wonderful, if we consider the 
ways, and steps by which it is brought about; and how really it may come to 
pass, that Doctrines, that have been derived from no better original, than the 
Superstition of a Nurse, or the authority of an old Woman; may, by length of 
time, and consent of Neighbors, grow up to the dignity o f Principles in 
Religion or Morality1.80?
8o* E. Grassi, Rhetoric as Philosophy (Carbondale, 111., 1980), p. 26.
808 For example, Charles Taylor, Sources o f the Self (Cambridge, Mass., 1989), asserts that such 
a subject emerges as part of the Lockean project of self-understanding, the means by which 
reason can attain full certainty of itself. In Locke’s view, Taylor says, ‘... many things have been 
declared authoritatively true ... which have no real title to the name. The rational, self- 
responsible subject can break with them, suspend his adhesion to them, and by submitting 
them to the test of their validity, remake or replace them’ (p. 174).
806 w . Walker, ‘Locke Minding Women: History, Gender, and the Essay’, ECS, 23:3 (1990), pp. 
245-68.
807 Essay, I.iii.22, p. 81.
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For Locke, what makes these ‘Principles’ so extraordinarily difficult to 
question, is that they are antecedent to all memory and thus come to be 
wrapped in an aura of the sacred or the natural.808 What concerns Locke is the 
subject’s inscription into an inherited background which is composed of 
(ungrounded) figures not (grounded) truths.80’ What passes for innate 
principles lies outside the scope of ‘reflexion’, to use Locke’s term, or the 
Mind’s consciousness of its own activity. The woman’s authority is likewise 
secured inasmuch as the adult mind cannot remember the moment when it 
was first impressed with a rhetorical figure, usually conveyed through a story, 
which now takes the form of a principle.810 Thus the Essay is haunted by the 
woman as she comes to stand for the origin of error. Now, it would seem that 
to expose the woman who first cared for us as the origin of error and Idol 
worship, as Lockean empiricism tried to do, would be sufficient to deprive her 
of her power. To remember her is to regain control over our symbolic 
production. However, notwithstanding Locke’s attempt to locate the cause of 
our errors in an external cause and subject it to reason, it is clear that he 
remains perplexed by the ‘something that blinds their [men’s] 
Understandings’811 and puts them in the service of unreasonableness: ‘Men 
worship the Idols that have been set up in their Minds; grow fond of the 
Notions that they have been long acquainted with there; and stamp the 
character o f Divinity, upon Absurdities and Errors, become zealous Votaries 
to Bulls and Monkeys; and contend too, fight, and die in defence of their 
Opinions’.812 Such remarks, of course, open rather than close the question of 
the origins of self-blindness. So it is unlikely that the empiricist discovery of 
the real figure of the superstitious nurse or mother, or any childhood
808 G. A. J. Rogers, Locke’s Philosophy (Cambridge, 1994), has argued that ‘the principle has 
been taught as if it were an undeniable truth, even though it really had no higher source “than 
the Superstition of a Nurse, or the Authority of an Old Woman”’ (p. 17). But in fact the 
principles men later come even to die for are not initially taught as truths (or even as principles 
which one could decide for or against).
8°9 As Ludwig Wittgenstein would later put it, an ‘inherited background against which I 
distinguish between true and false’ (On Certainty, tr. D. Paul and G. Anscombe [N.Y., 1972], 
§94).
810 The mind cannot recognise this moment as part of its own development and thus, writes 
Walker, as ‘an instance of female presence or power’ (Walker, ‘Locke Minding Women’, p. 
250).
811 Essay, II.xxxiii.18, p. 400.
812 Ibid., I.iii.26, p. 83.
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authority, would persuade anyone to divest himself of that sort of affect.
If we turn to the section entitled ‘Of the Association of Ideas’, which was 
added to Book II of the Essay’s fourth edition in 1700, the difficulties that the 
attachment to idols and other such affective props creates for the sort of 
subject that we associate with the name John Locke become clearer. This 
section, as Cathy Caruth has shown, stands in a peculiar relation to 
associationism, the tradition it founded, as it was developed most prominently 
by David Hartley. ‘The use of association to name a principle of rational 
thought’, Caruth asserts, ‘... altered the meaning it had in Locke’s work, in 
which it referred to a thought process subversive of normal reasoning and 
described as ‘madness’. ... In transferring the name to “rational thought” 
processes, the eighteenth-century empiricists effectively eliminated the 
phenomenon that, in Locke, had raised serious questions about the principles 
established in the rest of the Essay’.8'3 It is important to note, first, that such 
madness is not a general condition that affects only some men and is opposed 
to sanity. Instead, as Locke says, it is ‘a Weakness to which all Men are so 
liable’.81* In fact, ‘this flaw has its Original in very sober and rational Minds’.8i5 
What is more, the madness emerges, not when a man ‘is under the power of an 
unruly Passion, but [rather] in the steady calm course of his Life’. It is a 
‘disease of the mind’ that each is quick to find in the other but blind to in 
himself. An otherwise critical man can exhibit a stubborn ‘Unreasonableness’, 
refusing to yield ‘to the Evidence of Reason, though laid before him as clear as 
Day-light’. One would think him ‘fitter for Bedlam, than Civil Conversation’.816 
Consider Locke’s account of how the association of ideas works its spell:
‘Some of our Ideas have a natural Correspondence and Connexion one with 
another: It is the Office and Excellency of our Reason to trace these, and hold 
them together in that Union and Correspondence which is founded in their 
peculiar Beings. Besides this there is another Connexion of Ideas wholly 
owing to Chance or Custom; Ideas that in themselves are not at all of kin, 
come to be so united in Mens Minds, that ’tis very hard to separate them, they
8l3 Cathy Caruth, Empirical Truths and Critical Fictions (Baltimore, 1991), p. 1.
8l* Essay, II.xxxiii.4, p. 395.
8is Ibid., II.xxxiii.3, p. 395.
816 Ibid., II.xxxiii.4, p. 395; Il.xxxiii.i, p. 394; IIjcxxiii.2, p. 394; II.xxxiii.4, p. 395. Cf. id., First 
Treatise, p. 58: Locke notices how ‘The busie mind of Man’ is as capable of carrying us to 
absurdity and monstrosity, as to truth, reason, and light: ‘nor can it be otherwise in a Creature, 
whose thoughts are more than the Sands, and wider than the Ocean’.
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always keep company, and the one no sooner at any time comes into the 
Understanding but its Associate appears with it; and if they are more than two 
which are thus united, the whole gang always inseparable shew themselves 
together’.81?
For Locke, therefore, every rational connection of ideas can be plagued by an 
importunate outsider who pushes his way in on thought and plants his 
obscene presence in the way of proper thinking; and in the passage above this 
rapidly expands into a vision of the mad understanding as virtually stampeded 
by gangs of imposters. So deeply does this unnatural kinship of Ideas ‘set us 
awry in our Actions, as well Moral as Natural, Passions, Reasonings, and 
Notions themselves’, Locke says, that ‘perhaps, there is not any one thing that 
deserves more to be looked after’.818 However, the measures he advocates to 
prevent these unnatural associations from ever forming (especially in young 
people), pale in the face of the threat itself. For example, we can exercise 
greater vigilance over a child’s education at the hands of tutors; we can 
discipline nurses who fill their young charges with ‘Ideas of Goblins’ and other 
such ‘nonsense’. But as Locke himself acknowledges, not only are associations 
formed at all stages of life, their very nature, so utterly idiosyncratic and 
unpredictable (because so unique to each subject), that no amount of vigilance 
can possibly anticipate the wholly unexpected nature of association. ‘This 
strong Combination of Ideas’, he says, ‘not ally’d by Nature, the Mind makes in 
it self either voluntarily or by chance, and hence it comes in different men to 
be very different, according to their different Inclinations, Educations, 
Interests, etc.’81? These ‘frisking Ideas’ cause Locke such great anxiety because
817 Essay, II.xxxiii.5, p. 395.
818 Ibid., II.xxxiii.9, p. 397.
819 Ibid., II.xxxiii.6, p. 396. Consider the idiosyncratic character of the following example, 
which Locke gives ‘if only for the pleasant oddness of it’: ‘It is of a young Gentleman, who 
having learnt to Dance, and that to great Perfection, there happened to stand an old Trunk in 
the Room where he learnt. The Idea of this remarkable piece of Houshold-stuff, had so mixed it 
self with the turns and steps of all his Dances, that though in that Chamber he could Dance 
excellently well, yet it was only whilst that Trunk was there, nor could he perform well in any 
other place, unless that, or some such other Trunk had its due position in the Room’ 
(II.xxxiii.16, pp. 399-400). The Gentleman’s madness is a serious problem, because the 
madness is universal yet utterly idiosyncratic in the particular form it takes. One could say that 
we each have a ‘trunk’, i.e., an apparently meaningless psychic object that the subject drags 
from place to place and that has no logical place in the social grammar, but without which such 
grammar remains meaningless for the subject. If a trunk can take on such significance for a 
Gentleman, nothing can prevent another equally unremarkable object from assuming the same 
strange status in the individual’s fantasy life -  therein lies the disruptive power of association
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they “have leaked into virtually every aspect of social life’. He tells us that at the 
origin of ‘the Irreconcilable opposition between different Sects of Philosophy 
and Religion’, are these ‘wrong and unnatural Combinations of Ideas’. 
Significantly, association becomes a way of explaining what Locke, in his voice 
as the man of reason, is at a loss to explain, i.e., that the followers of these 
sects would ‘knowingly refuse Truth offer’d by plain Reason’. Even interest, he 
concedes, cannot *be thought to work whole Societies of Men to so universal a 
Perverseness, as that every one of them to a Man should knowingly maintain 
Falsehood’. ‘There must be something that blinds their Understandings, and 
makes them not see the falshood of what they embrace for real Truth’.820 
Association, he concludes, ‘gives Sence to Jargon, Demonstration to 
Absurdities, and Consistency to Nonsense, and it is the foundation of the 
greatest, I had almost said, of all the Errors in the World’.821
Partner in this crime against reason and reasonableness is language itself 
-  another form of association. It too threatens to unleash ‘frisking Ideas’ that 
are both necessary to and subversive of the social bond. The ‘Association of 
Ideas’ leads directly into Book III of the Essay, which deals with language (a 
natural transition when we consider how words themselves work on the model 
of association). There is a fundamentally inventive and creative dimension to 
language considered in its rhetorical aspect, which is the primary aspect that 
concerns Locke when he speaks about ‘the abuse of words’. Here Locke is 
particularly anxious about the rhetorically based faculty of ingenium, i.e., the 
human capacity, in Grassi’s words, to ‘surpass what lies before us in our 
sensory awareness’ by ‘catching sight of relationships, of similitudines among 
things’.822 Akin to the process of association, ingenium creates connections 
between things that have none; there is nothing logical or necessary in the
for an education in reason, a power that no pedagogy based on causal explanation can defeat. 
Note that inside the trunk is only ‘noise’ or ‘the insignificant buzz of purely empty sounds’. Yet, 
it is this noise which both enables symbolic meaning (the common grammar of the dance), and 
keeps the subject from being fully inscribed in that grammar. We may say that in the trunk is 
the stuff of rhetoric, that part of signification and subjectivity that is inventive, imaginative. So 
within Locke’s framework, the Gentleman’s Trunk undercuts another sort of fantasy: the 
fantasy of a wholly rational subject (when rational is understood as free of the influence of 
passion or affect).
820 Ibid., II.xxxiii.18, p. 400.
821 Ibid., p. 401.
822 Grassi, Rhetoric as Philosophy, p. 8.
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connections we create through the use of rhetorical language. In contrast to 
rational language (which never discovers anything new but only what is 
already given in the premises), ingenium is the art of invention. Rhetorical 
language ‘provides that which deduction can never discover’.823 It is important 
to note that Locke’s stance towards the ingenious dimension of language is 
ambivalent. This ambivalence is partly related to his non-naturalistic view of 
signification, which argued for the difference between res and verba. For 
Locke language is: (i) not a nomenclature (because it refers not to things in the 
world but to ideas in the mind); (ii) arbitrary (since there is no necessary 
connection between an idea and its sign); (iii) more or less voluntaristic (as it is 
the individual alone who chooses to make a particular sign stand for a 
particular idea); and (iv) private (because the sign he chooses stands for an 
idea in his own head and because the connection between sign and idea is 
invisible to others). Locke affirms language as the social bond; a well ordered 
commonwealth is, after all, unimaginable without language. However, ‘[t]o 
make words serviceable to the end of Communication’, he tells us, ‘it is 
necessary that they excite, in the Hearer, exactly the same Idea, they stand for 
in the Mind of the Speaker’. ‘Without this’, Locke warns, ‘Men fill one 
another’s Heads with noise and sounds; but convey not thereby their 
Thoughts, and lay not before one another their Ideas, which is the end of 
Discourse and Language [be it ‘civil’ or ‘philosophical’]’.8^  Language, 
therefore, enables thought, communication, and sociality; but it only fulfils its 
purpose when the members of a given speech community agree to make 
certain sounds stand for certain ideas that they trust each other to keep.823
This view, often repeated in the Essay, would seem to connect Locke with 
a tradition of seventeenth-century efforts (e.g. those of John Wilkins, Seth 
Ward, and George Dalgamo) to purge language, especially philosophical 
language, of its figurative properties and to bring it into accordance with the 
real existence of things. John Wilkin’s Essay towards a Real Character and a
823 Grassi, Rhetoric as Philosophy, p. 97.
824 Essay, III.ix.6, p . ; III.ix.2, p. ?.
823 So where Locke has us as a community agreeing and consenting to what words stand for,
Hobbes thinks we will never do this, we will always remain solipsists and therefore require an
overarching sovereign to name names.
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Philosophical Language (1668), a work sponsored by the Royal Society, is a 
good example of the project to create ‘noise-free channels of communication 
and to produce authoritative systems of meaning’.826 The word, for Wilkins, 
should exactly match the thing; things of the imagination, because they did not 
exist, should have no word. Locke clearly shares with seventeenth-century 
linguistic reformers the belief that contests of meaning are more about 
uncertain uses of words than about real differences in ideas. He wonders 
whether ‘the greatest part of the Disputes in the World are not meerly Verbal, 
and about the Signification of Words’; and whether
‘if the terms they are made in, were defined, and reduced in their Signification 
(as they must be, where they signify any thing) to determined Collections of 
the simple Ideas they do or should stand for, those Disputes would not end of 
themselves, and immediately vanish’.82?
It follows that ‘A Man should take care to use no word without a [precise] 
signification, no Name without an Idea for which he makes it stand’.828 Locke 
complains persistently against the willful ‘abuse of words’, which compounds 
the natural imperfections of language.82’ And, in his own modest contribution 
to linguistic reform, Locke proposes that ‘Words standing for Things, which 
are known and distinguished by their outward shapes, should be expressed by 
little Draughts and Prints made of them’.83° But several features of Locke’s 
thesis set it at odds with the obsessions of universal language schemers and 
linguistic reformers. For example, despite his belief that the flagrant abuse of 
words should be curtailed, Locke’s understanding of the nature of linguistic 
signs raises doubts about the effort to eliminate uncertainty in our speaking 
practices. ‘[I]t is easy to perceive, he says, ‘what imperfection there is in 
Language, and how the very nature of Words, makes it almost unavoidable, for 
many of them to be doubtful and uncertain in their significations’.^1 We 
should, of course, remedy the defects of language where we can (e.g. the willful
826 Robert Markley, Fallen Languages: Crises o f Representation in Newtonian England 1660- 
1740 (Ithaca, NY, 1993), p. 32.
82? Essay, III.xi.7, p. 511.
828 Ibid., III.xi.8, p. 512.
82’ See, e.g., ibid., III.x.13, p. 497; III.ix.21,489.
83° Ibid., III.xi.25, P- 522. This is proposed as a temporary solution, because Locke’s ideal of a 
dictionary containing a ‘Natural History’ of names, ‘will require too much time, cost, and pains, 
to be hoped for in this Age’ (ibid.).
83l Ibid., III.ix.i, pp. 475-6.
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abuse of words), but we are not to worship the idol of human perfection.
Locke’s semiotics is not only at odds with Adamicists (who yearn for the 
perfection of language before the Fall), but also with those reformers who 
would construct language anew. ‘I am not so vain to think’, he says, ‘that any 
one can pretend to attempt the perfect Reforming the Languages of the world, 
not so much as that of his own Country, without rendring himself 
ridiculous’.8*2 After all, ‘whenever we make them [words] stand for any thing, 
but those Ideas we have in our own Minds’, it is ‘perverting the use of Words’, 
and ‘brings unavoidable Obscurity and Confusion into their Signification’.8** 
The language reformers, therefore, merely recreate the problem of uncertainty 
in signification that they pretend to eliminate. What is more, for Locke, the 
fantasy of a perfectly transparent and common language also exhibits an 
implicit authoritarianism:
“To require that Men should use their words constantly in the  sam e sense, and 
for none but determ ined and uniform  Ideas, would be to  think, th a t all Men 
should have the sam e Notions, and should talk of nothing bu t w hat they have 
clear and distinct Ideas  of. W hich is not to he expected by any one, who hath  
not vanity enough to  imagine he can prevail with [or force] M en, to  be very 
knowing, or very silent’.8**
So if the abuse of words incites wars of interpretation, the dream of a common 
language, stifles public debate. Language reformers deny that,
‘eveiy Man has so inviolable a Liberty, to make W ords stand for w hat Ideas he 
pleases, tha t no one hath  the Power to make others have the same Ideas in 
their Minds, tha t he has, when they use the  same Words, th a t he does. And 
therefore the great A ugustus  himself, in the  Possession of th a t Power which 
ruled the World, acknowledged, he could not make a  new Latin W ord: which 
was as much as to  say, tha t he could no t arbitrarily appoint, w hat Idea  any 
Sound should be the Sign of, in the Mouths and comm on Language of his 
Subjects’.8**
This ‘inviolable Liberty’ of every man to make words stand for ideas in his own 
mind is at the centre of Locke’s political semiotics. However, it is important to 
note that, for Locke, there is an important difference between Adam’s liberty 
to affix words to ideas as he pleased and ours. He explains that ‘in Places,
8*2 Essay, III xi.2, p. 509. 
8** Ibid., III.ii.5., p. 407.
8 ** Ibid., III.xi.2, p. 509.
8*s Ibid., III.ii.8, p. 408.
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where Men in Society have already established a Language amongst them, the 
signification of Words are very warily and sparingly to be alter’d’.^6 So while 
common use is established through what Locke calls ‘tacit consent’, 
individuals thereafter are deprived of that initial freedom (i.e., of being able to 
make those sounds stand for any ideas they please) .837 Since we are bound in a 
loose form of reciprocal obligation to use words as ‘the rule of propriety’ 
dictates,83» he who exhibits ‘... an affected misapplication of them cannot but 
be very ridiculous. He that hath new Notions, will, perhaps, venture 
sometimes on the coining new Terms to express them: But Men think it a 
Boldness, and ’tis uncertain, whether common Use will ever make them pass 
for currant’,839 Locke, then, has little patience with men who are so vain as to 
coin new words. However, it is important for his political semiotics to insist 
upon our inheritance of Adam’s linguistic liberty. This liberty, in tandem with 
the arbitrary character of the sign, supports Locke’s critique of Filmer’s 
political semiotics: no man could possibly define for all posterity the absolute 
meaning of a word. Language is not substance; the sign has no core that 
persists through time (as Adamicists like Filmer would have it).
However, the wish to make language a substance is not unique to 
Adamicists and universal language schemers. It also animates the double 
character of what Locke calls the ‘secret reference’ that men give to their 
words. ‘First, they suppose their Words to be Marks o f the Ideas in the Minds 
o f other Men, with whom they communicate’; and ‘Secondly ... they often 
suppose their Words to stand also fo r  the reality o f  Things’.1*0 According to 
Locke, the secret reference is entangled in the perverse logic of association. 
‘[Tjhere comes by constant use, to be such a Connexion between certain
83s Essay, III.vi.51, p. 471.
837 See ibid., III.xi.11, p. 514, where Locke evokes the normative power of this informal duty by 
comparing words to money: ‘For Words, especially of Languages already framed, being no 
Man’s private possession, but the common measure of Commerce and Communication, ’tis not 
for any one, at pleasure, to change the Stamp they are current in; nor alter the Ideas they are 
affixed to; or at least when there is a necessity to do so, he is bound to give notice of it’. By 
using this metaphor he is drawing on a long tradition; see, e.g., Quintilian, Institutio oratorio, 
tr. H.E. Butler, 4 vols. (London, 1963), I, p. 113; Bacon, Adv. L., p. 231; Hobbes, Leviathan, pp. 
28-9.
838 Essay, III.ix.8, p. 479; cf. III.x.31, p. 506: ‘He that applies his names to ideas, different from 
their common use, wants propriety in his language, and speaks gibberish’.
839 ibid., III.vi.51, p. 471; cf. III.ii.8, p. 408; III.vi.44-5, pp. 466-8.
840 Ibid., III.ii.4, p. 406; III.ii.5, p. 407.
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Sounds, and the Ideas they stand fo r \  Locke says, ‘that the Names heard, 
almost as readily excite certain Ideas, as if the Objects themselves, which are 
apt to produce them, did actually affect the Senses’.1*1 His anxiety is that words 
actually have the force of empirical objects; they create sensations that give 
rise to Ideas (in the subject) whose connection to reality is questionable. The 
tendency to confuse words with things, Locke tells us, has its origins in our 
very formation as speaking subjects:
‘[B]ecause by familiar use from our Cradles, we come to learn certain 
articulate Sounds very perfectly, and have them readily on our Tongues, and 
always at hand in our Memories; but yet are not always careful to examine, or 
settle their Significations perfectly, it often happens that Men, even when they 
would apply themselves to an attentive Consideration, do set their Thoughts 
more on Words than Things. Nay, because Words are many of them leam’d, 
before the Ideas are known for which they stand: Therefore some, not only 
Children, but Men, speak several Words, no otherwise than Parrots do’.8'*2
The ‘childish’ man attributes substance to the sign and takes words for things. 
Above all, he is not in control of his symbolic production. The words that we 
have ‘readily on our Tongues, and always at hand in our Memories’ are more 
like sounds without any distinct signification. They do not correspond to a 
clear idea in the mind but are like a melody that plays in our head. In the 
Conduct o f the Understanding, Locke describes these archaic, infantile 
memories as ‘the chiming of some particular words or sentence in the 
memory’,
‘[I]t is a sort of childishness, if I may say so, of the understanding, wherein, 
during the fit, it plays with and dandles some insignificant puppet to no end, 
nor with any design at all, and yet cannot easily be got off from it. Thus some 
trivial sentence, or scrap of poetry, will sometimes get into men’s heads, and 
make such a chiming there, that there is no stilling of it; no peace to be 
obtained, nor attention to anything else, but this impertinent guest will take 
up the mind and possess the thoughts in spite of all endeavors to get rid of 
it’.8**
Singling out the chiming as the most debilitating form of the ‘transferring of 
thoughts’ that ‘clog’ our understanding and impede our reason, Locke notes
841 Essay, III.ii.6, p. 407.
842 Ibid., III.ii.7, p. 407. This infantile spectacle of parrot-speech recalls Locke’s account of how 
children receive ‘borrowed Principles’ into their minds, which they later come to adore and 
even die for as adults (I.iii.22, p. 81).
843 Of the Conduct o f the Understanding, ed. T. Fowler (Oxford, 1901), §45, p. 100.
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that, like the (unnatural) association of ideas, this meaningless noise afflicts 
even the most reasonable men, ‘persons of very good parts’.8** The chiming 
marks a point of impasse, a sort of affective tie that binds the subject to an 
‘object’.*  ^ For Locke, it is the task of the understanding to cast out the 
‘impertinent guest’, to still the noise, ‘immediately disturb and check it, [and] 
introduce new and more serious considerations’. After all, he says, ‘Men know 
the value of their corporal liberty, and therefore suffer not willingly fetters and 
chains to be put upon them’. A man should be ‘fully master of his own 
thoughts’.8** Locke reassures us that, if diligent, we can prevail over the 
aforementioned threats to rational thought. However, his analysis actually 
suggests a less optimistic outcome of our ‘struggle to preserve the freedom of 
our better part’ (i.e., our rational part), to keep at bay any passion that may 
‘take possession of our minds with a kind of authority’.**?
V
Locke, like Hobbes, attempts to fight what he saw as the destructive power of 
rhetoric with his own version of true persuasion. His animus, therefore, is not 
directed against persuasion as a concomitant of instruction; rather it is 
directed against the forensic temper that prizes success in verbal combat above 
responsibility to truth. In fact, Locke’s assault upon ‘bad’ rhetoric derives from 
a standard attack upon scholasticism.**8 In 1689, in the wake of a revolution 
which jettisoned King James II, but preserved the institution of monarchy in 
Britain, Locke’s Essay attacked the scholastic rhetoric which had, in his view, 
helped the absolutist regime stay in power. For Locke ‘the Governments of the 
World owed their Peace, Defence, and Liberties’, to ‘the unscholastick 
Statesman’; whereas the ‘artificial Ignorance, and learned Gibberish’ of 
scholastic ‘Disputants, these all-knowing Doctors,’ had ‘prevailed mightily in
844 Two Treaties, §45, pp. 96, 97,100.
845 See, e.g., ibid., §45, p. i02..g., ‘some trivial sentence or scrap of poetry’ or ‘the insignificant 
buzz of purely empty sounds’.
846 Ibid., §45, p. 101.
*»? Ibid., §45, p. 97.
848 In the course of the seventeenth century, scholasticism was subjected to devastating
criticisms that had roots in humanist assaults in the sixteenth century by the likes of Pico della
Mirandola and are even traceable to Petrarch in the fourteenth century.
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these last Ages’ to mislead the citizenry.*^ In fact, on the testimony of those 
who knew him best, Locke’s one great pastime was fulminating against 
disputers and disputations.88° He had a rather telling name for disputation in 
the Schools:881 ‘Hogshearing’, the laborious clipping of tiny hairs from the 
skins of vociferating animals (not swine apparently, but yearling lambs). Locke 
hated it (and he did it badly).882 This was partly the reason why he ‘pitched 
upon the study of physique’, where he was simultaneously away from the 
Schools, and ‘as far as might be from any publique concemes’.888 His 
repudiation of dispute, participating as it does in a larger polemic against 
scholasticism within Restoration culture, is important for what it reveals about 
the method and rhetoric of his epistemology. Primarily, it shows the depth of 
his allegiance to the master-builders of the new science.88-* To Locke’s 
colleagues in the Royal Society the disputation epitomised all that was 
stagnant and word-bound in scholasticism. Bacon’s theme that ‘the customs 
and institutions of schools, academies, [and] colleges ... [are] adverse to the 
progress of science’888 was taken up again and again by the Society’s fellows. 
Robert Boyle, for example, laments that ‘the Naturall Philosophy hitherto 
taught in most Schools, hath been so Litigious in its Theorie, and so barren as 
to its Productions’.886 Likewise, John Evelyn complains that ‘Obstreperous and 
Noisy Disputes’ about metaphysical abstractions were responsible for 
‘affrighting, and (till of late) deterring Men from adventuring on further 
Discoveries’.88? In rejecting disputations, Locke’s scientific contemporaries 
advocated a philosophy that was heuristic and pragmatic, concerned more
8-*9 Essay, III.x.9, p. 495.
880 See J. Le Clerc, The Life and Character o f Mr. John Locke (London, 1706), pp. 3, 27; and 
Pierre Coste, The Character of Mr. Locke’, in A Collection o f Several Pieces o f Mr. John Locke, 
ed. P. Desmaiseaux (London, 1720), p. xvii.
881 Disputations were central to the curriculum of British universities in Locke’s day: 
undergraduates were set disputing in college classes to sharpen their logic, and the attainment 
of most degrees depended on a successful performance in formal public debates.
882 P. Laslett, ‘Introduction’, Two Treatises, p. 22.
888 ‘Locke to Thomas Herbert, Eighth Earl of Pembroke, 3 December 1684’, in Correspondence, 
ed. E. S. de Beer, 8 vols. (Oxford, 1976-89), II, p. 663.
8s4 in general see, M. Ben-Chaim, Experimental philosophy and the birth o f empirical science: 
Boyle, Locke, and Newton (Aldershot, 2004).
888 F. Bacon, The Works o f Francis Bacon, ed. J. Spedding, et. al., 7 vols. (London, 1857-59), IV, 
p. 89.
886 R. Boyle, Some Considerations Touching the Usefulnesse o f Experimental Naturall 
Philosophy (Oxford, 1663), pp. 2-3.
887 J. Evelyn, Acetaria: A  Discourse ofSallets (London, 1699), A3r.
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with action and the pressing needs of humanity than with establishing 
universal principles.8®8
In a similar vein, notwithstanding his tenacious grip on his Christ Church 
fellowship, Locke made no attempt to disguise his contempt for the university 
curriculum of his day. For example, he told his friend and colleague Jean Le 
Clerc that he had often ‘wish’d his Father had never sent him to Oxford . A n d  
in Thoughts Concerning Education, Locke warns parents against hiring as a 
tutor a mere scholar who would merely empty ‘into his Pupil all the Latin, and 
Logick, he has brought from the University’.860 Locke attacks disputation in 
many of his works, but his most thorough and damning analysis of its dangers 
(criticisms already voiced by, among others, Joseph Glanvill, Robert Boyle, 
and John Evelyn) can be found in the Essay. ‘[T]he admired Art of Disputing’, 
he remarks, ‘hath added much to the natural imperfection of Languages, ... 
more than to discover the Knowledge and Truth of things ...\861 He tells us of 
his strong aversion to the violence and competitiveness of disputes, which turn 
students into captious ‘wranglers’ rather than careful thinkers.862 For Locke 
such combative fora clearly stunt intellectual growth. ‘[V]ictory’ in the schools 
is, after all, ‘adjudged not to him who had Truth on his side, but the last word 
in the Dispute’. As a result, even when men are ‘bafled and silenced in this 
Scholastique way’, they are ‘seldom or never convinced, and so brought over to 
the conquering side . . . \ 863 Onerous words and esoteric notions are developed 
primarily to create a privileged class of professionals and this testifies to the 
egotism of traditional philosophy. Pride, Locke tells us, explains it all:
‘the Schoolmen since, aiming at Glory and Esteem, for their great and 
universal Knowledge, easier a great deal to be pretended to, than really 
acquired, found this a good Expedient to cover their Ignorance, with a curious
8®8 It is worth noting that the Royal Society was in many ways an institution concerned with 
political and religious order and, consequently, by no means entirely comfortable with the 
implications of its divergence from the universities in methodology. See J. R. Jacob, 
‘Restoration, Reformation, and the Origins of the Royal Society’, H. Sci., 13 (1975), pp. 155-76; 
and id., ‘Restoration Ideologies and the Royal Society’, H. Sci., 18 (1980), pp. 25-38.
859 Le Clerc, Life and Character, p. 2.
860 Some Thoughts Concerning Education, ed. J. W. and J. S. Yolton (Oxford, 1989), p. 150.
861 Essay, III.x.6, pp. 493-4; cf. III.x.7, pp. 494; IV.iii.30, p. 561.
862 Plato had compared elenctic debates to wrestling matches, a metaphor revived in
Restoration accounts of disputation. See, e.g., Obadiah Walker, O f Education, 6th edn. 
(London, 1699), p. 120.
863 Essay, III.x.7, P- 4 9 4 ! IV.xvii.4, p. 677.
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and unexplicable Web of perplexed Words, and procure to themselves the 
admiration of others, by unintelligible Terms, the apter to produce wonder, 
because they could not be understood’.86-*
Locke creates a mocking myth of the origins of scholastic maxims or axioms. 
To prevent the endless spinning out of disputations between ‘obstinate 
Wranglers’,
‘whilst one never fail’d of a medius terminus to prove any Proposition; and 
the other could as constantly, without, or with a Distinction, deny the Major 
or Minor; ... certain general Propositions ... were introduced into the Schools, 
which being such as all Men allowed and agreed in, were look’d on as general 
Measures of Truth, and serv’d instead of Principles ... beyond which there 
was no going, and which must not be receded from by either side’.86®
Because these maxims were given the name of principles beyond which one 
could not go, they were wrongly assumed to be the source of all knowledge 
‘and the Foundations whereon the Sciences were built’.866 This ‘Method of the 
Schools’, Locke warns, has ‘allowed and encouraged Men to oppose and resist 
evident Truth, till they are baffled, i.e. till they are reduced to contradict 
themselves, or some established Principle’. Yet, ‘obstinately to maintain that 
side of the Question they have chosen, whether true or false, to the last 
extremity’ is considered ‘a Vertue and a Glory’.86? Locke repudiates, in 
addition, the three modes of argument on which the disputant chiefly relies, 
i.e., the arguments ad Verecundiam, ad Ignorantiam  and ad Hominem .868 In 
his view, to demand that an adversary accept an argument as true ‘out of 
respect, or any other consideration, but that of conviction’, or merely because 
he cannot provide a better one, is to build on ‘Ignorance, or Errour’.86? This is a 
topic on which the usually measured voice of the Essay becomes emphatic, 
even indulging in hyperbole: In their disputations, ‘these all-knowing Doctors’ 
have had ‘the Advantage to destroy the Instruments and Means of Discourse, 
Conversation, Instruction, and Society’.8?0
8&*£ssay, III.x.8.
86® Ibid., IV.vii.il, p. 600.
866 Ibid.
86? Ibid., p. 601
868 See ibid., IV.xvii.19-22, pp. 685-87. The true philosopher, by contrast, relies on 
Argumentum ad Judicium. ‘This alone of all the four, brings true Instruction with it, and 
advances us in our way to Knowledge’ (ibid., xvii.22, p. 686).
86’ Ibid., pp. 686-7.
870 Ibid., III.x.9, p. 495; III.x.10, p. 495.
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It is important to note that, with this appeal to the ends of ‘Conversation, 
Instruction, and Society’, Locke evokes an ideal of discourse central to the 
Royal Society’s formulation of its own project. Indeed, from its inception, the 
Society encouraged candid conversation in its meetings. If we are to believe 
Samuel Sorbiere’s description of the Society’s proceedings, these ideals seem 
to have been put into practice:
‘There is no body here eager to speak, that makes a long Harangue, or intent 
upon saying all he knows: He is never interrupted that speaks, and 
Differences of Opinion cause no manner of Resentment, nor as much as a 
disobling Way of Speech: There is nothing seemed to me to be more civil, 
respectful, and better managed than this Meeting’.8?1
Thomas Sprat’s History o f the Royal Society (1667) goes further and suggests 
that collective discussion was valued above physical demonstration. After all, 
‘though the Experiment was but the private task of one or two, or some such 
small number’, Sprat says, ‘the debating on its consequences, was still the 
employment of their full, and solemn Assemblies’.8?2 This commitment to open 
exchange is, of course, a concomitant of the Baconian view that natural 
philosophy is by definition a collective endeavour.8?3 Robert Boyle fills the early 
Philosophical Transactions with long catalogues of lieads of inquiry’ in 
question form on topics as diverse as blood transfusion and the natural history 
of the West Indies. Readers of the journal were quick to reply, fleshing out 
Boyle’s outlines from their own observation. The Transactions’ informal 
epistolary exchanges, in contrast to the disputation’s tight focus on a single, 
general thesis, are adapted to the varied and often random character of sense 
experience. With its play of voices about themes of common interest, the 
rhetoric of the Transactions comes to approximate sustained conversation.8?-*
8?‘ S. Sorbi&re, A Voyage to England (London, 1709), pp. 36-7; first published in Paris in 1664.
8?2 T. Sprat, History o f the Royal Society, ed. J. Cope and H. Jones (St Louis, Mo., 1959), p.
102.
8?3 For more information on Bacon see the excellent study by Stephen Gaukroger, Francis
Bacon and the Transformation o f Early-Modern Philosophy (Cambridge, 2001).
8?-t Charles Bazerman, Shaping Written Knowledge: The Genre and Activity o f the 
Experimental Article in Science (Madison, 1988), esp. pp. 77-8, examines the developing 
rhetoric of the Transactions between 1665 and 1800, tracing the genealogy of the modem 
scientific article. He argues that the form of the journal fostered debate and disagreement 
which, in turn, encouraged more theoretically motivated programmes of experimentation. For 
more information see, Peter Dear, ‘Totius in verba: Rhetoric and Authority in the Early Royal 
800161/, Isis, 76 (1985), pp. 145-61; and id. ‘Narratives, Anecdotes, and Experiments: Turning
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It is hardly surprising, therefore, to find that Boyle’s The Sceptical 
Chymist, clearly aspires towards polite conversation. In fact, he vows to 
provide in his work a model of ‘Philosophical conference’, an alternative to the 
‘Dialectical subtleties’ of the Schoolmen, and to demonstrate ‘how to manage 
even Disputes with Civility*. Moreover, ‘in a book written by a Gentleman, and 
wherein only Gentlemen are introduc’d as speakers’, Boyle tells us, ‘the 
Language should be more smooth and the Expressions more Civil than is usual 
in the more Scholastick way of writing’.8?6 The dialogue thus begins with large 
displays of friendship and fine manners. Cameades, Boyle’s spokesman, 
welcomes his fellow virtuosi into his garden ‘with open looks and armes, and 
... with his wonted freedom and civility’.8?6 And, of course, the interlocutors in 
The Sceptical Chymist are virtuosi of the best possible sort, i.e., accomplished 
experimentalists whose first-hand chemical experience is the product of 
private study. It is important to note, finally, that in Boyle’s work there is also 
a constant attempt to find a via media in metaphysical disputes. The 
corpuscular hypothesis, he says, is something that transcends metaphysical 
disputes between the Cartesian and Epicurean schools, whose hypotheses 
‘might by a person of a reconciling disposition be looked on as ... one 
philosoph/.8?? Eclecticism is presented here as an ingredient in gentlemanly 
behaviour, something to be contrasted with the adversarial mode of Scholastic 
disputation.
Stephen Shapin has argued that there is an intimate relationship between 
the emerging image of natural science and the development of modern 
‘selfhood’.8?8 The new science was a communal and public enterprise among 
gentlemen, so it required modesty and respect for the arguments (and 
experiments) of peers, the openness to attend to all relevant evidence, and for
Experience into Science in the Seventeenth Century*, in The Literary Structure o f Scientific 
Argument, ed. P. Dear (Philadelphia, 1991), pp. 135-63 (where he contrasts this rhetoric with 
that of Aristotelian science, which worked deductively rather than hypothetically).
8?s R. Boyle, The Sceptical Chymist, or Chymico-Physical Doubts and Paradoxes, 2nd edn. 
(Oxford, 1680), pp. 5,14.
8?6 Ibid., p. 4.
8?? Id., Preface to Some Specimens o f An Attempt to make Chymical Experiments useful to 
illustrate the notions o f the Corpuscular Philosophy, in The Works o f the Honourable Robert 
Boyle, ed. T. Birch, 2nd edn., 6 vols. (London, 1772), i.355-8 at p. 356.
8?8 See S. Shapin, A Social History o f Truth (Chicago, 1994); and id. and Simon Schaffer, 
Leviathan and the Air Pump.
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hypotheses to be tested in a public forum. Shapin is certainly right to 
emphasise that the pervasive ideology of a gentlemanly, ‘experimental’ 
persona is something that permeates and in some respects shapes natural 
philosophical practice.8?8 However, he does not trace its origins back further 
than Robert Boyle,880 whereas there are significant Baconian precedents for 
both the idea of a via media881 and for the idea of experiment and observation 
replacing Scholastic methods of disputation. Moreover, in using the dialogue 
form, scientists like Boyle worked with canons of civility that had been 
characteristic of its functioning from antiquity to the Renaissance. Neither was 
a gentlemanly preoccupation with civil conversation in any way peculiar to 
English natural philosophy. For example, the issue of a ‘civil’ and experimental 
approach to natural philosophy, and the inculcation of these values in natural 
philosophers, had been raised by Descartes in his La Recherche de la Verite 
par la lumiere naturelle, which dates from the 1630s or 1640s.882 So it is 
misleading to construe the continuing vitality of a register as a new ideology 
and to see a persona like Boyle’s as fashioning a modem self. Still, he 
undoubtedly lived the scientific persona with conspicuous success, and his 
critiques of Hobbes were an effective way of presenting the openness of 
Eclecticism, as an alternative to the prioristic over-reaching of speculative 
argument.
Boyle was one of the great influences on Locke’s thought and it is his 
model of philosophical conversation which Locke especially promotes in the 
Essay.883 He wants to promote the work as exemplary polite conversation and
8t9 Shapin, Social History, esp. pp. 409-10.
880 See ibid., pp. 160-8.
881 In Temporis Partus Masculus, Bacon says that Democritus ‘destroyed two falsehoods by 
knocking their heads together and opened up a middle path to truth’. In the De Sapientia 
Veterum, he uses the images of steering between Scylla and Charybdis, and of the flight of 
Icarus: ‘Moderation or the Middle Way is in Morals much commended, in Intellectuals less 
spoken of, though not less useful and good’ (Works vi.754). And in the Novum Organum, 
Bacon warns that to avoid the ‘Idols of the Cave’, we must steer a middle course between 
‘extreme admirations for antiquity1 and ‘extreme love and appetite for novelty1 {Nov. Org. I Ivi, 
in Works i.170; iii.59-60).
882 See Descartes, Oeuvres, ed. C. Adam and P. Tannery, 2nd edn., 11 vols. (Paris, 1974-86), X,
PP- 495-527. See A. Ranea, ‘A “Science for honnetes hommes”,’ in Descartes' Natural 
Philosophy, ed. S. Gaukroger, et.al. (London, 2000), pp. 313-29.
883 Locke’s regard for Boyle is registered in the ‘Epistle to the Reader’ in the Essay (pp. 9-10), 
where Boyle is named as one of the ‘master builders’ in the advancement of science, alongside 
Isaac Newton, Thomas Sydenham, and Christiaan Huygens. In ‘an Age that produces such
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the very antithesis of dispute. The natural setting for thought, after all, should 
be a guard against the obscene self-serving professionalism of the Scholastics. 
Thus his own candid and informal method he likens to two ‘virtuous pastimes’, 
hawking and hunting,1889 and his well-known account of the genesis of the 
Essay, whereby the ‘well directed study’ is an extension of a conversation 
among ‘five  or six Friends meeting at m y Chamber’.“ s This conversation 
among friends, unlike the average disputation, is portrayed as truly open and 
free and draws attention to the problematic character of judgement.886 The 
process of balancing competing claims and of gathering all the evidence which 
might bear on the issue demands the utmost ‘Diligence, Attention, and 
Exactness’.88? Locke calls ‘discourse’ both this seminal discussion and the book 
it gave rise to. What is more, Locke does not assume the authority commonly 
granted to a philosopher. He claims to have written the Essay merely ‘for my 
own Information, and the Satisfaction of a few Friends’.888 We are ‘not to 
expect any thing here, but what being spun out of my own course Thoughts, is 
fitted to Men of my own size’.88’ This intimate and diffident mood is sustained 
by his acknowledgement of the continuing role of his friends in revising the 
Essay. So for example, in the second edition Locke tells us that he was put 
upon a strict review of the controversial chapter on power: ‘... I my self from 
the beginning fearing, and a very judicious Friend of mine, since the 
publication suspecting ... [there to be] some mistake in it ...’.89° Moreover, by 
addressing the opening Epistle to us and by making large gestures of deference
Masters’, Locke says, ’tis Ambition enough to be employed as an Under-labourer in clearing the 
Ground a little, and removing some of the Rubbish, that lies in the way of K n ow le d ge B u t  as 
Rosalie Colie has (I think rightly) pointed out, Locke’s is ‘an odd kind of modesty”, because ‘it 
insists that such masters of thought have not sufficiently clarified knowledge so that an under- 
labourer of the sort Locke’s makes himself out to be, is still needed’ (The essayist in his Essay1, 
in John Locke, ed. J. W. Yolton [Cambridge, 1969], pp. 234-61, at p. 244).
889 Essay, Epistle.
88s Ibid.; emphasis added.
886 See R. Kroll, The Material Word (Baltimore, 1991), who argues for a prevailing rhetoric of 
probability in the Restoration, and points to the regularity with which neo-classical writers 
‘allude to and dramatize the reader’s necessarily contingent activity when faced with a text’ (p. 
53). For Locke’s contribution to the Restoration debate about probability see, Shapiro, 
Probability and Certainty; M. Osier, ‘John Locke and the changing ideal of scientific 
knowledge’, JHI, 31 (1970), pp. 3-16; and D. Patey, Probability and Literary Form 
(Cambridge, 1984), esp. pp. 27-34.
88? Essay, iv.xvi.9.
888 Ibid.
889 Ibid., p. 8.
890 Ibid., II.xxi.71, p. 282.
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to our judgements, Locke establishes the readers’ role as conversants (clearly 
intended as a compliment): ‘I consider my self as liable to Mistakes’, he says, 
‘as I can think thee’.
In chapter 2 we saw how, for Aristotle, one of the most important 
elements in persuasive or effective speech is the character or ethos displayed 
by the speaker.891 When we listen, we pay attention not only to the message 
conveyed but to the person conveying it. If the speaker strikes us as a 
trustworthy person, we are much more likely to accept (and act) on what he 
says. Locke’s writings in general reveal how well he learned this lesson. The 
Essay in particular is a classic example of the way in which an argument can 
be enhanced by skilful self-presentation. His voice in the Essay is that of a 
patient, moderate, bourgeois man, who despite his Protestant faith can be 
trusted to take a detached and impartial view of things. The very plainness of 
his style contributes to his Quaker-like tone. The impact of the Essay is clearly 
enhanced by the fact that he does not indulge in fanciful metaphors or 
overheated eloquence (those stylistic habits that make other writers 
entertaining, but not entirely trustworthy).892 When John Wynne of Jesus 
College, Oxford, asked him to write an English epitome of the Essay for the 
use of undergraduates, Locke’s answer was that he had not expected such a 
request. After all, he wrote ‘in plain and popular stile, which having in it 
noething of the aire of learning nor soe much as the language of the schools 
was litle suited to the use or relish of those who as teachers or learners applyd 
them selves to the mysterys of scholastique knowledge’.81* His ‘modesty’ is, of 
course, a counter-statement to scholastic ‘mysterys’. The ‘true’ philosopher, for 
him, should be modest, acknowledge the limits of his office. In fact, Locke is 
the clearest example of a powerful writer who tried to make deference and 
modesty his literary signature. From the first, the Essay was recognised as an 
attempt to establish a new way of writing philosophy. Not everyone was
881 See, e.g., Aristotle, Rh., 1.2.1356a.
892 Stanley Fish, Self-Consuming Artifacts (Berkeley, 1974), has argued that the tradition of 
plain talk in philosophy that Locke represents resembles in a secular sense an old rhetorical- 
theological strategy that was articulated by another professor of rhetoric, St. Augustine: ‘The 
teaching of the truth need not be accompanied by pleasing words or forceful exhortations, 
because the truth itself, if it is understood, both delights and moves’ (p. 34).
8*  Correspondence, V, p. 266.
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enthusiastic about the innovation. The biographer of Locke’s most bitter 
opponent, Bishop Stillingfleet, labelled the book ‘modish popularising’:
‘This Essay abounding with a Set of new Philosophical Terms, as if some 
wonderful Improvement of Knowledge was to have been hoped for from it, 
and being written with a graceful Air,... and elegancy of Style and politeness 
of Expression, a smoothness in Reasoning, and an ingenious improvement of 
his Arguments to the best Advantage,... no wonder true Understanding, and a 
right Apprehension of Things, set off with these uncommon Advantages, 
should easily recommend it self to the Affections of the Studious, especially 
the younger part of them’.8**
That is in fact a good description of the Essay, which is ingratiating and 
persuasive in just those ways. Later readers have come to take Locke at his 
word as merely a modest and plain speaker. Indeed, simplicity and downright 
drabness as a writer are what some critics have granted him. George 
Saintsbury singled out Locke’s style as the lowest moment in the history of 
English prose and found that his literary innovation consisted in making that 
prose ‘positively mean in every point of style’.8”  R. I. Aaron, a less exquisite 
judge, concluded that his style reflected his genuine directness and 
simplicity.8?6 It is easy to underestimate the rhetorical artifice of the Essay 
because there is nothing that is showy about it. By comparison with the 
magnificence of Bacon’s architectonics and clarity, with the incisive duplicities 
of Hobbes, and with the witty fluency of Hume, Locke’s style can seem as 
trivial as his thoughts seem to some. But we must not allow ourselves to be so 
easily deceived, however, by the art that conceals art. His very simplicity of 
style is itself part of a cunningly planned rhetorical strategy.
Locke’s image of philosophy, therefore, still draws on the promotional 
rhetorics of office. He casts his argument in the language of duty and 
responsibility, of ends and functions and what has impeded their fulfilment. 
The answer he provides is by and large, cut out and stitched with the same 
materials of intellectual office and its abuse as Hobbes had used: the complete 
obfuscation of past philosophy and the delusions of rhetoric, which are
894 T. Goodwin, The Life and Character ... o f the Late Dr. Edw. Stillingfleet (1710), pp. 86-7; 
cited in J. Yolton, John Locke and the Way o f Ideas (London, 1956), p. 89.
898 G. Saintsbury, A  History o f English Prose Rhythm  (Bloomington, 1965), p. 229.
896 R. I. Aaron, John Locke (Oxford, 1971), p. 49.
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attacked tout court, thus stigmatising the persona of the rhetorician as the 
enemy of the under-labourer.
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6Epilogue: living with uncertainty
Four books and thirteen chapters into his autobiography, and still not having 
advanced beyond the day of his birth, Tristram Shandy realised that to 
chronicle his life was going to take even longer than to live it.8*? It is clear that 
the present analysis is plagued by a version of the same problem, for a 
comprehensive examination of this opposition between philosophy and 
rhetoric, would take up more space than the original works, and a great deal 
more than is available here. There is room, however, to look briefly at how the 
enmity of rhetoric has persisted in contemporary philosophy. It is worthwhile 
raising this problem because, unlike the thinkers analysed in the main body of 
this work, most academic philosophers do not acknowledge, or even deny, that 
if the voice of reason is to have any prospect of being heard it will need to 
speak the language of rhetoric. Put differently, the question of rhetoric is 
considered unworthy of philosophical consideration. As hinted at repeatedly in 
this thesis, the predominant tendency in modern Anglo-American philosophy 
has been to either ignore the relation between form and content altogether, or, 
when not ignoring it, to treat rhetoric as largely decorative, i.e., as irrelevant to 
the contents that might be conveyed. Yet, philosophers, no less than other 
scholars, are entangled in the web of language, and draw (whether consciously 
or not) on the intellectual heritage of their culture. We saw that this situation 
is partly the result of the long-standing fascination of many Western 
philosophers with the method and style of natural science, which at different 
times has been taken to embody the only kind of rationality worth emulating -  
even in the ethical sphere. Though it is perfectly plausible to maintain that the 
true nature of the ethical sphere is such that it can best be conveyed in the 
style usually linked with mathematics or natural science, it is an error to take a 
method and style that have been effective for the exploration of certain truths, 
and apply them to a vastly different domain of human existence, a sphere that
s97 L. Sterne, The Life and Opinions ofTristam Shandy, Gentleman (London, 1903), p. 259.
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may require a different norm of rationality, a different kind of precision. As 
Martha Nussbaum persuasively puts it,
‘Whether Kant’s views ... were being defended or attacked..., the conventional 
style of Anglo-American philosophical prose usually prevailed: a style correct, 
scientific, abstract, hygienically pallid, a style that seemed to be regarded as a 
kind of all-purpose solvent in which philosophical issues of any kind at all 
could he efficiently disentangled.... That there might be other ways of being 
precise, other conceptions of lucidity... that might be ... more appropriate for 
ethical thought -  this was, on the whole, neither asserted nor even denied’.8®8
This sort of stance is prevalent among contemporary proponents of 
‘deliberative democracy’ or ‘discursive democracy’. In fact, their contempt for 
rhetoric becomes apparent when we learn that they have upheld conversation 
as the preferred model of political communication. Put differently, for them 
political deliberation takes the form, not of public oratory, but of ‘public 
conversation’, ‘discourse’ or ‘dialogue’.8®® According to most proponents of 
deliberative democracy, political decision-making is legitimate only insofar as 
its policies are produced in a process of public discussion and debate in which 
citizens and their representatives, going beyond mere self-interest and limited 
points of view, reflect on the general interest or on their common good (and 
presumably thereafter come to binding agreements about it).®00 The 
deliberation of citizens, in short, is vital if decisions are not to be merely 
imposed upon them.®01 But participants in this modem public sphere are to be 
conceived, not as citizens of an ancient polis assembling together to engage in 
the common exercise of political will, but as the dispersed members of ‘a 
society engaged in critical public debate’.®02 In other words, deliberation is a 
‘public’ rather than a ‘collective’ or a group-specific activity. Under the aegis of 
‘public opinion’, power and domination in human life were to give way to free
8®8 M. C. Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge (Oxford, 1990), pp. 19-20.
8®9 See A. Gutmann and D. Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge, Mass., 
1996), p. 131.
®00 The two main statements that guide the theory of deliberative democracy outlined here are 
that of Jurgen Habermas (Between Facts and Norms, tr. W. Rehg [Cambridge, 1992], esp. chs. 
7 and 8) and that of John Rawls (Political Liberalism [N.Y., 1993], esp. ch. 4; and Justice as 
Fairness: A  Restatement [London, 2001], esp. Pt. I).
®01 For more on the connection between deliberation and democracy see, W. Rehg and J. 
Bohman, ‘Discursive and democracy: The formal and informal bases of legitimacy’, JPP, 4 
(1996), pp. 7 9 -9 9 -
®02 J. Habermas, The Structural Transformation o f the Public Sphere, tr. T. Burger and F. 
Lawrence (Cambridge, Mass., 1989), p. 52.
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acceptance of the enlightened order of human rationality. From the discursive 
perspective, the question we ask ourselves is: Would everyone agree to be 
regulated by my maxim? Habermas and others, therefore, propose to replace 
the monological test of the categorical imperative with a dialogical test. At 
present a number of designs are a v a i l a b l e , 903 but I wish to write about them in 
general terms, though also with some particular references.904 In one way or 
another, each of the theories must deal with the main causes of disagreement 
(particular interests, relationships, and values) and of false or inauthentic 
agreement (inequality and misinformation). Since all these causes inevitably 
pervade the real world, moral and political philosophers, whilst trying to 
ensure the rationality of public judgement, are driven to design an ideal 
conversational setting and then an ideal speaker and/or an ideal set of speech 
acts. 905 But as seen earlier what they fail to acknowledge is that the substance 
of eveiyday experience invariably refers to a Tiere and now*; general 
theoretical abstractions, by contrast, profess to apply always and everywhere 
and, consequently, hold good no wher e-in-particular .^ °6 ‘What the historical 
record strongly suggests’, as Skinner eloquently concludes, ‘is that no one is 
above the battle, because the battle is all there is’.90? It is also important to bear 
in mind that the heart of moral experience does not lie in a command of 
general rules and theoretical principles, no matter how well reasoned those 
principles may seem, but ‘in the wisdom that comes from seeing how the ideas 
behind those rules work out in the course of people’s lives[;] ... in ... seeing ...
9°3 For more information see, S. Benhabib, Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic 
Legitimacy’, in Democracy and Difference, ed. S. Benhabib (Princeton, 1996), pp. 67-94; J. 
Cohen, ‘Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy’, in The Good Polity, ed. A. Hamlin and P. 
Pettit (Oxford, 1989), pp. 17-34; id- ‘Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy’, in 
Democracy and Difference, pp. 95-119; A. Gutmann and D. Thompson, Democracy and 
Disagreement (Cambridge, Mass., 1996); J. Dryzek, Discursive Democracy (Cambridge, 1990); 
Cass Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (Cambridge, Mass., 1993), p. 133-45; Jean L. Cohen 
and A. Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory (Cambridge, Mass., 1992); and J. Fishkin, 
Democracy and Deliberation (New Haven, CT, 1991). Also see, Jon Elster (ed.), Deliberative 
Democracy (Cambridge, 1998); J. Bohman and W. Rehg (eds.), Deliberative Democracy 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1997); S. Chambers, Reasonable Democracy (Ithaca, N.Y., 1996); and J. 
Bohman, Public Deliberation (Cambridge, Mass., 1996).
9041 acknowledge in advance that the particular references will not do justice to the complexity 
and sophistication of the theories involved.
905 For a sketch of these procedural idealisations see, Robert Alexy, ‘A Theory of Practical 
Discourse’, in The Communicative Ethics Controversy, ed. S. Benhabib and F. Dallmayr 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1990).
906 Thomas Nagel cited in Toulmin, Return to Reason, pp. 15-6.
907 Q. Skinner, Visions o f Politics, Vol. I: Regarding Method (Cambridge, 2002), p. 7
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what is involved in insisting on (or waiving) this or that rule in one or another 
set of circumstances’.*58 Put differently, our hope for certainty and clarity in 
theory needs to be balanced with the impossibility of avoiding uncertainty and 
ambiguity in practice. In any event, as long as philosophy is inclined to hold 
out at least the prospect of eternal truths and definitive certainties, then 
consensus as the ideal of rhetoric, and agreement subject to later revocation as 
the result attained by persuasion, had to seem contemptible to it. Once this 
prospect is abandoned, we recognise that in reasoning about the practical 
activities of life, it is often more rational to proceed rhetorically, aiming at an 
actual consensus -  and thus to accept something on insufficient grounds -  
than to insist on a procedure modelled after science. Put differently, we must 
set aside permanent validity as illusory, and we must connect our notion of 
rationality to specific functions of human reason. Such scepticism towards the 
claim that rationality has a permanent validity is commonplace among 
students of rhetoric and history, and must now be embraced by philosophers.
II
For theorists of deliberative democracy conversation is a public form of 
speech, i.e. suited to the political arena. But before the modem era deliberative 
rhetoric was seen as the most suitable genre for the political realm, because 
the uneducated mass of the people was integral to it. So why did previous ages 
regard deliberative rhetoric, and not conversation, as the most appropriate 
genre for political debate? To begin with, thinkers understood that political 
speech is public and directed primarily towards popular audiences, who, as 
Quintilian put it, ‘if not thoroughly ill-educated, are certainly ignorant of such 
arts as dialectic’. It follows that ‘unless we force, and occasionally throw them 
off their balance by an appeal to their emotions, we shall be unable to 
vindicate the claims of truth and justice’.** Cicero tells us that, ‘when the 
matter under consideration is ... important’, then copia or the ‘non-rational’ 
use of stylistic abundance, ‘is necessary either to win the Senate to a wise
908 A. Jonsen and S. Toulmin, The Abuse o f Casuistry: A  History o f Moral Reasoning 
(Berkeley, Ca., 1988), p. 314.
909 Quintilian, Institutio oratoria, tr. H. E. Butler, 4 vols. (London, 1963), 5.14.29.
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policy or to furnish it with information’.*10 ‘[M]en’s judgments’, as he explains 
in De oratore, ‘are more often formed under the influence of hatred, love, 
desire, anger, grief, joy, hope, fear, misconception or some other emotion, 
than by truth or ordinance, the principles of justice, the procedure of the 
courts or the laws’.*11 Public discourse, therefore, entails significant appeal to 
emotions.*12 Reason alone, for them, is insufficient in a large group, regardless 
of its social or class composition. Conversation, on the other hand, because 
conducted among a smaller group, can rely almost entirely on rational 
argument.
Another reason why the ancients saw oratory, not conversation, as 
appropriate for political debate is that oratory, like politics, is aimed at action 
in a way that conversation is not. Political oratory is highly structured, while 
conversations are less formal and need not to conclude in agreement. It is 
important to note that, for Cicero, this preoccupation with action does not 
diminish rhetoric’s standing vis-a-vis philosophy. ‘Service is better than mere 
theoretical knowledge’, he says in De officiis, because ‘the study and 
knowledge of the universe would somehow be lame and defective, were no 
practical results to follow’.*^  And in De Re Publica Cicero tells us that the 
political life is superior to the contemplative, ‘[f]or there is no principle 
enunciated by the philosophers -  at least none that is honourable -  that has 
not been discovered and established by those who have drawn up codes of law 
for States’.*1* In fact, while Aristotle and Plato eschew the statesmen’s morally 
ambiguous methods, he maintains that statesmen, because they lead people to 
act, bring about greater good than philosophers.*^
In addition, for the ancients, conversation may further philosophical truth 
better than oratory, but its egalitarianism, tranquillity, and rationality tend to
*10 Cicero, De legibus, ed. J.G.F. Powell (Oxford, 2006), 3.18.40
*u Id., De oratore, tr. E. W. Sutton and H. Rackham, 2 vols. (London, 1959), 2.178; cf. Brutus, 
89, 279; Orator, 128 (both works in Brutus and Orator, tr. G. L. Hendrickson and H. M. 
Hubbel [Cambridge, Mass., 1952]).
*12 De or., 1.3.12.
*•3 Id., De officiis, ed. and tr. by W. Miller (London, 1913), 1.43.153. Plato seems to voice a 
similar view in the Gorgias, when Gorgias answers Socrates with the following objection: ‘of 
what use is all the physician’s knowledge if the patient does not pluck up courage to do what 
the physician has prescribed?’ So one does need rhetoric to convince him.
91* Cicero, De Re Publica, ed. J. G. F. Powell (Oxford, 2006), 1.2.2; cf. Aristotle, Politics, ed. S. 
Everson (Cambridge, 1996), 1325^4.
*« De off., 1.21.70.
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hinder the emergence of an exceptional person from the group.’16 Politics, for 
Cicero, clearly required such an outstanding leader. In De Re Publica, he 
describes the ‘ideal statesman’ as a man of ‘ability, virtue, and dedication like 
the ancestral heroes, who should dominate the senate and magistracy of the 
ideal mixed state in order that it may function properly’.’1? But as Cicero makes 
abundantly clear in De oratore, it is eloquence, above all other skills, that 
allows the leader to attain greatness:
There is to my mind no more excellent thing than the power, by means of 
oratoiy, to get a hold on assemblies of men. ... For what is so marvellous as 
that, out of the innumerable company of mankind, a single being should arise, 
who either alone or with a few others can make effective a faculty bestowed by 
nature upon every man?’’18
The ideal statesman and the ideal orator, as seen in chapter 3, are the same.
The above explains why the ancients were convinced that deliberative 
rhetoric was more suited for political debate. Those who, like today’s 
deliberative democrats, would condemn the orator for arousing the emotions 
of his audience, should bear in mind that the essence of human beings is 
determined both by logical and emotional elements, and thus must be 
addressed as such. Put differently, speech can persuade the human being only 
if it appeals to both these aspects.’1’ In fact, even if we argue that decisions 
should be arrived at rationally, the impetus to act on a decision usually 
involves pathos. Cicero attributes a pivotal role to the emotions in civil 
rhetoric because of this and the fact that political deliberation must conclude
’l6 Although for Cicero those engaged in philosophically supported oratory or in status group 
conversation are already quite extraordinary. See Cicero, De Re Publica, esp. the Somnium 
Scipionis. The conversation of Scipio and his Mends is an illustration of the ideal behaviour of 
Roman senators. The purpose of the Somnium  is to show that public service is a divinely 
sanctioned and divinely rewarded activity.
’•? N. Wood, Cicero’s Social and Political Thought (Berkeley, 1988), p. 178.
’l8 De or., 1.8-30-31.
’■’ It is important to note that some important contemporary philosophers, mostly women, 
such as Amelie Oksenberg Rorty and Martha C. Nussbaum have argued that moral debates 
cannot be solved by ‘rational proof alone, but must be resolved through some mixture of 
reason and emotions. Rorty contends that the emotions involve evaluation and appraisal and 
are not, as such, either rational or irrational (see A. O. Rorty, ‘Varieties of Emotion’, SSI, 24 
[1985], pp. 343-53). Similarly, Nussbaum maintains that the emotions can be rational or 
irrational and that they are appropriate in deliberation -  in fact, we would not be better off if 
decisions were made by calculating intellects lacking empathy. After all, intellect without 
emotions ‘lacks the sense of the meaning and worth of persons’ needed to deliberate about less- 
visible human concerns, like far-off famines, homelessness, and safety standards (M. 
Nussbaum, ‘Emotions and Women’s Capabilities’, in Women, Culture, and Development, ed. 
M. Nussbaum and J. Glover [Oxford, 1995], pp. 360-95, at pp. 381-82).
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in action. Advocates of deliberative democracy, on the other hand, overlook 
the link between emotions and action, and as a result they play down the role 
of action. For them political debate is about discussion, but this debate need 
not culminate in activity. Simone Chambers, for example, contrasts her 
(Habermasian) methodology, where ‘participants are interested in bringing 
about a “change of heart,” in which communicative actors are primarily 
interested in mutual understanding as opposed to external behaviour’, with 
that of ‘strategic action’, where ‘participants are primarily interested in 
bringing about a desired behavioural response’.?20 But while the goal of 
‘mutual understanding’ is perfectly legitimate and even admirable, surely the 
lack of action in a political context, may potentially have serious 
consequences? A discussion about racism, for instance, can culminate with a 
‘change of heart’ for some participants, but unless we attempt to translate 
those ideas into action, ‘external’ racism will remain unaffected.
For deliberative democrats rational argument, which excludes any type 
emotional appeals, is the sole legitimate mode of persuasion in collective 
deliberation. Because only the ‘force of the better argument’ should persuade 
participants, conditions must be set whereby ‘only rational, that is, 
argumentative convincing is allowed to take place’.’21 Non-rational persuasion, 
by contrast, becomes likened to coercion. ‘Force’, Chambers says, ‘does not 
always come in the form of a state with a big stick. It can also come in the form 
of deception, psychological pressure, subtle forms of domination, and 
emotional manipulation’.’22 Coercion is not limited to ‘threats and bribes’, but 
includes ‘rhetorical manipulation’, which consists chiefly of appeals to the 
passions.? 2 3 Since deliberative democrats disagree with introducing passions 
into political discussion, they either ignore or oppose rhetoric.?2** For them 
rhetoric manipulates people into a consensus that is not rationally based and
’20 Chambers, Reasonable Democracy, p. 99.
921 Ibid.; cf. Benhabib, Toward a Deliberative Model’, p. 69.
922 Chambers, Reasonable democracy, p. 151.
’23 Ibid., p. 187, n. 30.
929 It is worth noting, however, that Benhabib does criticise Rawls for eliminating ‘all 
contestatory, rhetorical, affective, impassioned elements of political discourse, with all their 
excesses and virtues’ (Toward a Deliberative Model’, p. 76). But she does not explain how 
rhetoric fits in her own model of discourse. Bohman also acknowledges the need for rhetoric in 
public deliberation (Public deliberation, p. 7).
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is, therefore, illegitimate. From this point of view, rhetoric limits, rather than 
enhances, social justice, because ‘rhetoric moves people and achieves results 
without having to render an account of the bases upon which it induces people 
to engage in certain courses rather than others’.*1* But to portray rhetoric as 
unevenly grounded on emotional appeals is clearly misleading. Classical 
thinkers were concerned with the moral ends of the appeals and often 
ambivalent about moving the passions. For example, in his Rhetoric Aristotle 
initially says that ‘the arousing of prejudice, pity, anger and similar emotions 
has nothing to do with the essential facts’. But he later asserts that, given 
Athens’ large juries and assemblies, the orator must appeal to emotions.** 
Classical rhetoric, therefore, involved a balancing of rational and emotional 
proofs. The question of when and how to appeal to the emotions can be 
morally troubling, but it cannot be escaped from in the realm of politics. For 
deliberative democrats emotional appeals are coercive. At times this may well 
be true. But is reason itself never coercive? Zeno’s analogy of rhetoric to the 
palm of the hand, and of dialectic to the closed fist, refers to the greater force 
of logical argument.’2? And for many so-called postmodernists, no coercion- 
free zone is possible within discourse. Reason is not neutral -  it is a means of 
control, a form of coercion.’28
Advocates of deliberative democracy require, in addition, that the 
participants in any given conversation be equal. Equality, for them, is essential 
to political discourse. This is, of course, in stark contrast to what happens in 
civil or deliberative rhetoric, where citizens are merely spectators. Joshua 
Cohen, for instance, includes equality (formal as well as substantive) as one of
’«  Benhabib, “Toward a Deliberative Model’, p. 83; cf. Chambers, Reasonable Democracy, p. 
206. Habermas discusses rhetoric as display, but not as a part of deliberation (Structural 
Transformation, p. 8).
’*  Aristotle, On Rhetoric: a Theory o f Civil Discourse, tr. G. A. Kennedy (Oxford, 1991), 1354a 
15-20,1377b 21-25.
’2? Cicero, Definibus, tr. H. Rackham (Cambridge, Mass., 1914), 2.6.17.
** See Danna Villa, ‘Post-modernism and the Public Sphere’, APSR, 86 (September 1992), pp. 
712-21. Chambers acknowledges that not all coercion is the same: ‘One cannot imagine social 
interaction that is completely free from ... coercion [but] we must distinguish between “how 
little and how much” coercion, between situations when public understanding is shaped by 
strong (implied or explicit) threats, such as ostracism, anonymous denunciations, public 
reprimands, even burning at the stake ... [and] situations where individuals do not live under 
these threats’ (Reasonable Democracy, pp. 230,234; cf. pp. 5-6, 232).
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the four prerequisites for deliberative decision-making.^ Equality also 
dominates Bohman’s list of the *basic normative requirements and constraints 
on d e l i b e r a t i o n ’. ^  And for Benhabib, ‘egalitarian reciprocity* is at the very 
core of the theory of deliberative democracy; she describes it as the moral 
axiom which maintains that ‘each individual has the same symmetrical rights 
to various speech acts, to initiate new topics, to ask for reflection about the 
presuppositions of the conversations’.**! The idea of equality, therefore, is 
more than a right accorded to all potential participants. As Chambers explains, 
it is a belief that, for deliberative democracy to work, ‘it is essential that as 
many voices as possible are heard in the debate ..., that a high level of 
participation is m a i n t a i n e d ’. ^  Procedural democracy is difficult to object to in 
principle because its tenets rest on a commitment to a reasonable equity 
principle: The legitimacy of a decision is a function of the fairness of the 
process by which it was reached. Yet, pluralistic politics makes this standard of 
deliberative democracy suspect. It is clear that diversity and interdependence 
among members of civil society pose the challenge of reaching a decision in 
which partners are able to assemble, participate, speak, and publicise freely. 
But deliberative democrats also fail to acknowledge that some persons will 
always be better at political deliberation than others (or, indeed, better placed 
to engage in it). What is more, they demand more than a citizen’s formal right 
to enter public discourse -  they stipulate a substantive right. Put differently, 
instead of equality of opportunity to participate, they demand a de facto 
equality in participation. I fail to understand how we could guarantee such a 
thing. In fact, I even doubt such equality has ever existed. As Chambers 
acknowledges, ‘the major barrier to discursive resolution in liberal 
democracies usually comes in the form of political apathy, not conscious 
s u p p r e s s i o n ’^  Most individuals have little interest in the decisions that affect 
them and are willing to allow others to debate the issues and find solutions. 
However, if we accept Cicero’s assumption of the inherent value of political
929 Cohen, ‘Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy’, pp. 22-3.
93° Bohman, Public Deliberation, p. 16.
931 Benhabib, Toward a Deliberative Model’, p. 78.
932 Chambers, Reasonable democracy, pp. 197-98; cf. Gutmann and Thompson, Democracy 
and Disagreement, p. 37.
933 Chambers, Reasonable democracy, p. 198.
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activity, then the deliberative democrats’ demand for egalitarian political 
deliberation becomes more compelling. As seen earlier, ‘true honour’, for him, 
‘lies in worth, which finds its brightest lustre in serving the state with 
d i s t i n c t i o n ’^  But even though theorists of deliberative democracy distance 
themselves from Cicero’s strong republicanism, they nevertheless adopt a 
weaker version of it. Chambers, for example, argues that
‘advocates of deliberative democracy find republican models of democracy too 
demanding; [republicans] require a level of civic virtue no t likely to  be 
attained in liberal democratic societies, [they] put too much stress on the 
creation of a comm unity tha t acts as one, and ... are no t concerned enough 
with the autonom y of the individual w ithin collective procedures. [But] with 
the exception of the question of autonomy, the difference is really one o f  
degree’.935
Deliberative democrats, therefore, may wish to situate their ideal between the 
individualist liberal model and the communitarian republican model, but in 
the end they come closer to the republican model, because for them political 
activity is the form of communication that best expresses our humanity.
It is clear that the pluralism and complexity of modern society are strong 
prima fa d e  obstacles to deliberative democracy. Pluralism undermines 
deliberation by producing intractable conflicts. Deliberation, it would seem, 
only works for relatively homogeneous groups who share many values and 
beliefs -  and even in those it is not always possible. I said earlier that the 
conversational project presupposes the value of agreement; it also 
presupposes the possibility of agreement. Acquiescence is not enough, rational 
and explicit agreement is required. This, I believe, is a major flaw of all models 
of deliberative democracy. If the precondition for modern democracy is civil 
society, then its associated networks of diverse individuals and groups in 
relationships of mutual dependence will at least occasionally preclude shared 
standards of rationality. The fairness of procedural norms we have inherited 
from antiquity and have thematised as the basis of democracy are not 
particularly accommodating of such pluralism. Liberties such as religious 
liberty, liberty of conscience, liberty of thought and expression, and rights of
’34 Cicero, Adfamiliaries 10.12.5,2.15.3.
’35 Chambers, Reasonable Democracy, p. 184; emphasis added. Deliberative democracy has a 
‘Kantian component [valuing individual autonomy] that is not usually found in republican 
models of democracy’.
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person and personal property can themselves constrain democratic 
procedures. After all, there are distinct, incompatible understandings of value, 
each reasonable, to which people are drawn under favourable conditions for 
the exercise of their practical reason. Even if reasonable citizens holding 
irreconcilable views make good-will gestures so as to live with one another on 
mutually acceptable terms, it does not mean that there will be convergence on 
a single philosophy of life (as the criterion of warranted assent implies). What 
is more, how can it ever be certain that the better argument in any particular 
conversation is the best of all possible arguments? Moreover, acknowledging 
conversation as a legitimate form of political communication should not 
require invalidating another form, such as civil rhetoric. Even though the 
heroic features of the art may not be as important for us as to earlier societies, 
the sustained argument and freedom from interruption that political oratory 
provides is still necessary. ‘As Plato’s dialogues suggest’, and as Michael 
Walzer persuasively put it:
‘the philosopher requires a largely passive interlocutor if he is to  make a 
coherent argum ent. And since coherent argum ents are im portant in 
democracies, too (though Plato did not th ink  so), while democratic 
interlocutors are rarely passive, political debate among citizens cannot always 
take conversational form s’.^6
Despite the wishes of deliberative democrats, the distinction between speaker 
and audience cannot be made to vanish. That speaker and listeners are not 
equal, however, does not exclude listeners from the political process. 
Ultimately, it is the audience, not the speaker, which must deliberate, in the 
literal sense of ‘weighing’ the competing arguments and deciding between 
them. Although such deliberation may not conform to the dictates of ‘rational- 
critical’ discourse, it is participation nevertheless. Rhetorical democracy at its 
best, therefore, does not expect contestants to find one another’s reasons 
acceptable as their own, but it does respond to them as legitimate 
contributions to the deliberative process. We should begin from the premise 
that there are no definitive, metaphysically pure, unassailable arguments that 
can once-and-for-all ground democratic practices in ultimate and final
936 Michael Walzer, ‘A Critique of Philosophical Conversation’, PF, 21 (Fall-Winter 1989-90), 
pp. 182-96, at pp. 189.
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principles, and that any attempt to do so is but a historically-situated act of 
persuasion. On the other hand, this commitment to post-metaphysical and 
pragmatic criticism does not open the door to a naive and thorough-going 
relativism that is unable to cite certain forms of evidence as a part of the 
argument in favour of one form of democracy over another. Even while the 
notion of evidence or data is in itself rhetorically c o n s t r u c t e d , ^  the public 
give-and-take of democratic dialogue nonetheless obliges citizens to attempt to 
support their political claims with sound arguments grounded at least in part 
on lessons learned from a sincere appraisal of the available evidence regarding 
a given topic of debate. Relations that involve conflicts, negotiation, and 
compromise seldom adhere to philosophers’ standards for reaching rationally 
warranted assent. The motivation to engage in deliberation arises from the 
impact of communal conditions on attachments and a perceived need to 
protect or advance them. Political issues and decisions are, as Aristotle 
observed, in the realm of the contingent and consider what is true for the most 
part and, consequently, can only be resolved through the dynamics of rhetoric, 
which are not entirely explicable in rationalistic terms.
937 R. Berkhofer, Beyond the great story: History as text and discourse (Cambridge, Mass., 
1 9 9 5 ).
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